Reports and Policy Documents

Mr. President and distinguished members of the Council,

Political update

Conflict in the east

UN activity

Conclusion

The International Support Group for Lebanon met on Tuesday in Berlin to discuss the impact of millions of Syrian refugees in the country and the region. The Group includes representatives from the UN and its specialized agencies, the Arab League, the European Union (EU) and the five permanent members of the Security Council. It was established in 2013 to mobilize support for Lebanon's stability and state institutions in the wake of the crisis in Syria.

Chairman's Summary

At the invitation of German Foreign Minister Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier a meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon was held in the presence of Prime Minister Tammam Salam preceding the ministerial “Conference on the Syrian refugee situation – supporting stability in the region”, on 28 October 2014 in Berlin.

Participants recalled their previous statements, including that issued after the last meeting of the Group which was convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 26 September 2014 in New York.

Participants recognized with respect and grave concern the tremendous burden Lebanon continues to bear in hosting nearly 1.2 million refugees from Syria registered or awaiting registration, equivalent to a 30 per cent increase in Lebanon’s population, following the massive influx of Syrians into Lebanon since March 2011. They paid tribute to the response of its people and government. They recalled that mobilizing assistance to refugees and vulnerable communities affected by the crisis had been among the core objectives set at the inaugural meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon on 25 September 2013 (SG/2198), and that this requires a coordinated humanitarian and development response and greater burden-sharing.

Participants noted the recent decision of the Government of Lebanon concerning its Syrian refugee policy. They encouraged the Government and UNHCR, with other UN agencies and partners, to cooperate closely to promote the effective management of the refugee presence.Participants will strive to support efforts leading towards durable solutions, namely repatriation in safety, abiding by the principle of non-refoulement, and resettlement. They reaffirmed their commitment to efforts under the auspices of the UN to achieve a political solution to the conflict in Syria which will create the conditions for refugees to return in safety, while recognizing that conditions for safe return could precede such a solution. In the absence of these conditions, participants reaffirmed their support to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in his efforts to identify alternative options, including through increased resettlement, admission based on humanitarian needs, admission schemes based on private sponsorship, facilitation of family reunification or the use of programs such as student or employment visas to third countries. Participants welcomed efforts already undertaken by UN Member States in this regard and called for their enhancement.

Participants recalled that Lebanon has the highest per capita ratio of refugees worldwide, and that the pressure on Lebanese infrastructure and services is proportionately greater than in any other country. Reaffirming their call for expedited donor assistance, participants recognized the commitment of the Government of Lebanon to address the socio-economic impact of the Syrian crisis in an integrated Lebanon Crisis Response Plan to ensure that the needs of the vulnerable are adequately met, and stabilization requirements addressed. They welcomed the programs developed by the Lebanese government aimed at strengthening the public sector in response to the Syrian crisis, for example in the field of education. They acknowledged that competition over access to public services can exacerbate communal tensions and thus negatively affects stability. Participants called for the provision of support targeting the needs of refugees and Lebanese communities and affected Government programs, as will be outlined in the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and the Government’s Roadmap for Stabilization and reflected in the “Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan” (3RP). They noted that a range of instruments has been developed to enable the provision of support based on the Government’s stabilization priority projects, including the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund. They stressed the need for the Lebanese authorities to have in place arrangements to ensure speedy approval for international assistance programs and swift project implementation.

Participants recognized the security related implications of the crisis that threaten the safety of host communities and refugees alike and the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to mitigate them. They pledged to closely cooperate in countering all forms of extremism. They welcomed ongoing international assistance to address Lebanon’s security concerns and underlined the continuing urgent need for international support to the Lebanese Army and the security forces, as elaborated at the last meeting of the International Support Group.

Participants again emphasized the crucial importance of national unity for stability and security and expressed support for the efforts of Prime Minister Salam and his Government in confronting the many challenges facing the country. They expressed deep concern however at the continued vacancy in the office of the President and its impact on the functioning of State institutions. They affirmed that, while the presidential election must remain a Lebanese process, free from foreign interference, it is vital that Lebanon’s political leaders act to resolve the issue in the interest of all in Lebanon without further delay.

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Mr. President,

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

Allow me first to convey to you all the best regards and wishes of success from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. I would also like to congratulate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fudan University, the United Nations Association of China and UNITAR for organizing this event – a unique opportunity to delve into the challenges of global governance from the perspective of cooperation between China and the United Nations.

I am delighted to be in China for the second time as Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

The United Nations welcomes the increasingly important role China plays across many areas of our work, including international peace and security. We share China’s view that peace and development go hand in hand. We welcome China’s determination to promote the reform of global governance with the United Nations at its core. We see China – with its long-term strategy of peaceful development, reform and opening-up – as our natural partner in this endeavour.

This September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the UN General Assembly that China would seek “to play a more proactive and constructive role in addressing international and regional hotspot issues to promote peace and dialogue, defuse conflicts and safeguard world peace and stability.” This is not only encouraging and vitally important, it is also what lies at the heart of the mandate of my Department and what I see as the pinnacle of our growing partnership with China and of the changing nature of global governance.

In my remarks today, I will therefore focus on how our efforts to strengthen the United Nations’ ability to prevent and resolve armed conflicts, in cooperation with Member States and regional organizations, mirror China’s pursuit of the “3 Cs”: “comprehensive, cooperative and common security”. I will provide you with a sense of how we carry out preventive diplomacy in practice, and share some lessons we have learned.

I am very pleased that my predecessor and friend, Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, who spearheaded my Department’s effort on conflict prevention, is present here with us today. I am sincerely grateful to Lynn for helping to turn DPA from what had been a largely analytical department into one that is also operational in the areas we are discussing today.

Ladies and gentlemen,

In our view, “Comprehensive, cooperative and common security” starts with conflict prevention. It is the raison d’êtreof the United Nations and lies at the heart of the Charter, whose drafters envisioned a strong preventive role for an Organization created to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.

In 2011, State Councilor and then Foreign Minister H.E. Yang Jiechi at a high-level Security Council debate on preventive diplomacy reminded us that the UN “should truly change the mindset of prioritizing treatment over prevention” and to “devote energy to early warning, conflict prevention and peace mediation”.

This is exactly what DPA has been trying to do, and what we would like to do more of in cooperation with China. While our work to prevent and resolve conflicts takes different forms, today I will focus on the Good Offices of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoys as pivotal in preventing conflicts from erupting and in bringing wars to an end.

However, I will also be very clear that we cannot do this alone – history shows that only when we cooperate closely with Member States and regional organizations do we have a chance of succeeding.

Our Special Envoys are perhaps the most visible manifestation of the Secretary-General’s good offices mandate. In a variety of contexts across the globe, from Myanmar to the Arab world, these Envoys are supporting parties to prevent, defuse or resolve conflicts. They do this with support and mandates from either the Security Council, as is usually the case, or the General Assembly, and they always work in the context of respect for national sovereignty and ownership.

In Yemen, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser has helped the Yemeni parties stay the course, thus far, in what remains the only negotiated transition of the Arab Spring. While I do not want to underestimate the fragility of Yemen’s institutions or the extend of the country’s challenges, the national dialogue that is currently taking place is the broadest consultation ever seen in the country, and a striking example of inclusivity, particularly women’s groups.

Yemen has deep, historic, regional, tribal, political, and even religious divides, and it has one of the most heavily armed populations in the world. Yet with the help of its regional and international partners, Yemenis remained determined to pursue a peaceful, negotiated transition.

In the African Great Lakes region, which has seen continued instability since the mid-1990s despite hosting the world’s largest UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, the United Nations and its regional partners helped broker an unprecedented agreement, signed by eleven African nations, aimed at bringing peace to the peoples concerned.

The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy – the former President of Ireland, Ms. Mary Robinson – has been working closely with regional leaders, international actors and civil society groups to advance the implementation of this agreement and turn the tide from violence to hope. This agreement is called the “Framework of Hope,” and it contains voluntary commitments made at the national, regional, and international levels to address longstanding issues of governance, development and human rights. The Framework of Hope grew out of the conviction by regional and international leaders that the security problems in the Great Lakes region cannot be addressed by security means alone.

Ideally, prevention starts before it becomes even visible: in situations of low-level tensions that may, in the long run, become more serious if left unaddressed, we support national governments, at their request, to strengthen local capacities for conflict prevention and dispute resolution, working hand in hand with development partners.

In the best cases, we have worked with local and international partners successfully to address issues before they hit the news rather than merely respond once a conflict has attracted media attention.

When electoral processes raise the prospects of heightened tensions and instability, we work with governments to prevent election-related violence. In Guinea, for example, the Secretary-General responded last year to growing violence and calls for electoral boycotts by appointing an International Facilitator. The facilitator, working with a larger UN team of technical electoral and mediation experts, assisted the parties in overcoming their differences, with all parties agreeing to compete in and then accept the final results of the elections. The new national parliament is being sworn in today in Conakry, demonstrating that elections created the political space to move forward in the process of democratic consolidation. The fact that you have probably not heard of the UN’s role and that you didn’t have to read about a breakdown into violence are, in our opinion, hallmarks of successful intervention.

Often, prevention is about the patient and painstaking work of envoys and missions to keep attention on some of the world’s most chronic problems -- and to keep them from deteriorating. Big picture success has for decades eluded those working to bring peace to the Middle East, or solve the disputes on Cyprus or the Western Sahara. Yet there is not a doubt that the day-to-day work of keeping dialogue open and bringing parties around the table is helping to keep a lid on tensions.

Let me also refer specifically to Northeast Asia and Asia. The rest of the world expects a lot from the people and countries from this region, which is generally peaceful and well-equipped to address locally any issues that arise. But the region is not immune from serious challenges. Again with full respect for national sovereignty and in line with the UN Charter that is the basis of our work, we are ready to work with you and other countries concerned to overcome any deficit of mutual trust and understanding, so that the region can continue to realize its creative and constructive potential.

Regrettably, prevention does not always work. However, even in cases where it has clearly failed, such as Syria or the Central African Republic, Good Offices offer a potentially successful path back to security and reconciliation: diplomacy must continue to get the parties to step back from the brink and face each other around a negotiating table. Political challenges lie at the center of most conflicts and are the key to both their prevention and their resolution. Only by finding political solutions can we ensure that peace, when it does come, holds over the long term.

I am planning to travel with the Secretary-General to Geneva next week for the peace Conference on Syria. We have worked very hard to get the parties to Geneva. We still don’t know if we will succeed. But we see this as the best hope for achieving a political solution that can end the violence and help restore peace to Syria. We have long said that there is no military solution that will end Syria’s crisis, and the attempt by both the government and the opposition forces to impose a military solution has created a humanitarian catastrophe. It should be obvious to all that the cost of a military approach is simply too high. We’re grateful to China for its support of the 30 June 2012 Geneva communique which holds out the promise of a political solution.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Hard-won experience over the years has taught us a number of lessons about what works in preventive diplomacy and mediation as critical elements to bring about the “3Cs”. I know that China, too, has accumulated important knowledge in this regard, both in Asia and further afield. We are very interested in hearing your views, learning from your lessons, and exchanging experiences.

We have learnt that being present early is critical. This not simply about getting the necessary information at an early stage of the conflict, but also about mobilizing rapid, effective and unified diplomatic action as soon as opportunities present themselves. As a Permanent Member of the Security Council, China’s role here is essential: we need Security Council support for early engagement.

Second, early engagement is only part of the puzzle. We also need to be skilled at what we do. Preventive diplomacy and mediation are complex and increasingly specialized fields, which require expertise in a wide array of areas, some quite technical and complex. We have, therefore, focused on building up expertise that can be rapidly deployed and available to United Nations envoys, regional organizations and Member States themselves.

Third, partnerships are key. The crises we face are too complex for any one organization or Member State to address alone. In a world where the nature of conflict has evolved, where terrorism and transnational crime often intersect with political grievances, partnerships are all the more important. The United Nations is working ever more closely with regional and sub-regional actors, such as with the League of Arab States on Syria and with the African Union in Somalia and Mali. Our cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides a solid foundation for engaging with the region and we stand ready to work even more closely together. As does China, we are also building a strong partnership with ASEAN, in line with its own goals of establishing an ASEAN community by 2015.

Fourth, the perhaps most important ingredient for success in preventive diplomacy is leverage. The Secretary-General of the United Nations commands no battalions and is not in charge of a Treasury. The tools he has at his disposal are largely the power of persuasion and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

These are powerful tools in their own right. They reflect a shared understanding amongst Member States, refined through decades of negotiations and practice, and are applicable universally. But to be effective, they require that the international community – and in particular the major global powers – be closely aligned, empowering the Secretary-General to speak on behalf of a common voice.

In Syria, we see how hard it is to make progress when this unity of purpose is not present. In Mali and Yemen, on the other hand, the international community was able to move quickly to prevent quickly deteriorating situations from becoming even more unstable. We are attempting to do the same today in the Central African Republic and South Sudan.

While some countries may see UN support in conflict prevention or peacemaking as a sign that a government has failed, this is not the case. Our role is to support national efforts, and it is with national actors that we work in every single instance.

Ladies and gentlemen,

To realize “comprehensive, cooperative and common security”, the case for diplomacy – and ideally preventive diplomacy - is compelling andwe know that it works. Not in every situation, or even close. But our experience tells us that if we are present in the trouble spots, with early and skilful diplomatic initiatives, backed by the unified stand of the international community and the necessary resources, we can be successful in either preventing conflict or keeping it in check.

China is a key actor in this endeavour, whose voice needs to be heard both on specific cases and in general debates about a twenty-first century approach to these vital global governance topics. This is why this dialogue is so important and why, I hope, it will grow and flourish in the years ahead. We are confident that our partnership with China will contribute to making the world more peaceful, secure and prosperous.

May I wish you all a happy, healthy and dynamic forthcoming Year of the Horse.

Thank you.

Mr. President,

Friends and colleagues,

Let me begin by thanking Brookings, and in particular Strobe Talbot, Martin Indyk and Bruce Jones, for the invitation to speak about the UN’s diplomacy in today’s crises. I credit Martin, in fact, for how my career evolved: when I worked for Martin as a “Gaza watcher” from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, I had not planned to spend the rest of my State Department tenure in the Middle East and North Africa. Martin’s passion and leadership inspired me to do just that. Martin also had the good sense to encourage me to get to know Bruce Jones, then with the UN, to explore how the U.S. and the UN could work together to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace. Given the leadership role Norway plays in promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts including through funding and organizing UN mediation efforts, I am particularly grateful for Ambassador Strommen’s participation here today.

It is a pleasure to be here and to see so many familiar faces and such interest in the United Nations.

It was exactly a year ago this month that – after nearly 30 years at the State Department – I took up the position as head of the UN’s Department of Political Affairs. It has been an interesting twelve months.

For those who do not know it, the Department of Political Affairs works at the center of UN preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. It oversees political missions and peace envoys abroad, and the UN’s support for free elections worldwide. It monitors political developments around the globe and works hard to mobilize action at the international level to prevent and resolve conflict. One could say that the Department of Political Affairs, or DPA, plays a similar role within the UN that the U.S. State Department plays within the U.S. Government, in that we advise the Secretary-General on peace and political issues and manage UN political efforts in the field. But, as I shall explain, that parallel only goes so far.

Today I am delighted to be back in Washington, familiar terrain, but my vantage point has changed. To illustrate my new, UN perspective, I will attempt to answer two questions:

• First, what are the main differences in working on peace and security issues in the multilateral setting of the UN versus U.S. bilateral diplomacy?
• And second, what are some of the key challenges the UN faces in doing this work?

In answering these questions, I will open with some general comments about the work of the UN and then use some specific geographic examples to illustrate our methods.

On the first question – differences between multilateral and bilateral diplomacy -- I underestimated the time and effort I needed to adjust to a far greater change than I had anticipated. As an English native speaker I had assumed that I would have no difficulties in “reading comprehension” at the UN. It could not have been further from the truth: 193 nations are far more creative than a single one – getting fully proficient in UNglish is enriching even for those of us who grew up with Webster’s and the Oxford English Dictionary.

But, more seriously, until you leave the U.S. Government you cannot fully grasp what it means to walk into a room backed at all times by the tangible power of the Presidency, the Pentagon and the dollar, the voting weight at the IMF and World Bank, and a permanent seat in the Security Council. They were assets that – almost without noticing – I carried with me as U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State. Yes, of course when serving the U.S. Government, one is vaguely aware of the “package” one carries into a meeting. And one of my best educational experiences in the U.S. Foreign Service was observing and learning from experienced foreign policy practitioners, like Martin and Strobe, how to use those powers. But if one has spent an entire diplomatic career with those assets, as I did, it is something of a shock suddenly to be without them. Initially I felt a sense of almost diplomatic nakedness: you mean I now have to rely only on my own powers of persuasiveness?

But at the UN, I learned from watching my new colleagues that UN officials also wield important sources of power as they try to coax antagonists toward peace. But the UN powers are quite different from what U.S. diplomats carry with them to meetings. Learning how to use intangibles -- ideals, principles, values -- has been at the top of my own UN education.

Placed on our shoulders, for example, are the principles of the UN Charter and the legitimacy derived from the universal membership. The principles and ideals that gave birth to the UN, it is worth remembering, derive from U.S. leadership and vision.

Another of the UN’s strengths is its perceived impartiality, which allows us to talk to all sides and play the honest-broker role that others often cannot. And here again that universal membership helps: to crises, we can deploy negotiators and missions that are diverse and with regional and substantive expertise. This can help win quick respect of the parties concerned.

Moreover, our goal is to prevent and resolve conflicts, period. We do not pick winners or losers. Think about when the UN reports to the Security Council: While our reports can be, and often are, criticized, the UN has an ability to shape international perception of an issue that would be different, say, than when the U.S. Government issues a report on something in which the U.S. has a vested interest in a certain outcome.

This UN leverage, you might think, is less than what the U.S. has. But the legitimacy that the UN can convey to decisions on peace and security cannot be replicated by any one nation, no matter how powerful.

A further difference for me was trying to master, after all the years thinking about the Middle East, a conflict portfolio that is global as opposed to regional. My geographic experience from the State Department was of little use as I walked the corridors of the African Union for the first time, struggled to grasp the challenges we faced in the Central African Republic or Mali, or during the visits I’ve made to Ashgabat and Kathmandu.

What remains the same, however, whether viewed from Foggy Bottom or from Turtle Bay, is the political nature of most conflicts and, thus, the centrality of political solutions.

Yes, the UN can use troops – and often needs to – to stabilize and to provide security on the ground. The UN deploys over 110,000 troops around the world, second only to the United States. And, yes, UN humanitarian actors help to diminish the suffering of victims of man-made or natural disasters.

But lasting solutions to conflicts requires working the politics in tough places. The day I took office, the Secretary-General instructed me to strengthen our diplomatic engagement across the board, to do better on early warning, preventive diplomacy, and conflict mediation. Ban Ki-moon has made prevention – from prevention of childhood disease to prevention of armed conflict – the centerpiece of his leadership at the UN.

And this is what we are trying to do, with varying degrees of success, in numerous arenas today, often in evolving and complex operating environments, in which problems of state failure and internal conflict have been magnified by cross-border threats, such as terrorism and the rise of organised crime, by military coups, and by changing patterns of violence. And in doing this, we are trying to use established tools as effectively as possible, while also developing new approaches. It is worth remembering that the UN was established a result of a world war between states. But more often than not, conflicts now emerge within states, meaning our tools and engagement must constantly evolve as well.

Let me focus now on a few of these cases, and highlight what the UN brings to the table in doing politics in tough places: Syria, Somalia, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and Afghanistan.

I will begin with Syria. Nothing has been more painful than to watch the Syrian crisis unfolding ever more tragically every day, and sowing instability across the entire region.

The Syria crisis is an example of the challenges the UN faces when sharp divergences of perspectives paralyzes the Security Council. UN tools that some might consider as potentially useful – an arms embargo, sanctions, perhaps even reference of the Syria file to the ICC – simply aren’t available, given the Security Council deadlock. So what do we do?

First, one important aspect of the UN’s work regarding the Syria crisis is mobilizing support for humanitarian relief and delivering humanitarian assistance to those affected by the fighting. The humanitarian actors lead these efforts, obviously, but there are political aspects as well: the Damascus office of UN-League of Arab States Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi has, drawing on the impartiality of the UN, brokered with government and opposition forces some localized cease-fires to get assistance across constantly changing front lines.

Second, we are working as best we can to limit the damage to Syria’s neighbors of the spillover from the conflict. We promote ways to support host communities and government institutions, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon, to help mitigate what could easily become destabilizing factors stemming from the inflow of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Drawing on the fact that, while divided on Syria, the Security Council is united on Lebanon, we have also sought to strengthen political support for Lebanon.

Third, the UN has also organized post-conflict planning. These efforts do not presume any particular political outcome but do assume that, when the guns fall silent, the UN will be expected to play a role in rebuilding a shattered country. We have prepared a number of scenarios for UN action that will depend on the circumstances and on what the Syrian people themselves might request from the UN.

Our primary political role, of course, is promoting a political solution for Syria. We could not have more capable mediators than, first, Kofi Annan and, now, Lakhdar Brahimi. And only the UN can offer the broad umbrella of impartiality under which parties and their supporters can arrive at an internationally legitimized settlement in confidence that their interests could be protected.

But it has been an uphill struggle from the onset. All of our bleakest predictions seem to be coming true. Whenever a slight opening appears for advancing a political solution, dynamics either on the ground or among international and regional actors interfere.

Neither side in Syria has been ready to talk peace seriously. The Government has continued to depict what is a full-blown civil war, rooted in real grievances, as the work of a handful of foreign-backed terrorists. The opposition has remained mired in its conflicts and fragmentation.

Still, we remain convinced that there is no military solution. The belief by some that there is a military solution is leading to Syria’s destruction. We stand ready to host a peace conference as soon as possible in support of the Kerry-Lavrov initiative announced on May 7, and I participated in the two Russian-U.S.-UN trilateral preparatory meetings chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi in Geneva in June. But with current developments on the ground, the conference date keeps slipping.

In the end there is a need for a new politics in Syria – and urgently so: with every additional day of fighting, lives are lost, hatred rises and a united, multicultural, peaceful Syria becomes an ever more distant reality. If the key powers can help deliver the parties to the table, there is still a chance, based on the Geneva Communiqué, for a negotiated transition in Syria.

Let me turn now to Somalia, where we have reached a potential turning point. I was in Mogadishu just two weeks ago, my second trip there in 2013. For the UN, Somalia represents the challenge of how, in the face of so many crises demanding attention, the UN can help to sustain regional and international focus on a process that has the promise of real success but that still needs to be nurtured.

Since the early 1990s, it had been perhaps convenient to look away from Somalia in despair. But clearly one of the lessons of the past decade -- from Kabul to Mogadishu to Bamako – is that failed and failing states pose an unacceptable danger not only to their own people but to the region around them and the world at large.

And so the task ending anarchy and building security and a stable government in Somalia took on great strategic as well as humanitarian significance. The UN has invested heavily along with partners including the African Union and key governments such as the United States to try to turn the tide in that country.

The UN helped mediate the 2008 Djibouti Agreement, which laid out a roadmap for transition that was completed last August when Somalis elected a new Government. The UN helped broker some of the understandings between clans and regions that led to the end of the transition period.

Today, the country has, for the first time in decades, a leadership that is committed to building the state. The archetypal failed state has before it the best chance in a generation to build a stable government and bring a measure of peace and prosperity to its people.

Of course diplomacy is only one side of this story. It was a major security intervention by the African Union that fundamentally turned the tide against Al Shabab. The United States helped get that AU mission, AMISOM, off the ground and secure UN support for it. Part of our task today is making sure AMISOM continues to receive financial and political support, for the Somali security services are not yet able to extend authority across the entire state. Somalia still needs AMISOM, and AMISOM still needs financial and logistics support from the international community.

The very real security gains provided already by AMISOM have helped pry open space for serious political work. For the first time since the 1990s, the UN’s political mission for Somalia operates in Mogadishu, not Nairobi. Our political engagement inside the country includes helping to address the relationship between the federal government in Mogadishu and the regions, including Somaliland and Puntland. Our Special Representative in Mogadishu is also helping to manage the evolving relationships between Mogadishu and its neighbors, whose support remains essential to Somalia’s success.

Security is still a concern – a UN compound was attacked by terrorists last month – and we do not underestimate the obstacles ahead in Somalia. But we remain committed and determined to stay. Others need to remain focused on support for Somalia as well.

In the Great Lakes Region of Africa, we can see how the UN has addressed a long-standing challenge, a problem that seems almost immune to solutions – instability in the eastern Democratic Republic – with a new, expanded approach that offers a ray of hope.

MONUSCO, the UN’s peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is the UN’s largest. It remains an essential tool for the protection of civilians and to promote stability. But, recognizing that security tools alone were insufficient to solve the problems of the eastern DRC, the Secretary-General at the beginning of this year concluded a political agreement among 11 countries – the DRC and its neighbors – and four organizations, including the UN and the African Union. Dubbed the 11+4 agreement, this framework codified commitments from the DRC, the other national signatories, and the four organizations.  

In addition, the Secretary-General appointed Mary Robinson, the former President of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, as his Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, to use the framework to end the recurring cycles of violence, including horrific sexual violence. Besides working at the senior leadership level, Special Envoy Robinson is also drawing in grass-roots civil society and women’s organizations to a comprehensive political approach.

We also welcome the recent appointment of the U.S. envoy for the Great Lakes and the U.S. commitment to work closely with Mary Robinson in support of the 11+4 framework.

To add economic incentives and underline the linkage between security and development, the Secretary-General and Jim Yong Kim, the President of the World Bank, recently travelled in the region in what was the first joint mission of this kind.

Moreover, the Security Council has authorized a new intervention brigade within the UN’s peacekeeping mission in the DRC. This is intended to establish a deterrent that should give some breathing space for renewed political and diplomatic efforts.

In summary, we are bringing our convening power, diplomatic, peacekeeping and financial assets into play to encourage a comprehensive approach to the challenges in the Great Lakes. We cannot afford to let this new opportunity slip away.

Regarding Afghanistan, the UN is viewing our engagement in light of the significant changes that will take place with the withdrawal of ISAF troops and the presidential elections in 2014. My colleagues in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations have the lead in Afghanistan, but DPA is heavily involved in strategic thinking as well. Among other challenges, Afghanistan is a good example of how even the United Nations – like the United States -- needs to be sensitive to concerns of national sovereignty.

In March, the Security Council renewed the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for an additional year without major changes and thereby signalled a desire for continuity in the mission’s role, including its good offices on elections; reconciliation and regional cooperation.

Many of our Member States see a similar role for the UN post-2014. However, some actors in the current Afghan Government have indicated skepticism regarding a continued political role for the UN. They argue this role could “interfere” with Afghan sovereignty. UN diplomacy will require finding compromise and consensus among different interests to allow the Organisation to continue to assist Afghans in the most effective way without compromising the country’s sovereignty.

One way for the UN to engage, of course, is to work regionally, where Afghanistan is one among several partners. The UN’s Regional Centre in Central Asia based in Ashgabat, another one of DPA’s overseas missions, is actively involved in the Istanbul Process and working with the governments of the region to identify common projects and approaches which build trust and thereby prevent conflict and instability in the long term.

To illustrate our work on more “classic good offices,” let me also touch briefly on Yemen and relations between Iraq and Kuwait:

Yemen, in my view, is an excellent example of how the UN complements the work of other partners. It is the only country in the region to emerge from the so-called Arab Spring with a consensus blueprint for a peacefully negotiated transition. The GCC countries and bilateral partners such as the United States deserve our applause in promoting the power-sharing and transition roadmap known as the GCC initiative, finally signed by former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in November 2011. I believe that the leverage in terms of real power politics by certain GCC countries and the U.S. was essential in persuading Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down.

But Saleh’s signature was only one step in a long and complicated process. A national dialogue had to be organized, with a secretariat set up and committees established, to draw up principles on which a constitution would be drafted. Various understandings had to be brokered, lest the nascent dialogue process collapse. Powerful parties and individuals had to be persuaded to put their trust in the process. All these complicated aspects of implementation have been overseen by the UN, through the Secretary-General’s special envoy.

While considerable work remains before elections can be organized as scheduled in 2014, let us remember that Yemen has one of the most heavily armed and severely tribalized societies in the world, not to mention enormous economic and social challenges. The fact that the Yemenis themselves remain by and large inside the political process speaks volumes about the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy and partnerships.

On Iraq and Kuwait, the Security Council passed a resolution on June 27 that praised the relationship between the two countries, lifted some of the Chapter VII obligations on Iraq regarding Kuwait, and that was drafted with the full cooperation of both Iraq and Kuwait working in partnership. Moreover, the two countries have been maintaining their border together. For those of us who remember the 1990-1991 period, this is a remarkable turn-around. Credit is due first and foremost to the Kuwaitis and Iraqis themselves. But this is also an area in which I believe UN diplomacy, complemented and backed by the U.S. efforts in both Kuwait and Baghdad, made a real difference.

Both Yemen and Iraq/Kuwait demonstrate the importance of complementary action of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy: when we combine our strengths, lasting solutions can be found.

Ladies and gentlemen,

As we deal with tough politics in all of these arenas and others that might come up in the discussion afterwards, a number of challenges emerge across the board.

First, going from early warning to early response. Although we are still sometimes caught off guard, our single biggest challenge is not to improve early warning, but to find ways to mobilize early action – rapid and unified diplomatic action – as soon as opportunities open up. This is particularly important when we need to prevent mass loss of life. Successful early interventions are far less costly in blood and treasure than conflicts and peacekeeping, obviously.

But political space for early interventions is often extremely limited, due to concerns over sovereignty and interference in internal affairs. The UN cannot simply force itself upon the parties to a conflict; it can only mediate where there is willingness and consent. Sovereignty issues and other questions that affect our ability to broker peace and prevent atrocities are currently at the heart of a major internal process at the UN of learning from the lessons of failure to prevent atrocities in Sri Lanka.

Second, professionalising the service. Yes, there is an art to diplomacy and there always will be. However, in today’s complex peace processes, even the most skilled diplomat needs access to a broad range of technical expertise. Through relatively new instruments, including a stand-by team of mediation experts who can be deployed to any negotiation setting in the world within 72 hours, we are adding more than a dose of science to the art. This kind of mobile assistance – on issues such as power-sharing, constitution-making, mediation process design – is in such demand that we can barely keep up. And let me here salute Norway again, as Norwegian financial, intellectual, and logistics support has made this stand-by team possible.

My third point relates to security, a subject quite familiar to U.S. diplomats as well. Our work is becoming more and more dangerous. Mogadishu was only the most recent reminder. When our mobility is restricted due to security, our ability to deliver on our mandates is seriously compromised. In short, we, too, face the dilemma of trying to do effective political outreach while hemmed in behind T-walls, razor wire and sandbags.

Finally, let me end how I started, with leverage. Equipped with neither offensive battalions nor billions of available dollars, what leverage does the UN have – beyond the UN’s broad legitimacy I spoke of earlier?

The real challenge is finding ways to build consensus and to get the international community to speak with one voice.

When it is united, the leverage is high. On Yemen, we have a united Council. On Syria, we do not. It is hard to overstate the difference that makes.

Doing politics in tough places is not easy. But it is my strong belief that we have no alternative but to maintain the momentum around diplomacy and ensure that we stay focused, in every engagement, on finding political solutions.

And that we pool our efforts for peace. For while bilateral and multilateral diplomacy may work differently, when they combine their clout the results can be powerful. We need the best of both to succeed in today’s tough places.

Thank you very much.

I am visiting the Central African Republic today to express the grave concern of the United Nations about the deteriorating security and human rights situation in the country and to convey the solidarity with the people who are suffering and extremely vulnerable at this moment.

How to stop the suffering, ensure that security is restored and to help the Central African Republic back on a path to legitimate constitutional rule was the subject of my discussions in Cameroon on Saturday and again today in Bangui with Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye and with representatives of political parties and civil society.

I have also spent time today with our team in the country. They have been doing their best under very difficult circumstances under the leadership of SRSG Vogt.

I met yesterday in Yaounde with UN staff who had to be temporarily relocated until security permits them to return to their jobs. Many of our own staff also face uncertainty and had their homes and personal property looted.

Of course our primary concern remains with the people of the Central African Republic.

Foremost at this time is the urgent need to establish law and order throughout the country and to protect civilians from abuse.

There must be a stop to the killing, the looting, the attacks on civilian population, the violations of human rights and the violent confrontations targeting segments of the population.

There must be an immediate stop to acts of sexual violence, and a stop to the recruiting of children into armed groups.

Those who have seized power must shoulder their responsibilities and control those elements under their command. The Secretary-General believes firmly there should be no impunity for violence and crime.

All actors, including Seleka, should facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid. The extensive looting of humanitarian aid agency offices and warehouses and the disruption of vital humanitarian aid are having a devastating impact on the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians.

The authorities must move quickly to establish security, with support from all who are in a position to help fill the vacuum. ECCAS has made a welcome announcement last week of its intention to increase the numbers of regional forces. More support may be needed.

In my meeting with the Prime Minister in Douala on 20 April, I have urged him to exercise leadership in helping to restore calm throughout the country.

On the political front, there must be a full return to constitutional order, as the United Nations, the African Union, ECCAS and many in the international community have demanded. We continue to emphasize that this transition should be carried out in an inclusive and transparent manner, in accordance with the Libreville Accord signed in January this year.

Winner-take-all politics has caused grave harm in the past. A peaceful future will require dialogue and compromise between Central Africans.

Let me add that the international community also has an important responsibility. It must remain focused on the Central African Republic and to provide sustained and timely attention and resources.

The Central African Republic cannot continue to be the “forgotten crisis” that emerges briefly on the international radar screen and then slips back into oblivion until the next tragic flare-up.

After security, humanitarian needs are paramount at the moment. With the current humanitarian appeal at just over 20% funded, we are calling on donors to increase urgently their contributions in order to address the immense needs and help to prepare us to move forward as security conditions permit.

The United Nations is looking at how it can enhance its assistance. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has expressed his deep concerns.

My discussions here will help to inform a report he will be making to the Security Council in the coming days, as we look to see how best the UN can use all of the instruments at its disposal to help build the environment of peace and security that the people of the CAR so badly need and deserve.

Thank you.

Excellences,

Je me réjouis de vous retrouver à Bamako pour discuter comment nous pouvons au mieux harmoniser nos efforts en soutien au Mali. Depuis la dernière réunion du Groupe de soutien et de suivi, le 5 février à Bruxelles, la communauté internationale a continué d’intensifier ses efforts pour contribuer à la résolution de la crise au Mali. Comme vous le savez, le Secrétaire général a présenté son rapport sur la situation au Mali le 26 mars au Conseil de sécurité, et nous attendons une décision du Conseil dans les jours à venir. I am delighted to once again join all of you here in Bamako to discuss how we can best align our efforts in support of Mali. Since the last meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group on 5 February 2013 in Brussels, the international community has continued to intensify its efforts in support to the resolution of the crisis in Mali. As you know, the Secretary-General presented his report on the situation in Mali to the Security Council on 26 March and we expect the Council to take a decision on Mali in the coming days.

Dans le même temps, la stratégie intégrée des Nations Unies pour le Sahel est en cours de finalisation et nous espérons qu’elle servira d’outil pour s’attaquer à certaines des causes du conflit au Mali et dans le Sahel. Je salue la présence parmi nous l’Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général pour le Sahel, M. Romano Prodi. M. Prodi partagera avec nous sa vision sur la façon dont la communauté internationale pourra aider le Sahel à surmonter les défis profonds auxquels il est confronté. At the same time, the UN integrated Strategy for the Sahel is being finalized and we expect it to serve as a long term instrument to address some of the structural and underlying causes of the conflict in Mali and the broader Sahel region. I am delighted to have with us today Mr. Romano Prodi, Special Envoy if the Secretary-General for the Sahel. Mr. Prodi will brief us on the UN Sahel Strategy and will share his vision on the way forward for the international community to support the Sahel region in overcoming the deep-rooted challenges it is facing.

Entre-temps, nous devons redoubler d’efforts pour garantir que le processus politique, qui est fondamental pour la stabilité du Mali, ne soit pas supplanté par les opérations militaires en cours qui sont tout autant essentielles. Pour aborder plus en détail la nature du soutien et de l’engagement des Nations Unies au Mali et au Sahel, je salue également la présence icide M. Said Djinnit, Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest, de M. Anthony Banbury, Sous-secrétaire général à l’appui aux missions, de M. David Gressly, Chef du Bureau des Nations Unies au Mali, de M. Aurélien Agbénonci, Coordonateur résident et Coordonateur humanitaire de l’ONU au Mali et de M. Jack Christofides du Département de opérations de maintien de la paix. Meanwhile, we should redouble our efforts to ensure that the political process, which is key to Mali’s stability in both the short and long term, is not overshadowed by the equally essential military operations underway. There have been some important developments in the political situation which should encourage us to do just that. To further elaborate on all these developments and on the UN’ support and engagement in Mali and the West African region, I am also accompanied today by Mr. Said Djinnit, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, by Mr. Anthony Banbury, Assistant-Secretary-General for Field Support, by Mr. David Gressly, Head of the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM), Mr. Aurelien Agbenonci, United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Mali and by Mr. Jack Christofides from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

In terms of political developments in Mali, the establishment by the Transitional Government on 6 March of the National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation, and the appointment of its leadership a few weeks later, are important steps for putting in motion a broad and comprehensive political process. The appointment of a women and a Tuareg as vice-presidents of this Commission is consistent with the transitional authorities’ repeated assurances that inclusiveness and plurality will be foundation blocks of the political process. We hope that a broad and inclusive Malian-led political process can begin to address the challenges that must be overcome for Mali to achieve political stability and economic prosperity. We look forward to the establishment of the Secretariat so that the Commission can begin its important work in earnest.

To this end, the United Nations will provide all the assistance we possibly can to the Commission in collaboration with regional and international partners. In this regard, UNOM is available to assist all efforts to promote dialogue between the Government and those who wish to take part in the search for a political solution to the crisis, while UNOWA continues to coordinate closely with and support regional efforts to facilitate such a process.

I would also like to reiterate one of the key messages we have conveyed to the Security Council regarding the need to ensure that, in the current interplay between political and security priorities, the security imperative does not detract from the primacy of politics in Mali, in both the short and long term. Security Council members have expressed their strong concurrence with this message.

We are encouraged by President Traoré’s commitment to move rapidly toward elections by 31 July 2013, as this constitutes a fundamental benchmark in restoring constitutional order in Mali. We encourage all Malians to continue to work towards the creation of a favourable environment for the holding of credible and peaceful elections. There are important challenges for this electoral process to be held in time. Apart from logistical, legal and financial obstacles, the still-volatile security conditions and the absence of State administration in northern Mali poses an important challenge. And on the political front, the absence so far of a dialogue and reconciliation process limits the space for constructive electoral debate. Dialogue with all stakeholders, including in areas where the Malian administration is not yet deployed such as Kidal, is also essential to ensure that elections can take place across the entire territory.

Mindful of how much work is required to meet the July deadline, the UN will intensify its effort in support of the preparations for the holding of free, fair, transparent and credible polls in keeping with international standards. We call on the international community to step in and provide timely financial and logistic support for the elections. We hope that ongoing security operations as well as the appointment of the Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation will help overcome these challenges and pave the way for inclusive and credible elections.

As you know, the Secretary-General deployed a multi-disciplinary Exploratory Visit to Mali headed by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Mr. Edmond Mulet from 10 to 16 March to develop recommendations on options for establishing a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Mali. The Mission provided some key observations and recommendations to the Secretary-General that were included in his report.

One important observation states that the serious and inter-linked challenges that confront Mali require concerted and broad-based efforts by the Malian authorities and its people, together with significant international support. They go beyond addressing security threats and require tackling the deep-rooted political, governance, development and humanitarian challenges that are not susceptible to an easy solution. With respect to the security challenges, a key question is the extent to which the United Nations can or should assume responsibility for security and stabilization which, ultimately, will need to serve as an incentive for Malians to engage in a viable political process.

We are also mindful of humanitarian actors’ increasing concerns about the possible deployment of a United Nations force in Mali and the need to retain a clear distinction between the humanitarian and political/security agendas to ensure the impartiality of humanitarian action, avoid threatening the safety of aid workers and guarantee humanitarian access to all those in need.

In his report, the Secretary-General has proposed two options for UN engagement in Mali, which are now under consideration of the Security Council.

Our consultations with Security Council members indicates that the Council prefers the second option, that of a UN multidimensional stabilization mission under Chapter VII alongside a parallel force. Under this option, the bulk of AFISMA would transition to a UN stabilization mission, which would operate under robust rules of engagement allowing it to address threats to the implementation of its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment.

This option would be part of the process of transition from the current situation to a UN stabilisation mission deployed alongside a parallel force and it takes into account the fact that the UN is operating in a new geopolitical context and faces threats that have not been encountered before in a peacekeeping context. The situation on the ground remains fluid, and extremists and criminal elements continue to pose a significant threat to the safety and security of the people of Mali as well as to UN personnel. Therefore, it will be of critical importance that a clear distinction is maintained between the core peacekeeping tasks of an envisaged UN stabilisation mission and the peace enforcement and counter-terrorism activities of a parallel force. Any blurring of the distinction would place severe constraints on the ability of UN humanitarian, development, human rights and other personnel to safely do their work.

Given that the crisis in Mali is part of serious wider regional challenges, it will be essential to link our support to Mali within a broader regional strategy that incorporates Mali’s neighbours and key partners in the process. To that end, SRSG Djinnit will continue to work with the ECOWAS countries on the definition of a shared approach to effectively address the security and political challenges in Mali and its impact in the sub region and beyond.

In addition, the regional strategy that the UN is developing for the Sahel should be viewed as a complementary and indispensable process. As this issue will be addressed at more length during the day, I will just bring to your attention that the Secretary General is expected to report to the Security Council at the beginning of May on the development and implementation of the UN Strategy for the Sahel. In this regard, SESG Prodi has set the overarching framework for the strategy and has commenced work, in close coordination with concerned UN entities, on formulating an Action Plan focused on the four thematic pillars of the strategy; namely, governance, security, humanitarian and development as well as on the different levels of coordination foreseen in the strategy.

In closing, let me emphasize the full commitment of the United Nations to using all available tools to support and promote a Malian-led process leading to the resumption of democratic rule in the country in the short term and to political stability and economic growth in Mali in the long term.

Thank you.

The Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions note with concern that the 36th meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) did not take place in Gali on 24 April 2012.

The Co-Chairs take this opportunity to recall the consensus achieved at the 4th round of Geneva Discussions in February 2009 for the establishment of the IPRMs. The Mechanisms have since become an important tool to address security issues as well as other pressing issues on the ground.

The Co-Chairs underline the importance of the long-standing format of the mechanisms and consider that the setting of a precedent that can work against the interests of all stakeholders, namely to work towards ensuring security and stability on the ground, should be avoided.

The Co-Chairs urge all participants to maintain the current procedures and mechanisms pertaining to the Geneva Discussions, including the full functioning of IPRMs, and will do their utmost to facilitate further efforts on ensuring the smooth operation thereof.

On 29 February 2012, the thirty fourth meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), chaired by the United Nations, was held in Gali. The meeting took place in businesslike atmosphere with all participants engaging in the discussions in a professional manner.

The participants followed up on some detention cases discussed at the previous meetings. Useful information was exchanged on these and some other recent cases, which occurred since the previous IPRM meeting.

In relation to the recent limitations on the movement across the Inguri Bridge, freedom of movement of the local population was also addressed. Information was provided that those measures are temporary and will be lifted in due course.

Тhe need for joint efforts in the fight against crime was once again raised.  Update on the preparations to organize an information session within the IPRM framework, which could provide elements for common understanding of local cooperation in the fight against crime, was provided by the Chair.

The participants reiterated the value of timely and efficient use of hotline to share information on any additional security measures. 

It was agreed that the next meeting of the IPRM would take place in Gali on 23 March 2012.

On 26 October 2011, the thirty first meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), chaired by the United Nations, was held in Gali. The meeting took place in businesslike atmosphere with all participants engaging in the discussions in a professional manner.

The participants followed up matters discussed at the previous meetings, in particular, issues related to the alleged violations of the line of control.  The  participants also exchanged views with regards to the alleged helicopter over flights.

Тhe participants agreed  to the suggested ideas how to further improve the effectiveness of hotline communication.  It was once again emphasized that the hotline is a very important tool of communication, in particular in cases of emergency.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the IPRM would take place in Gali on 30 November 2011.

On 14 July 2011, the twenty ninth meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), chaired by the United Nations, was held in Gali. This meeting marked the second anniversary of the launch of this IPRM, which continues its work without interruption.

Тhe general security situation was assessed as calm. Participants exchanged the updated information on one detention case of a local resident, including the possible visit to the place of his current detention. They also discussed the request of one of the participants to hand over the persons wanted for their alleged involvement in terrorist acts.

Тhe participants also discussed the claims about questioning and recruitment of people crossing the Inguri River. Clarifications were provided on the incident involving the attempt to stop a minibus reportedly trying to cross at the unauthorized location on 6 July. In this context, participants underscored the need to respect the freedom of movement of local residents and called for refraining from any action, which undermines this right.   

The meeting took place in a constructive and businesslike atmosphere with all participants engaging in the discussions in a respectful and professional manner.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the IPRM would take place in Gali on 20 September 2011.

On 20 May 2011, the twenty seventh meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), chaired by the United Nations, was held in Gali.                                              

Participants discussed issues related to incidents, which took place since the last IPRM. They followed up the case of one local resident who was detained on suspicion of committing a serious crime. The specially-arranged fact finding team within IPRM was involved in studying the case. In addition, the updated information was provided on the alleged terrorist acts.

One of the serious incidents discussed at the meeting was the killing of a Colonel of a Russian Border Guards’ patrol team on 8 April 2011 in the Gali district by two perpetrators who were also killed during the shootout.  

Participants further discussed crossing procedures and freedom of movement of the local residents and exchanged views on how to ensure their unhindered movement across the Inguri River.

The participants discussed river bank protection works carried out on a section of one side of the Inguri River. In this regard, they stressed the need for advance notice and coordination of actions, as well as cooperation on the level of experts.

The timely and efficient use of hotline was highlighted as an important practical element of IPRM, in particular in cases of emergency.  

The meeting took place in a constructive, respectful and professional manner.  

It was agreed that the next meeting of the IPRM would take place in Gali on 21 June 2011.

On 22 February 2011, the twenty fifth meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), chaired by the United Nations, was held in Gali.

Participants discussed issues related to crossing, in particular by school children.  They also discussed the procedures of issuance and distribution of relevant identification documents.  Clarifications were provided on both matters.

Incidents, which took place since the last IPRM meeting, were discussed as well, including the detention of a local resident and the case of a missing person, who disappeared in 2008.

Participants once again addressed the issue of preservation of cultural heritage. 

The meeting took place in a businesslike, respectful and professional manner.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the IPRM would take place in Gali on 22 March 2011.

On 2 November 2010, the twenty second meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), chaired by the United Nations, was held in Gali.

Participants addressed in detail issues related to recent incidents including the disappearance of a resident of Abkhazia near the Inguri river on 9 October 2010. They exchanged available information on this particular incident and agreed to continue discussing this and other matters at the next IPRM meeting, which will be suggested by the Chair.

On 14 September 2010, the twentieth meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), chaired by the United Nations, was held in Gali.

As in the previous IPRM meetings, participants discussed issues related to freedom of movement of the local population, in particular school teachers and students.  In this regard, clarifications on procedures and modalities in place were once again provided, noting that there were no changes to the previous practices.  Participants also raised the issue of freedom of movement of goods and transportation means across the Inguri river.

Noting decrease in the number of incidents in the period since the previous IPRM meeting, the participants discussed some reported incidents, including the detention of Russian citizens on 30 August near Orsantia village.  Furthermore, participants exchanged information on the criminal situation in the Gali district and undertook to follow up on these matters on the operational level.

IPRM participants positively assessed the recent release by the Abkhaz side of the Georgian detainee as a confidence-building measure.

The meeting took place in a constructive, businesslike atmosphere with all participants engaging in a respectful and professional manner.

Participants agreed that the next meeting of the IPRM would take place in Gali on 8 October 2010.

On 15 June 2010, the eighteenth meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), chaired by the United Nations, was held in Gali.

Participants discussed the violent incidents that had recently taken place in Gali district, including the killing on 1 June of Mr Genadi Kvitsiniya, the killing on 3 June of Mr Dmitri Katsia, and the acts of arson on 6 June in the village of Dikhazurga, which resulted in the destruction of five houses.  In an effort to determine the nature of these incidents, participants engaged in a detailed discussion and provided clarifying information.

Notwithstanding a difference of opinion on the causal aspects, participants agreed that a known criminal element had been involved in at least one of these killings.  In this regard, they exchanged information on the activities of criminals operating on both sides and across the InguriRiver, and expressed a common interest to cooperate further on matters related to the combating criminal activities.

Participants regretted and condemned the events that took place on 6 June in the village of Dikhazurga.  They discussed both the factual circumstances surrounding this incident and steps taken since 6 June to avoid any further recurrence.  In this context, participants also noted the need to refrain from inflammatory public statements, including pre-judging the outcomes of ongoing investigations.

Despite the difficult nature of the discussions, the meeting took place in a professional and constructive manner, with all participants engaging openly and positively.

Participants agreed that the next meeting of the IPRM would take place in Gali on 20 July 2010.