New York, 28 July 2020
Urban areas are ground zero of the COVID-19 pandemic, with 90 per cent of reported cases.
Cities are bearing the brunt of the crisis – many with strained health systems, inadequate water and sanitation services, and other challenges.
This is especially the case in poorer areas, where the pandemic has exposed...
Excellencies,
Distinguished Delegates,
Ladies and Gentlemen.
I thank the co-organizers for convening this timely debate and Foreign Minister Heiko Maas for chairing this meeting.
Climate change impacts all of us. Record temperatures, unprecedented sea levels and frequent extreme weather events paint a dangerous future for the planet and for humanity. The environment suffers and people suffer. As lives and livelihoods are threatened, resource competition increases and communities are displaced.
The climate emergency is a danger to peace. There is no automatic link between climate change and conflict. But climate change does exacerbate existing risks and creates new ones.
And the consequences vary from region to region.
In the Pacific, the rise in sea levels places pressure on livelihoods, exacerbated by frequent extreme weather events that pose a risk to social cohesion.
In Central Asia, water stress and reduced access to natural resources and energy can contribute to regional tensions.
Across Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America, climate change is expected to displace more than 140 million people within their national borders by 2050, with potentially disruptive consequences for regional stability.
In the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the effects of climate change have deepened grievances and escalated the risk of violent conflict, providing fodder for extremist organizations.
Around the world, fragile or conflict-affected situations are more exposed and less able to cope with the effects of climate change. It is no coincidence that 7 of the 10 countries most vulnerable and least prepared to deal with climate change host a peacekeeping operation or special political mission.
Differences exist between regions, within regions, and within communities. Climate-related security risks impact women, men, girls and boys in different ways. In Sudan, climate change intersects with conflict and a legacy of exclusionary decision-making to compound resource scarcity. As a result, men often need to migrate away from their families in search of alternative livelihoods, leaving women behind in rural areas where they find themselves on the frontlines of both climate change and insecurity.
Excellencies,
To cope with climate change, we need to act on multiple fronts. Unquestionably, we need ambitious climate action and a commitment to accelerating the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
Peace and security actors also have an essential role to play. The failure to consider the growing impacts of climate change will undermine our efforts at conflict prevention, peacemaking and sustaining peace, and risk trapping vulnerable countries in a vicious cycle of climate disaster and conflict.
In the Lake Chad Basin, insecurity and governance challenges have impeded climate adaptation efforts, affecting livelihoods, social cohesion, and ultimately human security, which Boko Haram has proven adept at exploiting.
Drawing on the evidence before us, on what we are seeing happening globally, I would like to outline some actions we can take, together, to address climate-related security risks more effectively.
First, we need to leverage new technologies and enhance our analytical capacity to translate long-term climate foresight into actionable, near-tearm analysis. The Climate Security Mechanism – a joint iniative by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the UN Development Programme and the UN Environment Programme – has developed guidance in this regard and supports innovative approaches in the field.
In Iraq, the United Nations Assistance Mission, supported by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, is developing an early warning system that combines remote sensing techniques with an analysis of population density and displacement data to anticipate potential tensions over water resources.
Second, our efforts to deliver peace and security must place people at the center and learn from those who experience daily the consequences of climate change on their security. In this regard, I commend the organizers for ensuring a diversity of perspectives in today’s debate. I look forward to hearing from Ms. Coral Pasisi and Colonel Mahamadou Magagi. In our own work, we are also seeking to understand the broadest range of perspectives, such as those of practitioners and grassroots organizations from the Caribbean, the Middle East, Nepal, the Pacific and the Sahel.
Building on the power of women and youth as agents for change, we must better integrate peacebuilding, environmental and gender equality goals. In Chocó, Colombia, an interagency United Nations pilot project is promoting the engagement of women in environmental governance and natural resource management within the context of the implementation of the Final Peace Accord, with positive effects on local-level peacebuilding.
Third, we need to strengthen multi-dimensional partnerships and connect the work of the United Nations, Member States, regional organizations and others in this area.
The Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, led by the African Union and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, demonstrates the potential of inclusive, climate and security-informed approaches and shows a path towards stability.
The UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the Economic Community of West African States have established a joint coordination mechanism on climate-related security risks, which inter alia seeks to identify good practices for the prevention of transhumance-related violence in the region.
In the Pacific, the United Nations is continuing its close engagement with the Pacific Islands Forum to support implementation of the Boe Declaration and help strengthen the resilience of States and communities to address the unique challenges faced by atoll nations.
And in Central Asia, the United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy supports the Green Central Asia Initiative, launched by Germany, to create an environment conducive to regional cooperation on trans-boundary water and climate change.
These tailored, region-specific examples can provide valuable insights and lessons for other partnerships to follow. We are strongly committed to such collaboration.
Excellencies,
In recent years we have made considerable progress in our understanding of the linkages between climate change, peace and security. But climate change is relentless and its cascading effects will continue to grow and evolve.
We must remain vigilant and summon the courage to adapt our established approaches to ensure they are fit for a climate-changed world.
And above all, we must translate words into action. As the Secretary-General has emphasized, the pandemic recovery offers an opportunity to strengthen resilience and promote climate justice.
I am encouraged by today’s debate as another important step in the right direction and thank the organizers again for convening this meeting.
Thank you.
Mr. President, Minister,
Thank you for the opportunity to brief you on Syria and my effort to facilitate the political process pursuant to Security Council resolution 2254. I am joining you today from Geneva, where I look forward to reconvening the Constitutional Committee next month.
The issue of detainees, abductees and the missing is one that I have put at the heart of my efforts since I began my tenure. We have regularly met with the families of those detained and missing, whose experiences have made a deep impression on me.
This is a humanitarian and indeed human rights issue that demands sustained and meaningful action, in line with international law. And meaningful action on this file, which touches all Syrian families, could also build significant confidence within society, as well as between the parties and international stakeholders.
My Deputy and I have engaged directly with the parties, and our team continues also to participate in a working group together with Iran, Russia and Turkey, though this has not met now for many months due to COVID-19.
Mr. President,
Frankly, progress on this file has been vastly insufficient, to the frustration of many Syrians, inside and outside Syria. So many Syrians remain detained, abducted or missing, and so many families still desperately seek information on the fate of their loved ones.
The lack of progress is a pity because this is a cause that we can all get behind. Let me remind you that, a little over a year ago, this Council unanimously adopted resolution 2474 (2019) on “Missing persons in armed conflict”. It is indeed unfortunate that today in Syria the scale of the problem remains unchanged.
And so today, I want to begin with a loud and clear appeal for the Syrian government and all other Syrian parties to carry out unilateral releases of detainees and abductees, and meaningful actions on missing persons - at a scale that is commensurate with the scope of this tragic issue. Without addressing this issue, true reconciliation, the healing of society’s wounds, credible justice and sustainable peace will remain elusive. Let us make the upcoming Eid al-Adha an occasion that sees more Syrian families welcome their loved ones home.
Mr President,
Of course, the tragedy of detainees, abductees and missing persons represents only a single layer of the humanitarian catastrophe that has engulfed Syria – the greatest of this century.
Syrians are now being hit by yet another tsunami of suffering - economic collapse. Over the last month, Syria’s currency has regained some of its lost value, but still remains significantly depreciated relative to last year. And by almost any measure we see a downward spiral: rampant inflation, rising unemployment, weakened demand, more businesses shutting down, increased food insecurity with families skipping meals, and shortages of medicine.
We also now see a rise in reported cases of COVID-19, exacerbating Syria’s economic malaise and further constraining the humanitarian response. Testing remains extremely limited, particularly in areas outside government control. As of yesterday (22 July), the Syrian Ministry of Health has confirmed 561 cases – a relatively low figure, but still more than double the cases since my last briefing. And the geographical spread of the virus is increasing, penetrating more areas outside of Damascus, including the first 22 cases in north-west Syria, as well as 6 cases in the north-east.
Mr. President,
Humanitarian access is ever more imperative. Echoing the Secretary General, I want to “call on all parties to the conflict to ensure humanitarian access to all people in need in accordance with international humanitarian law”. I take note of this Council’s decision to extend the UN cross-border mechanism in northwest Syria via the Bab al-Hawa border crossing for twelve months.
And here let me also re-echo the Secretary General’s appeal from earlier this year, for the waiver of sanctions that can undermine the capacity of the country to ensure access to food, essential health supplies and COVID-19 medical support to respond to the pandemic.
Mr President,
To end Syrians’ suffering we must end the violent conflict, through a nationwide ceasefire, in line with resolution 2254, as well as an effective, targeted, cooperative approach to Security Council-listed terrorist groups in line with international humanitarian law.
There has been some progress towards this goal. In recent months, we have seen relative calm throughout Syria, with no major escalation and front-lines mostly frozen. But we continue to see flares of violence within and across those front-lines, which gives us cause for concern.
South-west Syria remains tense. In late June, we saw reports of clashes followed by further protests, assassinations and other security incidents. The Russian Federation has been working to help contain the situation. And I have been messaging to this effect as well. Meanwhile, underlying geopolitical tensions persist in the south-west. And I note fresh reports of Israeli airstrikes across a broad range of targets in Syria.
In the north-west, the calm brought about by Russian and Turkish efforts continues to largely hold. I note further progress in Russian-Turkish cooperation inside the de-escalation area, including the first joint patrols across the entire M4 route. I also note that the extremist wa-Harid al- Mu’minin operations room, which had launched cross-line attacks against the Syrian Government earlier this year, was forcibly dismantled by listed terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, following sustained clashes between the two groups. Last week, we then saw an attack on a joint patrol near Ariha, injuring Russian and Turkish soldiers. Subsequently, there was a brief uptick in pro-government airstrikes south of the M4 and shelling on north-west Syria as well as airstrikes on al-Bab city near the Turkish border. I hope that Russia and Turkey can help contain the situation and sustain calm across north-west Syria.
North-east Syria remains broadly stable but has seen some concerning incidents: most notably, fatal car bombings around Tell Abiad and Ras al-Ayn; a drone strike resulting in fatalities near the town of Ayn al-Arab; another drone strike near al-Derbassiya and recurring disruptions to the Allouk water station. We appeal to all stakeholders there, local and international, to exercise restraint and uphold existing arrangements that have provided calm throughout this year.
Meanwhile, ISIL’s continuing activity remains a serious concern – in southern, central and eastern Syria - with reported riots among ISIL detainees in al-Hasakeh.
Let me here recall once again that all parties to the conflict remain bound by international humanitarian law, including the rules of distinction, proportionality and precautions in order to avoid civilian harm.
Mr President,
We have now firmed up plans to convene the third session of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned Constitutional Committee. Earlier this week, I was able to confirm with the Co-Chair nominated by the Syrian Government and the Co-Chair nominated by the Syrian opposition that we will begin in Geneva on 24 August – provided that travel conditions do not change. I was also able to inform Middle Third members of this as well. I have encouraged all to prepare for a productive session on the agenda. And I hope that thereafter we will be able to proceed in subsequent sessions in a regular, business-like and substantive manner.
I hope that the Syrian parties can count on the support of the key international players with influence, in ensuring the success of the upcoming session. In this regard, I appreciated the expressions of support for reconvening and advancing the work of the Constitutional Committee, and for the implementation of resolution 2254, by the Presidents of the Astana guarantor countries, and by the many countries who participated in the Brussels IV Conference.
Mr. President,
I also hope that those key international players will work to unlock progress on the broader political process. Only through international dialogue can we begin to address many of the myriad challenges that Syria and Syrians face from humanitarian need, detention, displacement, violence and terror, to economic destitution and the violation of Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. We continue to see starkly different views on the nature of these challenges – the debate on sanctions is just one example. There is no sign that this or any of these issues will be resolved by entrenched positioning and rhetoric, in the hope that the other side eventually caves in. Serious and consequential international diplomacy is needed, to bridge significant gaps, including through reciprocal measures.
I believe that this is indeed possible and that common interest exists for such a dialogue. I have been encouraged by continuing dialogue between the Russian Federation and United States and will continue to engage them and all relevant countries on how to build a constructive Syria diplomacy that can support a Syrian-led, Syria-owned political process facilitated by the United Nations. If this path is not taken, all the other paths would lead to further loss and suffering for everyone – inside and outside Syria. This cannot be in anyone’s interest.
Mr President,
That is why, guided by resolution 2254 and with the support of the key international players and this Council, I hope that, step by step, we can chart a path forwards to end the Syrian people’s suffering and allow them to shape their future. That is: the release of those detained and abducted; a nationwide ceasefire to end violent conflict; a safe, calm and neutral environment that enables the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees; and a final political settlement built around a new constitution and inclusive free and fair elections under UN supervision, one that meets the Syrian people’s legitimate aspirations, that fully restores Syria’s sovereignty, unity, independence, territorial integrity and economic prosperity.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The CNMC was awarded on 20 July 2020 the Raymond Milefsky Prize by IBRU, Durham University’s Centre for Borders Research (United States). This...
Mister President,
Members of the Security Council,
I brief you today as Palestinians and Israelis are grappling with a complex and potentially destabilizing three-pronged crisis:
An escalating health crisis as both struggle to contain the rapid spike of COVID-19 cases.
A spiraling economic...
New York, 18 July 2020
Each year, on Nelson’s Mandela’s birthday, we pay tribute to an extraordinary global advocate for equality, dignity and solidarity. Madiba was a moral giant of the 20th century, whose timeless legacy continues to guide us today. The theme of Nelson Mandela International Day is “Take action, inspire change”. It highlights the...
This Week in DPPA is a brief roundup of political and peacebuilding events and developments at UNHQ and around the world.
COVID-19Afghanistan - Essential role of young women and men spotlighted in Kabul symposium
Peacebuilding – New video series on "Building Peace in the Pandemic"
For up-to-date information on COVID-19 and its impact, please visit:
Security CouncilRuiz Massieu: Violence against former combatants, social leaders and human rights defenders remains the most damaging threat to peacebuilding in Colombia
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Arria-Formula meeting on the “Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region”
YemenInterview with Special Envoy Griffiths
Middle East Peace ProcessListening to civil society voices, Palestinian and Israeli
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Contact DPPA at dppa@un.org
This Week in DPPA is a brief roundup of political and peacebuilding events and developments at UNHQ and around the world.
COVID-19Afghanistan – Community support crucial for ending domestic violence during COVID-19 For up-to-date information on COVID-19 and its impact, please visit:
Security CouncilSecretary-General sounds alarm on situation in Libya
Ibn Chambas: “COVID-19 pandemic is amplifying and exacerbating pre-existing conflict drivers”
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AfghanistanMeeting on violence reduction
IraqSpecial Representative visits Kurdistan
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In January 2020, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs launched the Innovation Cell, an interdisciplinary team dedicated to helping the Department and its field presences to understand and explore, pilot, and scale new technologies, tools, and practices in conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding. Responding to the Secretary-General’s call on the UN system to accelerate its uptake of innovative methods, the Innovation Cell catalyses innovation in peace and security, while providing a forum for colleagues at UNHQ and in the field to engage collaboratively in human-centred design and problem-solving.
The Cell is part of the UN’s Innovation Network (UNIN) and works to galvanize an ecosystem of technology, civil society, and academic partners outside the UN system on peace and security use cases, thereby leveraging innovation for the shared goal of peace.
What role technology can play in ceasefire monitoring and verification (July 2022)
Why Our Brains Are at War — And What We Can Do About It (Sep 2021)
What We Can Learn from Behavioural Science for Peace (July 2021)
How Dashboards Could Destroy World Peace — And How to Prevent It (March 2021)
What the “Lords of the Artic” Teach Us About Inclusive Peace (Feb 2021)
What Machines Can Teach Us About How to Write Constitutions (Jan 2021)
How to decode modern conflicts with cutting-edge technologies
Reach out to us at DPPA-Innovation@un.org for questions, comments and ideas.
Visit us at https://www.behance.net/dppainnovation to learn more about the Innovation-related think pieces and approaches.
Follow us at https://medium.com/futuring-peace and https://dppa.medium.com/ for innovation-related think pieces and approaches.
Follow @UN_Innovation to learn what UN entities are doing in the space of innovation.
New York, 4 July 2020
The COVID-19 pandemic and climate emergency have both revealed the fragility of our societies and our planet. These dual crises are disproportionately
affecting the world’s most vulnerable countries and people, and deepening many social and economic rifts. They also make clear the need to strengthen global cooperation and solidarity.
...This Week in DPPA is a brief roundup of political and peacebuilding events and developments at UNHQ and around the world.
COVID-19Somalia – visit to laboratory Plus, read more here about the response of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) to the pandemic. For up-to-date information on COVID-19 and its impact, please visit:
Security CouncilDiCarlo “Cooperation is not a zero-sum game”
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NATOAnnual talks between the UN and NATO
IraqNew Deputy Special Representative appointed
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Today marks one year since the airstrike on the Tajoura Detention Centre which resulted in the killing of at least 52 migrants and the injury of 87 others in one of the deadliest incidents since the launch of the attack on Tripoli in April 2019.
The attack on Tajoura, where migrants and refugees were trapped, and where some had been detained for up to two years without charge,...
Mr. President,
First let me recognize the presence today of His Excellency, Mr. Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and His Excellency, Mr. Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I would also like to recognize the presence of Secretary-General António Guterres.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, endorsed by resolution 2231, is a significant achievement of multilateral diplomacy and dialogue. It remains crucial to the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and to regional and international security.
It is therefore regrettable that the future of this agreement is in doubt. The United States withdrew from the agreement in May 2018. Before that date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified in 11 reports that Iran was complying with its nuclear commitments contained in the Plan.
As we have said, we regret the US withdrawal from the Plan. The re-imposition of US national sanctions lifted under the Plan, as well as the decision not to extend waivers for the trade in oil with Iran and on all remaining JCPOA-originating projects, are contrary to the goals of the JCPOA. These actions have impeded the ability of Iran and other Member States to fully implement the Plan and the resolution.
On 12 March, in a letter to the Secretary-General, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif wrote that US sanctions were constraining his country’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Secretary-General has appealed for the waiving of sanctions that could undermine a country’s capacity to respond to the pandemic. Further, he has expressed concern that the posture of private sector actors seeking to avert risk may continue to impede legitimate humanitarian aid transactions, especially with regard to banking needs.
Mr. President,
We also regret the steps Iran has taken, since July 2019, in response to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. As a result of these steps, taken under the monitoring of the IAEA, Iran has surpassed JCPOA-stipulated limits on its uranium enrichment level and on its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium. Iran has also lifted JCPOA limitations on its nuclear research and development activities.
Today, we appeal again to Iran to return to full implementation of the Plan. We also urge Iran to address concerns raised by other States regarding its actions inconsistent with the restrictive measures in Annex B of the resolution.
We encourage JCPOA participants to resolve all differences within the Dispute Resolution Mechanism under the Plan. We also urge all Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that may have a further negative impact on the JCPOA and regional stability.
The full implementation of the Plan is key to securing tangible economic benefit to the Iranian people. We are encouraged by the positive developments in INSTEX, which started to process its first transactions.
Mr President,
I will now turn to the Secretary-General’s ninth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (S/2020/531). As guided by the Security Council, the report focuses on Annex B to the resolution. It also provides findings and recommendations to Council members, as called for in paragraph 7 of the Note by the President 2016/44.
First, regarding the nuclear-related provisions, we stress that the procurement channel is a vital transparency and confidence- building mechanism. We call on all Member States and the private sector to support and use the procurement channel.
Further, we regret the 27 May decision of the United States to terminate the sanctions waivers related to the modernization of the Arak reactor.
Exemptions set out in paragraph 2 of annex B are specifically designed to provide for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of Iran under the Plan.
Second, regarding the ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States provided information on Iran’s launch of “Simorgh” and “Qased” space-launch vehicles in February and April of this year.
The information provided reflects divergent views among those Member States as to whether those launches are inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B. Paragraph 3 called upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.
Third, on the arms-related restrictions, the Secretariat analyzed two US seizures of arms and related materiel and continued its assessment of the cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs used in the 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia.
Regarding the November 2019 and February 2020 US seizures of arms and related materiel, the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Secretariat that the (I quote) “allegedly seized anti-tank guided missiles and thermal optical weapon sights do not conform to the products manufactured by the Islamic Republic of Iran.”(End quote) Iran further informed us thatsimilar optical sights claimed to be exported to Iran and later seized in Aden, are still in use in different military units.
Our findings indicate that the container launch units of the anti-tank guided missiles were of Iranian origin and had post-2016 production dates. We ascertained that the optical weapon sights had been delivered to Iran between February 2016 and April 2018 and observed that thermal optical weapon sights have design characteristics similar to those also produced by a commercial entity in Iran.
We also found that the components associated with the anti-ship missile, the unidentified missile, and as well as the cruise missile bore Farsi markings. The transfer of such materiel from Iran after 16 January 2016 may be inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).
Let me now turn to the cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia last year. In December 2019 we stated that we had not yet been able to independently corroborate that those weapons and their components were of Iranian origin or transferred from Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).
Since then, we made further progress in our examination of the cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs used in the attacks. We were able to confirm that some of the components of the delta wing UAVs (ignition coils) and the cruise missiles (pressure sensors of the fuel-feed system) had been exported to Iran in 2016 and 2018 respectively. In our analysis, we took note of the feedback from Iran that “the concerned pressure transmitter is not a dual-use item to be monitored by the government”.
We also ascertained that the jet engines and other components of the UAVs and cruise missiles show similarity to known Iranian models or have similar components (gyroscopes and engines) to an Iranian UAV reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016.
Furthermore, the sections of the cruise missiles recovered from the attacks and the sections seized by the United States in November 2019 form part of the same missile system, and it is highly likely that they were produced by the same entity. Finally, some of the items in the two seizures by the United States (a digital air data computer and the “Model V10” gyroscope) were identical or similar to those found in the debris of the cruise missiles and the delta-wing UAVs used in the 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia.
Mr. President
Based on these technical findings, while also having taken into account the information provided by Iran, the Secretariat assessed that the examined cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs and/or parts thereof used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia were of Iranian origin.
Finally, the Secretariat also received information from Australia, Israel and Saudi Arabia regarding alleged transfers of arms and related materiel from Iran. We are analyzing these issues and the Secretary-General will report back to the Council, if appropriate, in due course.
Mr. President,
Notwithstanding the current challenges to the JCPOA, it remains the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Its full implementation, as well as faithful adherence to resolution 2231, is also fundamental to regional stability.
Let me conclude by acknowledging the leadership of His Excellency Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve in his role as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 and to assure him once again of the Secretariat’s full support. I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for the continued cooperation.
Thank you, President.
