Welcome to the United Nations
  • Under-Secretary-General Rosemary A. DiCarlo in the Council meeting on non-proliferation.
Under-Secretary-General Rosemary A. DiCarlo in the Council meeting on non-proliferation. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

Security Council Briefing on the Fifth Report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), Under-Secretary-General Rosemary A. DiCarlo

Mr.  President, Members of the Security Council,

Nearly three years ago, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 (2015) to endorse the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Secretary-General, and the international community, welcomed the Plan as a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation.

Since Implementation Day, 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 11 times to the Security Council that Iran has been implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Notwithstanding the continued adherence by Iran to its nuclear-related commitments, the agreement is unfortunately at a crossroads.

On 8 May 2018, the United States of America announced its withdrawal from the agreement. The Secretary-General deeply regrets this setback to the JCPOA and believes that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.

At the same time, the Secretary-General calls on Iran to consider carefully the concerns expressed by Member States about Iranian activities that are allegedly contrary to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution. 


Mr.  President,  

I thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (S/2018/602).    As guided by the Security Council, and consistent with our last four reports, the one before you today focuses on annex B to the resolution. 

First, on the implementation of the nuclear-related provisions, I am pleased to report that the procurement channel continues to function effectively. Thirteen additional nuclear-related proposals were submitted to the Security Council for approval, bringing the total number of proposals to 37 since Implementation Day. 

However, in this reporting period, the Secretariat has received information from two Member States on the supply, sale, transfer or export to Iran of dual-use items that may have been undertaken contrary to the resolution.  The Secretariat has contacted the relevant Member States, who have informed us that they have initiated internal reviews. 

Iran in its response to the Secretariat stressed that it is the “responsibility of the exporting state to seek approval through the procurement channel” and encouraged more outreach activities to address the lack of awareness among some Member States.  The Secretary-General will report back on this issue to the Council in due course.

Second, in terms of ballistic missile-related provisions, the report reflects information provided by Israel and Iran to the Secretary-General and the Security Council on two ballistic missile launches by Iran in January 2018, as well as, our findings on the ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis into Saudi territory.

Since our last report, Saudi authorities brought to the attention of the Secretariat nine additional launches of ballistic missiles by the Houthis, which in their assessment were Iranian Qiam-1 missiles. The Secretariat was invited to examine the debris of three of those additional missiles. We provided preliminary observations, in our last report, from our examination of the debris of the missiles launched into Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017.

Based on the information and material analysed, the Secretariat assesses that the debris of the five missiles launched at Yanbu and Riyadh since July 2017 share key design features with the Iranian Qiam-1 ballistic missile.It is also our assessment that some component parts of the debris were manufactured in Iran.

We could confirm that subcomponents of the guidance system in these missiles were produced between 2002 and 2010. We note that the production date range of these subcomponents is incompatible with Scud missiles known to be in Yemeni stockpiles prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in early 2015.

However, we are at present unable to determine whether such missiles, or parts thereof, or related technology, may have been transferred from Iran after 16 January 2016, the date when annex B provisions came into effect.

The report also reflects information received from Israel regarding the possible presence of an Iranian drone in Syria, which was reportedly downed after entering Israeli airspace in 10 February 2018.

The Secretariat did not have the opportunity to examine its debris, but images provided by Israeli authorities show that its wing configuration appears consistent with that of an Iranian drone unveiled in October 2016. The report further notes that, according to Iranian media outlets, several Iranian drones have been deployed in Syria. The Secretariat has no information as to the owner and operator of those drones.

Third, as detailed in the report, the Secretariat examined arms and related materiel seized in Bahrain after 16 January 2016, and obtained additional information on the unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives recovered by the United Arab Emirates.  In both cases, the Secretariat is confident that some of the arms and related materiel it examined were manufactured in Iran.  However, we are unable to confirm whether these items were transferred from Iran after 16 January 2016.

The report also notes the 21 May 2018 statement by the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip that Iran has provided the Al-Qassam brigades and other armed groups in Gaza with money, military equipment and expertise. 

This statement suggests that transfers of arms and related materiel from Iran may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B. 

Fourth, the report highlights the participation of Iran’s Defence Industries Organization for the third year in a row in an arms and defence exhibition in Iraq.  It provides information on the foreign activities of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) in Syria.  Since both entities are on the 2231 list, their funds, other financial assets and economic resources on the Iraqi and the Syrian territories should have been frozen. 

The report also provides information on an additional travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. 

The Secretary-General has reiterated his call upon all Member States in the region to take the steps necessary to fully implement their obligations in relation to resolution 2231 (2015).


Mr. President,

In closing, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of His Excellency Ambassador van Oosterom of the Netherlands in his role as Facilitator for the implementation of this resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our excellent cooperation.

I would like to assure them, and the Security Council, of our fullest support for the continued implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).

Thank you, Mr. President.