
New York, 20 June 2020
Nearly 80 million women, children, and men around the world have been forced from their homes as refugees or internally displaced people. Even more shocking: ten million of these people fled in the past year alone.
On World Refugee Day, we pledge to do everything in our power to end the conflict and persecution that drive these appalling numbers.
...This Week in DPPA is a brief roundup of political and peacebuilding events and developments at UNHQ and around the world.
COVID-19Afghanistan: Young Afghans speak out for peace – voluntarism in context of the COVID-19 pandemic Peacebuilding Commission meeting on The Gambia DiCarlo: “Our works goes on despite challenging conditions”
For up-to-date information on COVID-19 and its impact, please visit:
Security CouncilPedersen calls for action on the release of detainees and abductees
La Lime: “reform of the Constitution is required to break the circle” BoliviaNew agreement between the Government and the UN |
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Colombia'Mountain Honey,' a contribution to peace
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Contact DPPA at dppa@un.org
New York, 19 June 2020
Sexual violence in conflict is a brutal crime, mainly perpetrated against women and girls, but also affecting men and boys.
It reverberates throughout communities and societies, perpetuating cycles of violence and threatening international peace and security.
...
New York, 19 June 2020
The COVID-19 pandemic has turned the world of work upside down.
Every worker, every business and every corner of the globe has been affected.
Hundreds of millions of jobs have been lost.
...The new report – Gender, Climate & Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change – by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Women, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA) reveals the close links between gender, climate, and security, and shows that women on the frontlines of climate action are playing a vital role in conflict prevention and sustainable, inclusive peace.
Mr. Chairman,
Excellencies,
Distinguished delegates,
First, I would like to thank, His Excellency, Ambassador Mohammed Hussein Bahr Aluloom, for convening this meeting.
I would also like to thank the co-facilitators of this agenda item, Finland and Mexico, for their continued support to special political missions.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to address the Fourth Committee during these challenging times and would like to focus on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and its implications for our special political missions.
The impact of the pandemic is truly multidimensional. The unprecedented health crisis is rapidly expanding humanitarian needs across the globe.
The economic impact of the virus is devastating as jobs have disappeared and businesses have suffered; it has increased poverty and marginalization; it is exacerbating various human rights challenges.
The pandemic is also a peace and security crisis. It has already led to social unrest in some countries and could potentially trigger violence that would both greatly undermine our ability to fight the disease and reverse the fragile gains for peace we have achieved over the last few years. It could also increase the suffering of vulnerable populations of refugees and forcibly displaced persons.
As the Secretary-General stated in his briefing to the Security Council on 9 April, we face multiple risks, including: an erosion of trust in public institutions if populations perceive that authorities have not addressed the pandemic effectively; an escalation of violence by conflict actors - including violent extremist groups - that think the confusion caused by the pandemic may give them a tactical advantage; and the rise of stigma and hate speech against various groups.
Across all of these areas, women too frequently bear the brunt of the social, economic and security consequences of the pandemic. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, the rise in domestic violence since the outbreak of COVID-19 has been particularly worrying.
Mr. Chairman,
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected every facet of our work, at Headquarters and for our special political missions in the field.
There has already been some impact on the operational capabilities of our missions, largely due to measures taken to limit the spread of the virus. Some peace processes have stalled, as the world responds to COVID-19. Our good offices and mediation engagements have felt the impact. Restrictions on movement may continue to affect the work of various confidence-based mechanisms, as well as our ability to engage in crisis diplomacy to de-escalate potential conflicts.
Despite these constraints, special political missions continue to fulfill their mandates. They are guided by four key objectives:
(1) to support national authorities in their response to COVID-19;
(2) to protect our personnel and their capacity to continue critical operations;
(3) to ensure that our own personnel are not a contagion vector; and
(4) to help assist vulnerable communities and continue to implement mission mandates.
For example, in Colombia, the UN Verification Mission, along with the UN Country Team, helped distribute sanitation kits to areas where former combatants are located.
In Somalia, UNSOM provided prefabricated buildings to be used for isolation facilities, and together with WHO, a testing laboratory in Mogadishu.
In Guinea Bissau, UNIOGBIS and the UN Country Team have established a Communication Task Force to support national communication efforts for COVID-19 response, particularly geared towards women as well as vulnerable groups.
Mr. Chairman,
SPMs are increasingly using technology to remain actively engaged with parties to peace negotiations and other stakeholders. Technology has also allowed us to reach out to communities while maintaining physical distancing rules.
Last week, with the support of the DPPA Innovation Cell, the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen carried out a first of its kind large-scale interactive virtual dialogue with hundreds of Yemenis on the opportunities and challenges for peace in the country. The consultation allowed over 500 Yemenis to express their thoughts on the prospect of a nationwide ceasefire, expectations for the peace process, and key humanitarian and economic measures that are needed, including to improve the country’s response to the pandemic.
Mr. Chairman,
Recognizing the urgency of the crisis, on 23 March, the Secretary-General called for a global ceasefire, urging warring parties to silence their guns to help create conditions for the delivery of aid and to open up space for diplomacy.
The response to the appeal was initially positive. Support came from every corner of the globe, including world leaders, regional partners, civil society and religious leaders. A number of conflict parties responded to the appeal and took first steps to stop fighting.
However, early gestures of support have not translated into concrete change on the ground. Some of the initial ceasefires have not been extended. Many conflict parties do not yet see the impact of the pandemic; some are even using it to press their advantage.
Special political missions are playing a key role in operationalizing the Secretary-General’s ceasefire call. Our SRSGs and Envoys continue to engage with their interlocutors to urge them to put their differences aside to combat COVID-19. On some occasions, their interaction is through virtual means.
The acting Special Representative in Libya, for example, is in close contact with the warring parties to work on a de-escalation of hostilities and facilitate ceasefire talks, which have recently resumed virtually. In Yemen, the Special Envoy is in dialogue with the parties to build trust and move towards a ceasefire and resumption of the political process. And in Afghanistan, our new Special Representative is engaging in support of the launch of intra-Afghan negotiations.
Our SPMs will continue to work to make the Secretary-General’s global ceasefire call a reality. This will require a collective effort, including by Member States, in order to regain momentum and allow the space for dialogue.
Mr. Chairman,
In addition to the above measures taken by the SPMs, various bodies of the UN have been playing their role to support their efforts. The Security Council has been holding virtual meetings and has approved mandates of SPMs to ensure the smooth running of their operations. The Peacebuilding Commission has been playing a critical convening role by bringing together national governments, SPMs, International Financial Institutions and other actors to support national and regional COVID-19 response measures.
In this regard, the ongoing review of the peacebuilding architecture is a critical process, as peacebuilding and sustaining peace are integral components of the work of special political missions.
For the third time since the creation of the UN peacebuilding architecture, Member States have the opportunity to strengthen the work of the UN in supporting conflict-affected countries. The review allows us to take stock of our support to nationally owned and led peacebuilding.
It has been a broad and inclusive process, guided by the Peacebuilding Commission, and informed by meetings open to all Member States, as well as regional and thematic consultations held around the world. Many of these consultations were conducted online due to the pandemic.
We are currently finalizing the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding and sustaining peace – which was consulted widely and will be the main input into the review. The report will take stock of the achievements we have made so far – working better together, breaking silos, and strengthening coherence and cross-pillar coordination. It will also point to enduring challenges and address how the UN can maximize its impact to promote a sustainable peace.
We look forward to working closely with Member States through the appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the review of the peacebuilding architecture reaches a successful outcome.
Mr. Chairman,
In closing, I would like to once again express my deep appreciation to Member States for their continued support to special political missions. Your support is indispensable for the missions to discharge their mandates.
I would also like to pay tribute to all our staff serving in special political missions, often in difficult conditions and under significant personal sacrifices, in order to help contribute to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding – and to assist the people we serve.
Thank you.
New York, 17 June 2020
The health of humanity depends on the health of the planet.
Today, our planet is ailing.
Land degradation affects some 3.2 billion people.
Seventy 70 per cent of the world’s land has been transformed by human activity.
We can reverse this trend and bring solutions to a wide...
Thank you, Mr. President (France, Nicolas de Rivière)
1. Last month, I told you how struck I was by the depth of concerns among ordinary Syrians at the current state and future of their beloved country.
2. A month on, I have heard these messages even louder -- including in continued consultations with Syrians participating in the Civil Society Support Room and with the Women’s Advisory Board.
3. I have heard many of the appeals you are familiar with – a thirst for progress on the 2254 political process, for an end to all violence and terrorism and a nationwide ceasefire, for actions on detainees and abductees and missing persons, and for progress in creating conditions for Syrian refugees and IDPs to return to their homes in a safe, voluntary and dignified manner.
4. I heard a new level of alarm at the dramatic collapse in economic conditions throughout the country. It is easy to understand why. During just one week during the reporting period, the Syrian lira’s market rate depreciated more than in the entire nine years prior, before rallying somewhat. But currency and price volatility remain acute. And the inflation rate has hit peak levels in the past six months.
5. The economic crisis is hitting every part of Syria, regardless of territorial control: from Damascus and the southwest … to Aleppo and the northwest … and to the northeast. Medicine is more expensive, and scarce. Food prices have skyrocketed and supply chains have been disrupted. The purchasing power of ordinary Syrians has seriously diminished as wages - both private and public sector - are vastly inadequate to meet the demands of the day.
6. Before this recent deterioration, over 80% of Syrians were estimated to be living below the poverty line. The situation is undoubtedly more severe today, and the intensity of that poverty is likely more acute. The World Food Programme now estimates that some 9.3 million people are food insecure, with over 2 million more at risk, a rise of some 42 per cent in the past year. As WFP Executive Director Beasley recently warned: if this situation deteriorates, “famine could well be knocking on [the] door”.
7. Syrian women – the primary breadwinners in many families – are disproportionately affected and forced to shoulder caretaking responsibilities while financially supporting the household. Many women, including those in refugee communities, are facing higher risks of exploitation and abuse as they struggle to provide for the day-to-day needs of their families.
8. In recent weeks, we have seen many Syrians begin to express new fears - even panic in some quarters. We have heard of shops and pharmacies forced to close, unable to cope with the recent volatility; of jobs being lost; of remittances drying up. In some areas of northwest Syria, reports have emerged of locals increasingly using foreign currencies.
Mr. President,
9. The decade-long conflict in Syria has wrought destruction on Syria’s people, its environment, its infrastructure and the very fabric of its society – the bonds of trust that underpin any economy. Syria’s economic governance has also been characterized by recurrent fiscal and monetary mismanagement and corruption.
10. In recent months, new factors have joined these underlying structural problems, pushing the economy to the brink. The banking crisis in nextdoor Lebanon has had a significant impact. The repercussions all societies and economies have experienced from measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic have also played their part.
11. Another factor in this context is significant sanctions by the United States and the European Union. These target individuals and entities affiliated with the government, and also restrict activity in the financial, banking, oil and gas and military sectors as well as exports and multilateral lending to and investments in Syria. Further US secondary sanctions - which have been foreshadowed since the passage of legislation 6 months ago - will begin entering into force as early as tomorrow, aimed at deterring foreign business activity with the Syrian government.
Mr. President,
12. Against this backdrop, we have seen some Syrians take peacefully to the streets in a few areas in recent weeks - such as Sweida, Daraa and Idlib - protesting a range of grievances.
13. Moreover, in Syria’s southwest, what was set to be a major violent confrontation, centred around the town of Tafas, has been averted for now - with the assistance of Russian mediation. However, we are concerned that there have since been further security incidents and tensions that might result in renewed escalation of violence. This is an area where there are broader geopolitical tensions, which appear to be growing more acute. I further note that this month again saw reports of Israeli airstrikes inside Syria. Southern Syria is also an area where ISIL cells appear to remain active.
14. Meanwhile, in the northwest, the calm brought about by Russia and Turkey is by-and -large holding. However, we have seen worrying signs: increased mutual shelling, reports of reinforcements on both sides, the first reported pro-government airstrikes in three months; and reports of new civilian displacement. Last week, the extremist wa-Harid alMu’minin operations room launched another cross-line attack that resulted in the deaths of several Syrian soldiers. Two of its leaders were subsequently killed in a US drone strike on 14 June. It and other small extremist factions have now formed a new operations room – a likely harbinger for future attacks. I have been assured by both Russia and Turkey that they are working to contain the situation and sustain the calm, and I note there has been further progress in Russian-Turkish cooperation on the work of joint patrols on the ground.
Mr President,
15. I continue to appeal for calm to be sustained in Idlib and elsewhere and for a nationwide ceasefire, in line with resolution 2254. I underscore the importance of addressing the challenge posed by listed terrorist groups through a cooperative, targeted and effective approach that safeguards stability, protects civilians and fully respects international humanitarian law. The same is true regarding efforts to prevent ISIL’s resurgence, whose attacks continued in and around the central desert.
Mr. President,
16. I am ready to convene and facilitate a third session of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned constitutional committee. Conscious that global travel restrictions remain in place, I am hopeful that a session in Geneva may be possible towards the end of August.
17. But obviously, the realities facing the Syrian people cannot be solely addressed by discussing the constitution. And the Syrian parties will face great difficulties in resolving Syria’s problems without real diplomacy among the key international players with influence. After all, there are still five international armies operating across the country, and active measures by many countries as regards Syria.
18. There are real and substantive differences among those international players, as there are between the Syrian parties. Indeed, we have seen the depth of these differences in debates over sanctions in recent weeks. And we continue to see it in competing assessments regarding the political will of different actors to work to resolve the conflict. These issues are not going to be resolved by positioning. They need to be the subject of real discussion and diplomacy. Unlocking progress will need mutual and reciprocal steps, on the basis of clear understandings, by the Syrian parties and by international partners. I am convinced that there are common interests on which to build such a diplomacy, and there is a common stated commitment to advancing resolution 2254 and supporting the Syrian-led, Syrian-owned, UN-facilitated political process.
19. Let me also reiterate at this critical time the Secretary-General’s emphasis on the importance of full, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access, using all modalities, including scaled-up cross line and cross border access. Humanitarian access remains imperative, not only given the increasing suffering of the Syrian people, but also given that there is still a risk from the COVID-19 pandemic. Syria now has reported 183 cases in total.
20. Meanwhile, I reiterate my appeal for the Syrian government and all other Syrian parties to carry out large-scale and unilateral releases of detainees and abductees – especially of women, children, the elderly and the sick – and for more meaningful actions on missing persons. The COVID-19 pandemic is still a risk and should serve as an extra impetus for such action, as it has in other countries.
Mr. President,
21. Syria is going through a time of great flux. Nobody involved in the conflict should presume that time is on their side. Nobody should be sure there will be better openings down the road. What is required is the
readiness of all to deal seriously with the realities of the conflict. Guided by resolution 2254, with your support I will continue to work with the Syrian parties and all international stakeholders to facilitate a way forward that addresses all features and outcomes of the conflict, that restores the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Syria, that ends the acute suffering of the Syrian people. and that enables them to shape their own future.
Thank you, Mr. President.
New York, 16 June 2020
On the International Day of Family Remittances, and in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, we recognize the determination of 200 million migrants who regularly send money home, and the 800 million family members living in communities throughout the developing world who depend on those resources.
Last year, remittances to low- and middle-income countries reached...
Monsieur le Président, Distingués membres du Conseil de Sécurité,
1. Je voudrais d’abord vous remercier de l’opportunité qui m’est donnée de vous entretenir par visioconférence de la situation en Afrique centrale et des activités de l’UNOCA.
2. Cette session se tient dans le contexte de la pandémie de la COVID-19, qui a bouleversé la vie des citoyens ainsi que le fonctionnement des Etats et des institutions régionales en Afrique centrale. La sous-région a enregistré son premier cas de COVID-19 le 6 mars 2020. A ce jour, tous les pays membres de la Communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique centrale (CEEAC) en sont affectés. A la date du 11 juin, 21.929 cas confirmés en laboratoire et 462 décès ont été enregistrés, selon l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS).
3. La crise économique est une conséquence majeure de la pandémie. Selon les projections des experts de la CEEAC, la croissance en Afrique centrale devrait connaître une contraction de 2.3% à cause de la pandémie. Cette situation affecte de manière disproportionnée la sous-région d’Afrique centrale, où de nombreux pays sont producteurs de pétrole. Le ralentissement des activités socioéconomiques dû à la COVID-19 prive les Etats des ressources dont ils ont besoin pour répondre à l’impact socioéconomique de la pandémie, avec le risque de créer des troubles sociaux. Puisque les gouvernements sont obligés de choisir entre les dépenses urgentes en matière de santé publique et les autres priorités, ils risquent de ne pas disposer de ressources nécessaires pour le bon fonctionnement des institutions nationales et le financement de réformes cruciales.
4. Je suis heureux de constater que les gouvernements et institutions régionales de l’Afrique centrale ont pu s’adapter au nouveau contexte de crise. Ils assurent la continuité de certaines activités cruciales. Ainsi, après l’adoption en décembre 2019 d’une ambitieuse réforme visant à renforcer son efficacité et moderniser ses structures, la CEEAC est en train de mettre en place ses nouvelles structures. La réunion ministérielle extraordinaire qui s’est tenue les 3 et 4 juin a permis d’examiner les progrès réalisés dans la mise en œuvre de la réforme institutionnelle, ainsi que la situation en République centrafricaine et les efforts régionaux contre la COVID-19. La réunion a adopté les quatre axes de la Stratégie de lutte contre la COVID-19 et ses implications en Afrique centrale. Ces quatre axes sont : (i) prévenir la propagation du virus ; (ii) limiter le taux de mortalité et gérer les cas positifs ; (iii) répondre à l’impact socioéconomique et sécuritaire de la COVID-19 ; enfin (iv) répondre aux problèmes de sécurité transfrontalière créés par la pandémie. Un Sommet extraordinaire des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement est prévu en juillet par visioconférence.
5. L’UNOCA est resté opérationnel en dépit de la pandémie et continue de mobiliser les entités pertinentes des Nations Unies pour soutenir l’organisation sous-régionale pendant cette période cruciale de son évolution. Un groupe de travail conjoint UNOCA-CEEAC a été créé à cet effet. J’ai aussi récemment tenu deux réunions virtuelles successives avec les Coordonnateurs résidents des Nations Unies dans la sous-région, afin d’assurer une coordination de leurs efforts au niveau des pays avec les initiatives régionales, notamment celles prises par la CEEAC. De plus, l’UNOCA est resté en contact étroit avec les missions et bureaux régionaux des Nations Unies, y compris la MINUSCA, la MONUSCO, le Bureau de l’Envoyé spécial pour la région des Grands Lacs et le Bureau de l’Envoyé spécial pour le Burundi, afin de promouvoir la cohérence dans les actions de l’ONU en faveur de la paix et de la sécurité en Afrique centrale.
Monsieur le Président,
6. La persistance des conflits armés dans certaines parties de l’Afrique centrale sape les efforts en vue de répondre aux défis posés par la COVID-19. Un certain nombre de conflits dans la sous-région se poursuivent en dépit de l’appel lancé par le Secrétaire général le 23 mars pour un cessez-le-feu mondial.
7. En ce qui concerne les droits de l’homme, je félicite les Etats pour leurs efforts en vue de limiter l’impact de la pandémie sur les droits économiques et sociaux, y compris en adoptant des mesures financières visant à préserver les emplois et apporter une assistance aux entreprises et aux couches les plus vulnérables de leurs populations. Je salue aussi les mesures de clémence prises par certains Etats en faveur des prisonniers, répondant ainsi à l’appel de la Haute-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme pour la décongestion des prisons afin de prévenir la propagation de la COVID-19 en milieu carcéral. Dans certains cas, les gouvernements ont adopté des mesures restrictives pour prévenir la propagation du virus, qui ont été perçues comme affectant l’exercice de certaines libertés fondamentales. Tout en reconnaissant la nécessité de telles mesures, il est important que les gouvernements veillent à ce que les forces de l’ordre les appliquent avec précaution et mesure, dans le respect des principes et standards en matière des droits de l’homme.
Mr. President,
8. Unfortunately, in these trying times for the governments and the populations of Central Africa, terrorist and armed groups have continued to destabilize the subregion. I strongly condemn deliberate attacks on civilians, and the destruction of private property and public infrastructure, including hospitals. I welcome the mobilization of the armies of Cameroon and Chad, including within the framework of the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight terrorism in the Lake Chad basin. Operation "Wrath of Boma", launched by the Chadian army between late March and early April, seems to have considerably weakened Boko Haram. However, experience shows that the countries of the region will only be able to eradicate the group through a well-coordinated strategy combining both military and non-military approaches, through the strengthening of the multinational force, and through initiatives aimed at addressing the root causes of the crisis, respectively. I would therefore like to call for greater international support in the implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haramaffected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin.
9. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), although weakened, continues to kill, loot and abduct civilians and children. During the reporting period, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been particularly affected. The fight against the LRA must be pursued to ensure that the gains made are not undermined. I therefore call on regional actors, including the African Union and ECCAS, and international partners, to strengthen their cooperation and mobilize the necessary resources to defeat the LRA, within the framework of the United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the activities of the LRA.
Mr. President,
10. The pressing question of the impact of climate change on peace and security in Central Africa remains a major priority in our efforts to prevent conflicts and sustain peace in this subregion. UNOCA has taken steps to strengthen its understanding of this impact in order to systematically integrate it into its analyses and conflict prevention activities, and to develop related partnerships.
11. The mounting threat of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea where an increasing number of acts of piracy has been recorded in recent months, emerges also as a top priority on our agenda. The fourth annual meeting of senior officials of the Economic Community of West African States, ECCAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, in charge of the Interregional Coordination Centre for the Implementation of the Regional Strategy for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea (ICC), originally scheduled for 27 March, had to be postponed due to the COVID19 restrictions. This meeting will provide the opportunity for the strengthening of regional coordination and cooperation, including through the ICC, which should be provided with adequate capacity and means for its functioning and the implementation of its programmes.
12. In addition to the above-mentioned regional challenges, the Central African States have pursued their efforts to improve good governance and respond to challenging internal situations that threaten their stability. In several countries, legal proceedings were instituted against prominent personalities over allegations of embezzlement of public resources. I would like to reaffirm UNOCA's support for the fight against corruption in Central Africa, while urging States to ensure a fair trial for those implicated.
13. In Cameroon, following the release of the Government’s investigations into the Ngarbuh attack, the army announced yesterday that three military officers were charged with murder and remanded in custody at the Yaoundé military prison. This new development demonstrates the commitment of the Government to bring to justice those responsible for the killing of civilians in Ngarbuh last February. In another development, on 8 June, the Cameroon Network of Human Rights Organizations recommended that the Government set up an independent commission of inquiry into the death of the journalist, Samuel Ajiekah Abuwe, known as Wazizi, similar to, and I quote, “the one that brilliantly operated following the tragic events of Ngarbuh in the North West region” – end of quote. Several other national and international nongovernmental organizations have made similar calls.
14. Further steps taken in the implementation of the recommendations of the Major National Dialogue, held from 30 September to 4 October 2019, are included in the report of the SecretaryGeneral tabled before you. The launch, on 3 April, of a presidential programme for the reconstruction and development of the North-West and South-West regions is another significant step forward that should be consolidated through the continuation of dialogue and the cessation of hostilities. I encourage the follow-up committee on the recommendations of the Major National Dialogue to continue to promote dialogue, including with the parties to the conflict, in order to ensure the protection of civilians and human rights and create conditions for the reconstruction and development of the two regions. I had the opportunity to discuss these issues with President Paul Biya, during the audience he granted me in Yaoundé on 13 May. I am concerned about continued challenges to humanitarian access in the two regions and urge the Government and the humanitarian community to reinforce their coordination and cooperation in order to facilitate the delivery of much needed assistance to the populations affected by the crisis.
15. In Congo, I urge the authorities to take the necessary measures to build confidence in the dialogue platforms provided for by the Constitution, including the Conseil national du dialogue and invite other stakeholders to participate in the latter in good faith.
16. I also welcome the efforts of Sao Tome and Principe towards a consensual judicial reform aimed at protecting the country from institutional instability, ensuring the independence of the judiciary and fighting corruption. The United Nations is supporting the Government in this process, and I maintain close contact with all stakeholders.
Monsieur le Président, Distingués membres du Conseil de Sécurité,
17. Comme vous pouvez le constater, l’Afrique centrale continue de faire face à de nombreux défis. La COVID-19 devrait amplifier ces défis dans des proportions que nous ne pouvons pas encore évaluer avec exactitude pour le moment. Toutefois, les mesures individuelles et collectives prises par les pays et la sous-région pour contenir la pandémie et relever les autres défis auxquels ils sont confrontés sont encourageantes et méritent d’être soutenues par la communauté internationale.
Je vous remercie pour votre aimable attention.
This Week in DPPA is a brief roundup of political and peacebuilding events and developments at UNHQ and around the world.
COVID-19Afghanistan – Building social cohesion crusial during COVID-19 crisis Central Asia – Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers in the region UNRCCA convened an online meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers of Central Asian states and Afghanistan on 11 June. The meeting served as a platform for the countries in the region to share their analysis and vision regarding regional challenges in the context of COVID-19 and ways to address them. The online event was chaired by Special Representative Natalia Gherman who in her opening statement underlined that “the COVID-19 pandemic has made it clear that we are now confronting shared threats more than ever before. The United Nations is striving to support each country and each region in its battle against the pandemic in any way possible.” “Regional cooperation on emergency preparedness can save lives and help ensure regional peace and security,” she concluded. Miroslav Jenča, Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and Americas, also attended the meeting. Read more here
Colombia - Former combatants continue to help communities during COVID-19
Peacebuilding Commission meeting on Central Africa |
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Critical role of Peace and Development Advisors highlighted
Security CouncilLouncény Fall: Impact of climate change on peace and security a priority SomaliaSwan: Unity of purpose among Somalis is indispensable Gender, Climate and SecurityNew joint report
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ASHGABAT, Turkmenistan
On 11 June 2020, the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy...
New York, 9 June 2020
There is more than enough food in the world to feed our population of 7.8 billion people.
But, today, more than 820 million people are hungry.
And some 144 million children under the age of 5 are stunted – more than one in five children worldwide.
Our food systems are failing, and the...
New York, 8 June 2020
The COVID-19 pandemic is a sharp reminder of how we are all intimately connected -- to each other and to nature.
As we work to end the pandemic and build back better, we have a once-in-a-generation opportunity – and responsibility -- to correct our relationship with the natural world, including the world’s seas and oceans.
We rely on the...
The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) was established on 3 June 2020 by Security Council resolution 2524, for an initial period of twelve months. The Mission was headquartered in Khartoum and had a mandate spanning the entire country.
UNITAMS’ overarching objective was to support the Sudanese democratic transition. To that end, the Mission was mandated by the Security Council to assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights and sustainable peace, as well as to support peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements, peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, and the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.
On 3 June 2021, the Security Council adopted resolution 2579 (2021) extending the mandate of UNITAMS by a further twelve months. The resolution retained the Mission’s original strategic objectives, while prioritizing some elements of the mandate, including: ceasefire monitoring as part of Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) implementation; support to the implementation of the National Plan for Civilian Protection; support to the peace talks; support to the implementation of power-sharing arrangements per the JPA; support to the constitution-drafting process; and capacity-building of the Sudan Police Force and the justice sector.
UNITAMS complemented the ongoing work of the United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes on the ground and worked closely with the Sudanese transitional Government and the people of Sudan in support of their democratic transition.
On 3 June 2022, the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNITAMS for a further year until 3 June 2023, according to resolution 2636 (2022). The mandate of the Mission was renewed again on 3 June 2023 for an additional six months, according to resolution 2685 (2023).
On 1 December 2023, the Security Council passed resolution 2715 (2023), which determined the termination of UNITAMS’ mandate on 3 December 2023, and stipulated for the Mission to complete the transfer of its tasks, where appropriate and feasible, to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes by 29 February 2024.
This Week in DPPA is a brief roundup of political and peacebuilding events and developments at UNHQ and around the world.
COVID-19Central Asia – The impact of COVID-19 on preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism
Women's role essential for a global ceasefire
Group of Friends of the Peacebuilding Fund discuss COVID-19
PBC meeting on socio-economic response to COVID-19 in peacebuilding contexts
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Security CouncilNew special political mission for Sudan
Central AsiaCentral Asia Launch of essay contest ColombiaRuiz Massieu: the implementation of the peace agreement is an achievement of Colombia and for Colombia
PalestineUnited Nations Forum on Palestine
OutreachElectoral assistance in focus at meeting with member States
Conflict-related sexual violenceLaunch of handbook
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Contact DPPA at dppa@un.org
The Secretary-General recognized the findings of the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (August 2021) -- that the world is facing unprecedented risks from climate change and that every region is affected – as a “code red for humanity”. Inevitably, given the magnitude of the climate emergency, its cascading effects extend beyond the environmental sphere and into the social and political realm. While climate change is rarely – if ever – the primary cause of conflict, it can act as a risk multiplier, exacerbating underlying vulnerabilities and compounding existing grievances.
Understanding and responding to climate-related security risks has become a strategic priority for the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), as is reflected in its Strategic Plan for 2023-2026. Such risks are highly context-specific, with impacts that vary across regions, countries and communities, requiring integrated analysis and responses as women, men and youth are affected in different ways. The risks are greatest where past or current conflicts have undermined the capacity of institutions and communities to absorb the additional stress brought on by climate change or adapt to the changing environment.
As the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, stressed in a briefing to the Security Council in 2020, climate change has major implications for our ability to prevent conflict and sustain peace around the world. This is true in contexts where DPPA manages special political missions (the majority of which are deployed in highly climate vulnerable countries according to the ND-GAIN Index) as well as in non-mission settings, where DPPA supports UN Resident Coordinators on conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, including through the Joint UNDP-DPPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention.
DPPA is making targeted efforts to adapt its practices and methods to a climate changing world, including by integrating climate change considerations into analytical and planning mechanisms as well as into prevention, mediation and peacebuilding strategies. Key activities include targeted analysis, coordination for action, environmental approaches to prevention, and the development of new guidance in DPPA core areas, such as the mediation of armed conflict. In line with its Security Council mandate, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia was the first UN field mission to deploy dedicated capacity on climate security to assess climate-related security risks, develop appropriate risk management strategies, and report findings to the Security Council. Similar efforts are underway in other contexts where the Council has recognized the adverse effects of climate change, among other factors, on stability. Since climate-related security risks are not felt equally by everyone, DPPA pays particular attention to the impact on women as well as the potential of women as agents of change.
Given the complex nature of the linkages between climate change, peace and security, DPPA pursues in integrated approaches and multi-layered partnerships. In an effort to promote approaches that combine peacebuilding with resilience and adaptation efforts, DPPA, through the Peacebuilding Fund, invests in a growing number of climate-sensitive peacebuilding projects around the world. The Department also seeks to strengthen partnerships with regional organizations, governments, civil society, and the research community to build on existing capacities, support local solutions, and strengthen the global evidence base on climate-related security risks.
An important component of DPPA’s efforts to understand and address the linkages between climate change, peace and security is the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM). Established in 2018 as a joint initiative between DPPA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), and joined by DPO in late 2021, the CSM seeks to help the UN system address climate-related security risks more systematically. See the CSM 2023 Progress Report here.
To this end, the CSM supports field missions, UN Resident Coordinators and regional organizations to conduct climate security risk assessments and develop risk management strategies. The CSM has also established a UN Community of Practice on Climate Security as an informal forum for information exchange and knowledge co-creation. The group – which convenes around more than 500 personnel from 25 UN entities – meets every few weeks and is open to all UN staff interested in this topic.
An additional priority for the CSM is capacity building to help strengthen our collective ability to advance prevention and sustaining peace in a climate-changing world. Jointly with partners, the CSM has developed a toolbox to help foster a shared approach to the analysis of climate-related security risks and shape integrated and timely responses. The toolbox is available to all practitioners and contains the following guidance documents:
14-16 November 2023, Cairo: Workshop on Multilateral Partnerships on Climate, Peace and Security
Please enquire here for more information.
Violent conflict is complex; its causes and consequences are not fixed in time or place. To better understand how to prevent and resolve conflict, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs studies the factors contributing to violence and how to address them. As it strives to innovate to meet emerging challenges in the realm of global peace and security, DPPA is, for example, researching and experimenting with new approaches that leverage digital technology in mediation and prevention, and is looking at the potential links between climate change and conflict.
This Handbook is intended to serve as a practical guide to support the implementation of the CRSV mandate by United Nations Field Missions, including Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions. It serves both as a guidance for civilians, military, and police personnel deployed to United Nations Field Missions and as a pre-deployment orientation tool for future Mission personnel.