Both Iran and the United States have been putting strain on the groundbreaking 2015 deal to monitor Iran’s nuclear programme, which remains a “cornerstone of international peace and security”, said the UN’s political affairs chief on Thursday.
Both Iran and the United States have been putting strain on the groundbreaking 2015 deal to monitor Iran’s nuclear programme, which remains a “cornerstone of international peace and security”, said the UN’s political affairs chief on Thursday.
The head of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office (UNOCT) has highlighted the importance of tolerance in combating the “corrosive spread” of violent extremism.
Thank you, Madame President, for convening today’s meeting on non-proliferation, which remains a cornerstone of international peace and security and a top priority for the international community.
In this regard, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue, and resolution 2231 (2015), are crucial to nuclear non-proliferation as well as regional and international security. We are encouraged by the broad international support for the Plan and the resolution. Their full and effective implementation is key to ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and to secure tangible economic benefit to the Iranian people.
We therefore regret the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the recent steps taken by Iran to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan.
Certain actions taken by the United States, since its withdrawal from the Plan, are contrary to the goals of the Plan. The re-imposition of its national sanctions lifted under the Plan, as well as its decision not to extend waivers for the trade in oil with Iran and certain non-proliferation projects, may also impede the ability of Iran and other Member States to implement the Plan and 2231.
Since July, under IAEA monitoring, Iran has surpassed JCPOA-stipulated limits on its uranium enrichment level, as well as limits on its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium. It has taken steps related to centrifuge research and development, and commenced injecting uranium hexafluoride gas into the centrifuges at the Fordow facility. Iran has stated that all these steps are reversible and that it intends to remain in the Plan. It is important that Iran returns to full implementation of the Plan, and refrain from further steps to reduce its commitments.
We welcome the initiatives of the other participants of the JCPOA, which should be given full effect as a matter of priority. In this regard, the recent decisions by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway to also join the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) are positive developments.
These actions can contribute to the goals of facilitating legitimate business with Iran and the preservation of the Plan. The Secretary-General encourages Member States and others to work with JCPOA participants to achieve these important goals.
At the same time, Iran should carefully consider and address the concerns expressed by Member States about its activities in relation to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution.
Excellencies,
Over the course of this year, tensions in the region have worryingly escalated. We witnessed attacks against oil tankers, strikes against a civilian airport, and a highly sophisticated and synchronized attack against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. Combined with acrimonious rhetoric, these developments have dangerously brought the region closer to a serious confrontation. Such an eventuality would be devastating and must be prevented at all cost. The Secretary-General continues to call on Member States to exercise maximum restraint and prevent further escalation amid heightened tensions.
Madam President,
I will now turn to the measures contained in annex B to the resolution, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s eighth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 and subsequent information obtained during the reporting period.
First, on the implementation of the nuclear-related provisions, we have not received new reports on the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B. It is vital that the procurement channel works effectively and efficiently to promote increased international engagement with Iran. All Member States and the private sector are encouraged to fully utilize and support this channel.
In this connection, we recall the 3 May 2018 announcement by the United States that involvement in certain nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B may be exposed to its national sanctions. We also note the announcement by the United States that effective 15 December 2019 it “will terminate the sanctions waiver related to the nuclear facility at Fordow”.
Exemption provisions in resolution 2231 allow for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of Iran under the Plan, subject to the relevant notification requirements.
Second, several Member States have provided divergent views on Iran’s test-firing of ballistic missiles in the reporting period, as well as a reportedly failed launch of a space-launch vehicle in August. Paragraph 3 of annex B calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.
France, Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States viewed the missiles reportedly launched by Iran to be category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and are therefore designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. By contrast, Iran and the Russian Federation stressed the lack of any reference to the MTCR regime in paragraph 3 of annex B. They further stated that Iran’s ballistic missile activities were not inconsistent with paragraph 3, as these missiles were not designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
Related to ballistic missiles activities, the Secretariat also received information from the United States that several shipments of HTPB (hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene) – a substance that can be used in solid missile fuel – were transferred to Iran in July and August 2017. We are examining this information and will update the Council accordingly.
Third, regarding arms-related restrictions, the Secretariat confirmed that 23 optical sights for RPG-7-type rocket propelled grenade launchers, part of a larger consignment seized in Aden (in December 2018), were delivered to end-users in Iran in 2016. This suggests that these optical sights may have been transferred from Iran to Yemen after 16 January 2016, which would be inconsistent with Iran’s obligations under resolution 2231. We had already indicated in our last report that the grenade launchers found in that seizure had characteristics similar to the Iranian-produced RPG-7-type launchers, such as markings and heat shields.
Further on the arms restrictive measures, the Secretariat – at the invitation of Saudi authorities – examined the debris of the weapons systems used in the 14 May attack on the oil facility in Afif, the 12 June and 10 August attacks on the Abha International Airport and the 14 September attack on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais.
Though the Houthis claimed responsibility for the 14 September attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais, their announcements on the number and type of weapons systems used do not correspond to the information that we have seen. The Houthis claimed that the attacks involved 10 UAVs.
However, the number of impact points observed by the Secretariat shows that the attacks involved a larger number, and different types, of weapons systems – which is consistent with the information provided by Saudi authorities. According to them, the attacks involved at least 18 UAVs, and 7 cruise missiles. In addition, since the publication of the report, United States has shared additional information with us regarding the debris of one of the UAVs, which indicated that this UAV traversed a location about 200km northwest of Abqaiq shortly before the strike.
At this time, we are unable to independently corroborate that the cruise missiles, or the recovered components we inspected, are of Iranian origin. I would like to stress, however, that this is our preliminary finding. We are still very much in the process of reviewing components and subcomponents recovered, as well as collecting and analysing additional information on these cruise missiles.
For example, we have recently received confirmation that some of the cruise missile components were, in fact, not made by the identified manufacturers but could have been copies. The Secretary-General intends to report back to the Security Council on our further findings.
Regarding the UAVs, the Houthis in Yemen are not known to be in possession of the specific delta wing type UAVs used in these attacks. The UAVs were found to be equipped with a type of vertical gyroscope that had been observed on an Iranian UAV reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016. Parts of the UAVs were also produced and transferred between Member States, after 16 January 2016, and as recently as 2018.
Based on our preliminary assessment, the Secretariat is unable to independently corroborate that the UAVs, or the recovered components we examined, are of Iranian origin. As with the cruise missiles, the Secretariat is still actively reviewing components and subcomponents recovered, as well as collecting and analysing additional information on these UAVs. The Secretary-General intends to report back on our further findings.
In addition, I would like to bring to your attention arms-related information that had become available since the publication of the Secretary-General’s report. At the invitation of the United States, the Secretariat travelled to examine arms and related materiel, alleged to be of Iranian origin, which the US seized in international waters off the coast of Yemen, on 25 November 2019. The seized items included anti-tank guided missiles, surface to air missiles, as well as parts of cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles. The anti-tank guided missiles that we saw had production dates as recent as 2018. Their container-launch units also had characteristics consistent with the Iranian-produced Dehlavieh anti-tank guided missile; we had made a similar observation of other ATGM container-launch units seized in Yemen in our sixth report to the Council. The Secretariat is still reviewing the information and will report back to the Council with additional details.
Finally, we were informed of additional travel allegedly untaken by the Commander of the Al-Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Major General Qasem Soleimani, to Iraq in October 2019. We also were informed of alleged cooperation between a Member State’s academic institution with an entity on the 2231 list, as well as several ongoing cooperation agreements in the construction sector between foreign entities and other entities on the list.
The Secretariat has requested clarification from relevant Member States and will report back to the Council.
Madam President,
The Secretary-General considers the full implementation of 2231 by all Member States as an integral component of our collective conflict prevention efforts. This has assumed greater importance in the context of current tensions in the Gulf. The Secretary-General, therefore, calls on Member States to avoid confrontational actions and explore avenues for dialogue and cooperation in the interest of international peace and security.
Let me conclude by acknowledging the leadership of His Excellency Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve in his role as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 and to assure him once again of our full support. I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.
The humanitarian situation facing civilians in many parts of Syria is “worse than when the year began”, the UN deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator told the Security Council on Thursday.
Obstacles to any lasting deal between Israel and Palestine continue to mount, the UN’s Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process told Security Council members on Wednesday, and only “concrete action” towards a two-State solution will change that dynamic.
Shifting balances of power are triggering “new and dangerous risks”, the UN chief told the Italian Senate in Rome on Wednesday, pointing to the need for more coordinated international responses, focused on solutions.
Extending the deadline for the establishment of a unity government in South Sudan has helped maintain a ceasefire but also disillusioned many citizens, the Security Council heard on Tuesday.
An average of nine children have been killed or maimed every day in Afghanistan so far this year, according to a new report from the UN Children’s Fund, UNICEF, which describes the country as “the world’s most lethal warzone”.
The search for peace will remain of “paramount importance” to Afghanistan as the country awaits the outcome of the recent presidential election, the top UN official in the country told the Security Council on Monday.
The UN envoy for West Africa and the vast Sahel region, told the Security Council on Monday that in recent months, the region has been “shaken by unprecedented violence”.
Our top stories for Friday include an exclusive UN News interview with Yemen Envoy Martin Griffiths; India’s new “discriminatory” citizenship law; a milestone smallpox eradication anniversary; helicopters deployed in DR Congo Ebola fight; Mediterranean migrant latest, and Chile’s deadly protests: UN report finds clear pattern of repression.
This Week in DPPA is a brief roundup of political and peacebuilding events and developments at UNHQ and around the world.
UkraineUN political chief visits Ukraine
Security CouncilUN Secretary-General urges DPRK and US to resume talks
EgyptAswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development in Africa SomaliaDelegations of AU, EU, IGAD and UN hold consultations with stakeholders in Baidoa and Jowhar The delegation continued to Jowhar, the capital of Hirshabelle state, on 11 December. Noting the country’s goals for 2020 are achievable with the strong collaboration among all stakeholders, the delegation encouraged “all Somali leaders, institutions and communities to engage in dialogue to agree a way forward, and to cooperate to realize the priorities for the year ahead.”
AfghanistanBalkh leaders call for stronger measures to protect children in armed conflict
|
|
Central AsiaTurkmenistan creates national strategy on prevention of violent extremism and countering terrorism
LebanonInternational Support Group (ISG) for Lebanon meets in Paris Northeast AsiaExpert consultations on Women, Peace and Security in Beijing
ColombiaWomen share their experiences in “building memory”
National social dialogue and forum to defend social leaders in Cartagena city
|
Subscribe to This Week in DPPA by clicking here: Sign Up Now
Contact DPPA at dppa@un.org
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has seen an increase in the number of reported cases of the deadly haemorrhagic virus Ebola linked to ongoing violence by armed groups targeting remote communities, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on Friday.
When warring parties in Yemen met in a renovated castle outside the Swedish capital last December for UN-brokered talks, they showed that perhaps there could be a way out of brutal conflict and the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the UN Special Envoy for the country said this week.
Escalating violence and insecurity in Mali have sparked an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, rendering 3.9 million people in need of assistance and protection – an increase of 700,000 since the beginning of the year, the UN said on Thursday.
Madam President,
Members of the Security Council,
There have been troubling developments related to the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – DPRK – in recent months.
The first relates to the resumed missile testing by the DPRK.
The launch of two missiles on 28 November marked the thirteenth time the DPRK has launched ballistic missiles or other projectiles this year.
More recently, on 7 December, the DPRK announced what it referred to as an important test at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground situated on the west coast, that would help to change the “strategic position of the DPRK once again in the near future”. Some experts believe that the word “strategic” refers to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability. Analysts have reported signs of a rocket engine test at the site having been conducted within the past few days.
The DPRK through its state media has announced the test of various new missile systems this year, including systems it has referred to as multiple-launch rocket systems as well as a new land-based short-range ballistic missile and a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
As is well known, Security Council resolutions, most recently resolution 2397 of 22 December 2017, prohibit the DPRK from, inter alia, conducting any further launches that use ballistic missile technology. Furthermore, according to the information available to the United Nations, the DPRK did not issue any airspace or maritime safety notifications.
The second development relates to the DPRK’s ongoing suspension of diplomatic engagements. The DPRK has yet to resume working-level talks with the United States; inter-Korean contacts have stalled; and the DPRK is forgoing some international engagements.
The third development relates to the DPRK’s warning of a “new path”.
The DPRK has set a new policy that it will not discuss denuclearization unless the United States’ so-called “hostile policy” is removed; it has set a year-end deadline for the United States to come up with a “bold” proposal agreeable to Pyongyang; and has warned that it would otherwise take a “new path”.
While it is unclear what the “new path” may entail, the DPRK Foreign Ministry stated on 30 November that we may see what a “real ballistic missile is in the not distant future”. In terms of timing, the Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea will hold a plenary meeting in “the latter half” of December, to “discuss and decide on crucial issues in line with the needs of the development of the Korean revolution and the changed situation at home and abroad”. Previous sessions of the Central Committee have seen the ruling party prepare for major announcements.
The Secretary-General is very concerned by the latest developments on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK’s reference to launching ballistic missiles and its threat of potentially taking a so-called “new path” in the coming weeks is deeply troubling. The Secretary-General is reiterating his call on the DPRK leadership to comply fully with its international obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, resume working-level talks with the United States, and work for peace and stability.
On 15 December 2017, the Secretary-General described the situation on the Korean Peninsula as the most tense and dangerous peace and security issue in the world. Significant progress was made in 2018 towards building trust, reducing the risk of war and opening channels of communication. The summits involving the leaders of the DPRK and the Republic of Korea and United States respectively gave rise to hope that it is possible to build an atmosphere conducive to advancing sustainable peace and complete and verifiable denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.
Today, however, and as mentioned, talks between the DPRK and the United States, as well as between the two Koreas, have stalled.
The Secretary-General calls on the parties to continue what they have started. It will require perseverance, political courage and painstaking diplomacy. He urges the DPRK and the United States to resume talks. Diplomacy can continue to reduce tensions that could otherwise set events on an unpredictable trajectory.
The Secretary-General calls for the international community to support the parties in their endeavours and to ensure the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The unity of the Security Council remains essential for achieving the goal of complete and verifiable denuclearization and creates the space for diplomatic initiatives to that end.
I would like to close, Madam President, by noting that a breakdown in diplomacy will not help the human rights or humanitarian situation in the DPRK.
Meeting the population’s basic needs of food, access to essential health services as well as to clean water and adequate sanitation, are a humanitarian imperative but also a basic human right.
While the primary responsibility to meet these needs lies with the DPRK Government, as is the case for any government toward its people, the United Nations Secretariat has consistently stressed the humanitarian imperative to provide humanitarian assistance when the basic needs of the population are not being met.
International humanitarian operations in the DPRK remain critical for over 10 million people – or around 40 per cent of the population. The United Nations Secretariat recalls that the measures imposed by the Security Council are not intended to negatively affect or restrict food aid and humanitarian assistance that is not prohibited by relevant Security Council resolutions. The United Nations Secretariat is encouraged by the Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee’s adoption of Implementation Assistance Notice Number 7 in August 2018, which provides guidelines for obtaining exemptions necessary to facilitate humanitarian assistance in the DPRK, as well as the improvements in rates and timeliness of exemption approvals.
Addressing the humanitarian needs in the DPRK requires an integrated response – for example, addressing water, sanitation and hygiene to also improve health and nutrition - to be effective and to save lives and prevent more suffering. I urge all Member States to fund life-saving humanitarian operations in the DPRK. Some USD 120 million are required to address the critical humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable 3.8 million people in 2019. A gap of USD 87 million remains.
Thank you, Madam President.
Recent developments concerning North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes are “deeply troubling”, the UN’s Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific said on Wednesday, briefed the Security Council.
The Geneva International Discussions (GID) held its 50th round on 10-11 December 2019.
Over the past decade, engagement by participants contributed to relative stability, while core security and humanitarian issues have remained unresolved.
We are now faced with a deteriorating situation on the ground and the participants’ diverging positions on key issues of the agenda have become further entrenched. Since August 2019, there are serious security challenges in the Chorchana-Tsnelisi area. People continue to suffer hardship. Restrictions to freedom of movement have been imposed on several occasions at crossing points with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Crossing points on the South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) have been closed for more than five months this year. This has caused an increased number of incidents, including detentions.
Although the 50th round took place in a business-like atmosphere, it was overshadowed by the above-mentioned challenges leading to intense exchanges. As in previous rounds, it was not possible to address issues relating to internally displaced persons/refugees due to a walkout by some participants.
We reiterated our calls for participants to reduce tensions on the South Ossetian ABL, for all crossing points to be reopened, for all detainees to be released, and for participants to engage constructively in dialogue — in Geneva, as well as in the Gali and Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs).
The Co-Chairs commended the commitment of the participants to the GID process and reminded them of the need to reinvigorate it in order to achieve concrete results on key issues of the agenda in the coming year.
The participants agreed to hold their next round on 31 March -1 April 2020.
Making the appeal is the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, who reports that online hostility against activists has increased since the announcement last month of international legal proceedings over the atrocities.
