

A New Agenda for Peace: Brazil's comments on the UNSG's initiative

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Brazil appreciates the United Nations Secretary-General's proposal to elaborate, in close consultation with Member States and through an inclusive and transparent process, a new agenda for peace. The elaboration of a new agenda for peace provides Member States with an opportunity to recommit to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, while updating some of our tools and methods to the needs and demands of our time.

The United Nations is a joint endeavor of sovereign States. In order to improve the organization's effectiveness in the maintenance of international peace and security, Member States should spearhead the preparation of a new agenda for peace. Therefore, along the elaboration process, the UN Secretariat should extensively consult Member States and take into account their practical recommendations and main concerns; provide regular briefings to the membership; and proceed with transparency and in good faith towards a final document that brings Members States together around a common diagnosis of the current situation and shared goals to better promote peace.

Regarding its scope, any new agenda for peace has to focus on the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework and provisions of the UN Charter, while bringing it up to speed with the world we live in now. Accordingly, the agenda must tackle current threats to international peace and security as recognized by the Security Council, in order to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". The number of armed conflicts and its dire humanitarian consequences have risen significantly in the last decade. Terrorism also constitutes a major international threat. Against this backdrop, Member States have to critically assess what the United Nations has done to prevent and resolve conflicts, as well as support post-conflict peacebuilding and propose new approaches to promote and sustain peace. Brazil has consistently argued that a shift away from managing crises and towards the prevention of conflicts is the best investment the United Nations can do.

Central to any consideration of peace and security nowadays is the reform of the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for its maintenance according to the UN Charter. The international system is at a critical juncture, facing multifaceted crises, while its central body in the field is unequipped to provide effective solutions. The composition of the Security Council remains the central and most important issue of the reform, while many of its methods of work suffer from a chronic democratic deficit and demand serious improvement. The Security Council cannot and will not be a legitimate and effective body as long as the Global South remains sidelined and whole regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Africa are not represented in the permanent category and are not better represented as elected members as well.

Brazil was disappointed in that the Security Council reform was not mentioned in the preliminary comments concerning a new agenda for peace in the "Our Common Agenda" report. Any agenda for peace that does not include the UN Security Council reform cannot be considered "new", nor a roadmap for the effective maintenance of international peace and security.

Below is a compendium of Brazil's priorities and practical recommendations on the main topics mentioned, inter alia, in paragraphs 88 and 89 of the "Our Common Agenda" report.

REFORMING THE ARCHITECTURE AND THE WORKING METHODS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The current composition of the Security Council reflects the geopolitical situation of 1945, not that of a world that has since seen 142 new countries join the United Nations. Although reform is needed on many fronts, peace and security is a particular area of concern. This is where reform talks are completely stalled, despite the blatant inadequacy of the current structure of the United Nations Security Council. An instrument designed according to the interests of 20th century powers to solve 20th century problems, the Security Council is no longer fit for purpose. It is proving unable to uphold international law and defend the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Above all, it no longer spurs peaceful resolution of conflicts, as well as diplomacy and dialogue.

Moreover, improving the working methods of the Security Council is a necessity for improving the efficiency and the legitimacy of the body. There is a wide-ranging recognition from member states on the need to encourage a more meaningful participation of all Security Council Members, especially elected ones, in the draft of outcome documents of the body.

In light of this context, Brazil understands that the composition of the Security Council remains the central and most important issue of the reform. The Security Council cannot be a legitimate and effective body as long as the Global South remains side-lined and whole regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa are not represented in the permanent category. There is an urgent need to pave the way for the inclusion in the Council of actors capable of taking on major responsibilities in the field of international peace and security, representing all regions of the world.

It is clear that no minor reform of the Security Council would be able to sufficiently address the issues of efficacy, legitimacy and representativeness – a change in its composition is needed. Notwithstanding this fact, much can be done in order to improve the working methods of the Council. In addition to revisiting and rethinking the issue of how pen and co-penholderships are determined and how it shapes the work of the body, Brazil considers it necessary to improve the guidelines on how negotiations should be

facilitated at the Council, in order to make sure that the facilitators provide enough room for all Council members to fully engage, discuss, and contribute to the negotiations of outcome documents.

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

Taking into account the priority given to the Women, Peace and Security agenda, Brazil considers it essential that its objectives and provisions, as established by the relevant Security Council resolutions, be included and strengthened in the New Agenda for Peace.

The implementation of all four pillars of the WPS resolutions - participation and representation, prevention, protection, as well as relief and recovery - should be included in the transversal actions proposed throughout the document.

Brazil finds it disappointing that women – and girls – are the last of the "six core areas" proposed for a new agenda for peace in the "Our Common Agenda" report. This is revealing of the difficulty to overcome the age-old scorn for women's agency in international peace and security. Brazil expects any new agenda for peace to mainstream women's role in international peace and security. In line with the eleven resolutions approved by the Security Council on women and armed conflicts, it should recognize, at the outset, the fundamental role of women in promoting and sustaining peace.'

Therefore, the formula "women and girls" (used in paragraph 89 "g" of the "Our Common Agenda" report) should be avoided. It may give the impression that they are only potential victims of conflicts, knowing that children and teenagers do not play the same role as adults in decision-making. Brazil favors language that promote women as interested parties.

As far as conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding are concerned, a new agenda for peace should emphasize the transformative potential of women's participation as negotiators and mediators, as well as members of parliaments and national justice and security systems. In particular, Brazil expects any new agenda for peace to incorporate the relevance of parity, understood as more than numbers, but as encompassing leadership as well, in line with resolution A/RES/76/269, which established the "International Day of Women in Diplomacy" (24/6).

As a signatory to the Declaration of Shared Commitments on Women, Peace and Security, Brazil also expects any new agenda for peace to promote the contribution of women in all matters under the consideration of the Security Council.

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations must be strengthened in order to avoid duplication of efforts and to improve effectiveness on the ground. We have many successful examples of such partnerships, especially as regards the role of the

African Union (AU) and sub-regional organizations in the search for peace and stability in the African continent.

Brazil strongly advocates for the need to continue improving the collaboration between the UN Secretariat and the AU commission, as well as between the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council. We support the full implementation of inter-organization arrangements, such as the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, which help structure the institutional cooperation.

It is essential to take into consideration regional aspirations and fully incorporate indigenous solutions to identified local challenges. In the case of the African Union, the “Agenda 2063” presents the priorities defined by African countries in order to achieve the goals of a prosperous Africa based on “inclusive growth and sustainable development” and “a peaceful and secure Africa”.

Conflict prevention is a key element for peace. When we are able to prevent and avoid conflict, not only the costs of peace are much lower, but more importantly a lot of human lives and suffering are spared. A significant part of our efforts must therefore be directed at social and economic development, capacity building and strengthening national institutions, so that social and political grievances are not allowed to simmer and turn into conflict. Addressing political and diplomatic efforts to resolving disputes is a major and often overlooked responsibility of the Security Council.

Security and development are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing. In post-conflict situations as well, sustaining peace requires addressing the economic, political and social dimensions of conflict, while the military element ensures adequate response to security challenges on the ground. Brazil commends the essential role played by AU-led peace operations and recognizes the importance of guaranteeing predictable, adequate, sustainable and flexible financing mechanisms to support regional deployment initiatives.

The UN should also strive for enhanced dialogue between the UNSC, the African Union and the Peacebuilding Commission. The latter is uniquely placed as an enabler to mobilize international attention and to support regionally and nationally-defined peacebuilding priorities, both in terms of financing and expertise. Technical cooperation, notably South-South cooperation, plays an important role in capacity building. The PBC’s accumulated experience in promoting national ownership, inclusivity and institution-building should be taken full advantage of.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY

The Secretary General’s “Our Common Agenda” report refers in several occasions to a supposed nexus between climate change and security. However, there is no scientific evidence in support of such assertion. On the contrary, the general findings of the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC regarding impacts and vulnerabilities associated with climate change, clearly states that “non-climatic factors are the dominant drivers of

existing intrastate violent conflicts”. It also affirms that “compared to other socioeconomic factors the influence of climate on conflict is assessed as relatively weak”.

Conflicts have multiple factors and are context-specific. Establishing a direct link between climate change and security does not only run contrary to scientific evidence but it is also counterproductive, as it does not take into account the real root causes of conflict and the singularity of each conflict. A new agenda for peace should envisage consideration of possible effects of climate change in other existing vulnerabilities and on a case-by-case basis, always based on the best available science at a given moment.

Brazil reiterates the centrality of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement, which are the competent fora for addressing climate change. The UNFCCC alone has the legitimacy, the mandate and sufficient representation to address the issue. The challenge posed by climate change affects the fate of all of us, 193 countries, particularly in the Global South. Anything relating to an issue of such importance and extent must not be left to be discussed by only 15 member states, who do not even have the mandate for it.

Any consideration about this common challenge must be addressed by a representative body, with the mandate and legitimacy to do so, and in accordance with the principles agreed within the UNFCCC, particularly the “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” of States, and their obligations.

A new agenda for peace should reaffirm the primacy of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement in addressing the global challenge of climate change. It should recall the obligations of the parties and their commitments within the UNFCCC.

Any reference to potential impacts of climate change on stabilities and vulnerabilities should reflect the best science available and should take into account the specificity of each conflict.

A new agenda for peace should refer to the potential impacts of conflicts on the environment, considering the environmental costs of armed conflicts, such as land degradation due to shelling or landmines, mass movement of refugees and the like.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The international community must take action in bridging gaps and finding consensus to ensure strictly depoliticized and effective delivery of humanitarian aid, in full compliance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. It is essential to consolidate the coordinating role of the United Nations through consensual, permanent and representative mechanisms that can anticipate difficulties, mainly with the technical support from humanitarian actors on the field.

The current trend of concentrating humanitarian discussions in informal “ad hoc” mechanisms, in which the priorities of donor countries outweigh those of other actors, demonstrates a tendency of increasing polarization concerning today’s main humanitarian crises, including within the UN Security Council. Politicized decision-making processes

have a negative impact on the operational level, making humanitarian assistance on the ground even more complex, more expensive and more dangerous.

To ensure efficient and accountable provision of assistance to victims of crises, armed conflicts and disasters, future generations must be fully equipped with economic tools that allow adequate funding, planning and solidarity in the provision of humanitarian assistance and essential services. To that end, Brazil advocates that international humanitarian assistance policies must respect the principles of sovereignty, consent and national priorities, as well as seek convergence between emergency needs and the promotion of resilience and sustainable development, based on the values of inclusion, pluralism and full respect for human rights.

It is further necessary to find effective and predictable responses to the humanitarian needs of migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, displaced persons and stateless persons, as well as promote durable solutions – which include sustainable reintegration, local integration and relocation/resettlement. Effective solutions must comprise strong partnerships and very close coordination with the UNHCR, IOM, civil society, local authorities, and the private sector, according to the principle of shared responsibilities.

DISARMAMENT

The multilateral disarmament regime finds itself in a decisive moment in its history. The current scenario is one of disarray, with the collapse of the architecture of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements inherited from the throes of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. The lack of common ground among nuclear powers has disrupted even further the fragile equilibrium that underpins the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. As a result, all disarmament fora, even those of a rather technical profile, are contaminated by pervasive mistrust and politicization, rendering consensus increasingly difficult to attain.

In 2022, the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, followed by concrete nuclear threats, has only exacerbated the deficiencies of the system. The frailty of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its intrinsically unbalanced nature was once again exposed by the failure of its X Review Conference in adopting a final consensual document, last August. After two failed review conferences, the foundations that underpin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have been weakened. The balance in the bargain between disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives needs to be reestablished. The New Agenda for Peace should recognize such imbalance and promote a return to balance.

This counterproductive dynamic resonates in other disarmament fora, where the culture of consensus is seriously damaged, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, consensus has become utterly exceptional, with the vast majority of the resolutions adopted by vote. The Conference on Disarmament, a central piece of the disarmament machinery, has been paralyzed for decades.

With that in mind, the new agenda for peace should seek to chart a path of renewed convergence among nuclear-armed States, which bear greater responsibility for the current instability, while putting broader security interests of the international community at the center of the debate. The risks we now face are no longer manageable effectively through existing mechanisms. The time has come for a new framework for the reform of the disarmament regime and the multilateral machinery that underpins it.

These efforts must be realistic, but at the same time guided by a moral imperative. All three regimes related to weapons of mass destruction are rooted on the notion that the use of these weapons in conflict is unacceptable. Regarding nuclear weapons, the wide majority of Member States support an approach of outright prohibition, as demonstrated by the wide and growing support enjoyed by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). However, this approach does not exclude efforts within other regimes, such as the NPT, towards highlighting the threat to humanity represented by nuclear weapons, thereby eroding misguided notions that attribute to such weapons an essential role for the maintenance of international security.

Brazil has consistently affirmed that the current challenging security environment cannot be used as a justification for indefinite paralysis. On the contrary, the risks demand an active and propositional stance, especially by non-nuclear weapon States, which have a marked interest in the maintenance and further development of a multilateral regime that ensures their own security.

In light of that consideration, Brazil advocates that a new agenda for peace should include a call for the preservation and reinforcement of the moral barrier against the use of any weapons of mass destruction, taking into account the recent erosion of the taboo regarding the use of chemical weapons. The deepening of such erosion or its spread into the domains of nuclear and biological weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. The New Agenda for Peace should reaffirm the crucial role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (BWC), and the 1540 Committee of the Security Council. Special emphasis should be given to the need to strengthen the BWC, which so far does not have an effective monitoring mechanism.

In addition, it should call for an overhaul of the disarmament machinery in terms of both its mandate and methods of work, in particular with regard to the role of the Conference on Disarmament and its rules of procedure. One particularly promising means to that end would be to convene the long-overdue Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-IV). The UN Secretariat should foster the continuing discussion on this intergovernmental process, especially with the aim of defining the terms of reference and mandate of an eventual Preparatory Committee. The annual resolution presented by the Non-Aligned Movement on the subject is proof of the broad support that the initiative has among Member States. Although the intergovernmental nature of the process must be preserved, the inclusion of the item in the New Agenda for Peace can give renewed impetus to the initiative, speeding up the definition of its terms of reference and the convening of a

Preparatory Committee. The Disarmament Machinery review process should pay special attention to the role of the Conference on Disarmament and its rules of procedure.

NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament is the only way to ensure the long-term sustainability of non-proliferation. For as long as weapons of mass destruction remain in existence, their use as an instrument of coercion will represent a powerful incentive to proliferate. In this sense, modernization and expansion of existing nuclear arsenals as well as the strengthened role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines send a nefarious message to the rest of the world – one that reaffirms the dependency on these weapons to ensure their own security, while undermining the national security of the rest of the world. This trend must be urgently reverted.

In that sense, the elaboration of a new agenda for peace provides Member States with an opportunity to reflect upon the need to revert proliferation incentives and to protect existing organizations and mechanisms established to ensure non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

A new agenda for peace should promote further discussions on the intrinsic relation between disarmament and non-proliferation, bringing back to the forefront the need to fulfill the “grand bargain” of the NPT between the disarmament and non-proliferation pillars. Furthermore, it should highlight the illegitimacy of undue restrictions to peaceful purposes based on unjustified or unfounded non-proliferation concerns.

A new agenda for peace should also call on States to support the technical mandates of multilateral organizations and mechanisms, ensuring that these bodies will be able to discharge the obligations set by their legal mandates. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention, a new agenda for peace should include a direct call for the strengthening of the convention particularly in light of lessons drawn from the COVID pandemic.

CYBERSECURITY

While the process of digital transformation has allowed unimaginable levels of interconnectivity between people, it has also generated new vulnerabilities, often of a transnational nature. Cyber security is therefore a key enabler of the continuity and sustainability of the social and economic development brought about by the digital transformation.

As an area of global reach and concern, with potential to complicate geopolitical competition and friction, cyber challenges demands that further international understandings about the digital vulnerabilities be addressed through inclusive multilateral processes that generate ample support from the States. This is a recent and constantly evolving agenda, and it is still unclear whether international cybersecurity governance will be institutionalized through binding instruments or will remain based on

current voluntary and non-binding standards of responsible behaviour of States in the use of information and communication technologies in the context of international security.

In any scenario, however, the emerging regime must meet the goal of guaranteeing an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyber space, as well as ensuring broad participation of developing countries in its development.

Brazil has clear priorities regarding the progress of understanding about cybersecurity at the international level, including the dissemination of best practices on preventing and mitigating threats; the promotion of cybersecurity as an enabler for the process of reducing the digital gap, allowing digital inclusion to be a driving mechanism for economic and social development; and the support for the uses of information and communication technologies taking into account the application of international law, including human rights, international humanitarian law and data protection. Brazil understands that international law is applicable to the behaviour of States in cyberspace. The question is not "if", but rather how to translate it to the specific characteristics of this environment. International Humanitarian Law, specifically, is applicable in conflict situations regardless of the technology being used.

Brazil strongly supports the ongoing process of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) in its goal of producing a consensus report by 2025 with concrete advances on the voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour on the uses of information and communication technologies, including on how international law applies in the cyber space. Brazil hopes that cybersecurity discussions in the General Assembly will be held under a single track with broad support from states, including regarding the future of the debate from 2025 onwards. The process should consist of a truly multilateral process, providing authentic ownership of countries, particularly developing countries, over the norms, which would in turn ensure greater support and adherence in their implementation.

COUNTER-TERRORISM

Brazil repudiates terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, as enshrined in its Constitution. The United Nations has a central role to play in enhancing cooperation to combat terrorist threats and the adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism must remain a priority.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy remains the most comprehensive guidance for the international community in its fight against terrorism as it emanates from the most representative body of the UN, the General Assembly.

All counter-terrorism actions must be consistent with international law, including the UN Charter, international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law. Focusing solely on military solutions has proven ineffective in the long run, and a more comprehensive approach is necessary. The rule of law and effective criminal justice systems are key to counter-terrorism efforts and must be strengthened.

Enhancing international cooperation, in particular the exchange of information and intelligence for investigating terrorist threats, is also essential in that regard, as continuous capacity building to prevent the financing of terrorist activities. Special attention must be paid to the misuse of information and communication technologies for terrorist purposes, preventing cyberspace from becoming a locus for radicalization and recruitment, as well as money laundering and financing of terrorism.

It is also imperative that the fight against terrorism gives greater attention to prevention, including the consideration of its root causes. Recruitment is often linked to lack of economic opportunities, inequality and exclusion. Promoting sustainable development on an equitable basis, as well as the rule of law and access to justice are important elements of any terrorism prevention strategy. It is also essential, in this regard, to work towards the elimination of discrimination and stigmatization based on nationality, religion, gender or ethnicity. The persistence of protracted conflicts and regional tensions contributes to creating fertile ground for terrorism.

The possible linkages between terrorism and transnational organized crime vary considerably, depending on the geographic, social and political context. There are no automatic linkages between these two distinct phenomena. Accordingly, they demand different remedies and must be addressed at their respective fora.

INVESTING IN PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING

Preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding are crucial tools to prevent crises from escalating into conflicts. Once tension escalates to armed conflict, it creates a vicious cycle that is hard to break. When violence becomes the preferred answer, respect for law and institutions becomes elusive. When lawlessness is the rule, it creates a breeding ground for serious human rights violations, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

Prevention requires keeping an open door to dialogue between all parties and tackling the root causes of conflict, especially those of a socioeconomic nature. Purely military or security strategies will not be able to adequately prevent conflicts. As the Security Council starts considering a broader set of issues in order to better fulfill its mandate, it also becomes imperative to enhance its cooperation with other UN bodies responsible for development-related issues, establishing more clear guidelines and follow-up opportunities. The purposes of the UN Charter are better achieved through an increased coordination, cooperation and interaction among the principal organs of the United Nations, as well as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Their roles should be seen as mutually supportive, in accordance with their respective mandates enshrined in the Charter.

The PBC is uniquely positioned to bridge discussions across the different UN pillars. To strengthen the effectiveness and coherence of UN peacebuilding efforts, the PBC should continue to enhance its advisory capacities. In particular, the PBC can provide important inputs to the Security Council in discussions of renewal of mandates and drawdowns of

peacekeeping operations and special political missions. PBC representatives could also be invited to field visits of the members of the Security Council and to periodic briefings to its subsidiary bodies.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AS A KEY TOOL IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Conflicts are growing ever more complex and peacekeepers nowadays need to operate in ever more volatile security environments. Moreover, they are tasked with increasingly demanding mandates.

In this context, strategic communications have an enabler and multiplier effect across all areas of peacekeeping operations. They are critical to securing the political and public support that peacekeeping missions need to implement effectively their mandates. They are essential to the protection of civilians and to the advancement of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. They are a tool to draw attention and collect feedback from local communities.

They also help promoting respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; combating misinformation, xenophobia, racism and discrimination; and preventing and fighting sexual and gender-based violence. Ultimately, they help create a safe environment to peacekeepers.

For these reasons, a New Agenda for Peace would benefit from highlighting strategic communications as a pivotal element for UN peacekeeping. It should set out the need for a clear strategy on communications in peacekeeping operations, to be implemented at all levels and across all components of peacekeeping operations.

It could also highlight the need for improved capabilities in both UN Headquarters and the missions' communication capabilities. Strategic Communications and Public Information teams in missions can be strengthened, through better recruitment and the allocation of adequate resources. Relevant new technologies should be used to their full potential.

The New Agenda for Peace should further ascertain the need for adequate training. Effective strategic communications rely heavily on training all peacekeepers across components. Pre-deployment training on strategic communications for all civilian, military and police officers would have a significant impact on engagement with local stakeholders.

Finally, the NAP should give impetus to institutionalize a culture of strategic communications across components in peacekeeping operations, whereby strategic communications would be integrated into planning, decision-making and implementation of daily activities.

STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE PEACEBUILDING COMISSION

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is well suited to work as a platform to promote greater coordination among relevant partners of a particular country at risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict. Additionally, it can mobilize regional organizations and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and foster South-South and triangular cooperation arrangements in support of national peacebuilding initiatives. The Commission can also support the implementation of peacebuilding activities by peacekeeping operations and help mobilize political support to promote reconciliation, the Women Peace and Security agenda, institution building and other nationally defined peacebuilding priorities. However, there is more the PBC could do, particularly vis-à-vis its bridging and advisory roles.

Established in 2005, the Commission is considered a "teenager" among UN bodies. The relations of the Commission with ECOSOC, the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the coordination between the PBC and those bodies, remain yet to be fully explored. This matter has a priority status for most of the PBC members, and this is the reason why the relationship of the PBC with other bodies was included in its 2022 programme of work.

There is a need to turn these relations into a more meaningful collaboration among those bodies, which can be achieved through tools and methods such as:

- (i) consultations on issues relating to peacebuilding and sustaining peace ahead of the formation, review, drawdown and transition of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, with a clear timeline for that;
- (ii) regular submission of written advice by the Peacebuilding Commission on common agenda topics;
- (iii) submission of advice on how peacebuilding planning and strategies could concretely address the needs of children affected by conflict, especially in areas that require long-term commitments, like the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups;
- (iv) further alignment of the PBC work programme and those of the main UN bodies;
- (v) greater interaction between the Commission and those coordinating the drafting of resolutions (Council penholders, UNGA facilitators. e.g.); and
- (vi) enhancing working methods (esp. UNSC's) regarding the interaction with the PBC.

Additionally, another important step forward would be to work further on the perception of the broader UN membership in relation to the tools employed to meet demands in conflict-affected settings, as some countries may still hesitate to seek the PBC's support due to a lack of understanding of the Commission's role. In that regard, it is suggested that the Work Programme of the Commission include events planned to that end, such as seminars wherein PBC/PBF supported countries could share positive experiences with new potential partners.

SANCTIONS, HUMANITARIAN EXEMPTIONS AND DUE PROCESS IN LISTING ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS

Since 1966, the Security Council has established 30 sanctions regimes. There were many lessons learnt in this period. Although sanctions are an important tool for the maintenance of international peace and security, they may have unintended adverse consequences. If inadequately designed, they may stoke tensions rather than defuse them. Ill-devised sanctions can disproportionately affect vulnerable populations, worsen food insecurity and raise inflation. Contrary to their goals, they can spare those they were originally targeted against while unintentionally punishing those who should be protected: innocent civilians, women and children in the throes of conflict. They may also hinder neutral, impartial, independent and humane humanitarian assistance. If they are imposed without proper regard to due process standards, they may violate human rights and miss their targets.

A New Agenda for Peace would benefit from a more judicious use by the Security Council of its coercive power in addressing threats to international peace and security. UN Security Council Resolution 2664 (2022) is a considerable step in this direction, by having introduced an exemption on asset freezes for humanitarian providers across all UN sanctions regimes. This substantial improvement must have a permanent character. It is also necessary to build upon it to avoid the criminalization of any impartial humanitarian activities. The fight against threats to international peace and security will be self-defeating if it prevents the protection of civilians and is not compliant with international law, including the UN Charter, international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law. The Council should also make preliminary assessments of potential negative effects of sanctions before deciding to apply them.

A New Agenda for Peace would also gain from a more transparent, evidence-based and balanced listing process of designated entities and individuals. Sanctions should be imposed on grounds of solid evidence. Furthermore, any listed entities and individuals should have the right to request a review of their designation by an independent and impartial body. In this sense, it is of utmost importance to extend the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson established by Security Council resolution 1904 (2009) to all UN sanctions regimes. The Security Council may be undermined in its credibility and ability to take action if sanctions are not fair and are perceived not as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security but as a political expedient tainted by double standards. Due process is key for well-functioning sanctions regimes.