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DiCarlo: "Achieving the landmark JCPOA took determined diplomacy. Restoring it will require additional effort and patience"


Thank you, Mr. President for the invitation to brief the Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015).


Diplomatic engagements in and around the Joint Commission to restore the Plan resumed in November 2021. But despite their determination to resolve political and technical differences, the participants and the United States are yet to return to full and effective implementation of the Plan and resolution 2231.


Achieving the landmark JCPOA took determined diplomacy. Restoring it will require additional effort and patience. Together with the Secretary-General, I therefore urge the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States to quickly mobilize in this same spirit and commitment to resume cooperation under the JCPOA.


In this regard, we welcome the step taken by the United States in February 2022 to reinstate waivers on nuclear non-proliferation projects. We again appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan and to extend the waivers regarding the trade in oil with Iran.


We also again call on the Islamic Republic of Iran to reverse the steps it has taken that are not consistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan.


While the International Atomic Energy Agency has not been able to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran, it estimates a total enriched uranium stockpile of more than fifteen times the allowable amount under the JCPOA. This includes amounts of uranium enriched to 20% and 60%, which is extremely worrying.


Moreover, on 8 and 20 June, the Agency reported that Iran had started to install additional advanced centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and began feeding uranium into advanced centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Fordow.


The Agency has also once again reported that its “verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol”.


In his latest report, the Agency’s Director General informed the Security Council that the decision of Iran to remove cameras at various locations and to place them and the data collected from them under Agency seals “could have detrimental implications”.


The Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s nuclear activities and to confirm their peaceful nature are key to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA.


Mr. President,


The Plan and resolution 2231 (2015) support our common objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security. In this regard, the bilateral and regional initiatives to improve relationships with Iran remain key and should be encouraged and built upon.


We also continue to encourage Member States and the private sector to engage in trade with Iran using available trade instruments to address ongoing challenges.


In addition to the issues with regard to implementation of its JCPOA commitments, it is also important for Iran to address concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to annex B of resolution 2231 (2015).


Mr. President,


I will now turn to the measures set out in annex B to the resolution, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s thirteenth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (S/2022/490).


First, on the nuclear-related provisions, no new proposals were submitted to the procurement channel in the last six months. The Council, however, received five notifications, submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B, for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan.


Second, regarding the ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States provided information to the Secretary-General and the Security Council concerning ballistic missile launches and the presentation of a new Iranian medium-range ballistic missile between November 2021 and February 2022.


We also received information from these same Member States about two space launch vehicle tests and two static engine tests by Iran between December 2021 and March of this year.


The information provided reflects divergent views among those Member States as to whether those launches and other activities are inconsistent with the resolution.


Third, we reported on our analysis and examination of information, from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, related to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).


This paragraph pertains to the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in Council document S/2015/546. This document includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other Unmanned Aerial Vehicle systems with a range of 300 km or more.


In the reporting period, we conducted a follow up visit to Riyadh, as well as a visit to Abu Dhabi, upon invitation of their respective authorities.


We examined the debris of nine ballistic missiles, six cruise missiles and several UAVs used in various attacks by the Houthis against the territories of Saudi Arabia and the UAE since 2020 and which were alleged to have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231.


We observed that the debris of the nine ballistic missiles and six cruise missiles had similar design characteristics and parts consistent with those of missiles it had examined previously and assessed to be of Iranian origin.


We also assessed these missiles and/or parts thereof to be of Iranian origin. However, we have not been able to determine when the ballistic missiles or parts thereof may have been transferred from Iran, in particular, whether such transfer(s) occurred after 16 January 2016, the date on which the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) came into force.


Finally, on the assets freeze provisions, we did not receive any information alleging actions inconsistent with these provisions of resolution 2231 (2015).


Mr. President,


The JCPOA was a triumph for non-proliferation and multilateralism. After many years of uncertainty, the Plan is now at a critical juncture. We hope that Iran and the United States will continue to build on the momentum of the last few days of talks, facilitated by the European Union to resolve the remaining issues.


Will we realize the promise of multilateralism and diplomacy by reaching a compromise on the remaining issues? Or will we simply let the painstaking efforts of many years slip between our fingers?  


The Secretary-General is convinced there is only one path to lasting peace and security for all Member States, and that is the one based on dialogue and cooperation. We hope that diplomacy will prevail. 


In closing, I would like to thank the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), Her Excellency Ms. Geraldine Byrne Nason, for her leadership throughout her tenure, as well as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.


Thank you, Mr. President.