2017–2018

Evaluative Exercises

A SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS
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ACRONYMS

DFS  Department of Field Support
DPA  Department of Political Affairs
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO  Department of Peace Operations
DPPA Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
EOSG Executive Office of the Secretary-General
HQ   Headquarters
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
NGO  Non-governmental organization
PBC  Peacebuilding Commission
PBF  Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office
PDAs Peace and Development Advisors
RCs  Resident Coordinators
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SPMs Special Political Missions
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN   United Nations
UNCTs UN Country Teams
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNEG UN Evaluation Group
WPS  Women, Peace and Security
INTRODUCTION

This summary report of evaluative exercises comes as the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) became the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), following the reform of the United Nations the peace and security pillar.

Over the years, the Department has made steady progress in establishing structures, policy, budget and processes for the evaluation function. The Department graduated from observer status to full membership of the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) in 2018. This important development recognizes the Department’s commitment to learning and accountability through evaluation.

As a learning organization, the Department commissioned several evaluative exercises—lessons learned studies and evaluations—in 2017 and 2018. This summary report, the first of its kind, provides an overview of the variety of evaluative exercises undertaken by the Department during this period.

In the spirit of transparency, the Department has decided to systematically disseminate summaries of all its self-evaluations and lessons learned studies, if sharing of full reports is not feasible. This new disclosure practice is applicable retroactively from January 2017 and is aimed at supporting both accountability and learning objectives.
Since 2004, the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) have collaborated in conflict prevention through the Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention (Joint Programme). The most visible output of the Joint Programme is the deployment of Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs). Recognizing the potential of the Joint Programme, the DPA Learning and Evaluation Board mandated a study to take stock of the work of PDAs in building national capacities for conflict prevention with a view to strengthen DPA support to the Joint Programme.
KEY FINDINGS

1. PDAs make strategic use of operating environments to create entry points for engagement. Key to creating entry points is to identify areas where PDAs can add value and cultivate relationships within the United Nations (UN) and with national stakeholders. While entry points are critical for a successful PDA engagement, they are just the first step. Long-term accompaniment of capacity building support is also needed. PDA interventions are also shaped by the length of PDA engagement and deployment in a particular country. While there are instances where PDAs benefit from existing entry points created by preceding PDAs, relationships are generally considered difficult to transfer from one PDA to another.

2. The beneficiaries of PDA support are as much national actors as UN Country Teams (UNCTs). The core components of the support PDAs provide to both national stakeholders and to UNCTs include: analysis and assessments; conflict sensitive strategies and programming; and training initiatives. At the national level, PDAs also support a wide range of processes and structures to prevent, resolve and transform conflict. While PDAs engage with an array of national interlocutors, including religious and tribal leaders and non-governmental organization (NGO) peacemakers and mediators, there appears to be a gap in their outreach to women’s groups and networks on issues related to gender/women, peace and security.

3. In many instances, it is challenging to assess the results and contributions of PDA interventions. This is due in part to the inherent challenge of measuring successful conflict prevention. Yet, there is a perception amongst some PDAs that the Joint Programme is structured around the expectation of concrete deliverables in capacity building. Moreover, the relatively short-term deployments of PDAs, typically averaging between two to four years, contrast with the long-term nature of capacity building work.

4. Enhanced and targeted Headquarters (HQ) support is vital. In addition to the external factors noted above, PDAs face challenges internal to the UN system, particularly to the Joint Programme and the unique position of the PDA and related to Headquarters (HQ) support. Despite these challenges, many PDAs have positive views of HQ support for their work. While PDAs, complemented by other UN engagements, contribute to the objective of the partnership, in many instances, the PDA function is heavily focused on analysis, coordination support and programme design. This recognition should prompt reflection on: a) the utility and direction of guidance and support provided by the Joint Programme and; b) how it can better enable PDAs to prioritize the building of national capacities in their interventions.
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PDA mandate: DPA Desk Officers should work closely with the Joint Programme to ensure that PDA Terms of Reference and workplans are clearly defined and that DPA, Resident Coordinators (RCs), UNDP and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) have a common understanding of PDA roles and responsibilities. Stock-taking discussions involving DPA, PDAs, RCs, UNDP and PBSO should take place at least annually to ensure the continued alignment of PDA work plans with the expectations of a PDA deployment. These recommendations should be incorporated into the review of the Standard Operating Procedures on Accessing and Requesting Support from the Joint Programme.

2. Technical support: DPA and the Joint Programme should ensure that, through the “core group”, technical support to each PDA is systematic, coordinated, effective and properly resourced to relevant thematic/cross-cutting DPA Divisions/Offices and UNDP Bureaus. The Guidelines for Desk Officers on Engaging in the Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention should be revised to address technical support gaps and disseminated widely. DPA should additionally raise awareness on the roles and responsibilities of DPA Desk Officers backstopping PDAs and of the Joint Programme through periodic meetings across the Department.

3. Financial support: In order to secure sustained financial support for PDA interventions, UNDP and DPA can jointly advise on fundraising methods. A session on funding mechanisms and fundraising techniques should be included in PDA inductions to address challenges raised by PDAs in this area. Working sessions on fundraising and proposal development could also be organized during the global PDA retreat. RCs/UNCTs should also be urged to provide PDAs with access to basic funds for travel, training needs, and/or small programmatic activities.

4. Mentoring support: In consultation with partners and PDAs, the Joint Programme should examine the best way of revising the PDA Advisory Group to provide PDAs with peer to peer mentoring support. Information management platforms should be developed to enhance internal communication and peer learning. The Advisory Group should prioritize and contribute to efforts to address the lack of systematic gender mainstreaming in the implementation of the Joint Programme.

5. Measuring impact: DPA should ensure that the Joint Programme undertakes a follow up evaluation as part of the Joint Programme 2017 midterm review, to assess PDAs’ impact on building national capacities and to make recommendations for the sustainability of the Joint Programme’s work in this area. Notwithstanding such an exercise and given the inherent challenges of capacity building in the short-term deployments of PDAs, DPA should reflect on the potential PDA role in servicing the larger sustaining peace agenda.

November 2017 Lessons Learned Study

Background

OHCHR, DPA and DPKO-DFS jointly conducted this study to identify lessons learned and good practices that can enhance the impact and regularity of public reporting by all peace operations. The study was not an assessment of the work of particular missions.
The value and impact of public human rights reporting: In deeply polarised crisis settings, where impartial and credible information is scarce, United Nations reporting provides a transparent and objective account of human rights violations. Public reporting can broaden political space for government actors that are committed to protecting human rights, particularly if reports also acknowledge the positive contributions of such actors. Furthermore, it provides other states and civil society with a platform to engage authorities in a human rights dialogue. In some instances, public reporting has helped to establish a protection dialogue with non-state armed groups found responsible for violations. It can provide early warning on future crises and atrocities and generate momentum for preventive action.

While there is often concern among political actors that public reporting on human rights in particular may trigger backlash, this study finds that in practice public reporting as such leads to few tangible negative consequences. Missions can effectively contain backlash by taking proactive measures such as building broad stakeholder support in advance of publishing a report, ensuring sustained dialogue with the authorities and giving them a fair chance to comment on draft reports and, in exceptional cases, releasing particularly sensitive reports in the name of the OHCHR only. In some cases, human rights components have also shown self-restraint and not published information in order not to do harm by exposing particular victims or undermining sensitive human rights reforms.

Why some peace operations report more often than others: Political factors may facilitate or complicate reporting to a certain extent. Some governments appreciate the value of impartial United Nations assessments of the human rights situation in helping them promote and achieve reforms. Others view any public scrutiny of their human rights record as a threat. Yet others may not like public reporting but acquiesce to it to placate international allies. Specific demands for reporting from the Security Council, important Member States and the lead Headquarters departments can help soften opposition to public reporting. Internal dynamics of peace operations and the working methods of human rights components are just as important as political factors.

How to maximize the impact of public reporting:

• Move from reports to reporting: Some missions still see public human rights reporting as the release of lengthy reports, issued once or twice a year and geared towards an expert readership. In an increasing number of peace operations, however, a modern paradigm of human rights reporting is taking shape that strategically blends comprehensive thematic reports, frequent periodic updates, flash reports on major incidents, shorter public statements and verified information promptly published through social media.

• Build support through consultation and a follow-up strategy: Consultations with civil
society and local communities on reporting priorities infuse a grassroots perspective, while engagement of political teams in the mission and at Headquarters ensures that reporting takes into account broader political dynamics and sensitivities. Providing the host Government a chance to comment on forthcoming reports is not only a matter of procedural fairness, but is often the first step in sensitising authorities about identified concerns and possible solutions. Parallel to preparing their reports, peace operations need to formulate a strategy on how to systematically follow up on recommendations with the authorities and other stakeholders.

- Strengthen and invest in quantitative reporting: Reports increasingly contain quantitative data, including to compare different actors and document trends over time. However, human rights components need considerable resources, stability in terms of staffing and geographic coverage, and methodological rigour to produce empirically sound figures. Quantitative data can complement, but must not replace solid qualitative analysis of violations and their root causes.

- Enhance remote monitoring and use of modern technology: As missions are deployed to increasingly insecure environments, human rights components use remote monitoring techniques to complement on-site visits and personal interviews with victims and witnesses. However, the potential of other technologies such as satellite and drone imagery, crowdsourcing applications and image authentication still needs to be fully harnessed.

- Invest in the presentation of reports: Due to its length, dense wording and austere layout, the average report is unlikely to attract the attention of decision-makers, journalists or the broader public. Features like direct accounts from victims or audio-visual footage could enhance the emotional appeal of reports, but are rarely provided. In a number of cases, reports and statements are not made available in widely spoken local languages.

- Develop and implement a public communication and dissemination strategy: Reports will usually lead to a sustainable positive impact on the human rights situation only if civil society, international partners, United Nations entities and local communities take note of them and lend strong support to their recommendations. Efforts to enhance the media coverage and dissemination of public reporting outputs have helped in reaching and mobilising target audiences. They need to be further systematised and better resourced.

- Invest in creating national reporting capacity: Human rights components need to invest the resources necessary to build and support national human rights monitoring and reporting capacities so that impartial reporting can continue even after the United Nations is no longer present. In this regard, it is crucial that the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) incorporate adequate human rights capacity to carry on capacity-building support after the mission leaves.

Public reporting and the future of peace operations: This study invites a reflection on how to strengthen the public reporting and advocacy of peace operations generally; not just on human rights. If the size of peace operations and their armed capacity shrinks, missions will have to rely more on public advocacy. Impartial reporting by the United Nations is becoming also increasingly crucial to counter the growing use of strategic disinformation and propaganda by warring parties and their backers. Most importantly, to maintain popular support for peace operations, we must do more to reach beyond United Nations meeting rooms and touch the hearts and minds of a broader international public.
Evaluation of DPA’s Partnership with the UN Peacebuilding Commission, Fund and Support Office

BACKGROUND

This evaluation examined DPA’s partnership with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) using a cross-section of “mini” case studies that reflect the spectrum of DPA’s mandate and partnerships with these entities. Kyrgyzstan (2010-2017) and West Africa and the Sahel (2016-2017) were assessed as examples of partnerships managed by regional political offices. Burundi (2011-17) and Liberia (2016-17) were assessed as examples of partnerships in country-based mission and mission transition settings. Burkina Faso (2016-17) and Sri Lanka (2015-2017) were pilots for new partnerships between DPA and the PBF to sustain peace, which have been guided through DPA headquarters.
Staff of the Kahawatta Pradeshiya Sabha present their ideas on how reconciliation could be promoted within their communities. This programme was one of several supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and conducted through the Office of National Unity and Reconciliation for staff of government offices to increase dialog and reconciliation. PHOTO: UNIC COLOMBO

**KEY FINDINGS**

1. DPA provides responsive and comprehensive support to the PBF to develop priority peacebuilding plans and programmes in integrated peacebuilding missions, and increasingly, in non-mission settings;

2. DPA’s up-front investment in PBF planning has not been sufficiently reinforced through support for PBF monitoring and evaluation and political risk management;

3. DPA has underutilized its partnerships with the PBC, PBF and PBSO for supporting structural prevention;

4. DPA has started to develop good partnership practices for working with the PBF and PBC during UN mission draw-down phases, but there are gaps in sustaining regional support;

5. DPA can do more to empower its desk officers to sustain peace;

6. The overall effectiveness of DPA is constrained by the absence of a common UN conflict prevention approach and coordinated resources in non-mission settings.
The findings highlighted four main gaps in DPA’s partnership with the PBSO, PBC and PBF. First, DPA has not drawn upon or informed the PBSO, PBF and PBC as systematically as it could to advance its structural prevention mandate (that is, to support long-term, inclusive national peace and institutional development processes.) Second, DPA desk officers are not sufficiently empowered to collaborate with the PBC, PBF and PBSO to sustain peace through existing systems, guidance and training. Third, DPA is generally absent from PBF monitoring and evaluation and risk management processes, which means that its initial investment in planning and design enjoys little-to-no systematic and periodic follow-up to guarantee a political pay-off. Fourth, DPA and PBSO’s overall effectiveness in sustaining peace is constrained by the UN’s disjointed and unpredictable staffing and funding streams and mandates. This gap is especially pronounced in non-mission settings.
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Intensify structural prevention efforts through the provision of regular political analysis to the PBC and PBF, including to facilitate country-led dialogues through the PBC on long-term country priorities and needs for sustaining peace through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Framework; and to assist the PBC and PBSO to galvanize system-wide and inter-governmental follow-up to support country-owned and led plans.

2. Execute a plan to empower DPA staff to fulfill their sustaining peace mandate with the PBC and PBSO including: the dissemination with PBSO of a policy and code of conduct covering DPA and PBSO’s partnership activities; and provision with PBSO of a package of training and guidance for all DPA officers on joint working practices to sustain peace covering the principles of PBF programme design, monitoring and evaluation, and risk management.

3. Systematically contribute to PBF monitoring and evaluation and risk management processes. DPA Political Affairs Officers should participate at the key points in the PBF’s evaluation cycle (year one evaluability assessments; mid-term evaluations; year three lessons learned exercises; and year five reviews of PBF eligibility) in order to ensure that corrective actions and lessons are identified that match political realities on the ground.

4. Propose with PBSO and UNDP a menu of options for coordinating and ensuring the availability of expert personnel and funding in regional, mission drawdown and non-mission settings. The formula should take account of the Secretary-General and Member States’ decisions on UN Secretariat and development system structures and identify a menu of flexible working models under the Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention to fill capacity gaps in the field, and proposals to strengthen the predictability and coordination of voluntary and assessed contributions for sustaining peace in non-mission and regional settings.
Evaluation of the UNDP/DPKO-DFS/DPA Project on UN Transitions in Mission Settings

DECEMBER 2017  Evaluation

BACKGROUND

In response to increased requests from UN field presences for transition-related support, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) initiated a joint project in 2014 aimed at ensuring UN transition processes are planned and managed in a proactive, gradual and integrated manner, thereby supporting the sustainability of peacebuilding achievements.

The evaluation examined the project’s work undertaken between 2014 and 2017. It assessed whether key project deliverables were met; how the project infrastructure supported UN transition processes; and the impact of the project on UN transition processes in priority countries, as well as at Headquarters.
1 In its spirit and function, the project is in line with the thinking of the Secretary-General, as well as the recommendations of the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO, 2015) and the Report of The Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of The United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (AGE, 2015), which call for more integrated responses across the political, security and development pillars.

2 There is empirical evidence that technical and operational support to UN transitions in the field is relevant and effective.

3 The project is timely and has helped raise awareness that support to transitions increases the likelihood that they will run more smoothly, experience less resistance and increase sustained support to peacebuilding in country—laying the ground for future sustainable development. In particular its support through Transition Specialists, surge capacity and expert field visits has led to concrete results such as the elaboration of transition plans and other documents that support transitions.

4 At times it has been challenging to find the right capacity to support countries.
and to deploy TS in a timely manner, but the project team managed to find alternatives to ensure that support to transition planning does not slow down.

5 Through its different activities, the project has contributed to raising awareness and facilitating discussions on the need to start planning for transitions at an early stage and respond to or anticipate Security Council resolutions.

6 The organization-wide UN policy on transitions (2013) and the UNDP guidance on transitions (2014) are relevant but need to be updated to reflect results from this project.

7 The project suffers from insufficient visibility within the three entities at Headquarters, including their leadership and the UN at large, including the Member States. The effectiveness of its information sharing with Member States needs to be improved.

8 Lessons learned documents are useful, as they contribute to knowledge management but the evaluation found limited evidence that they are effectively used or that they provide relevant information to readers. This is partly due to an ineffective dissemination mechanism.

9 Training courses and capacity building efforts have been relevant and useful in increasing transition-related expertise in the organization.

10 The project management team has adequately fulfilled its tasks and has been flexible in responding to the demands from countries and Headquarters. Transition processes are, however, not limited to the three entities. The project’s strategic relevance will increase if the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBSO, PBC, PBF) and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) are more directly involved.

11 The advisory role of project staff and Transition Specialists has raised awareness of the complexity of UN transitions as a process (political, operational and technical) and reduced the perception that UN transitions equal a ‘handover’ between mission and the UNCT.

12 Questions of gender have been absent from the work of the project as have been methodologies for gender mainstreaming transitions. There are, however, gender sensitive elements in transition plans. There is little guidance on or understanding of how gender can be addressed.
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

On the operational side, the second stage of the project needs to:

1. Continue support to countries if and where required. In Haiti, a new two-year mission has started and support throughout the mission life cycle would allow the project to collect evidence on how operational support to a transition for the duration of a mission can consolidate planning processes and contribute to a smoother transition.

2. Create a talent pool of staff/consultants that can support transitions, including through rapid short-term deployment. This would reduce the time of deployment, increase the expertise levels of those deployed, and ensure more types of skills are readily available. The project should consider Transition Specialists to serve several countries at a time.

3. Expand the tool box in support of UN leadership in transition countries and reserve time to conduct research, or contribute to research, on transitions including in response to new themes that emerge from the SG’s initiated reforms.

4. Consider tailor-made trainings to a broader number of stakeholders contributing to UN transitions, including other entities working in country.

5. Develop a proactive, coherent, and flexible advocacy and outreach strategy to disseminate results of the project and broaden the audience to target strategic offices in the UN, the UNCT, development partners and other interested parties. This could include UN transition notes for different audiences at different levels in the UN to increase the visibility of the project and contribute to strategic discussions. A communications strategy could help effective targeting.

6. Given the above, UNDP needs to create a window of support to transition planning in the Strategic Policy Team in the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support by increasing staff time and agree with other project partners on the human and financial resources needed and develop a cost sharing model. There are, however, gender sensitive elements in transition plans. There is little guidance on or understanding of how gender can be addressed.
On the strategic side, the second phase of the project needs to:

1. Review the UN Transition Policy and consider incorporating all aspects of UN transitions, including start-ups and scaling up. Consider how the EOSG can reflect this policy in Planning Directives and strategic decision making. Review the UNDP guidance document and consider how it can be made relevant for the wider UNCT.

2. Lobby for the anchoring of dedicated transition capacity at the strategic, as well as the operational levels, financed through regular budget mechanisms.

3. Undertake research and seek support to introduce gender in the project substance and outputs.

4. Initiate discussions with UN training institutes to enable a handover of the training in order to make the training sustainable and part of the institute’s curriculum. Consider how learning and support can be organized interactively among different staff and management.

5. Explore the capturing, sharing, and use of knowledge on transitions through the development of a knowledge management strategy on transitions.

6. Develop a communications strategy to provide UN transition information upstream to the UN EOSG, other UN strategic bodies, including those that are part of the UN peacebuilding architecture.
This study was part of the DPA’s efforts to document good practices and lessons from the start-up phase of Special Political Missions (SPMs). It identified a number of lessons and proposed recommendations based on three case studies: the UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB), the UN Mission in Colombia (UNMC), and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY). The lessons covered critical elements to be considered for an SPM start-up, including: guidance; planning processes and tools; coordination; leadership; funding and budgeting; and capacity requirements.
KEY FINDINGS

Most interlocutors were unaware of the 2012 SPM Start-Up Guide, with HQ and mission managers generally unaware of start-up processes and the role of Policy and Mediation Division (PMD) in supporting SPM processes. In some instances, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) engagement with senior DFS advisors during the peace negotiations at mission start-up was considered a good practice as it assisted in determining the feasibility of proposed UN support. However, scenario planning and risk analysis around SPM start-up was generally considered insufficient.

It was observed that mission concepts, or equivalent documents, were either not produced or not signed off at the appropriate level. When detailed transition plans for successor missions were developed, they supported a smooth transition, including for human resources. Coordination fora on start-up and throughout mandate implementation tended to function more as consultative groups than as bodies for decision-making.

Another challenge was DPA’s lack of authority over DFS and other departments whose support for carrying out mission start-up is essential.

There was a sense that budgeting processes were often disconnected from strategic and political planning and that, in many instances, budgets drove planning. Inconsistent timelines for planning and budgeting placed significant constraints on mission capacity. Moreover, there was reported inconsistent engagement of divisions and SPMs on funding options and preparation of SPM budgets, with divisions lacking awareness of SPM-led budgeting and funding processes.

Limited DPA and DFS dedicated planning capacity at HQ and in SPMs, and high staff turnover within advance teams reportedly impeded start-up. There was also limited gender capacity to advise on women’s political participation and gender mainstreaming at start-up and into mandate implementation. Where present, Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs) were seen as facilitating linkages between peace operations and the UN development system at mission start-up.

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

As noted above, the lessons covered guidance; planning processes; planning tools; coordination; leadership; funding and budgeting; and capacity requirements. The main recommendations reflected these categories, notably the necessity for briefings to relevant DPA Divisions and members of SPM planning teams early on; an SPM Start-Up Guide applicable to various mission settings; relevant guidance to be coordinated and co-owned by DPA, DPKO, and DFS; SPM start-up processes to more explicitly define roles and responsibilities for the clear involvement of departments; senior DFS capacity to be included during peace/political negotiations at mission start-up; Results-based budgeting (RBB) to be fully integrated into mission plans; and DPA to strengthen planning capacity with dedicated and trained staff.
This study was undertaken to assess if the objectives of DPA’s Gender, Women Peace and Security (Gender/WPS) staff training were met and to generate lessons learned for potential ways to make the training more impactful. To date, the Department has conducted 15 trainings for a total of approximately 350 staff. The evaluation will also inform a review of the training content, in light of new requirements stemming from the creation of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) on 1 January 2019.
Participants in the training found that their understanding of gender concepts had increased, and more than half of the respondents indicated that the training had enabled them to integrate a gender focus in their work.

A majority of respondents expressed a desire for more tailored training for professionals depending on where they are in their careers. While participants with limited years of experience found all sessions useful, those later in their careers requested more practical tools and good practices for the application of the WPS agenda. Overall, respondents most valued the sessions that explore strategies, provide good practices and include practical measures to promote women’s participation in conflict mediation and prevention.

Respondents working in SPMs and HQ indicated that they would benefit from receiving capacity building tailored to their context and specific responsibilities.
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conduct more group discussion and collective analysis of case studies or examples from participants.

2. Provide more examples of practical tools and more cases demonstrating how they were used.

3. Explore ways to provide training on Gender/WPS based on context-specific needs.

4. Develop an easily accessible internal forum for participants to access training material; contact fellow participants; exchange good practices and information to continue the learning beyond the training room. In the coming months, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and Department of Peace Operations (DPO) intend to make resources on WPS available in a joint repository to all staff in the peace and security pillar.
The UN-World Bank partnership in Yemen: Lessons Learned from the deployment of a UN-World Bank Adviser in the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General

BACKGROUND

In 2018, DPA completed a lessons learned study on the deployment of a World Bank Adviser in the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen from 2014 to 2017. This deployment, the first of its kind in a special political mission, was funded through the UN-World Bank Trust Fund as part of the UN-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations and in recognition of the centrality of economic issues to the Yemeni transition. At the request of the DPA Learning and Evaluation Board, the study sought to analyze this experience, capture lessons learned, and develop a preliminary understanding of the conditions under which the UN-World Bank partnership can effectively support mediation and political processes in fragile and conflict-affected settings.
KEY FINDINGS

The study assessed the deployment of the World Bank Adviser as a largely successful initiative that contributed to greater engagement by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on macroeconomic issues critical to the transition, closer alignment of World Bank programming with the political process, and an unprecedented level of risk acceptance in the Bank’s provision of emergency financing. For example, the Adviser helped develop a framework through which the Office of the Special Envoy was designated to manage a joint financing facility to support the Yemen National Dialogue Conference outcomes and leverage its resources to contribute to overall state-building. After the civil war broke out in early 2015, the Adviser was instrumental in spearheading a proposal to resume cash transfers to the poorest Yemenis into peace talks in 2015 and 2016, enabling an incremental agreement in the talks that contributed to the larger political process. When, nevertheless, the talks collapsed in August 2016 and the humanitarian crisis worsened, the Adviser served as a bridge between political and development actors that contributed to the channeling of over USD 1 billion of World Bank emergency financing through different UN entities.
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

The study identified several lessons for similar initiatives in the future. These include the need for better consultation between the World Bank and the UNCT on emergency financing on normative issues and alignment to national priorities; and persistent administration, recruitment and management challenges. The study made a number of recommendations for future deployments of World Bank Advisers to UN peace operations on these issues, and on how the UN and World Bank can ensure that those involved in the facilitation or mediation of a peace process systematically incorporate political economy analysis and thinking about macro-economic stability, the development agenda, and the core functions of state institutions into their work.