Welcome everyone and thank you very much for coming here.
As I’m sure you will all agree, over the last few months the situation in Gaza deteriorated rapidly. This was the combination of three factors:
First is the humanitarian factor. People’s life has become more difficult as people have limited money, the economy has collapsed, electricity and water are scarce.
We cannot stand idle when we see 2 million Palestinians in Gaza living in such terrible...
United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres today (Thursday) announced the appointment of Major General Stefano Del Col of Italy as Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Major General Del Col succeeds Major General Michael Beary of Ireland, who will complete his assignment on 7 August 2018. The Secretary-General is grateful to Major General Beary for...
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a strategic partner of the United Nations on issues relating to political affairs and peace and security. The SCO has been an observer in the UN General Assembly since 2005 and starting from 2009, the General Assembly has included an item on “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” on its agenda every other year resulting in a relevant resolution.
In April 2010, the UN and SCO Secretariats signed the Joint Declaration on Cooperation, which includes information exchange and capacity building. In addition, SCO has also established partnerships with the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT).
The UN and the SCO pursued their cooperation, particularly in the area of peace and security, including counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism, and sustainable development. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), as well as UNRCCA (United Nations Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia) maintain regular contacts with the SCO Secretariat and its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent.
The United Nations Secretary-General and other UN high-level representatives regularly attend the SCO Summits.
Since 2017, DPPA has deployed a Liaison Officer to the SCO in Beijing.
I am concerned by the consequences of Israel’s decision to temporarily suspend imports and exports with the exception of basic humanitarian supplies through the Kerem Shalom crossing.
Humanitarian assistance is no substitute for commerce and trade. I urge the authorities to reverse this decision.
Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Gaza should also do their part by maintaining...
Bogotá, 5 July 2018 - The United Nations Organization in Colombia vehemently rejects and condemns the killings of human rights defenders and community and social leaders.
The upsurge in violence imperils the conditions for a true stable and lasting peace. The inhabitants of the regions most affected by the armed conflict are those who today are vulnerable to multiple violations of their collective and individual...
The Secretary-General is gravely concerned by the resumption of the military offensive in southwest Syria and its continued devastating impact on civilians. An estimated 750,000 lives are in danger and up to 325,000 people have been displaced. The Secretary-General fully supports today’s statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi. As the custodian of the 1951 Refugee Convention, he is the authoritative voice of the United Nations on refugees...
On 5 July, Security Council members will hold consultations on Yemen, receiving briefings from UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths via video-teleconference and from OCHA Director of Operations John Ging.
Collaboration between the United Nations Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UN DPPA) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been instrumental in fostering peace and stability across Europe and Eurasia for over three decades. This partnership is even more important as the OSCE region is facing challenges with both protracted and new conflicts.
The UN-OSCE partnership is founded on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and revolves around one overarching goal: to resolve political differences peacefully. The 1993 Framework for Co-operation and Co-ordination laid a foundation for the two organizations to harness their respective strengths and mandates to tackle pressing global challenges. The Framework has been reinforced by a host of agreements, including a joint statement of the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE in 2019 to complement the 1993 Framework, which has cemented high-level political collaboration and ensured co-operation on the ground. In the framework of the New Agenda for Peace, the two organizations are identifying complimentary ways for their work on peace and security. To deepen the cooperation between the two Organizations, in 2016, the Department of Political Affairs established a Liaison Office in Vienna. In addition to supporting senior-level and working-level engagements between both organizations on a broad range of issues, the Liaison Office channels expertise from various departments of the UN Secretariat to the OSCE, including by ensuring effective information sharing on relevant peace and security issues as well as relevant policy documents. The Liaison Office also supports inter-agency forums that are regularly organized to facilitate and support high-level and working-level engagements between both organizations.
DPPA's Policy and Mediation Division and the OSCE Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention Centre and its Operations Service signed a joint workplan for mediation support in 2014, outlining several practical areas of cooperation between the two organizations, including staff exchanges, access to mediation expertise and capacity building.
“Events on the battlefield” are the main spoiler to the peace process in Yemen, but political negotiations are the top overall priority for resolving the conflict, according to the UN’s envoy for the country, speaking exclusively to UN News.
Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,
Nearly three years ago, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 (2015) to endorse the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Secretary-General, and the international community, welcomed the Plan as a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation.
Since Implementation Day, 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 11 times to the Security Council that Iran has been implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Notwithstanding the continued adherence by Iran to its nuclear-related commitments, the agreement is unfortunately at a crossroads.
On 8 May 2018, the United States of America announced its withdrawal from the agreement. The Secretary-General deeply regrets this setback to the JCPOA and believes that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.
At the same time, the Secretary-General calls on Iran to consider carefully the concerns expressed by Member States about Iranian activities that are allegedly contrary to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution.
Mr. President,
I thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (S/2018/602). As guided by the Security Council, and consistent with our last four reports, the one before you today focuses on annex B to the resolution.
First, on the implementation of the nuclear-related provisions, I am pleased to report that the procurement channel continues to function effectively. Thirteen additional nuclear-related proposals were submitted to the Security Council for approval, bringing the total number of proposals to 37 since Implementation Day.
However, in this reporting period, the Secretariat has received information from two Member States on the supply, sale, transfer or export to Iran of dual-use items that may have been undertaken contrary to the resolution. The Secretariat has contacted the relevant Member States, who have informed us that they have initiated internal reviews.
Iran in its response to the Secretariat stressed that it is the “responsibility of the exporting state to seek approval through the procurement channel” and encouraged more outreach activities to address the lack of awareness among some Member States. The Secretary-General will report back on this issue to the Council in due course.
Second, in terms of ballistic missile-related provisions, the report reflects information provided by Israel and Iran to the Secretary-General and the Security Council on two ballistic missile launches by Iran in January 2018, as well as, our findings on the ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis into Saudi territory.
Since our last report, Saudi authorities brought to the attention of the Secretariat nine additional launches of ballistic missiles by the Houthis, which in their assessment were Iranian Qiam-1 missiles. The Secretariat was invited to examine the debris of three of those additional missiles. We provided preliminary observations, in our last report, from our examination of the debris of the missiles launched into Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017.
Based on the information and material analysed, the Secretariat assesses that the debris of the five missiles launched at Yanbu and Riyadh since July 2017 share key design features with the Iranian Qiam-1 ballistic missile.It is also our assessment that some component parts of the debris were manufactured in Iran.
We could confirm that subcomponents of the guidance system in these missiles were produced between 2002 and 2010. We note that the production date range of these subcomponents is incompatible with Scud missiles known to be in Yemeni stockpiles prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in early 2015.
However, we are at present unable to determine whether such missiles, or parts thereof, or related technology, may have been transferred from Iran after 16 January 2016, the date when annex B provisions came into effect.
The report also reflects information received from Israel regarding the possible presence of an Iranian drone in Syria, which was reportedly downed after entering Israeli airspace in 10 February 2018.
The Secretariat did not have the opportunity to examine its debris, but images provided by Israeli authorities show that its wing configuration appears consistent with that of an Iranian drone unveiled in October 2016. The report further notes that, according to Iranian media outlets, several Iranian drones have been deployed in Syria. The Secretariat has no information as to the owner and operator of those drones.
Third, as detailed in the report, the Secretariat examined arms and related materiel seized in Bahrain after 16 January 2016, and obtained additional information on the unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives recovered by the United Arab Emirates. In both cases, the Secretariat is confident that some of the arms and related materiel it examined were manufactured in Iran. However, we are unable to confirm whether these items were transferred from Iran after 16 January 2016.
The report also notes the 21 May 2018 statement by the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip that Iran has provided the Al-Qassam brigades and other armed groups in Gaza with money, military equipment and expertise.
This statement suggests that transfers of arms and related materiel from Iran may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B.
Fourth, the report highlights the participation of Iran’s Defence Industries Organization for the third year in a row in an arms and defence exhibition in Iraq. It provides information on the foreign activities of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) in Syria. Since both entities are on the 2231 list, their funds, other financial assets and economic resources on the Iraqi and the Syrian territories should have been frozen.
The report also provides information on an additional travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani.
The Secretary-General has reiterated his call upon all Member States in the region to take the steps necessary to fully implement their obligations in relation to resolution 2231 (2015).
Mr. President,
In closing, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of His Excellency Ambassador van Oosterom of the Netherlands in his role as Facilitator for the implementation of this resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our excellent cooperation.
I would like to assure them, and the Security Council, of our fullest support for the continued implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).
Thank you, Mr. President.
