Reports and Policy Documents

Photo caption: For one week, the National Police Force will strengthen its understanding of situations requiring respect for human rights, including in the...

The Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions have taken note with strong concern of reports of the death in custody in Tskhinvali on 22 February of Mr Archil Tatunashvili, and express their condolences to the family of the deceased. They also note that, according to reports, a post-mortem examination has already taken place, and therefore call on the authorities in control in Tskhinvali to hand over the body of Mr. Tatunashvili to his family without delay.

The Co-Chairs also appeal that Mr Levan Kutashvili and Mr Ioseb Pavliashvili, who were apprehended by at the same time as Mr Tatunashvili, be permitted to cross to Tbilisi-administered territory immediately.

The Co-Chairs express the hope and expectation that the forthcoming Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting in Ergneti on 1 March will be an occasion to provide further information on the circumstances surrounding the detention of Mr Tatunashvili, Mr Kutashvili and Mr Pavliashvili and the subsequent death in custody of Mr Tatunashvili.

Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Council,

I thank you for this opportunity to introduce the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIOGBIS). As the report already presents a detailed outline of recent events in Guinea-Bissau, my intervention will focus on updating you on political developments since its issuance, analyzing present challenges and making proposals for the way forward.

Mr. President,

This briefing is taking place against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving political situation in Guinea-Bissau. In recent weeks, a series of key events have occurred with important ramifications. At the country level, President José Mário Vaz dismissed former Prime Minister Umaro Sissoco Embaló and replaced him with Artur Silva. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) finally held its Party Congress, despite attempts made by national authorities to block it and re-elected Domingos Simões Pereira as its leader.

At the regional level, on 4 February, the ECOWAS Authority, pursuant to its decision of 27 January, imposed targeted sanctions on 19 individuals deemed to be obstructing the implementation of the Conakry Agreement.  These individuals and their family members are subject to travel bans and assets freezes. They have also been suspended from ECOWAS activities.  The ECOWAS Authority also requested the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, the European Union, the United Nations and other partners to support and facilitate the enforcement of the sanctions.

Following the imposition of these sanctions, the reaction of national stakeholders has been mixed. Those upon whom the sanctions were imposed have described them as “unsubstantiated” and “unjust”, while those in favor of the sanctions have characterized them as a necessary measure to safeguard the country’s democratic course.  

Meanwhile, national reactions to the appointment of Mr. Artur Silva as the new Prime Minister have been generally consistent. On 31 January, the PAIGC issued a statement denouncing Mr. Silva’s appointment as not being in conformity with the Conakry Agreement. Last week, the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), the second largest party in Parliament, and the Group of 15 dissident members of the PAIGC, also issued public statements stressing that they would only participate in a government formed under a consensual Prime Minister in strict compliance with the Conakry Agreement. Thus far, the Prime Minister’s efforts to consult with political parties represented in the National Assembly on the formation of an inclusive government have not borne fruit.

Mr. President,

Under my leadership, the “P5” group of regional and international partners, comprising representatives of the African Union, the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries, ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations, has continued to harmonize efforts and messaging at opportune moments with the aim of creating a stable and enabling environment for dialogue among political leaders. So far this year, I have convened three meetings of the group. My efforts, together with the partners, have focused on engaging national authorities and key political stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau to defuse escalating tensions, encourage political dialogue to ease the political gridlock, call for protection and respect for the human rights of Bissau-Guinean citizens, and urge all aggrieved stakeholders to pursue their grievances through legal and constitutional means.  

Furthermore, under my direction, UNIOGBIS continues to play a central role in supporting and facilitating the regional mediation efforts of ECOWAS by, inter alia, ensuring the participation of Bissau-Guinean stakeholders at the Summit of the ECOWAS Authority and Heads of State and Government in Abuja in December, providing substantive and logistical support to the ECOWAS high-level delegations during their missions to Bissau and regularly sensitizing regional leaders on ongoing political developments in the country, while encouraging them to exert their influence on protagonists towards compromises.

Mr. President, Distinguished members of the Council,

The absence of a functioning and stable Government for more than three years has limited the ability of UNIOGBIS to effectively and sustainably implement some of its mandated tasks. As recommended by the DPA-led Strategic Review Mission conducted in 2016, and endorsed by this Council last year, I have streamlined UNIOGBIS’ leadership and structure to promote better integration and complementarity with the UN country team and other international partners, while boosting the Mission’s political capacities, which has enabled me to exercise my good offices more effectively at the national level. These changes have also assisted the broader UN system in Guinea-Bissau in delivering more focused and integrated peacebuilding support to national authorities and civil society, including women and youth. In this regard, the support provided by the Peacebuilding Fund has been critical.

Going forward, UNIOGBIS will need to focus its efforts on supporting national leaders in their efforts to appoint an acceptable Prime Minister, establish an inclusive Government, organize and conduct timely elections, and implement the priority reforms as outlined in the Conakry Agreement and the ECOWAS Roadmap.  Until the completion of the electoral cycle in 2019, more than ever, Guinea-Bissau remains a country that requires a dedicated United Nations presence to prevent a further deterioration in the political and security situation at the national level and avoid any negative consequences in the sub-region.  In this context, my good offices, political facilitation, advocacy and mediation roles, alongside my efforts to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law and carry out integrated peacebuilding support, will continue to be critical.

As the Secretary-General has indicated in his report, it is vital that the United Nations remain engaged in peacebuilding efforts in the country while supporting ECOWAS’ intervention to resolve the political crisis for at least one more year. At the end of that period, the SG has expressed his intention to authorize an assessment of the current Mission, and to present options to the Security Council for a possible re-configuration of UN presence in the country.  It is my hope that the Council will give favorable consideration to this recommendation.

Mr. President,

The AU Peace and Security Council, through its communique issued on 13 February, has fully endorsed the measures taken by ECOWAS on 4 February, including sanctions against “political obstructionists”, requested the AU Commission to coordinate with the ECOWAS Commission in order to ensure the effective implementation of these measures and further requested that the United Nations Security Council endorse the PSC Communique endorsing the ECOWAS decision.

At this critical juncture, it would be important for the UN Security Council to continue to reaffirm the centrality of the Conakry Agreement and to reiterate its full support to ECOWAS in its mediation efforts and for the measures it has taken against political stakeholders deemed to be obstructing the resolution of the political crisis.

I would further seek the Council’s support in underscoring the importance of urgently organizing and holding legislative elections within the constitutionally-mandated timeline.

Lastly, throughout the past year, ECOMIB’s presence has consistently acted as a stabilizing factor in the country. Therefore, I would call on members of the Council and international donors to support the continued presence of ECOMIB through to the holding of a presidential election in 2019, including by advocating for the renewal of its mandate and the provision of the financial support needed to maintain its deployment.

Mr. President, Distinguished members of the Council,

I would like to express my gratitude to the Council for its continued interest in promoting peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau.

I would also like to commend ECOWAS and its current Chairperson, President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo, and the ECOWAS Mediator for Guinea-Bissau, President Alpha Condé of Guinea, for their tireless mediation efforts.

Finally, I would like to express appreciation to all multilateral and bilateral partners, especially to AU, CPLP and EU for their commitment to promoting peace and prosperity in Guinea-Bissau.

After several years of long-term investment in the stability of Guinea-Bissau, it is time to consolidate and reap the dividends of our concerted efforts. It is vital that we accompany this process to its completion. 

Thank you for your attention.

Mr. President,

We are discussing the crisis in Myanmar in this Chamber for the first time in 2018. It is now five months since the start of the violence that has forced 688,000 Rohingya across the border.  And the outflow of people continues, although at a lower rate. As of 5 February, between 1,000 and 1,200 people were reportedly waiting on a beach in Maungdaw planning to leave for Bangladesh. Since the last briefing by Under-Secretary-General Feltman on 12 December 2017, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/72/248 on the human rights situation in Myanmar by vote.

Mr. President,

The Secretary-General has laid out three priorities that provide an important framework for assessing the situation. Regrettably, while there has been certain progress, not all have been implemented thus far.

First, the need to end violence and improve the security situation. Although large-scale acts of violence have subsided, concerns about threats and intimidation against the remaining Rohingya population from Bamar and Rakhine communities, as well as from militia and security forces in Rakhine State, persist. Bamar-Rakhine tensions remain high, further fueled by incidents such as a clash between the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the military on 7 January. Or the incident in Mrauk-U on 16 January, in which police shot and killed seven Rakhine nationalist protestors, and later imprisoned two noted Rakhine leaders. We remain concerned about the protection of future returnees.

On 14 November 2017, the Government of Myanmar reportedly transmitted to the Bangladesh authorities a list of 1,300 of what it calls suspected “terrorists” and asked for their extradition. The Government also published in the official newspaper the names and photos of hundreds of suspected “terrorists”. These steps have raised questions about due process, and possible intimidation of potential returnees.

Second, the immediate granting of humanitarian access in the affected areas of Rakhine.  Such access continues to be severely curtailed.  The majority of humanitarian organizations that previously worked in Rakhine are simply not allowed to enter the area. A handful of organizations are given travel authorizations but in a short-term and unpredictable manner that impedes the systematic delivery of assistance. The UN does not have sufficient access to make a meaningful assessment of the humanitarian or human rights situation. Thus, there is little sense of whether the full range of humanitarian needs of the population are being met or about the state of protection of the human rights of all people of the region.

Third, voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) to their places of origin or choice. Let me acknowledge the fact that the Governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar had signed a Memorandum of Understanding and established a Joint Working Group which reached agreement (on 16 January) on a number of issues to facilitate the return process.  It is also important to note that Myanmar had made progress in its logistical preparations to receive returning refugees.  

On the issues related to repatriation, I will defer to the High Commissioner Grandi to provide more details on these issues.

 

Mr. President,

The Secretary-General has underlined the importance of implementing the recommendations of the Rakhine Advisory Commission as a key element of creating conditions for a safe and dignified return.  The Government has taken some high-level steps to advance this process, including convening an Advisory Board led by Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai with distinguished national and international participants.  At the end of its mission, the Board offered preliminary recommendations to the Implementation Committee, including: the inclusion of the UN at an early stage, soonest full humanitarian access, wider media access, and the formation of an independent fact-finding commission. In this context, I wish to reiterate that we urge the Government to cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and all UN human rights mechanisms, in particular the Fact-Finding Mission mandated by the Human Rights Council and with the Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar. It is important that the work of UN human rights mechanisms not be undermined by other mechanisms.

As suggested by the final report of the Rakhine Advisory Commission, we urge the Government to take a leadership role in promoting inter-communal cohesion, create an environment conducive for dialogue, foster values of tolerance and respect for basic human rights between Rakhine and Rohingya communities, and to accelerate and align the citizenship verification process in alignment with international standards and treaties.

Overall, addressing the root causes is fundamental to ensuring a durable, genuine solution to this crisis. We have consistently said the problem is statelessness. This must be addressed.

In line with the Council’s Presidential Statement of 6 November 2017, Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten concluded her first official visit to Myanmar from 14 to 17 December 2017, to address reports of conflict-related sexual violence.  In her consultations, she advocated for the swift adoption of a Joint Communiqué of the Government of Myanmar and the United Nations on the prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2106 (2013).

 

Mr. President,

While we discuss Rakhine, we also take this opportunity to note other developments in Myanmar, in particular the ongoing fighting, as well as peacemaking efforts between the Government and diverse Ethnic Armed Organizations.  

We are concerned that fighting in Kachin and northern Shan states has escalated in recent months.  This has cast a shadow on peace negotiations, and provoked a number of serious human rights and humanitarian concerns. Such concerns include the situation in Tanai, Kachin, where many civilians have been killed or injured, and as many as 5,000 civilians are reportedly unable to leave the area where fighting is ongoing. And as in Rakhine State, the Government has severely restricted humanitarian access in many of the most critical areas. The UN is therefore unable to verify the numbers of people affected.   

On a more positive note, two Ethnic Armed Organizations, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in Nay Pyi Taw today. The signing is the first of its kind for the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) government and brings the total number of ethnic armed groups that have signed the NCA to ten out of sixteen.

Finally, let me address the unfortunate arrest of two Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo. The Secretary-General has called in clear terms for the release of the journalists and urged the authorities to respect the right to freedom of expression and information. Allow me to reiterate those calls here today. The ability to exercise the right to freedom of expression and information is a barometer for respect for human rights more broadly. Reuters has now published the story these journalists were working on, a deeply disturbing account of the execution of ten Rohingya men in Inn Din village (Maungdaw) in northern Rakhine State. The Associated Press has also published a report of five mass graves in Gudar Pyin village in Buthidaung. These and other shocking reports of grave abuses demand our attention and action, for the sake of lasting peace and justice.

Thank you

The Multi-Year Appeal 2018-2019 lays out the priorities for the biennium, taking into account the Secretary-General’s vision and focus on prevention, and in line with DPA’s Strategic Plan for 2016-2019. Under the overarching priorities of the Strategic Plan, the MYA 2018-2019 puts emphasis on inclusive processes as part of setting the agenda for conflict prevention and as a cross-cutting theme in all areas of our work. The MYA continues investments in sustaining peace and further strengthening of partnerships and common agendas with regional and sub-regional organizations.

Сообщение для СМИ

17 января 2018 г., 52-aя встреча совместного Механизма по Предотвращению и Реагированию на Инциденты (МПРИ) была проведена в городе Гали под председательством Организации Объединённых Наций, с участием грузинских, российских, абхазских и МНЕС (Миссия Наблюдателей Европейского Союза) представителей.

Общую обстановку на местах в плане безопасности, начиная со встречи МПРИ от 27 ноября 2017 г., охарактеризовали как спокойную и стабильную. Участники снова подчеркнули важность горячей линии связи в целях обмена информацией, и главным образом для предотвращения инцидентов. Председатель и участники приветствовали недавнее освобождение нескольких задержанных, случаи которых обсуждались на предыдущих встречах МПРИ.

Согласно предварительной повестке дня, участники продолжили дискуссию по ранее обсужденным вопросам,  включая по делу об убийстве, произошедшему в мае 2016 г., и по одному случаю задержания от апреля 2017 г.  Кроме того, они обсудили новые пункты повестки дня – вопросы по “укреплению границы” и военным учениям. Относительно военных учений, к участникам был обращен убедительный призыв обеспечить транспарентность  и проявить усилия по осуществлению одной из согласованных мер по добровольному обмену заблаговременными извещениями о значимой деятельности с целью укрепления доверия, что является постоянным пунктом повестки дня. Кроме того, участники подробно обсудили несколько других вопросов, включая патрулирование вдоль линии контроля и ранее согласованный “кодекс поведения” патрулей.  

52-я встреча МПРИ прошла в конструктивной и деловой атмосфере. Обсуждение всех пунктов повестки дня было полезным и по существу.

Было согласовано провести следующую встречу 27 февраля 2018 г.   

 

The English press release is available here.

The UNOAU Chief of Staff, Ms. Nathalie Ndongo-Seh, attended the inauguration ceremony of the African Standby Force (ASF) Continental Logistics Base on  5th January, 2018. This base is located in Douala in the...

The end of year publication features some of the highlights of our online magazine Politically Speaking in 2017.

UNOAU hosted the UN Liaison Team in Ethiopia in its premises in December.

In this meeting, key issues of common concern in relation to the work of the UN and the African Union were discussed. 

Mr. President, Members of the Security Council, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Almost two years after Implementation Day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, we are at a critical crossroads.  Today’s meeting is an important opportunity to reflect carefully on what has been achieved and the challenges that lay ahead. Since 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported to this Council nine times that Iran is continuing to adhere to its nuclear-related commitments.

Against this positive story of JCPOA implementation, on 13 October, the President of the United States decided not to certify to Congress that the suspension of its national sanctions pursuant to the agreement is "appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by the Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program"[1].  This decision has regrettably created considerable uncertainty about the future of the JCPOA.  The Secretary-General is reassured that the United States, during the recent 7th meeting of the Joint Commission, together with other participants, expressed its continued adherence to its commitments and stressed the need to ensure the full and effective implementation of the agreement in all its parts in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere.

The support of this Security Council for the agreement is vital to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as regional and international stability.  The agreement is in the interest of the global non-proliferation regime, and of regional and international peace and security. It is also the best way to realize the aspirations of the Iranian people through an opportunity for greater economic engagement with the world.  The international community will be following carefully what the participants to the agreement, and this Council, will do in the coming months and years – and will certainly calibrate its own actions accordingly. 

For these reasons, the Secretary-General encourages the United States to maintain its commitment to the agreement and to consider the broader implications for the region and beyond before taking any further steps.  Similarly, he encourages the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider the concerns raised by other JCPOA participants.  The Secretary-General also encourages the international community to continue to support the full implementation of this historic agreement and welcomes the affirmative statements by numerous other Member States in support of the Plan.

Mr. President,  

Thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (S/2017/515).  This report was submitted to the Council on 8 December 2017 pursuant to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and the Note by the President of the Council issued on 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). 

As guided by the Security Council, the report of the Secretary-General focuses on the implementation of the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).   I now turn to the main findings of the fourth report. 

First, the Secretary-General has again not received any report regarding the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the resolution. Meanwhile, Member States are making greater use of the procurement channel.  Eight additional nuclear-related proposals were submitted to the Security Council for approval, bringing to 24 the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day.  These proposals were processed in accordance with the timelines established by resolution 2231 (2015), with due regard for information security and confidentiality.   I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge once again the excellent cooperation we have with the European External Action Service, especially its Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission.

Second, regarding the implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions, the report reflects official information provided by Member States on the launch of the Simorgh Space Launch Vehicle in July 2017 by the Islamic Republic of Iran and on several ballistic missile launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In October and November, the Secretariat was requested to travel twice to Saudi Arabia to examine the debris of the ballistic missiles launched at Yanbu and Riyadh on 22 July and 4 November 2017, respectively.  Saudi authorities assessed that Iran had a role in manufacturing these missiles used in the July and November attacks.  We take note of the information presented in the recent press conference by Ambassador Haley on 14 December and Iranian statement(s) in response. At this time, the Secretariat is not yet in a position to confirm whether those missiles were Iranian Qiam-1 missiles (a variant of the Scud missile) transferred contrary to resolution 2231 (2015), as assessed by Saudi authorities.   However, the report contained preliminary observations indicating that (1) the two missiles had similar features which suggested a common origin; (2) the missiles contained features that are consistent with missiles of the Scud family; (3) the missiles also had features known to be consistent with the Qiam-1 missile; and (4) one of the missile bore castings similar to that of an Iranian entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).  The Secretariat is still analysing the information available and will report to the Council in due course.  The Secretariat recommended a joint meeting of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and of the “2231 format” to be jointly briefed by the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Secretariat on their respective findings at the appropriate time.  It is important that the Security Council is able to consider this issue holistically, and coherently, on the basis of all the information available to it.

Third, in terms of restrictions on arms-related transfers, the Secretariat was requested to examine the arms and related materiel seized by the United States in March 2016.  The Secretariat also received information on an unmanned surface vessel (USV) laden with explosives allegedly used against the Saudi-led coalition and had the opportunity to examine parts of its guidance and detonation systems.  The Secretariat was also requested to examine two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), reportedly recovered in Yemen after Implementation Day.

The Secretariat is confident that close to 900 of the assault rifles seized by the United States are identical to those seized by France also in March 2016, which the Secretariat had assessed were of Iranian origin and shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The Secretariat is also confident that half of the 200 rocket propelled grenade launchers had characteristics similar to Iranian-produced RPG launchers.  We are still analysing the remaining weapons found in the shipment and will report back in due course.

The Secretariat could also observe that the guidance and detonation systems of the USV included a computer terminal with a dual English/Farsi keyboard and characteristics similar to those of Iranian-produced terminals.  It was also observed that the detonation system included items identical to items found on board the dhow Adris by the United States in March 2016, and that the electrical cables within the detonation mechanism and in the guidance system bore markings indicating Iranian manufacture.  An update will be provided in due course.

The Secretariat observed that one of the UAV – which Saudi authorities ascertain was similar to that of the Iranian-made Ababil-II – is similar to other drones reportedly seized in Yemen brought to our attention by the United Arab Emirates.  We look forward to the opportunity to examine these other unmanned aerial vehicles, in order to independently ascertain their origin.

Fourth, the report also highlights the participation of the Defence Industries Organisation in another foreign exhibition, the International Aviation and Space Salon held in the Russian Federation in July 2017.  The issue was raised with the Russian Federation and we were informed that an investigation into the issue found no action inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).  The Secretary-General report also provides information on additional travels by Major General Qasem Soleimani, noting that the Security Council should call upon the government of relevant Member States to take the necessary steps to ensure the proper implementation of the travel ban and other provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

Before concluding, I wish to underline that the Secretariat carefully considered the information that the Islamic Republic of Iran conveyed in its letter dated 28 August 2017 which stated that the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, signed into law on 2 August 2017, violated the terms of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).  It is our assessment that this information does not fall within the scope of this report, unless guidance to the contrary is provided by the Security Council.

Mr. President,

In closing, I would to thank H.E. Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi (Italy) for his successful tenure as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) during this challenging year. I would also like to take this opportunity to wish well to H.E. Ambassador Karel Jan Gustaaf van Oosterom (Netherlands) as he will assume the role of Facilitator on 1 January 2018 and to assure him of the Secretariat’s full support.  Thank you.

 

[1] Note: quote is taken from speech by President Trump on 13 October, itself based on the language of the U.S. Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. 

Mr. President,

Thank you for the invitation to brief on recent developments in Myanmar.  I welcome the participation of Ambassador Hau Do Suan as well as Ambassador Masud Bin Momen.  I also welcome being joined by Ms. Pramila Patten, Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

Mr. President,

The estimated number of refugees who entered Bangladesh since 25 August now exceeds 626,000.  As the Secretary-General underlined in his 2 September letter to the Council, we need collectively to encourage the adoption of policies to end the vicious cycle of discrimination, violence and displacement in Rakhine. 

The Council’s 6 November Presidential Statement (PRST) reaffirming the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Myanmar noted that the Government holds the primary responsibility to protect its population, through rule of law and the respect, promotion and protection of human rights. 

During my October visit, I explored with the authorities potential United Nations support in these key areas. 

My visit followed shortly after State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s 12 October address responding to the humanitarian concerns in Rakhine and the return of refugees from Bangladesh.  We welcome the State Counsellor’s decision to establish the Union Enterprise Mechanism as well as the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on returns between Myanmar and Bangladesh. 

We are also encouraged by the announcement that the new Advisory Commission comprising of international experts and the Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State will meet in early January to finalise action plans to rehabilitate and develop the region.  We hope plans will swiftly be followed by action.

The State Counsellor’s visit to Rakhine on 2 November was an important step.  We urge all Myanmar leaders, including in the military, to condemn incitement to racial hatred and violence. We encourage them to adopt measures to defuse tensions between communities and create an environment for safe and dignified repatriation, including through interfaith initiatives.

 We have highlighted to the authorities that the capacities, best practices, and extensive experience of the United Nations can help in implementing their stated intentions in a timely and effective manner.

Mr. President,

Although violence has subsided, new refugees continue to arrive in Bangladesh, albeit at slower rates. These refugees arrive exhausted, destitute and traumatized. The Government of Bangladesh estimates that more than 36,000 unaccompanied children arrived with no immediate family support system.  During November, arsons in Rakhine State appeared to lessen, but recent satellite imagery revealed renewed fires and related destruction in different villages.

Humanitarian access to Rakhine State remains insufficient. Although Myanmar permitted some ICRC and more recently WFP assistance, access by other UN agencies and partners to northern Rakhine is still highly restricted. Issuance of travel authorizations has eased in central Rakhine, but large numbers of staff still lack these permits due to cumbersome procedures.

We are all grateful for the continued generosity of the Government and people of Bangladesh, and we call on the international community to continue to support these efforts.  But the origins and solutions to the Rohingya crisis rest in Myanmar. Repatriation and reconciliation policies will fail without accountability and non-discriminatory rule of law and public safety measures to address the fears and distrust among communities in Rakhine.

Mr. President,

On 23 November, Myanmar and Bangladesh reached a bilateral agreement on the issue of returns. The agreement recognizes the need for a ‘comprehensive and durable solution’ through the ‘safe, dignified, and voluntary return’ in accordance with international law.

In this regard, I would like to present some key considerations:

1. Returns must be supported by reconciliation efforts, and the time frame must allow for this and other measures to ensure that return is sustainable. Central to this is the implementation of the Rakhine Advisory Commission recommendations;

1. Returns should be to the ‘original place of residence’ or to a safe, secure place near to their destination of choice, as envisaged by the Arrangement.  It should not be to camps, however temporary; experience shows that camps lead to prolonged segregation;

1. The reference to freedom of movement in the arrangement is positive, but the qualifier ‘in conformity with existing laws and regulations’ which are currently extremely restrictive, is a serious limitation. Expanding freedom of movement is essential to achieving stated commitments on access to basic services and livelihoods.

1. Eligibility criteria for return must be applied in the broadest possible manner.  The current requirements (including documentary proof of residence) would be difficult for many refugees to meet;

1. Finally, experience on voluntary repatriation movements over the decades, underscores the important role that the UN, through UNHCR, can play in all aspects of a return operation.

We encourage including UNHCR in the Joint Working Group aimed at overseeing all aspects of return. 

We appreciate the role of neighbouring countries, particularly China, in constructively engaging both Bangladesh and Myanmar to facilitate the bilateral agreement.  During his recent visit to Myanmar, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out the importance of finding a long-term solution, including by addressing the chronic underdevelopment in Rakhine state.  Strengthened regional cooperation with Myanmar will be essential.  We welcome Myanmar’s engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for humanitarian assistance, which led to an initial delivery of 80 tonnes of relief material for Rakhine.

The recently established Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine aim to support cooperation between the Government and all sectors, including the UN, in the implementation of development projects.  Meetings between the government, donors and the UN have started.  In addition, the Implementation Committee for the Rakhine Advisory Commission has begun meeting and identified priority interventions in specific sectors.

These are welcome developments, but we again urge tangible action and implementation of these commitments.  Plans alone are not sufficient.  We hope Myanmar will draw upon the wealth of expertise the UN can offer.    

 

Mr. President,

As Kofi Annan highlighted, the complex challenges in Rakhine require civilian-military coordination.  Council members have underlined the importance of effective partnership with the Myanmar authorities, especially the military.  Close neighbors like China and Indonesia can help through their military-to-military engagement.  We appreciate the recognition by these regional and other Member States for the role of the UN in helping Myanmar address areas beyond Rakhine issues including the peace process, to help advance the country’s democratic consolidation efforts.  The 2020 national elections will stand as an important test in the consolidation of the nation’s democratic institutions. 

The effort to achieve peace between the Government and various Ethnic Armed Organizations is a cornerstone of this transition.   All eight signatory parties have shown a sustained commitment to upholding the October 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.  Momentum in the peace process is slowing, however, with the majority of Ethnic Armed Organizations still not among the signatories.   

Finally, I note that the General Assembly is expected to approve the Third Committee Resolution on Myanmar, requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Envoy.  We want this initiative to strengthen our partnership with Myanmar, in close consultations with interested Member States in the region and beyond.  We believe we have much to offer in working with Myanmar on a number of challenges the country faces, in full respect of Myanmar’s sovereignty.                                

Thank you.

 

Mr. President,

Members of the Security Council,

According to the official news agency of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and various governmental sources, at approximately 02:48 am local time on 29 November 2017, the DPRK launched a ballistic missile, which it termed an “intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-15”. The missile was reportedly launched from an area north of Pyongyang, covering approximately 950 km and reaching an apogee of around 4,500 km, before impacting into the sea in Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

These parameters indicate that, if flown on a standard trajectory, the missile as configured would have a range in excess of 13,000 km. This is the DPRK’s third test of a ballistic missile of apparent intercontinental range in less than six months and its twentieth ballistic missile launch this year. The DPRK again did not issue any airspace or maritime safety notifications.

The official media claimed the DPRK was now – quote – “capable of striking the whole mainland of the U.S.” – end quote. The official media also claimed that the DPRK had – again I quote - “finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power” end quote.

Mr. President, this is the thirteenth time the Council has met to discuss the DPRK in 2017. The DPRK’s repeated nuclear and missile tests over the past two years have created great tension on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. This dynamic must be reversed. The solution can only be political.

Given the grave risks associated with any military confrontation, in exercise of its primary responsibility the Security Council needs to do all it can to prevent an escalation. Unity in the Security Council is critical. Security Council unity also creates an opportunity for sustained diplomatic engagement – an opportunity that must be seized in these dangerous times to seek off-ramps and work to create conditions for negotiations.

Mr. President, the Secretary-General strongly condemns this latest launch. This is a clear violation of Security Council resolutions and shows complete disregard for the united view of the international community. The Secretary-General urges the DPRK to desist from taking any further destabilising steps. The Secretary-General reaffirms his commitment to working with all parties to reduce tensions. I called a meeting this morning with the DPRK Permanent Representative to deliver the Secretary-General’s message in person. During the meeting, I stressed that there is nothing more dangerous to peace and security in the world than what is happening now on the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. President, the Secretary-General discussed the situation on the Korean Peninsula with all concerned parties in the margins of the high-level week of the General Assembly. During the Secretary-General’s meeting with Mr. Ri Yong Ho, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the DPRK on 23 September, he expressed concern over the tensions on the Korean Peninsula and appealed for de-escalation and full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. The Secretary-General emphasized the need for a political solution.

Mr. President, amidst the heightened tensions, the United Nations and other humanitarian actors play a critical role in saving the lives of the most vulnerable in the DPRK. The needs are increasing and food security remains a critical concern for 70 per cent of the population. Member States are again reminded of the need to support the life-saving activities carried out by humanitarian organisations in the country.

We will continue to closely follow the developments and remain in close coordination with the concerned international organisations, and with Members of this Council, as well as other governments concerned.

Thank you.

Сообщение для СМИ

28 ноября 2017 г., 51-я встреча совместного Механизма по Предотвращению и Реагированию на Инциденты (МПРИ) была проведена в городе Гали под председательством Организации Объединённых Наций, с участием грузинских, российских, абхазских и МНЕС (Миссия Наблюдателей Европейского Союза) представителей. Общая обстановка на местах в плане безопасности, начиная со встречи МПРИ от 25 октября 2017 г., была оценена как спокойная и стабильная.  Была подтверждена положительная оценка важности и существенного вклада горячей линии связи, и участникам рекомендовалось продолжить эффективно использовать этот инструмент для обмена информацией.

Согласно повестке дня, участники обменялись взглядами и представили дополнительную информацию относительно ранее обсужденных, но еще нерешенных, вопросов. Они также обсудили новые пункты повестки дня, включая вопросы, связанные со свободой передвижения и документами для пересечения. В этой связи была представлена обновленная информация касательно выдачи разрешений на постоянное место жительства местному населению. Новая тенденция случаев, связанных с пересечениями иностранными гражданами в Абхазию в неконтролируемых местах, была также подробно обсуждена, и участники выразили готовность продолжить рассмотрение этого вопроса.

Участники еще раз затронули необходимость добровольного обмена заблаговременными извещениями о значимой деятельности с целью укрепления доверия, что является постоянным пунктом повестки дня. Как обычно, встреча прошла в конструктивной и деловой атмосфере.

Было решено провести следующую встречу 17 января 2018 г.

 

Press Release in English

Monsieur le président, Permettez-moi, tout d’abord, vous féliciter pour votre accession à la présidence du Conseil pour le mois de novembre. Profitez de cette occasion, je salue les membres du Conseil.

Mesdames et Messieurs les membres du Conseil,

Mon exposé se propose, d’une part, de vous rendre compte des activités que j’ai menées depuis le dernier examen par le Conseil, de la question du Burundi et, d’autre part, de faire le point sur les derniers développements en la matière.

La mission assignée à l’Envoyé Spécial au Burundi est très claire: appuyer les efforts de la région, en d’autres termes, le médiateur et le facilitateur, pour faire avancer les négociations dont la finalité, je le rappelle est le dialogue inclusif inter burundais.

C’est ce que j’ai fait, en entreprenant les démarches suivantes:

• rencontre avec les autorités et les acteurs politiques burundais;
• rencontre avec l’opposition burundaise et représentants de la société civile, y compris ceux qui sont en exil;
• rencontre avec des chefs d’Etat africains et partenaires du Burundi;

Mes premiers entretiens avec le médiateur, le Président Museveni, ont eu lieu en août 2017, à Entebbe. Ils ont porté sur la nécessité et l’urgence de convoquer un mini-sommet régional, aux fins d’évaluer les avancées des négociations et, si possible, les assortir de décisions. A l’issue de nos échanges, le médiateur m’a informé de son intention de rencontrer le Président Pierre Nkurunziza. Je sais que récemment il a dépêché un émissaire spécial porteur d’un message à son homologue du Burundi.

J’ai également rencontré un certain nombre de leaders africains toujours dans le but de les sensibiliser et solliciter leur soutien, compte tenu de leurs affinités avec les autorités burundaises.

Ma rencontre avec l’opposition burundaise de l’extérieur s’est déroulée à Bruxelles, le 14 octobre 2017 et a regroupé les responsables du CNARED ainsi que ceux de la société civile, en exil. Pour cette première entrevue, je leur ai surtout expliqué le sens de ma mission qui est essentiellement une mission de bons offices, cherchant, en appui aux efforts de la sous-région, à rapprocher les positions du gouvernement et de l’opposition en vue d’un dialogue inclusif inter- Burundians. Ma visite à Bruxelles m’a aussi donné l’opportunité d’avoir des échanges avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Belgique et quelques représentants de l’Union Européenne sur la situation qui prévaut au Burundi.

Mon retour à Bujumbura a été l’occasion de recueillir les vues de deux autorités morales de l’église catholique du Burundi, très influentes, en l’occurrence les évêques de Bujumbura et de Gitega.

Ma rencontre le 2 novembre 2017 avec l’Ombudsman a essentiellement porté sur les échanges avec les opposants de l’extérieur, à Helsinki et l’adoption par le gouvernement de la nouvelle constitution révisée.

L’Ombudsman m’a assuré qu’en dehors de la non-limitation relative et la durée de 7 ans du mandat présidentiel, prévue par la nouvelle constitution, le gouvernement a respecté toutes les autres dispositions de l’Accord d’Arusha.

Toutes ces activités que j’ai eu à mener, ont fait l’objet d’un compte-rendu au Facilitateur, avec qui je me suis entretenu le 3 novembre dernier à Dar-Es Salam.

De la synthèse d’ensemble, le Facilitateur, en accord avec le Médiateur et le gouvernement burundais, a décidé de la convocation, le 27 novembre prochain, à Arusha, d’une session de dialogue entre les représentants du gouvernement et toutes les autres parties prenantes burundaises, y compris l’opposition en exil. Ces assises se dérouleraient du 27 novembre au 8 décembre 2017 comme je l’ai dit à Arusha. Nous avons été informés que le CNARED ne serait pas prêt à y participer.

Un sommet des Chefs d’Etat de la Communauté des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Est serait prévu en janvier 2018, qui entre autres, aurait à évaluer les conclusions de ces assises. Concernant la situation même au Burundi, il y a deux semaines, j’étais à Bujumbura et tout était apparemment calme, en dehors des manifestations de colère contre la décision de la CPI d’ouvrir des enquêtes sur les crimes contre l’humanité commis depuis 2015 au Burundi.

Les manifestations ont également dénoncé les rapports sur les abus et violations des droits de l’homme, dont les allégations portent sur les cas d’arrestation ou emprisonnement, les disparitions forcées, traitements inhumains et dégradants ou restrictions de liberté d’association, d’intimidation, et discours de haine.

Les autorités burundaises, s’attèlent déjà, à la préparation des prochaines élections, bien que la question du dialogue inclusif n’ait pas encore trouvé une juste solution.

En conclusion, les Nations Unies ont l’obligation, quelles que soient les difficultés qui persistent, de continuer leur mission de bons offices, aux côtés de la sous-région, afin d’aider le Burundi à sortir de la crise. Nous restons persuadé que le processus politique demeure la seule voie pour le dénouement de la crise burundaise.

S’agissant enfin des relations Nations Unies – Burundi, elles me semblent aller dans le bon sens. En effet, le Secrétariat des nations unies et le gouvernement poursuivent les négociations sur le projet d’Accord de siège. On notera, cependant, que le gouvernement n’a pas encore concrètement satisfait à sa décision de coopérer pleinement avec le Conseil des Droits de l’Homme et le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés. Les négociations se poursuivent également avec le Bureau du Haut-Commissaire aux Droits de l’homme.

Mesdames et Messieurs les membres du Conseil, tell sens les principaux faits, que j’ai noté depuis mon dernier briefing au conseil. Je vous remercie de votre attention.  

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished delegates, Ladies and gentlemen,

I have the pleasure to address the Fourth Committee on behalf of Under-Secretary-General Feltman and introduce the Secretary-General’s latest report on “Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions”, requested by the General Assembly in resolution 71/100. USG Feltman regrets that his schedule did not allow him to be here today.

Let me express DPA’s appreciation to the delegations of Finland and Mexico for their continued leadership on this agenda item, and their close cooperation with the Secretariat.

 

Mr. Chairman,

The current debate is the fifth the General Assembly has held on special political missions. The debate is a critical part of the ongoing discussion between Member States and the Secretariat on the key role played by special political missions in promoting international peace and security, as well as on the challenges they face in implementing their mandates safely and effectively, and the actions that need to be  taken to strengthen and support them.

This debate, and the Secretary-General’s report submitted in advance of it, provides an opportunity to discuss the various policy issues reflected in GA resolution 71/100, as well as the priorities and concerns voiced by Member States in May this year during the annual interactive dialogue on special political missions.

Since USG Feltman briefed the Fourth Committee on the SPM agenda item last year, the global operating environment has continued to face uncertainty, volatility and rapid transformation. Today’s conflicts are enormously diverse in nature, involving competition over state institutions, natural resources, and territory. The regionalization of the causes and consequences of conflict adds layers of complexity to our efforts to resolve them, as has been the case with respect to Syria, Libya and Yemen, to name but a few. Within some conflicts, we have seen the rise of political narratives and actors such as ISIS/ISIL and Boko Haram that reject the modern conception of the state.

Against this backdrop, special political missions continue to play a wide variety of peace and security functions, demonstrating their versatility and flexibility. At national and regional levels, SPMs have played vital roles in advancing political transitions; in supporting governance, strengthening institutions and enabling democratic processes; and in identifying early risks and crafting effective preventive responses.

The report of the Secretary-General details a wide variety of developments for SPMs, from the completion of the initial mandate in Colombia, where the mission supported the remarkable progress made by the Government and the FARC-EP towards the implementation of their peace agreement, and the establishment of the follow-up Verification Mission; to the expansion of the mandates of several panels of experts; to the strategic assessments and subsequent adjustments to the missions in Libya and Somalia.

It also addresses a number of policy issues that arise from, or are made more urgent by, these trends in the mandates and operating environments of SPMs. Many of these issues were also raised by Member States during the interactive dialogue in May. Let me highlight four such issues.

The first is the effectiveness of SPMs in preventing conflict and sustaining peace. The Secretary-General has called for a reorientation of the work of the Organization around a universal agenda for prevention. This has injected renewed energy into our efforts to strengthen the efforts of the UN to prevent conflict, as conceptualized in the Sustaining Peace resolutions, which call for a focus on “preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence” of conflict.

With their diverse mandates and operational orientations, special political missions are a critical part of any effort to strengthen the Organization’s work on conflict prevention. The integration of a broad range of disciplines into the work of SPMs, including DDR, SSR, human rights and institutional capacity development, serves as a strong example of the three pillars of the Organization working effectively as one in support of prevention. The research conducted by panels of experts provides an invaluable source of information to the Security Council that underpins the effectiveness of sanctions regimes as a key preventive tool.

The recommendations of the High-level Panel on Peace Operations and the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture provided a detailed technical agenda for increasing the effectiveness of SPMs, while the recent announcement by the Secretary-General of a surge in preventive diplomacy and the establishment of a High-level Advisory Board on Mediation have put new wind in their sails.

A second important policy area is the strengthening of partnerships between SPMs and regional and sub-regional organizations, another priority for the Secretary-General. The case for close collaboration between SPMs and regional organizations on early warning and analysis, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution has been thoroughly and convincingly made. We must now work to strengthen our links to these organizations and find innovative ways to collaborate, based on the principles of transparency, mutual accountability and comparative advantage.

Over the past year we have taken major strides forward in the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations on peace and security cooperation, guided by decisions of the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. The signing this April of the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, in particular, provides a strengthened basis for collaboration and technical exchange. We are also enhancing our collaboration with other regional organizations including the European Union, OSCE and League of Arab States. At the sub-regional level, our regional offices have made significant progress in building operational relationships with their counterparts.

A third area of focus is the Women Peace and Security Agenda, where DPA’s efforts to deploy more gender expertise to special political missions has met with some success. The impact of these capacities on the work of the missions is tangible, with evidence of a gender-disaggregated approach to planning, executing and monitoring of the implementation of SPM mandates reflected in reports to the Security Council. DPA will continue to provide targeted support to help missions foster the roles of women in mediation and peacemaking efforts and to encourage women’s increased political participation.

With respect to the fourth area of focus, as the focal point for electoral assistance, DPA has continued to respond to requests for support to electoral processes, including through SPMs. Increasingly, such support is targeted at medium-to-long term objectives of increasing the capacities of electoral bodies and addressing structural challenges that affect the success and credibility of electoral processes. A critical element of sustaining peace and preventing conflict over the long term, electoral support delivered by SPMs will need to continue to evolve to respond effectively to such demand.

 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee,

In addition to these four key areas, the Secretary-General’s report addresses our ongoing efforts to improve geographical distribution and gender representation in SPMs as well as to advance transparency, accountability and efficiency in the execution of our mandates. In particular, the report highlights the continued efforts that the Secretariat has made in ensuring that our missions are broadly representative of the United Nations membership.

While some progress has been made to improve the representation of women in SPMs, progress is far too slow and will need to be accelerated to meet the Secretary-General’s goals for achieving gender parity across the Organization. Improving both the geographic distribution and representation of women in SPMs will continue to be priorities that DPA and its leadership take very seriously. The report also addresses in some detail the safety and security challenges faced by special political missions in an ever-more volatile global environment, and highlights some of the impediments to mandate implementation that missions operating in difficult security environments face.

The real and serious nature of the security threats UN personnel face every day was laid bare in March 2017 with the murder of two members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as of the four Congolese citizens accompanying them, who were killed while researching arms trafficking, armed group activity, and human rights abuses in the DRC. We pay tribute to the two brave young professionals, as well as their Congolese aides, and to all personnel of SPMs who similarly put their safety on the line to implement Security Council mandates.

 

Mr. Chairman,

We look forward to the consideration by the governing bodies of the various reform proposals put forward by the Secretary-General over the last few months. While Member States deliberate on the reforms, special political missions will continue to play a critical role in the UN peace and security toolkit. It is therefore vital that we retain a sharp focus on SPMs and the conditions required for their success, including international and regional political backing, relationships and entry points, and effective backstopping and support. We appreciate the support Member States have continued to demonstrate to this crucial tool, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council.

We will continue to work closely with the Fourth Committee to take stock of the progress achieved and challenges faced by special political missions, and seek your guidance and advice on the way forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Сообщение для СМИ

25 октября 2017 г., 50-ая встреча совместного Механизма по Предотвращению и Реагированию на Инциденты (МПРИ) была проведена в городе Гали под председательством Организации Объединённых Наций, с участием грузинских, российских, абхазских и МНЕС (Миссия Наблюдателей Европейского Союза) представителей. Она была проведена в деловой и довольно конструктивной атмосфере. Общая обстановка на местах в плане безопасности, начиная с сентябрьской (2017 г.) встречи МПРИ, была оценена как спокойная и стабильная.

50-ой встрече предшествовали презентации по борьбе с преступностью в условиях конфликта или постконфликтных ситуациях, представленные двумя международными полицейскими экспертами. Цель этой инициативы ООН состояла в том, чтобы уделить главное внимание различному международному опыту относительно того, как наладить и укрепить сотрудничество, обмениваться информацией и координировать действия правоохранительной органов. 

На самой встрече, главным образом продолжилась дискуссия по инцидентам, которые уже  были обсуждены во время предыдущих встреч МПРИ. Участники также обменялись мнениями относительно расширения добровольного обмена информацией о значимой деятельности с целью укрепления доверия.  Была подчеркнута важность активного использования горячей линии связи и обмена точной информацией.

Участники согласились провести следующую встречу 28 ноября 2017 г. 

Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

Today’s briefing is taking place as important developments unfold to end the more than ten year long Palestinian divide and return Gaza to the full control of the legitimate Palestinian Authority.

Last month when Hamas dissolved the Administrative Committee, a parallel institution to run governmental affairs in Gaza, it agreed that the Palestinian Government of National Consensus should assume its responsibilities in the Strip.

President Abbas welcomed this crucial step, promising on 20 September at the UN General Assembly that the Government would soon visit Gaza.

The Secretary-General, the Middle East Quartet and several Member States expressed their firm support and encouraged the parties to build on the commendable efforts of Egypt to seize this positive momentum toward Palestinian unity.

On 2 October, Prime Minister Hamdallah travelled to Gaza with a delegation of some 150 officials, including Ministers, key security agencies and heads of the energy and water authorities. On the following day, the Government held its first meeting in Gaza since 2014.

The United Nations has worked with the Palestinian leadership and the region in support of this process. Special Coordinator Mladenov travelled repeatedly between Ramallah, Gaza and the region in recent weeks to support the reconciliation effort and alleviate the humanitarian crisis. He also led a UN delegation during the Government visit and engaged with the Prime Minister, as well as all Palestinian political factions and civil society to ensure their support for the implementation of the understandings reached between Fatah and Hamas in Cairo on 17 September. These understandings included a three-step process to advance Palestinian unity: the return of responsibilities in Gaza to the legitimate Palestinian Authority (PA); subsequent bilateral talks between Fatah and Hamas in Cairo, including on public sector employees, security and control of the border crossings; and consultations with all Palestinian factions.

On 12 October, with Egyptian mediation, Fatah and Hamas signed an agreement that enables the Palestinian government to resume its responsibilities in Gaza. According to its provisions, by 1 November, the Palestinian Authority should take control of the crossings of Gaza. Separately a joint committee will be formed to resolve the issue of public sector employees that should complete its work no later than 1 February 2018.

A statement released by Egypt further highlighted that the Government should assume its full responsibilities in the management of the Gaza Strip by 1 December 2017. It was further announced that Egypt has called for a meeting in Cairo on 21 November for all Palestinian factions.

The agreement does not contain any provisions related to elections, the formation of a national unity government, or the disarming of Hamas.

The Secretary-General has spoken to President Abbas and welcomed the signing of this intra-Palestinian agreement. Its timely implementation and concrete efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis will be critical for effectively empowering the Palestinian Government in Gaza. Its implementation should also facilitate the lifting of the closures, while addressing Israel’s legitimate security concerns.

The agreement is an important step toward achieving the goal of Palestinian unity under a single, democratic Palestinian national authority on the basis of the PLO platform, the Quartet principles and the rule of law.

The United Nations will continue working with the Palestinian leadership and the region in support of this process, which is critical for reaching a negotiated two-state solution and sustainable peace.

 

Mr. President,

I would like to take a moment to discuss the acute severity of Gaza’s humanitarian crisis and continuing human rights abuses.

In an urgent call to action, during his August visit to the region, the Secretary-General called it “one of the most dramatic humanitarian crises” he has ever seen. Since then, the conditions have only worsened.

For the sixth consecutive month, the two million people living in Gaza have received electricity for a mere four to six hours per day. The lack of energy has had a devastating impact on all aspects of their lives.

It continues to disrupt essential public services including health care, the water supply and sanitation systems. The equivalent of over 40 Olympic-size swimming pools of virtually raw sewage continues to flow daily into the Mediterranean Sea, leaving the whole shoreline contaminated.

Gaza is an unfolding environmental disaster that has no regard for borders.

The quality of health care inside the Strip is deteriorating at an alarming rate. Access to medical care outside Gaza has also become increasingly difficult.

As the Government returns to Gaza, it is critical that urgent measures are taken to reverse these trends.

Meanwhile in other worrying developments, on 26 September Hamas sentenced three men to death by hanging on the charge of murder, accessory to murder and burglary. There are serious doubts as to whether their trials and detention conditions in Gaza meet international standards. As in previous cases, if these executions were to be implemented, they would be done in violation of Palestinian law, which requires the approval of the President.

I urge Hamas not to carry out such executions and I, once again, call on President Abbas to establish a moratorium on the implementation of the death penalty.

 

Mr. President,

Turning to the broader situation on the ground, over the past month violence has remained at low levels, compared to the rest of the region. Four Israelis were killed by a Palestinian attacker, who himself was shot, at the entrance of the Har Adar settlement on 26 September. It is deplorable that Hamas and others once again chose to glorify this attack.

The UN urges all to condemn violence and stand up to terror.

On 4 October, the body of an Israeli man from the settlement of Elkana was found in the Israeli-Arab village of Kafr Kassem with signs of extreme violence. Israeli authorities investigating the death arrested two Palestinians from the West Bank town of Qabatiyah in relation to the incident.

During the reporting period in total 80 Palestinians were injured by Israeli security forces, with five Israelis injured by Palestinians.

On 8 October, a rocket fired from Gaza toward Israel landed inside the Strip. No injuries or damage were reported. In response, the Israel Defense Forces shelled a Hamas post in central Gaza Strip, with no injuries reported.

 

Mr. President

Turning to the question of settlements, on 17 and 18 October, the Israeli High Planning Committee met to advance plans for more than 2,000 housing units in Area C of the occupied West Bank. This includes units in the new settlement of Amihai and a new neighborhood in Kochav Yaacov, both designated for settlers evicted by court orders from illegal outposts. Separately, a tender was issued for 296 units in Beit El and building permits for 31 units were conditionally approved in Hebron. Reportedly, the Hebron Municipality is expected to appeal this decision, which would delay the implementation of the building permits.

This week, work began to prepare for the construction of infrastructure in Givat Hamatos, a settlement that, if built, would further disconnect East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank.

I remain concerned about proposed legislation that, if adopted, would expand Jerusalem’s municipal jurisdiction by incorporating several West Bank settlements.

The UN reiterates that all settlement activities are illegal under international law and are an impediment to peace.

 

Mr. President,

2017 has seen a significant decrease in Area C demolitions as compared to the previous year. Against this background some 13 residential, livelihood and public structures in the West Bank and East Jerusalem were demolished in the past month. This brings the total of demolished structures for the year to over 350. Meanwhile the number of demolitions in East Jerusalem is quickly approaching 2016 levels, which were the highest number since 2000.

I am particularly disturbed by reported Israeli plans to evict specific communities, including Bedouin in Khan al Ahmar, adjacent to the E-1 area, and Susiya in the South Hebron Hills. Nearly all structures in Khan al Ahmar now have demolition orders. Many of the structures are donor funded, including a school that serves 170 children.

I urge Israel to cease the practice of demolitions, which has led to the displacement of thousands of people.

 

Mr. President,

Turning to Lebanon, the situation has remained generally quiet in the UNIFIL Area of Operations and along the Blue Line. 

On the occasion of LAF Commander Aoun’s visit to UNIFIL, on 22 September, the LAF formally announced the deployment of the 5th Rapid Intervention Regiment to the UNIFIL Area of Operations, fulfilling their earlier commitment to expand LAF’s presence south of the Litani river.

The regiment has since deployed, and coordination of activities between UNIFIL and the regiment has commenced. On 19 September, HoM/FC Beary chaired a Tripartite meeting during which the parties discussed the UNIFIL mandate extension under resolution 2373, violations of Security Council Resolution 1701, Blue Line marking and ongoing liaison and coordination matters.

On the Golan, the ceasefire between the State of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic has been maintained, albeit in a volatile environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in Syria. Both sides have stated their continued commitment to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and support for the full return of UNDOF to the area of separation, conditions permitting.

 

Mr. President,

In closing, I would like to emphasize that despite the overall negative trajectory that has characterized the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for far too long, there are reasons for cautious optimism.

This past month, thousands of Israeli and Palestinian women united in a two-week march for peace that brought forward participants of all ages and backgrounds. The yearning for peace amongst both peoples remains strong. These grass-roots initiatives by civil society are critical to building the foundation for peace and must be supported.

A key piece of the peace puzzle is to bring Gaza back under the control of the legitimate Palestinian Authority. The lack of Palestinian unity was identified in the July 2016 report of the Middle East Quartet as one of the main obstacles to achieving a two-state solution.

Current Palestinian efforts to return the Government to Gaza must be encouraged; they must be supported; and they must be successful. The parties have taken a crucial first step in this process. They have demonstrated a willingness to engage positively and in good faith. Yet overcoming their deeply entrenched differences will not be easy, it will take time, and there will be many hurdles to overcome along the way.

Success carries with it an enormous opportunity, just as failure carries with it great risks. Palestinians need to decide which path they will take. The international community must ensure that they are given every support and opportunity to reach a positive outcome, and we must ensure that work can move forward on ending the occupation and establishing a viable, sovereign Palestinian state that lives in peace and security with Israel.

Thank you.

     

Mr. President,

Let me update you first on the latest developments, and then turn to the way ahead on the political track and the implementation of Security Council resolution 2254.

First, what’s happening on the ground. The Amman discussions and the meetings which have taken place very effectively in Astana have created four zones of de-escalation – in the south, in Eastern Ghouta, north of Homs, and in Idlib province. We also now have two other so-called de-confliction zones which have been brokered by the Russian Federation in Ifreen and Eastern Qalamoun. 

However, the situation, you know it, we know it, remains still fragile. We are concerned by the al Nusra offensive in Idlib and Hama provinces following the Astana meeting, and the heavy fighting that has been taking place there. This includes some of the first airstrikes in the area since April, some allegedly hitting civilians and civilian infrastructure including health facilities, as well as heavy opposition shelling on civilian towns under government control in Hama and Latakia. We are also concerned at heavy fighting in other places. So the situation is far from perfect. Nevertheless, we have to admit, and we want to reaffirm it here, the creation of the de-escalation zones is a very important step in the effort to de-escalate the violence in the whole country and we are seeing the results of it.

ISIL is being beaten back. Government forces have advanced in the eastern countryside of Hama and Homs and broken the three-year of the so-called siege of, which is taking place de facto in Deir Ez Zor city. The Government and allies recently crossed the Euphrates River. Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces with the backing of the International Coalition made further advances against ISIL, taking control of most of the city of Raqqa, while the SDF-led Deir Ez Zor military council has made advances against ISIL on the eastern banks of the Euphrates.  The Government and its allies have reportedly increased their strikes on SDF positions. Armed opposition groups are also involved in battle against ISIL in Daraa.  I wish to recall the United Nations’ calls for the protection of civilians – and this is the right place to do it – in Idlib, in Deir ez Zor, in Raqqa and elsewhere where fighting is still going on. 

In the midst of this intensive military activity, while we all recognize that the fighting against ISIL is important, we need to remember that the civilians cannot be punished twice: already because they have been under the rule of ISIL and then because they happen to be unlucky enough to be there when the fighting goes on. I would like to urge that more needs to be done in the field of protection of civilians: more needs to be done to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure from military assault, and to ensure safe, sustained and unimpeded access to all civilians in need in Syria, wherever they are. You will hear more from my colleague Mark Lowcock on the latest humanitarian developments.

Allow me nevertheless to specifically underline the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons. Thousands of them according to their families are still missing, abducted or detained. We have not seen any progress on this issue – neither in Astana, despite several attempts and hopes; nor in Geneva. A very large number of Syrian families are suffering from the absence of their all detained or missing relatives, and lack above all information on their fate. They don’t even know if they are alive or not. The time has come to address this issue now as a major priority, particularly in this period when we see de-escalation taking place.

I also hope that concrete results can be achieved in the near future on the issue of humanitarian mine action - I hate mines, I had three of my colleagues killed by mines both in Afghanistan and in Iraq. I’ve seen them in action -  as this would constitute another important confidence-building measure. I note with interest the ongoing dialogue between UNMAS and the Government of Syria in this regard.

 

Mr. President,

There is wide consensus that de-escalation arrangements must not lead to a soft partition of Syria, must not lead to a soft partition of Syria, and that Syria’s unity and territorial integrity must be fully upheld. I found many common perspectives through the hundreds of Syrians we are meeting regularly; Syrians of all backgrounds have voiced their strong rejection of any partitioning of Syria – its territory and its people.

That is why de-escalation should be a pre-cursor to a truly nation-wide ceasefire, and to action on the humanitarian and confidence-building fronts – the issues identified in paras 12-14 of 2254. The Astana effort -- and the Amman one too -- should be seen as laying the basis for a renewed Geneva process -- one that moves from preparatory talks into genuine negotiations on the political future of Syria as envisaged in resolution 2254, tackling all four baskets of the agenda, and as welcomed by this Council.

 

Mr. President,

I have engaged both sides, as well as all those who have an influence over them, during the General Assembly, which has been as usual very useful. I attended a number of multilateral meetings in its margins, including one convened by the European Union - and I want to thank the European Union for that initiative - with a wide cross-section of international actors. I also had the opportunity to visit Washington on Monday, while my Deputy, Ambassador Ramzy, visited Moscow yesterday and today. I intend to maintain a high level of engagement with all concerned countries and Syrian parties in the weeks ahead.

We will continue to engage with all participants in the Civil Society Support Room and to draw on the insights of the Women’s Advisory Board. Participants from both have strongly underscored to me the expectations of a broad cross section of Syrians for an inclusive political solution reflecting the interests of all Syrians and grounded in human rights, equality, and justice. They continue to call attention to the voices missing from the political process, including women who are half the population if not more. They should have an equal voice in the decisions shaping the future of their country.

I wish to confirm today my intention to convene the 8th round of the intra-Syrian talks in Geneva – I discussed it with the Secretary-General yesterday – in about a month from now – the precise date is to be determined. It should be no later than end October or very early in November. I am reaffirming that timeframe so that all concerned can use the crucial month from now until then to create conditions for those talks to be particularly meaningful. And I am calling on both sides – I repeat, both sides – to assess the situation with realism and responsibility to the people of Syria and to prepare seriously to participate in the Geneva talks without preconditions – without preconditions. Let me explain exactly what we mean by that.

We believe the Government has an interest and indeed a duty to genuinely negotiate with the opposition that this Council has identified by name in 2254. Until now, the Government has conditioned its readiness to move from talks to real negotiations on the issue of opposition unity, and a commitment to certain essential principles. I also know how important the terrorism and counter-terrorism issue has been to the Government. But it is precisely at this time, as terrorism is starting to be defeated in Syria, - and we are watching it with our own eyes - that we need to preserve those gains on the ground and sustain them through a real and inclusive political process – guided by resolution 2254.

The Government therefore should be urged to show by word and action that it genuinely wants to have a negotiation about credible, inclusive governance locally and centrally; about a schedule and process for a new constitution; about UN supervised elections -- all while the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Syria are preserved -- all while terrorism is combatted and defeated. It is important that those states who are friends of the Syrian Government encourage it to show its readiness to move forward, including on the substance of 2254, the agenda of the baskets, not just in broad terms, but in specifics, with details, sequencing and implementation modalities. This will not be easy, but it has to start, and the United Nations will be more than willing to be an honest broker in enabling real negotiations with the opposition.

For its part, we also believe that the opposition has an interest and indeed a duty now to signal that it does want to speak with one voice and with a common platform in genuine negotiations with the Government on those 4 baskets and on the implementation of resolution 2254. No one is asking the opposition to suddenly stop being the opposition – but we are urging the opposition to realize that it is at its most credible and effective when it stands together, and shows readiness to negotiate, which means to give and take.

In this regard, there has been a lot of hard work done by my office frankly. There is much to build from. My office facilitated valuable technical work of the three opposition platforms from May to July. The opposition should be urged now to take the opportunity presented by the effort of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to convene what they call an inclusive Riyadh 2 conference – which we hope and trust will take place in October before the Geneva talks and before Astana. That conference should be the time and place for the opposition, with the encouragement of those who have influence over it – and some of them are in this room – to ensure that it comes together, and presents a strategic approach to the negotiation process to realize the vision which remains always the same of 2254. The United Nations is ready to support this in any way we can.

Let me caution all sides against illusions of victory or dreams of shortcuts. There is no substitute for a UN, internationally supported process based in Geneva on a comprehensive and inclusive approach that also helps Syrians to re-discover a modicum of trust and social cohesion after this bitter conflict.

We need to remember: hundreds of thousands are dead, and millions carry the physical or psychological wounds of a brutal conflict. Millions are displaced, either within Syria or beyond, even as some are trying to return home. Thousands are detained, thousands have disappeared – many without a trace, and with no progress on revealing their fate. Infrastructure – particularly civilian infrastructure – has been destroyed on a scale that is not imaginable. Internationally proscribed terrorist groups, even if they are on the back foot today and they have shown their resilience in other places of the world in surviving battlefield reverses and thriving again – which they will or they could if there is no new political compact that enables the society to transition to a shared, inclusive, democratic future. The need to address the unmet grievances that exist in Syria is apparent to me from the range of Syrian voices who are not aligned neither with the Government nor the opposition.

That is why, Mr. President, the time has come for the focus to return to Geneva, and the intra-Syrian talks under the auspices of the United Nations – yourselves. That is the only forum in which the transitional political process envisaged by this Council in resolution 2254 can be developed with the Syrian parties themselves, with the full legitimacy that the UN provides and the backing of the international community. We have a month until those talks - that is why we want to all work in this month. Let us use it to prepare them well.

Thank you, Mr. President.

 

On 19 September 2017, the 49th meeting of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) was held in Gali town under the chairmanship of the United Nations with the participation of Georgian, Russian, Abkhaz and EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission) representatives. The meeting was businesslike and rather constructive.

The overall security situation on the ground since the previous IPRM meeting was assessed as calm and stable.

The participants followed up on the 19 May 2016 killing case of a Georgian civilian man at one of the former crossing points. They exchanged information on previous and recent detentions of local residents related to alleged “illegal crossings”. An appeal was reiterated to handle such cases from a humanitarian and administrative angle, rather than as a criminal offence. The participants also followed up on the issues related to crossings by schoolchildren to access education in the language of their choice.

The participants were called upon to give due attention to prevention of incidents and to closely cooperate in this respect, including by provision of an advance notice of sensitive activities and the active use of hotline, which has proven its effectiveness.

Furthermore, the participants continued to take the opportunity in the margins of the meeting to conduct intensive bilateral discussions on issues of their interest and confidence building.

The participants agreed to hold the next meeting on 25 October 2017. 

Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

Thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in the Lake Chad Basin (S/2017/764).  

Mr. President,

Allow me to comment first on security and political developments. Thanks to coordination among affected countries, we have witnessed encouraging progress in the fight against Boko Haram.  The Secretary-General commends the Governments of the region for their efforts, including through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Without question, Boko Haram’s combat capacity has diminished.  But to compensate for this, Boko Haram has changed tactics, increasing the use of suicide attacks.

We thank the Government of Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross for efforts in the release of an additional 82 girls kidnapped from Chibok in north-east Nigeria in 2014. The recent visit to Nigeria by the Deputy Secretary-General and the Executive Director of UN Women shed further light on the plight of women and girls in the Lake Chad Basin.

Unfortunately the fight is far from over.  130 attacks attributed to Boko Haram in the four affected countries in June and July resulted in 284 civilian fatalities, a significant increase compared to 146 attacks and 107 civilian fatalities in April and May. The most affected countries remained Nigeria, followed by Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

In terms of political advocacy, the two Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and for West Africa and the Sahel regularly visit the affected countries to promote enhanced inter-regional cooperation. They propose a regional strategy to address the root causes of the crisis. Such a strategy should be owned and supported by the affected countries as well as the relevant sub-regional organizations:  the Economic Community for Central African States, the Economic Community for West African States and the Lake Chad Basin Commission.

The Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region in February, and the visit by this Council in March brought needed attention to the long neglected crisis in the Lake Chad Basin. The UN and international partners are working to sustain the momentum created by these events. Last week in Berlin, the UN participated in the first Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Oslo Consultative Group on Prevention and Stabilization in the Lake Chad Region.  This brought together representatives of the affected countries, donors and regional and sub-regional organizations. Discussions focused on addressing the structural causes of the crisis, including community stabilization, restoration of services, local governance systems and prevention of violence.

 

Mr. President,

Turning to the development challenges, I note that the Lake Chad Basin crisis has wreaked havoc on basic infrastructure, assets and government services. Insecurity has sparked large-scale unemployment and left 1 million school-age children deprived of education. The substantial economic impact of the crisis has reached nearly $9 billion across north-east Nigeria alone.  Poverty, low legitimacy of the State, human insecurity and climate change, among other challenges, compound this dire situation. As is so often the case, women and the youth are key risk groups.

Conflict and displacement have eroded, and in some cases ruptured, the bonds between and within communities. Intra-communal structures and processes that traditionally regulated violence and resolved conflicts have weakened. We detect worrying signs of social fragmentation as tensions emerge from ethno-religious, social and other divisions, including between IDPs and host communities. Unless robust peacebuilding efforts are introduced, reintegration of ex-combatants, including from Boko Haram and vigilante groups, risks creating additional tensions and heighten the risks of secondary conflict.

In addition, the report notes the need for greater attention and funding to support development interventions including community stabilization, economic revitalization and prevention to build community resilience and ensure durable solutions.

 

Mr. President,

Yesterday, Under-Secretary-General Lowcock of OCHA concluded his first visit to Niger and Nigeria to raise international visibility on the humanitarian situation,  discuss with the Governments and consider practical steps to further strengthen the response.

Despite significant progress made in reaching affected people in the Lake Chad basin, the humanitarian needs in the region continue to be staggering. Some 10.7 million people require humanitarian assistance. With 8.5 million people in need, north-east Nigeria is again enduring the worst of this crisis. Funding continue to fall significantly short. At present, the regional appeal requesting $1.5 billion for 2017 is funded at only 40%.

The region now faces the rainy season, when food insecurity is at its worst, with thousands of farmers having missed four planting seasons in a row due to conflict, resulting insecurity and displacements. Across the region, 7.2 million people are severely food insecure, including 5.2 million in north-east Nigeria, where an estimated 50,000 people are at highest risk of famine.

The crisis displaced an estimated 2.4 million people, including 1.5 million children. New displacements occur alongside the return of IDPs and refugees. Given the continued insecurity and lack of basic services in many affected areas, involuntary and unsafe returns of refugees and IDPs must be avoided at all costs.

 

Mr. President,

On human rights, we are deeply concerned with the continued violations by Boko Haram, including killings, forceful use of children as suicide bombers and sexual and gender-based violence against women and children. Perpetrators must be brought to justice.

The UN has also received numerous allegations of serious human rights violations committed in the context of counter-terrorism operations. The UN continues to advocate strongly with MNJTF to put forward a clear strategy to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse, including by recruiting a dedicated gender adviser within its civilian component.

The report notes our conviction that we must develop a common understanding that human rights violations are among the root causes of instability in the Lake Chad Basin and that impunity will fuel the crisis. Investing in traditional justice mechanisms at the community level is essential to sustainable reconciliation and stability. Prevention of terrorist activities, stabilization and recovery initiatives must integrate the human rights dimension.

Sexual violence remains appallingly widespread in the region. It is a driver of forced displacement and a particular risk in displacement settings, where conflict-affected women and children are exposed to daily risks of exploitation. Those suffering from acute physical and psychological trauma need urgent medical and psychosocial care. The UN is exploring options for the deployment of dedicated expertise on conflict-related sexual violence to north-east Nigeria.

The UN faces a serious funding shortage to deploy human rights monitors across the region. We reiterate our call to the international community to generously contribute funds to enable UN to support the establishment of national and regional mechanisms for the systematic monitoring and reporting of the human rights situation.

 

Mr. President,

Allow me to touch on SSR and DDR.  The lack of a comprehensive approach in addressing Boko Haram defectors, including clear and transparent criteria that are human rights-compliant and in line with the international terrorism framework, produces multiple challenges. Despite good faith, ad hoc efforts result in thousands of persons being irregularly detained and/or unpredictably processed. This situation is not productive, sustainable or in accordance with the rule of law, and justice is not served.

 

Mr. President,

In our view, the MNJTF efforts remain indispensable in resolving the crisis. However, the heavy financial investment borne by regional countries comes at a high cost:  Governments have no choice but to divert much of their national budgets from development to addressing national and regional security. Within the UN, Member States are careful to make sure that we do not shift development and humanitarian funds to peace and security work; we would hope that the affected countries could attract the support to do the same.  We welcome the pledges already made and encourage the further timely disbursement of contributions to enable MNJTF to address the challenges it faces.

 

Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,                            

In conclusion, I note that the complex and increasingly protracted nature of the Lake Chad Basin crisis calls for innovative and integrated solutions that bridge traditional divides between humanitarian and development strategies. UN is committed to adopting a New Way of Working that will address the urgent needs of the affected populations and the root causes of the crisis in a coordinated and phased manner. I urge all partners to redouble their efforts to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to the affected populations, as well as early and longer term recovery. That is the basis to build resilience and assure durable solutions to the crisis.

We encourage, once again, the affected countries to jointly elaborate a regional strategy to address the root causes of the crisis. We hope that the planned regional conference on stabilization in N’Djaména, in October, will be the first step towards the development of such a strategy.

We in the UN remain committed to working with regional countries on ending the violence, protecting civilians, promoting human development and alleviating the suffering in the Lake Chad Basin. We can prevent this crisis from growing but that would require greater political and financial support to the Lake Basin region. The Side-event on 21 September, in the margins of the General Assembly, will be a key opportunity for the international community to reaffirm its support for the region.

Thank you for your attention.

Mr. President,

I last briefed the Security Council after the 7th round of the Intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which concluded on the 14th of July. Since then, we have been active in a range of diplomatic efforts and continuing contacts. I have recently held high-level consultations in Tehran and Paris, and my Deputy Special Envoy, Ambassador Ramzy, was earlier in Moscow and is currently in Saudi Arabia. Contacts are continuing with other actors as we seek to lay the ground for further rounds of talks that bring the parties into a genuine negotiation.

Let me now elaborate on how I assess the situation at present, and what we think we can expect in the period ahead – in de-escalating violence, in combatting terrorism, and in advancing the political process.

While undoubtfully there is still violence in Syria, the trend of de-escalation and the operationalization of de-escalation zones is indeed continuing. We are encouraged by the calm in the southwest, and the opening of a trilateral Amman Monitoring Centre by the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Jordan. Meanwhile, following a series of agreements with armed groups, including with the active support of Egypt and the Russian Federation, we have seen a significant reduction of violence in parts of the Ghouta de-escalation zone, although not in all of it. In Homs, we note that the Russian Federation's efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement are continuing. We are worried about reports of shelling and airstrikes north of Homs city, which we believe require the guarantors’ urgent attention.

Meantime, the situation in Idlib is complex and complicated and needs close attention. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham – or as we still continue to call it, the former al-Nusra, a terrorist group identified by this Council – has seized territory from other armed opposition groups in this area. Its stated intention is to set up some kind of new Al-Nursa dominated administration. It is very important that Astana guarantors, in liaison with the Government and armed opposition groups, come to a speedy agreement to operationalize the de-escalation zone in Idlib. This will also require a very important element: protecting civilians; but that will be addressed I am sure by my colleague, Steven O’Brien.

As efforts to combat terrorism continue, we are seeing ISIL/Daesh’s area of control being constantly shrunk – something I think everybody welcomes in the ongoing fight against terrorism. While the Government of Syria is proceeding towards Deir Ez-Zor, the Lebanese army has advanced against ISIL/Daesh on the Lebanese side of the border. The Syrian Democratic Forces and the US-led coalition continue their efforts to eliminate ISIL from Raqqa, while the Russian Federation is supporting the Government of Syria in proceeding towards Deir Ez-Zor.

And while military operations are underway, rapid, safe, and sustained humanitarian access remains indeed essential, as well as the work for the release of the arbitrarily detained persons, and to shed light on the fate of the thousands of disappeared. All parties must also do their utmost to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure while this is happening. I am sure my colleague and friend, Under-Secretary-General O’Brien – who I would like to thank personally for his immense efforts on Syria – will further address these issues in his briefing on the humanitarian aspects. I also want to thank UNMAS for its continued readiness to support humanitarian demining efforts.

 

Mr. President,

The developments I have described are the result of a very timely process of prioritization and cooperation among key external players, and a realization among internal players of the need to compromise. The challenge ahead will be to extend this spirit into the political realm. This requires clear and new thinking from the opposition and the Government, and enhanced international cooperation.

Let me start with the opposition. The opposition invitees to the Geneva talks – i.e. the HNC, the Cairo Platform and the Moscow Platform, those specified in SCR 2254 – have important and urgent work to do to develop common negotiating positions and strengthen their unity. It is high time. I briefed you last time on progress we have made with them in two rounds of UN technical talks in Geneva and nearby – there was important substantive progress, which should now be used as a springboard for further efforts. Given that many developments are taking place elsewhere between the actors of the opposition, we have refrained from holding further UN technical talks to give time for these developments to unfold and progress. But time must not be lost. Elevating common technical commonalities to the political level remains an imperative.

I am grateful to Saudi Arabia for taking the initiative for a new, more inclusive meeting of the opposition – a Riyadh 2 conference as it is called, including with the hosting of a preparatory meeting last week. Our technical work and political support will be important contributions to these efforts. We will work closely with Saudi Arabia and all who have traditionally supported or engaged with the opposition in this pursuit. I recall in this respect that 2254 does encourage me to be active in any finalization effort in this regard.

 

Mr. President,

As we counsel fresh thinking and initiative on the part of the opposition, we may also need to do the same with the Government. The Government has indicated that it would be prepared to intensify its engagement with a unified opposition and with clarity on principles that govern the political process. But there are times when strong public signals are sent that indicate an exclusively military approach, and a dismissal of the prospects of any meaningful political negotiation.

However, we have seen too many instances in other conflicts where, despite military advances, a government has not been able to turn those gains into a sustainable post-conflict situation, due to unmet political grievance and lack of genuine inclusion of all in the future of the country. That’s why we are convinced that both the Government and the Opposition should have a genuine interest now to engage in a serious discussion.

Ultimately, it will only be Syrians who determine the future of their country. But an internationally supported and inclusive political process will be required to lay the foundation for a sustainable future, and for genuine reconstruction.

It is in the profound interests of the long-suffering people of Syria that the government and the opposition realize that the time has come to engage in a more serious and concrete negotiation.

 

Mr. President,

In this regard, I would like to note that we are not only focused on the government and opposition, but are listening to the full range of Syrian stakeholders.

Immediately after the 7th round, our OSE Civil Society Support Room completed regional consultations in Beirut, Gaziantep and Amman. These discussions involved over 120 actors and networks stemming from the Syrian civil society, establishing the foundations for future consultations in Geneva. It is becoming increasingly clear from these consultations that regardless of their perceived differences, all Syrians are impatient for the conflict to end and the political process to deliver. We will continue to encourage and facilitate their collective work.

Let me also update you on the Women Advisory Board. Following its regular contributions to the work that was done during the 7th round of intra-Syrian talks, the 12-member board is currently undergoing a rotation exercise to ensure continuous diversity of perspectives.

I count on the continued support of the Women Advisory Board to advise me and my team to ensure the meaningful representation of diverse women’s voices and women’s rights perspectives in the political process as we move forward. And we hope to see the same, both in the delegation of the opposition and of the Government.

 

Mr. President,

So, how do we bring all of this activity together into one common effort in the coming months to genuinely advance a political solution? What is the path forward?

First, Russia, Iran and Turkey and others – including the United States of America, Egypt and Jordan – will need to keep actively working, as they have been doing, on de-escalation. The next Astana meeting, now scheduled for 14 and 15 September, should help to address these matters, and I and my team will be there to help.

Second, it will be important that Saudi Arabia and all who have influence with the opposition focus as they are currently doing on one plan to foster the cohesion and realism of the opposition. We shall on our side be actively involved in that too, while, let me reiterate, standing ready for my office to convene further technical talks to support what Saudi Arabia has been trying to do in unifying the opposition.

Third, it will be vital for those with influence on the Government of Syria to [urge it to] assess the situation carefully and signal a genuine readiness for dialogue and inclusion on the political future of Syria.

Fourth, I appreciate the continued engagement and support of the European Union, and view the meeting it intends to host during the General Assembly as an opportunity to address future resilience and stabilization efforts and support the humanitarian needs of civilians.

Bearing all this in mind, Mr. President, it is my intention to re-convene the formal intra-Syrian talks in Geneva later in October. This is designed to give time for the dynamics I have just described to reach a further stage of maturity. It is my hope that both the Syrian Government and the opposition will come to Geneva then to engage in formal negotiations.  

 

Mr. President,

This is a time for realism and focus, for shifting from the logic of war to that of negotiation, and for putting the interests of the Syrian people first. If I could identify one thing above all that can make the difference, it will be a sense of unity of purpose internationally with clear priorities and common goals.

We need to find creative ways to proceed along the path of peace that this Council, with SCR 2254, has long sought to advance. With that, and our common encouragement to the Syrians in this regard, we can make a real difference in this tragic conflict. I also look forward to the occasion of the forthcoming General Assembly to see further occasions and initiatives related to an accelerated political process in Syria.

Let me summarize so that we have on our radar screen some points that may be helping us to focus. First, our Security Council meeting and your own deliberations. Second, Astana is due to take place, and we want them to succeed and look at additional de-escalation areas. Then the opportunity that all of us will have at the General Assembly to promote and push for discussions, initiatives, related to an accelerated political process for Syria. Then, in October, we hope to see – and we will be working and pushing for it – that the Riyadh 2 meeting will contribute to produce a common platform among the oppositions, hoping meanwhile that the Government will also be helped to realize that there is now a need for a genuine and concrete political negotiation.

Meanwhile, we hope that Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa will be moving towards liberation. Hence, there will be even more urge for a sustainable political solution so that Daesh will not reappear again like it did in Iraq.

Late October: Geneva talks. This time, we hope, serious ones, concrete ones. We are planning for two weeks in a row. That is basically what we are seeing on our radar screen. Things may happen to support the political process, to stop it, to complicate it or to move it forward, but we need a to have a common vision.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Thank you very much Mr. President for the opportunity to brief the Council on the situation in South Sudan. My remarks build on the briefing provided by Assistant Secretary General Wane and cover the developments relating to a resumption of a political process in South Sudan.

 

Mister President,

Since my last briefing two months ago, the five internal and regional initiatives to address the crisis in one form or another indicate continuing concern over the trajectory and depth of the conflict, without any of them so far presenting a definite breakthrough in the political impasses. However, I remain hopeful that some or a combination of them, may have the potential to positively impact the situation. 

As we have heard from ASG Wane, there is sporadic fighting and widespread insecurity across the country. Our engagements with South Sudanese interlocutors, including the opposition, suggest that battlefield fortunes continue to inform the calculus of both the Government and its opponents. Alongside its military pacification efforts, the Government has created an appearance of reconciliation efforts, inter alia through the limited release of political prisoners.  

The Government has further linked these efforts to the National Dialogue initiative, and to lay the ground to calls on political actors to prepare for elections in 2018. We have made clear to all external and internal stakeholders our view that the prevailing insecurity, (internal and external) population displacement, the lack of appropriate institutions or a reasonably level political playing field, in an increasingly divided ethnic environment, militate against organizing credible elections within a year, indeed it may well contribute to deepening and extending the conflict.

ASG Wane has dealt with some of the challenges facing the National Dialogue and its potential contribution to long-term sustainable peace. I would simply draw attention, in the context of various current regional initiatives, to the possibility of the National Dialogue initiative being played off against other initiatives directly related to securing an immediate Cessation of Hostilities.

 

Mr. President,

Among the regional efforts, the Ugandan initiative has focused on the reunification of certain factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This initiative led in late July to President Kiir, Madame Rebecca Garang of the Former Detainees group, and First Vice President Taban Deng committing to expediting the implementation of the Arusha Agreement of January 2015. This agreement concerned a resolution of SPLM intra-party problems.  With the continued absence of Machar’s opposition faction, and some among the Former Detainees reluctant to reconcile with President Kiir in such a manner, the Ugandan initiative continues to fall short of achieving its goal. It may even be divisive amongst and between opposition groups. President Museveni has also begun to engage groups outside the SPLM core, inter alia encouraging preparations for elections.

Another regional initiative, the meeting of opposition parties that was to be hosted in Kenya by President Kenyatta, has not gained much traction. With the Kenyan Government focused on the outcome of recent elections, and the Former Detainees – who were the driving force behind the initiative – preoccupied with the Kampala discussions, the initiative appears to be stalled.  The apparent advantage to any peace process of dealing with a coherent opposition, and the rising competition and conflicts between opposition groupings, have led stakeholders to explore alternatives.  A meeting between Opposition parties, possibly outside Kenya, could be reinstated as part of preparations for the IGAD Revitalization Forum.

The decision of the IGAD Heads of State summit of 12 June to convene a High-Level Revitalization Forum in respect of the 2015 IGAD sponsored peace agreement has begun to gain some momentum. It aims to include Government and Opposition groups in a dialogue to consider how to implement the Peace Agreement, and IGAD has appointed Special Envoy, Ambassador Ismail Wais, to follow through on its decisions. Recognizing the importance of securing President Kiir’s buy-in, the IGAD Council of Foreign Ministers met in Juba on 24-25 July. Following that, IGAD, with help from JMEC, UNMISS, and my office, carried out a mapping exercise on the relevant opposition actors to be included in the Revitalization Forum.

In mid-August, I attended an IGAD-hosted meeting of independent South Sudanese experts in Ethiopia. The discussions were frank, and generated a number of recommendations for IGAD, including on which opposition parties to engage, and on how the Peace Agreement should be adjusted to reflect the new realities in South Sudan.

While the IGAD initiative continues to have potential, a main concern, which I have conveyed to IGAD, is its cautious preparation for engagement with the opposition actors. While these engagements are delicate, the danger is that the more they consult with IGAD capitals, including Juba, the more suspicious the opposition will become that its agenda is partisan.

Crucially, and irrespective of his declared commitment made to the IGAD Council of Ministers during their Juba visit to implement the IGAD summit decisions, President Kiir continues to prioritize the National Dialogue and the reunification of the SPLM, which he recently stressed would bring peace, with the revitalization process playing only a “supplementary role”.

As IGAD grapples with these challenges it has already warned that the indicative timeline for holding the Revitalization Forum at the end of September will necessarily slip.

Meanwhile, in regard to the AU’s engagement, the AU High Representative, President Alpha Oumar Konaré is awaiting the internal adoption of a broad AU engagement strategy on South Sudan before taking matters further. Previously, President Konare has emphasized speaking with one voice, the primacy of internal support for any solutions to the conflict, and a full and robust presence of the Regional Protection Force. President Konare is visiting Addis Ababa this week, providing my office an opportunity to engage and take stock on the current tracks of engagement, and the respective steps to be taken by the AU, IGAD and the UN. We will be concerned to establish mutual complementarity between IGAD and AU initiatives. This will be crucial as we enter a period of a more intensive public engagement by, respectively, your Council, the AU Peace and Security Council, and forums on the margins of the UN General Assembly.

 

Mr. President,

Given the motives and underlying logics that drive the National Dialogue, the SPLM reunification process, the IGAD’s Peace Agreement Revitalization forum, and even the AU plan of action, it would at first instance appear that these initiatives will clash or undermine each other. On the other hand, they could harness the potential complementarity. And such an outcome would require a clear commitment to an inclusive and credible peace process. We have underlined to the IGAD Secretariat the importance of distinguishing the particular goals of each initiative and to focus on how they can work to the greater good. The Revitalization Forum, the National Dialogue or the other initiatives should neither adopt the agenda of the other nor overload the agenda of competing initiatives with their own goals.

In the quest for a more coherent approach therefore, my office will continue to work closely with IGAD, JMEC, the AU and UNMISS to support initiatives towards a sustainable peace.  I will also continue to engage South Sudanese stakeholders so as to open lines to all sides of the conflict.

Thank you.