UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL ROSEMARY A. DICARLO’S
REMARKS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON NON-PROLIFERATION
(IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 2231 (2015))
New York, 18 December 2023
Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).
Despite repeated calls on all parties concerned to renew dialogue and engagement aimed at a return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015), diplomatic efforts remain at a standstill. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General still considers that the JCPOA represents the best available option to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful.
In this context, the Secretary-General has stressed that it is essential for Iran to reverse steps that are not consistent with its nuclear related commitments under the Plan and which it has pledged are reversible. He has also underscored that the United States would need to lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan and extend waivers regarding the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In its most recent report, dated 15 November 2023, the International Atomic Energy Agency noted that, unfortunately, its verification and monitoring continues to be, and I quote, “seriously affected by Iran’s cessation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA”. The Agency is still unable to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in the country.
Nevertheless, the Agency estimates that Iran maintains a total enriched uranium stockpile more than twenty times the allowable amount under the JCPOA. This includes increased quantities of uranium enriched to 20% and 60%. Such a stockpile of enriched uranium remains a very serious concern.
Mr. President,
I will now turn to the restrictive measures set out in annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), as reviewed in the Secretary-General’s sixteenth report on the resolution (S/2023/975). The restrictive measures related to missile activities and transfers, as well as the asset freeze expired the day after 18 October 2023, in accordance with the resolution. Therefore, the report of the Secretary-General covers implementation of those provisions until 18 October.
First, on the nuclear-related provisions, no new proposals were submitted to the procurement channel in the last six months.
The Security Council, however, received three notifications, submitted pursuant to the nuclear-related restrictive measures for certain activities consistent with the Plan.
During the reporting period, the United States renewed waivers with respect to nuclear non-proliferation projects foreseen in the Plan and the nuclear-related provisions in annex B to resolution 2231 for another 180-day period.
Second, regarding ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom provided information to the Secretary-General and the Council concerning a test flight of a space launch vehicle conducted by Iran in September of this year.
The letters received from these Member States continue to reflect differing opinions on whether this type of launch is inconsistent with the resolution.
Third, we also examined information related to paragraph 4 of annex B.
This paragraph pertains to the supply, sale or transfer to or from Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in Council document S/2015/546 which require prior approval of the Council.
It includes the list of complete delivery systems and subsystems, as well as the associated components and equipment, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems with a range of 300 km or more.
At the invitation of the Government of Yemen, the Secretariat examined the debris of a cruise missile used in an attack by the Houthis on the Al-Dhaaba oil terminal in November of last year.
We observed numerous similarities relating to design, configuration, dimensions, manufacturers and part numbering between the debris seen in Yemen and previously examined components of cruise missiles used in prior Houthi attacks on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as with cruise missile components seized by the United States and United Kingdom.
The Secretariat assessed that the cruise missile used in the November 2022 attack was also of Iranian origin and may have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231.
This assessment was subsequently corroborated by the unveiling of a new Iranian cruise missile designated as “Paveh” and the release of better images of an Iranian jet engine.
The Secretariat determined that both the cruise missile and jet engine shared identical or similar design characteristics, structure and components with those observed in cruise missiles used in prior Houthi attacks or found in maritime seizures which have been reported to the Council.
In the reporting period, we also examined the ballistic missile components seized by the British Royal Navy in February 2023 and alleged to have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231.
These included an inertial navigation system and a re-entry vehicle nose cone. We observed again that these components had similar design characteristics or markings to those seen on components examined from the debris of previous ballistic missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
We also received letters from Ukraine and the United States reiterating their concerns about the alleged transfers of uncrewed aerial vehicles from Iran to the Russian Federation, in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B.
The United States also shared information, that it assessed to be clear evidence of the supply of these UAVs based on its analysis of debris recovered from attacks on Ukraine compared with debris collected from other theatres.
In response letters, the Permanent Representatives of Iran and the Russian Federation once again disputed these allegations. They dismissed the evidence presented by the United States and Ukraine as “utterly fabricated” and disputed any violation of resolution 2231.
In October, the Secretariat attended a briefing organized by the United Kingdom and the United States. The briefing included displays of various weapon systems, including the debris of UAVs reportedly recovered from Russian attacks against Ukraine in the fall of 2022, as well as similar UAV debris allegedly retrieved from attacks in Iraq and for which Iran claimed responsibility.
Israel submitted letters regarding multiple launches of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as uncrewed aerial vehicles, by the Houthis in October and November of this year.
According to Israel, these missiles and weapons were transferred to the Houthis by Iran on or before 18 October 2023 in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231.
Iran rejected these allegations as “entirely groundless” and the Russian Federation noted that they “are not substantiated with any proof[s]”.
The Secretariat noted that the information provided by Israel concerning the attack dates and types of weapon systems used is broadly consistent with statements and a video released by the Houthis.
While the Secretariat cannot confirm the authenticity of the video, we did note that the weapon systems displayed in it resemble those used in multiple prior Houthi attacks and which we assessed to be of Iranian origin.
Finally, the Secretariat received information from a Member State alleging actions inconsistent with the assets freeze provisions that the Secretariat was unable to corroborate.
Mr President,
The adoption of the JCPOA just over eight years ago was rightly and universally hailed as a historic breakthrough. Today, the hope the deal engendered has greatly diminished.
The United Nations will continue to urge the participants to exercise maximum restraint and to exhaust all available diplomatic avenues to restore the Plan. Indeed, the participants are responsible for its fate.
But whether the JCPOA succeeds or fails – especially at this extremely dangerous juncture in global peace and security – matters to all of us.
In closing, I would like to thank Her Excellency Vanessa Frazier for her leadership as Facilitator for resolution 2231, as well as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.
Thank you, Mr. President.