مرحبا بكم في الأمم المتحدة

Reports and Policy Documents

2017

  • 3 أغسطس 2017

    Thank you, Mr. President for the opportunity to address the Security Council on issues related to United Nations sanctions.

    This Security Council discussion on sanctions is set against a backdrop of wide-ranging and sustained challenges to international peace and security.   New crises are straining the collective capacity to respond, while older conflicts are simmering, without resolution, and with the potential to reignite.   

    It seems timely therefore to take stock of the efficacy of UN sanctions, as was recently done for peace operations, peacebuilding and the women peace and security agenda.  Just as the causes of conflicts are complex and interlinked, the  responses must be effective, complementary and mutually reinforcing.  Sanctions are not an end in themselves. At their most effective, sanctions should contribute to a comprehensive political strategy, working in tandem with other Charter-based instruments, to prevent and peacefully resolve conflicts.

    Today, 13 Security Council sanctions regimes[1] play an enabling role in preventing conflict, countering terrorism and constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  The Council has adopted tailored and calibrated sanctions measures to deter unconstitutional change of governments, the illicit exploitation of natural resources which fund the activities of armed groups, as well as violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, in particular sexual violence in conflict as an act of terror.  Conversely, sanctions measures have been adopted to support implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts.  The Council’s sanctions regimes on ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, as well as its 1718 regime on DPRK are central to international efforts to tackle terrorism and non-proliferation, respectively. Both have been continually adjusted to meet specific and evolving challenges, with due regard to the impact on civilian populations.

    Security Council sanctions are also a flexible instrument, subject to regular reviews, adjustments and terminations. In 2016, three sanctions regimes (Iran, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia) were terminated. While the Council has adopted 26 sanctions regimes since 1966, it has also terminated 15 regimes to date, invalidating the often-heard criticism that the Council establishes but does not terminate its sanctions regimes. 

    In this commitment to continually review its sanctions regimes, the Council has also requested the Secretary-General to take stock of various elements of the sanctions regimes.  Since 2014, the Secretary-General has provided assessments to the Council on the arms embargoes in Somalia and Central African Republic, as well as the sanctions regimes in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. In his next report  to the Security Council on small arms and light weapons, the Secretary-General will provide  lessons learned on the implementation of arms embargoes in field missions. 

    Reviews of sanctions regimes have also resulted in strengthening responses to growing threats. Last year, the Council adopted two resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016)) which considerably strengthened the existing sanctions regime on DPRK. In Libya, the Council expanded the prohibitions on the export of petroleum products, and designation criteria were adopted this year for acts of sexual violence in the Central African Republic, as well as in the  ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regimes.  

    Moreover, the Council has combined robust sanctions enforcement with due respect for human rights through the Focal Point for Delisting in the Secretariat and the Office of the Ombudsperson for the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Over the last decade, the Council has made important strides in its due process commitments when imposing targeted sanctions on individuals and entities.

     

    Mr. President,

    Effective UN sanctions require the broad-based support of Member States and the international community at large. Even the best designed UN sanctions resolutions are not self-implementing. Member States would need to fulfill their implementation obligations.  And while there may have been different assessments of the implementation gap of UN sanctions, it is undeniable that the diversity and complexity of targeted UN sanctions regimes have imposed a considerable implementation burden on Member States and other implementing entities.

    To mitigate these difficulties, the Security Council and its sanctions committees have enhanced outreach to Member States, and especially to regional countries affected by sanctions. Sanctions committees routinely meet with regional countries to discuss implementation challenges. Chairs of sanctions committees have also held open briefings, including for regional groups, to promote awareness of Council sanctions regimes.  These are supplemented with the travel of committee Chairs to countries and regions impacted by sanctions, to gain first-hand understanding of the effectiveness of sanctions measures. Furthermore, all Security Council sanctions lists[2] have been made available in the six official languages, with linkages to UNSC-INTERPOL Special Notices[3], where available. The Secretariat has also been working on the implementation of an enhanced data model of UN sanctions lists to deepen the information base for more accurate screening of individuals and entities by relevant national and international authorities.

    While these are all useful means to enhance the application of sanctions, the implementation of UN sanctions is necessarily a “whole of government” endeavor and Member States would benefit from even greater “in-country” assistance.  Sanctions are adopted in New York, but they are mainly implemented at border crossings, ports, and airports as well as in banking and financial institutions, bringing together a multitude of governmental institutions at various levels as well as the private sector. Beyond Member States, the positive experience of Council’s partnership with INTERPOL (especially through the use of the [UNSC-INTERPOL] Special Notices) should be applied to other important partnerships, especially the aviation and financial sectors. 

     

    Mr. President,

    All previous States-led reviews of UN sanctions have stressed the importance of coordinated UN system-wide support to Security Council sanctions regimes. Since 2014, under the leadership of the Department of Political Affairs, the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on UN sanctions, comprising 26 UN entities, has continued its work to ensure system-wide support to UN sanctions. The Working Group is an important forum for promoting better understanding of UN sanctions regimes, facilitating the preparation of sanctions assessment reports, as well as promoting productive interactions among UN entities, sanctions committees and sanctions experts.  

    The Department of Political Affairs, through its Security Council Affairs Division (SCAD), has also continued its support to the Security Council in the design, implementation and evaluation of UN sanctions.  In recent years, SCAD has further enhanced its support to the Council, sanctions committees and their experts on substantive, procedural and technical issues.  Sanctions workshops and regime-specific briefings were organised for incoming members of the Council to explain working methods and procedural issues, as well as the substantive aspects of each sanctions regime. Furthermore, advisory support was also provided to Member States to facilitate implementation of UN sanctions regimes, in particular regarding exemption requests and implementation reports.   

    SCAD also plays a key role in the support to, and management of, the nine sanctions monitoring groups, team and panels[4], which comprise 59 sanctions experts.  Since 2013, the Division has organized an annual inter-panel workshop for all sanctions experts.  And since 2015, it has organized an investigative techniques workshop for relevant experts, in partnership with the UN Office for Internal Oversight and Audit. 

    The importance of our support to sanctions experts was brought into sharp focus, tragically, with the killings in March this year of Ms. Zaida Catalan and Mr. Michael Sharp, members of the DRC Group of Experts.  Even as we continue to press for full accountability for these abhorrent crimes, we need to also reassess the security arrangements governing the work of sanctions experts to ensure that such crimes never happen again.  In this regard, the findings and recommendations of the board of inquiry will be instructive, and we look forward to the support of the Security Council in the implementation of the necessary changes that may be required. 

     

    Mr. President,

    United Nations sanctions are a formidable instrument for global peace and security.  It is important that they continue to be deployed in tandem with other Charter-based instruments, in the service of clearly established objectives, and with respect for due process and human rights.

    Thank you. 

     

    [1] Somalia and Eritrea, ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, Iraq, DRC, Sudan, 1636 (Hariri investigation), DPRK, Libya, 1988 (Taliban), Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Yemen, and South Sudan.

    [2] As of 31 July 2017, the UN Security Council Consolidated Sanctions List contains 1031 entries (654 individuals and 377 entities)

    [3] As of 31 July 2017, there are 583 UNSC-INTERPOL Special Notices

    [4] The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (supporting the 1267 and 1988 Sanctions Committees), the Group of Experts on the DRC, and the Panels of Experts on Sudan, DPRK, Libya, CAR, Yemen and South Sudan.

  • 26 يوليو 2017

    Сообщение для СМИ

    48-ая встреча совместного Механизма по Предотвращению и Реагированию на Инциденты (МПРИ) была проведена в городе Гали под председательством Организации Объединённых Наций (ООН).  Грузинские, российские, абхазские и МНЕС (Миссия Наблюдателей Европейского Союза) представители приняли участие во встрече.

    Общая обстановка на местах в плане безопасности, начиная с предыдущей встречи МПРИ, была оценена как относительно спокойная и стабильная. Особое внимание было уделено основному мандату МПРИ, то есть, предотвращение инцидентов и сотрудничество в ответ на любые события. В этом связи было высоко оценено частое использование горячей линии связи, и участникам рекомендовалось продолжить эффективно её использовать для предотвращения инцидентов и в гуманитарных целях, таких как случаи срочных медицинских эвакуации.

    В целях нахождения решения, была продолжена дискуссия по двум раннее обсуждённым случаям  - по делу от 19 мая 2016 г. об убийстве грузинского гражданского лица на одной из бывших точек пересечения и дальнейшее содержание под стражей двух людей за предполагаемое “незаконное пересечение”. Относительно второго пункта, вновь прозвучал призыв уделить должное внимание гуманитарной стороне этого случая и освободить задержанных как можно скорее.

    Участники обменялись имеющейся в наличии информацией по вопросам, связанным с видами на жительство и документами для пересечения. Кроме того, было сделано обращение к соответствующим властям рассмотреть механизмы для беспрепятственного  пересечения школьниками в течение предстоящего учебного года, который начнётся в сентябре.

    Применяя уже установленную практику, которая всегда приветствовалась Председателем, участники использовали на полях встречи для двусторонних обсуждений интересующих их вопросов.

    Участники согласились провести следующую встречу 19 сентября 2017 года.

     

    Read the English press statement.

  • 26 يوليو 2017

    Mr. President,

    I would like to start by congratulating you on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month.

    It is an honour for me to address for the first time the Security Council in my capacity as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General. As you are aware, EAC Facilitator, Former President Benjamin Mkapa was scheduled to brief with me this Council. Due to health reason, he is not here today. I wish him a speedy recovery.

    My briefing will focus on three aspects:

    1. my meetings in Bujumbura
    2. my preliminary assessment on the situation in Burundi
    3. and possible way forward

     

    Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs les membres du Conseil,

    Arrivé à Bujumbura le 27 juin, j’ai été reçu, successivement, par le Ministre des Relations extérieures et de la coopération internationale, Monsieur Alain A Nyamitwe et par le Président Pierre Nkurunziza. J’ai eu avec le Président Nkurunziza près d’une heure d’entretien en tête-à-tête. Ma rencontre avec le Président était essentiellement une visite de courtoisie.

    J’ai également rencontré à Bujumbura, différents acteurs politiques burundais, les représentants de la société civile, et des confessions religieuses, les membres du corps diplomatique ainsi que la famille des Nations Unies.    

    En Tanzanie, j’ai été reçu par l’ancien Président et Facilitateur du dialogue inclusif inter-burundais, Monsieur Benjamin Mkapa, et le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Monsieur Augustine Mahiga. Le Facilitateur dit avoir terminé son travail dont le rapport a été transmis au Président Museveni, le Médiateur en Chef du dialogue inter-burundais.

    A Addis Abeba, j’ai également eu des entretiens, en marge du Sommet de l’Union Africaine, avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de l’Ouganda, avec des leaders Africains qui suivent de près la situation au Burundi, notamment le Président en exercice de l’Union Africaine, Monsieur Alpha Condé, ainsi qu’avec le Président de la Commission de l’Union Africaine, Monsieur Moussa Faki.  

     

    Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs les membres du Conseil,

    Je viens de vous relater, assez rapidement, les contacts que j’ai eus dans le cadre de mon premier voyage au Burundi et dans la sous-région. J’imagine que vous vous posez la question de savoir quelle analyse je fais de ces différents échanges?

    Il ressort de ces entretiens, des appréciations divergentes sur la situation politique qui prévaut dans le pays. Les autorités burundaises sont confiantes en leur capacité à conduire les affaires du pays dans la sérénité. Elles estiment que la situation générale est calme, dénoncent les interférences étrangères dans la gestion de leurs affaires internes et rappellent leur attachement à leur souveraineté nationale.

    Les représentants de l’opposition politique et certains de la société civile, pour leur part, s’inquiètent de ce qu’ils qualifient de  dérives autoritaires actuelles du pouvoir et demandent, à cet égard, une plus grande implication de la région et de la communauté internationale, en faveur de la tenue d’un dialogue inclusif et sans préconditions et avec la participation de tous les Burundais. Ils souhaitent également, la suspension du processus de révision de la Constitution, en cours, ainsi que la fin de la violation de leurs droits élémentaires et l’hostilité des autorités à leur égard, laquelle s’accompagne, selon eux, d’une répression par les forces de l’ordre ou par des groupes proches du pouvoir. En revanche, les partis politiques et organisations de la société civile, favorables au pouvoir, sont d’un avis opposé.

    La situation socio-économique continue de se dégrader, en raison de la conjoncture politique tendue, qui dissuade l’engagement des investisseurs privés nationaux et internationaux. Le chômage, notamment des jeunes, est une réalité. Cette situation entraine des départs de populations vers les pays voisins, ce qui accroit indubitablement le nombre des réfugiés.

    Quant à la situation sécuritaire, elle s’est améliorée depuis le début de l’année. A Bujumbura, tout semble calme et la population vaque librement à ses occupations. On note toutefois que, ces dernières semaines  ont été marquées par des attaques à la  grenade ayant occasionné plusieurs morts et blessés. Pour l’instant, les raisons de ces attaques n’ont pas été élucidées. 

     

    Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs les membres du Conseil,

    C’est une telle atmosphère de paix que l’on souhaiterait désormais au Burundi. Mais dans quelle condition et à quel prix pourrait-on y arriver?

    La première exigence est de donner la priorité au dialogue inclusif, condition sine qua non à tout règlement de la crise. Il devient impératif que le Gouvernement burundais accède à l’insistance des pays de la sous-région et de l’Union Africaine, appuyée en cela par les Nations-Unies, d’aller au dialogue inclusif, c’est à dire impliquant l’opposition exilée et celle de l’intérieur. C’est, à mon avis, à ce prix que nous parviendrons à instaurer la confiance entre les Burundais, à garantir des institutions crédibles, stables et démocratiques et à promouvoir la réconciliation nationale.

    De ce point de vue, l’Accord d’Arusha doit demeurer la norme de référence la pierre angulaire. Tous les acteurs non-gouvernementaux que j’ai eu à rencontrer, le reconnaissent et l’exigent.  

     

    Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs les membres du Conseil,

    Les nouvelles perspectives et orientations que nous devons envisager pour le règlement de la situation du Burundi, doivent converger, me semble-t-il, vers une action commune et collective des dirigeants Africains, et d’abord ceux de la sous-région, solidairement avec les Nations-Unies, visant à:

                -Persuader le régime burundais d’accepter des mesures d’apaisement, notamment celles proposées par le Facilitateur et celles plus générales contenues dans l’Accord d’Arusha ;

                -Une action commune aussi visant à encourager le régime burundais à s’engager impérativement dans le dialogue inclusif inter-burundais.

    Dans cette optique, la récente visite du Président Nkurunziza au Président Magufuli de la Tanzanie, est un signe encourageant. Osons espérer que ce geste est l’indication de la  volonté de faire avancer le processus de dialogue inclusif.

    Voilà pourquoi entant qu’Envoyé spécial et alors que de nombreux hauts responsables Africains se décide à s’engager personnellement et à fond dans le règlement de la crise, je suggère d’apporter plus de discernement dans l’examen de la question burundaise.

     

    Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs les membres du Conseil,

    Comme vous le savez, je suis à ma première mission exploratoire et  entends poursuivre mes consultations dans les jours à venir.  Je crois en l’engagement de la sous-région a ouvrer pour la paix au Burundi avec le soutien de l’Union Africaine et je recommande fortement que les Nations-Unies accompagnent et soutiennent résolument ces efforts.

    A terme, même s’il faut encore un tout petit peu de patience, nous arriverons certainement à un compromis dynamique.

    Par conséquent, et pour me répéter, tous nos efforts doivent porter sur ce soutien sans faille à la région et, en particulier, aux efforts du Médiateur et du Facilitateur ainsi qu’à ceux du Gouvernement de la Tanzanie.

    Je vous remercie de votre attention.

  • 26 يوليو 2017

    On 26 July 2017, the 48th meeting of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) was held in Gali town under the chairmanship of the United Nations (UN).  Georgian, Russian, Abkhaz and EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission) representatives took part in the meeting. 

    The overall security situation on the ground since the previous IPRM meeting was assessed as relatively calm and stable. The special emphasis was made on the key mandate of the IPRM, which is prevention of incidents and cooperation in responding to any occurrences. In this connection, the frequent use of hotline was highly commended, and the participants were encouraged to continue using it effectively for incident prevention and for humanitarian purposes, such as emergency medical evacuation cases.

    The earlier discussed two cases – the 19 May 2016 killing case of a Georgian civilian man at one of the former crossing points and the continued detention of two individuals for an alleged “illegal crossing” - were followed up with a view to finding solutions. With regard to the second point, an appeal was reiterated to give due attention to the humanitarian side of the case and to release the detainees as soon as possible.

    The participants exchanged available information on issues related to the residence permits and crossing documents. Furthermore, an appeal was made to respective authorities to consider the modalities for smooth crossing of schoolchildren during the upcoming school year, which commences in September.

    Following the already established practice, which is always welcomed by the Chair, the participants used the margins of the meeting for bilateral discussions on issues of their interest.

    The participants agreed to hold the next meeting on 19 September 2017.

  • 21 يوليو 2017

    The Ninth General Meeting between the United Nations (UN) system and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and its associated institutions was held at the UN Headquarters in New York on 20 and 21 July 2017.  The UN Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, and the Secretary-General of CARICOM, Ambassador Irwin LaRocque, addressed the participants.  The meeting − which enjoyed wide participation of representatives of the CARICOM Secretariat and its associated institutions and of the UN system − was co-chaired by Ambassador Colin Granderson, Assistant Secretary-General, Foreign and Community Relations of the CARICOM Secretariat, and Ms. Martha Doggett, Director, a.i. of the Americas Division of the UN Department of Political Affairs.  Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Ambassador Granderson delivered closing remarks.

    The UN Secretary-General congratulated CARICOM on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the General Assembly session during which it was granted observer status at the UN and thanked CARICOM Member States for their leadership on pressing global issues, such as climate change and non-communicable diseases (NCDs).  He underlined that the UN system stood ready to help prevent and mitigate the effects of climate change, a global threat and a hurdle for sustainable development which affects, in particular, the most vulnerable countries such as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), including low-lying coastal States.  He commended the progress of regional integration in the Caribbean and welcomed the meeting as a means to increase bilateral cooperation between CARICOM and the UN.  The UN Secretary-General thanked the Caribbean region for its strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy and expressed his gratitude for CARICOM’s longstanding role as an advocate for Haiti.  He praised the contributions to the UN by CARICOM nationals who figure prominently among his senior advisers and the UN leadership in general, while calling for CARICOM and the UN to stand together in defense of the rights and well-being of future generations.

    The Secretary-General of CARICOM expressed the Caribbean Community’s appreciation for the support rendered by the UN System to the integration movement and the development of its Member States. He reiterated the Region’s commitment to the UN “as a principal forum for multilateral cooperation and a platform from which small States can be seen and heard.”  He outlined some of the major challenges faced by CARICOM, including the adverse effects of climate change, graduation from concessional development financing based on GDP per capita and not taking into account the inherent vulnerability of SIDS, crime and violence, the illicit trade in drugs and small arms, the threat of terrorism and extreme violence, the blacklisting of CARICOM Member States as non-cooperative tax jurisdictions despite their compliance with the relevant OECD regimens, the withdrawal of correspondent banking relations, and the high economic cost of addressing NCDs.  With regard to NCDs, Secretary-General LaRocque welcomed ECOSOC’s most recent resolution on their prevention and control, which, inter alia, called for greater financing to facilitate the work of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force.  He, also, noted the opportunity provided by the Ninth General Meeting to examine the impact of global changes and developments of significance to SIDS and to strengthen cooperation between CARICOM and the UN system in relation to those developments. 

    An update was provided on the Caribbean Community, highlighting the links between the Community’s four (4) pillars − economic integration, foreign policy coordination, human and social development and security − and the implementation of the Community’s first Strategic Plan 2015-2019.  The Meeting was also informed of the outcome of the review of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), which highlighted the significant progress made but also the challenges involved in completing implementation.  Note was taken of recent decisions of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community further strengthening the integration arrangements and charting the way forward toward making the CSME more effective.

    As part of the review of the implementation of decisions adopted in the previous General Meeting, the Meeting was informed of progress made in various areas of strategic intervention and received a briefing on the main activities undertaken via the UN Multi-Country Sustainable Development Framework (MSDF), which has been signed by fourteen (14) CARICOM Member States and twenty (20) UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes.  Taking into account that the UN MSDF and CARICOM Strategic Plan 2015-2019 are fully aligned and complementary, the UNDS proposed to use the UN MSDF as the Strategic Framework for collaboration with the UN system, which was welcomed by the CARICOM Secretariat.  Thus, CARICOM will continue to engage with the UN system in the Caribbean through the MSDF Annual Coordination Meeting to enhance collaboration and for better and faster results toward the SDGs in the Caribbean region. Also, the UN system will engage with CARICOM and its institutions to build initiatives addressing identified needs and gaps, while ensuring complementarity that may be identified by the MDSF Virtual Policy Networks.  This does not preclude the existing MOUs with specific UN Entities.  UN Agencies will continue to engage in specific areas of sectoral expertise with CARICOM.  The CARICOM side expressed its appreciation to the UN for its support. A brief overview of current changes and developments in the international and hemispheric political and economic environment and their geopolitical and geo-economic implications for the Caribbean Community was presented.

    The action framework that the UN has adopted regarding SIDS, with particular reference to the SAMOA Pathway, was presented.  Participants highlighted the challenges that Caribbean States face in the implementation of the 2030 Development Agenda as well as the goals of the SAMOA Pathway.  The aim of the Caribbean Community in achieving a high level of congruity between the developments at the international level on SIDS with its regional strategic plan and the international sustainable development agenda was noted.  CARICOM stressed the urgency to take action, mobilize resources, strengthen cooperation and undertake activities needed to achieve the SDG and SAMOA targets.  Additionally, the economic and social burden on the region from the epidemics of CHIKV and Zika and the gap in regional health security was noted. 

    The Meeting also focused on the strong linkages between the development of Caribbean States and the environment.  The role that the CARICOM Secretariat and the UN system could play in supporting Member States’ participation in both regional and global multilateral environment agreements was highlighted.  CARICOM’s impending engagement in a series of national, sub-regional and regional consultations on the proposed Community Environment and Natural Resources Policy Framework and First Action Plan was underlined and discussion on these engagements with UN stakeholders was invited. 

    The Meeting also received a report on the energy situation in CARICOM Member States, which depend heavily on fossil fuels and which face technical, environmental and socioeconomic obstacles to improving energy efficiency.  Participants were updated on CARICOM’s Energy Policy, and the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C-SERMS). The Meeting recognized the critical role of energy within the sustainable development agenda of CARICOM SIDS, along with key issues faced by CARICOM in integrating variable renewals and resilience into energy planning and in incorporating energy at the center of development planning.  CARICOM pointed out that a sustainable energy architecture, if suitably designed, could play a significant role in empowering Member States with an ability to implement some of the measures that are necessary for adapting to climate change and sea-level rise.  It could also support other critical interventions, which are necessary for Member States’ sustainable development and resilience building.  The General Meeting noted the positive steps made within the Caribbean Community, inclusive of the establishment of the Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (CREEE), thanks in part to the critical support of international partners.

    Recognizing that the impacts of climate change will be felt most strongly by SIDS, CARICOM sought support for adaptation and mitigation measures and in implementing national action plants as well meeting commitments under the COP Paris Agreement.  Adverse effects include more extreme climate events occurring with more intensity, frequency and unpredictability.  The importance of community-level preparedness was highlighted, given the differential impacts of recent hurricanes in the region.  The UN recognized the capacity of CARICOM through the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and offered support to strengthen partnerships for joint risk assessment, mobilization of disaster experts and resource mobilization.

    Additionally, the Meeting noted the multi-dimensional challenges of financing for development.  These included the lack of economic resilience and of access to concessional multilateral financing and a worsening of the external public debt situation resulting from a constrained fiscal capacity.  Several initiatives were being pursued by CARICOM States toward the achievement of fiscal and debt sustainability, such as a fiscal responsibility framework for the Caribbean Community and an ECLAC initiative on debt for climate change adaptation and debt reduction.  The Meeting was also informed of external challenges which exacerbate inherent vulnerabilities.  These included the decrease in correspondent banking relations − which disrupted international payments and capital inflows − and the high cost of compliance with the OECD-driven international tax agenda.

    CARICOM emphasized the need to advance measures to develop sustainable ocean-based economies in the Caribbean and the importance of technical assistance and investments in unlocking the potential of oceans and seas for food security, employment and the economic development of Caribbean countries, especially in the context of SDG 14 −  “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development” −  and of the outcomes of the UN Oceans Conference held in June 2017.  CARICOM also highlighted the ongoing work on the development of a legally binding international instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.  The Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP) was spotlighted as a model for protection and sustainable development of marine resources. 

    The important relationship between fisheries and the environment was underscored.  In recognition of the blue-growth concept, which focuses on generating economic growth from oceans and seas, CARICOM sought to expand and sustain the productive potential of fisheries and aquaculture, while developing new opportunities for trade in marine products and improving the resilience of coastal communities.  It was posited that although marine conservation and fisheries were treated as separate issues, they were part of the same system.  A call was made by CARICOM, therefore, for closer collaboration between the agencies involved in the maritime environment and those involved in fisheries, as well as for continued technical support from the UN system to develop and implement fisheries management plans, strengthen data collection and statistics for evidence-based decision-making, and build human resources in fisheries and oceans management. 

    A presentation was made on CARICOM’s Human Resource Development Strategy, which will focus on the development of technical and personal skills to address the workplace, the future of jobs and active citizenship. It was recognised that the opportunities for lifelong learning and certification presented through the proposed seamless system would be crucial in addressing wastage and the current high stratification of outcomes.  The importance of an inter-sectoral approach  and partnerships at all levels in ensuring successful implementation of the Strategy was stressed.

    Furthermore, linkages were drawn between the CARICOM’s HRD Strategy and the framework for the implementation of SDG 4: “Ensure inclusive and quality for all and promote lifelong learning” on education.  It was stressed that, as a basic human right, as a transformational force for poverty eradication, as an engine for sustainability, and as a force for dialogue and peace, education is a fundamental enabler for the enjoyment of other rights.  Implementing evidence-based education policies is in fact a key strategy to address all development challenges and uphold the 2030 Agenda.

    Prioritizing early-childhood development and addressing the need for reform and expansion of higher education were exemplified as commitments to lifelong learning in the region.  In order to improve learning outcomes, tackle disparities, prevent dropouts, secure completion of secondary education and increase completion of tertiary education, participants underscored the need to generate tangible outcomes in relation to SDG 4, such as: tying education with employment; moving towards a technology and gender-inclusive approach; developing vocational training based on requirements needed to go into the workforce and ultimately building a culture of human rights.

    Participants drew attention to the linkages between health and nutrition security, particularly with respect to the child population and underscored the value of the ongoing collaborative work between CARICOM and the UN in securing Food and Nutrition Security with emphasis on reducing the food-import bill through increased food production and trade, wider application of Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS), supporting the Regional NCD Strategy and implementation of effective Agricultural Health and Food Safety Systems.  The Meeting was advised of decisions of CARICOM Heads of Government supporting action in these areas and the importance of the Region realizing the potential for the contribution of agriculture.  CARICOM expressed its appreciation particularly to the FAO for its ongoing contribution to the Region’s agriculture sector. 

    Participants assessed youth development as an accelerating factor for national and regional development, paying attention to the outcomes of CARICOM’s Youth Development Action Plan.  The benefits of systematic mainstreaming of a gender perspective, including a gender perspective in development frameworks, were underscored.  Participants agreed on the need to foster the use and collection of data and application of gender-analysis tools such as the CARICOM Gender Equality Indicators as a means to support and amplify Governments’ capacity to achieve gender equality and monitor and assess its SDG implementation. Participants welcomed the decision of the CARICOM Heads of Government during the 28th Inter-sessional Meeting celebrated in February of 2017 in Guyana to endorse the “Every Caribbean Women, Every Caribbean Child Initiative” and to take actions to address  women’s, girls’, children’s and adolescent’s health.  Attention was drawn to the fact that gender equality, including the prevention of gender-based violence and adolescent pregnancy, as well as combating NCDs and HIV requires a multi-sectoral approach that relies on the availability of sex-disaggregated data as a minimum requirement in all monitoring frameworks.

    UN participants praised CARICOM’s leadership in raising global awareness of NCDs.  Cooperation options between the UN and CARICOM to improve Caribbean States’ health systems were explored, including sexual reproductive health and “Fast Tracking” the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, under a convening role of CARICOM/PANCAP. 

    The regional challenges regarding transnational organized crime and citizen security were discussed.  CARICOM highlighted its concerns regarding the escalating crime and violence in the region and their deleterious impact on society  and the need for support for interventions to eradicate this scourge.  Participants agreed on the need to maintain a comprehensive approach to security issues.

    Responding to the priorities emphasized by CARICOM, the UN also stood ready to continue to support the Caribbean region in strengthening the approach to citizen security through tackling key areas of concern, including criminal intelligence and the control of small arms and light weapons, as well as the strengthening of capacities at both the national and regional levels for statistics.  UNODC applauded the work of the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) in the development and drafting of the Caribbean Agreement for the Return and Sharing of Recovered Assets and pledged to continue to support the development, adoption and subsequently the implementation of the Agreement in the region.  As the Caribbean region, led by IMPACS, seeks to strengthen its capacity to prevent, combat and prosecute terrorism through the development of a Caribbean Counter Terrorism Strategy − currently under development − the UN System aimed to support the implementation of the Strategy through the focus on region-wide strengthening of the legal counter terrorism framework, at both the national and regional levels, in line with UN Security Council resolutions.

    An overview was provided of the University of the West Indies (UWI)’s 2017-2022 Strategic Plan, which is focused on expansion of access to tertiary education, alignment of industry and academia for wealth creation and economic growth, and UWI’s agility to respond to global opportunities.  In highlighting the UWI’s current thematic research areas, synergies with the MSDF in the Caribbean, the SDGs and CARICOM development goals were identified, with the UWI pledging to increase UN access to its research and graduate talent.

    Participants agreed that the Ninth UN-CARICOM General Meeting achieved its goals of strengthening the existing partnership between the two organizations and identifying ways to maximize progress in the priority areas of cooperation.  The Tenth UN-CARICOM General Meeting is expected to take place at the CARICOM Headquarters in Georgetown, Guyana, in 2019.

  • 12 يوليو 2017

    Mr. President,

    The situation in Yemen remains extremely grave. The intensity of the conflict increases day after day and the tragic humanitarian situation continues to worsen.

    For a third successive year, Yemenis have seen the Holy month of Ramadan transformed from a month of tolerance and peace into a month of violence and hopelessness. Yemen has seen an increase in battles of attrition between the parties to the conflict, and the pace of military operations has increased in Hajjah, Marib and Al Jawf governorates. Since 10 June, fighting has also escalated significantly in Taiz and areas to the east of the city. The fighting for control of the Presidential Palace in the city has intensified in parallel with indiscriminate shelling in residential areas, leading to an increase in the numbers of dead and injured, and further destruction to the city’s remaining civilian infrastructure. There have been numerous casualties in Ma’reb governorate, particularly during the battle for control of Serwah district.

    Violence has also continued in Hajjah governorate and the border area between Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, including on 22 and 29 June when rockets landed in the Jizan area of Saudi Arabia. Airstrikes have continued to hit numerous locations in the governorates of Saada, Taiz, Marib and Sana’a. Airstrikes hit a market in Moshnaq village in Saada on 18 June and Al-Mokha town on 4 July. Both incidents resulted in numerous civilian deaths and injuries, including women and children.

    I am deeply concerned by the continued targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure by the parties to the conflict. I have consistently urged the warring parties to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law. The targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure is utterly unacceptable and must stop immediately.

    On 15 June, an Emirati ship was subjected to a bombardment from the vicinity of Al-Mokha port, threatening maritime security in the Bab Al-Mandab strait. The continued targeting of vessels in the area seriously jeopardises the provision of much needed humanitarian and commercial supplies to the most vulnerable Yemenis.

    In addition, security continues to be undermined by the activity of extremist groups including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. On 7 June, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeted the convoy of the Abyan Chief of Security, killing two of his bodyguards. Later in the month, on 14 June, militants detonated an improvised explosive device at a police station in Al-Dhale’ governorate, killing the Chief of Police and wounding several others. As part of their counter-terrorism efforts, on 27 June, the Government of Yemen re-deployed additional forces to Abyan, Lahj and Taiz.

    As I have stated here many times, the longer the conflict lasts, the more the terrorist groups will expand and threaten Yemen’s future.

     

    Mr. President,

    The humanitarian situation in Yemen is appalling. The people are suffering from war, hunger and cholera, which has spread further during the last few weeks. The country is not suffering from a single emergency but a number of complex emergencies, which have affected more than 20 million people and whose scale and effect will be felt long after the end of the war. 14 million people are food insecure, of whom almost 7 million are at risk of famine. My colleagues will provide further details on the humanitarian situation in their briefings.

    Cholera is spreading rapidly and is infecting children and elderly people and other vulnerable groups in many areas of the country. There are now over 300,000 suspected cases and over 1,700 have died as a result of the epidemic. Tens of thousands of healthcare workers have not been paid for many months, more than half of the country’s health facilities have closed and supplies of medicine and medical equipment remain severely limited.  

    The speed and scale of Yemen's cholera outbreak highlights the consequences of a collapsed public sector system. I praise the generous donation of USD 67 million from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which helped to slow the spread of the disease. I call on other donors to provide further contributions as soon as possible. The non-payment of salaries for healthcare workers and other staff in the public sector is an urgent issue. If this is not addressed the health situation will continue to deteriorate and key state institutions will cease to function. I fully support the joint UNDP, WHO and UNICEF proposal to support immediate payments to health care workers as soon as possible in advance of an agreement to restart salary payments nationally as I have proposed. I encourage member states to support this important initiative which will help ensure the maintenance of health care services. Preserving national capacity is critical to stabilizing the humanitarian situation now and to securing service delivery in the future.

    A World Bank-financed cash transfer program is expected to disburse the first quarterly payment to the most vulnerable households across the country in August, benefitting about eight million Yemenis. My office has been working continuously with partners to ensure the success of this initiative, to support household purchasing power, avoiding widespread destitution, improving the general situation and restoring hope. I hope that the international community will heed this call and support these initiatives. 

     

    Mr. President,

    Over the last year, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and I have called repeatedly for the resumption of commercial flights from Sanaa. The lack of commercial flights has placed an unnecessary burden on the population and worsened an already desperate humanitarian situation. I appeal to the Coalition and the parties to the conflict to support our proposal for the resumption of regular flights specifically for individuals requiring medical care, students studying abroad and the reunion of families.  

     

    Mr. President,

    I continue to encourage the parties to work towards the agreements I outlined during my last briefing to this Council. I am planning to invite representatives of Ansar Allah and GPC to restart discussions of these ideas as soon as possible. In the past few days, I was in direct contact with Ansar Allah, which is cause for optimism. I am grateful for the efforts of the People’s Republic of China for playing an instrumental role in this regard.

    The proposed agreements focus on the Hodeidah port and the surrounding area and aim to ensure the continued flow of basic humanitarian supplies and commercial goods through the port and to implement a programme for collecting taxes and other revenues so that they can be used to support salaries and services, instead of supporting the war. An agreement on the port of Hodeidah should become the basis for a national agreement for the resumption of salary payments nationwide that will provide some relief to many Yemenis. Without doubt, such an agreement will require clear mechanisms to ensure that all state revenues, whether collected in Hodeida, Sanaa, Aden or elsewhere, are used in support of salary payments and the reactivation of state institutions in all areas of the country.

    The Government of Yemen has reacted positively and has agreed to negotiate on the basis of my proposals. In my meetings with President Hadi he agreed on the necessity of implementing measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian and commercial supplies, and prevent arms smuggling and the diversion of taxes and other revenues. I arrived this morning from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where I met Saudi Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister His Royal Highness Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud, and I welcome the commitment by the Saudi leadership to support agreements between the parties on these issues.

    I will depart for Cairo tomorrow to continue my current work with the Government of Yemen and regional leaders on these ideas. I also hope to meet with the delegation of Ansar Allah and GPC soon to discuss the possible agreements on Hodeidah and salaries as a preliminary step to a national Cessation of Hostilities and a comprehensive resolution to the conflict which restores peace to Yemen. It is essential that Ansar Allah and the GPC engage with me constructively and in good faith on these proposals if they truly want an end to the war and improvements in the humanitarian situation.

    I reiterate my sincere gratitude to the international community, which has consistently supported my efforts and the proposals that I have put forward to the parties. I briefly visited France recently and the new government has re-iterated its support for the peace process. Regional and international unity is critical in order to secure peace and security in Yemen.

     

    Mr. President,

    I commend the courageous efforts of Yemeni civil society, who continue to push for peace in spite of many security challenges. In June, the Yemeni Women’s Pact continued to promote a spirit of compromise and mechanisms that could put an end to this devastating conflict. I recently met a group of Yemeni youth activists who also demonstrate the same commitment and dedication. Yemeni civil society groups are in constant contact with my team and me. They are supportive of the efforts of the United Nations and recognize that only a political solution will end the war and the suffering of the Yemeni people. Their drive and sense of nationalism carries with it high hopes. I wish that the political leaders would mirror these activists’ love of their nation and its people, which I sense with each and every proposal I receive from them. They are the true voices of Yemen, far removed from personal concerns and considerations. They convey the suffering of the people from the farthest corners of the country.

    The political leadership must recognize that the continuation of the war can only lead to more human and physical loss, and complicate crucial questions on the future of the country, including the grievances of the South. In this context, the Southern Question requires a deeply considered solution and I call on Yemenis to address this question through dialogue and peaceful means.

    Finally, I want to note that history will not judge kindly those Yemeni leaders who have used the war to increase their influence or profit from the public finances, and Yemenis’ patience will not last. The people need an alternative to politicians who work for their own interests and not for their country, who destroy and do not build, and who use the finances of the people and the state to enrich themselves, rather than serve the people.

    I call on all of the parties to act for the sake of peace. Their excuses are unacceptable, and their justifications are unconvincing, especially when the solutions are in plain sight. The opportunity to reach peace is not yet lost.

    Thank you, Mr. President.

     

     

  • 5 يوليو 2017

    Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

    According to the official news agency of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and various governmental sources, at approximately 09:00 am local time on 4 July 2017, the DPRK launched a ballistic missile, which it termed a quote – “test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14” – end quote.

    The missile was launched near the Panghyon airfield in the northwest of the DPRK.  According to the DPRK, it covered a distance of 933km during a 39-minute flight, reaching an altitude of 2,802km, before impacting into the sea.  According to these parameters, the missile would have a range of roughly 6,700 km if launched on a more typical trajectory, making it an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) according to widely used definitions.  The DPRK again did not send pre-launch notifications to international organisations responsible for airspace and maritime safety.

    The official media claimed the DPRK was now – quote – “a full-fledged nuclear power that has been possessed of the most powerful inter-continental ballistic rocket capable of hitting any part of the world, along with nuclear weapons” – end quote.

    This is the seventh time the Council has met to discuss the DPRK in 2017.  Including today, five of these emergency consultations have followed the launch by the DPRK of ballistic missiles in open violation of Security Council resolutions.

    Mr. President, the Secretary-General strongly condemns the launch of a ballistic missile of possible intercontinental range conducted by the DPRK.  This action is yet another brazen violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and constitutes a dangerous escalation of the situation.  The DPRK leadership must cease further provocative actions and comply fully with its international obligations. The Secretary-General underlines the importance of maintaining the unity of the international community in addressing this serious challenge.

    The DPRK must stop actions in violation of Security Council resolutions and allow space for the resumption of sincere dialogue.  All parties must work to reopen communication channels, particularly military-to-military, to lower the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding.

    Amidst the escalation of the security situation in the region, the United Nations and partners play a critical role in saving the lives of the most vulnerable people in the DPRK. As the Council considers its response, we again remind Member States of the importance of separating political and humanitarian concerns, and urge them to support the life-saving activities carried out by the humanitarian organisations in the country.

    Mr. President, I would like to close by reiterating the Secretary-General’s commitment to seeking peaceful and political solutions. The United Nations will remain in close contact with all concerned parties and remains ready to assist in any way possible.

    Thank you.

     

     

  • 5 يوليو 2017

         

  • 29 يونيو 2017

    Mr. President, Members of the Security Council, Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Two years after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Secretary-General is immensely encouraged by the continued commitment by all participants to the agreement.  The JCPOA – reached by the E3/EU+3 and Iran on 14 July 2015 – is the embodiment of successful multilateral diplomacy, political will and perseverance. This diplomatic achievement reflects the spirit, purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and gives us all hope that even the most difficult issues amongst States can be addressed through dialogue, understanding and reciprocity. As noted by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Federica Mogherini, the agreement belongs to the entire international community. Hence it is imperative that all JCPOA participants, the United Nations and the international community at large continue to support the full and effective implementation of this historic agreement.

     

    Mr. President, 

    Today’s meeting of the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) is taking place against a backdrop of steady implementation, cooperation and progress.  Since “Implementation Day”, 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued seven reports documenting continued implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments. The recent 25 April meeting of the Joint Commission in Vienna – the fifth meeting since Implementation Day – noted the continued adherence to JCPOA commitments by all its participants, and stressed the need to ensure its full and effective implementation.

    The Secretary-General believes that the comprehensive and sustained implementation of the JCPOA will guarantee that Iran’s nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful, while allowing for transparency, monitoring and verification.  It will also provide Iran with an opportunity for greater engagement with the international community and assist in increasing Iran’s trade and economic relations. It will also bring forth to a satisfactory conclusion the consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue by the Security Council.  

     

    Mr. President,  

    Thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Third Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (S/2017/515).  The report was submitted to the Council on 16 June 2017 pursuant to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and paragraph 7 of the Note by the President of the Council [issued on 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44)].   

    As guided by the Security Council, the report of the Secretary-General focuses on the implementation of the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).   Let me turn to the main findings of the third report.  

    First, the Secretary-General has not received any report, nor is aware of any open source information regarding the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the resolution. 

    I also welcome the fact that Member States are making greater use of the procurement channel. Since 30 December 2016, 10 new nuclear-related proposals were submitted to the Security Council for approval, bringing to 16 the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day. Of the 16 proposals, 10 were approved by the Council, 2 were withdrawn by the proposing States and 4 are currently under review. 

    The proposals were processed in accordance with the timelines established by resolution 2231 (2015), with due regard for information security and confidentiality.  The operational linkages established between the Security Council and the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission are both effective and efficient.  

    In this regard, I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge the excellent cooperation we have with the European External Action Service (EEAS), especially its Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group (PWG) of the Joint Commission (JC). 

    Second, regarding the implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions, the report notes that on 29 January 2017, Iran launched a (Khorramshahr) medium-range ballistic missile. Letters were submitted to the Secretary-General by Iran and Israel, and jointly by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States concerning the launch, which presented a range of views and interpretations.  As in the case of the ballistic missile launches by Iran in March 2016, there was no consensus in the Security Council on how this particular launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). In this regard, I would like to quote from the third report of the Secretary-General: [quote] I call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to avoid such ballistic missile launches that have the potential to increase tensions. I appeal to all Member States to redouble their efforts to promote peace and stability in the region [end quote].

    Third, in terms of restrictions on arms-related transfers, the report includes additional information on the seizure of an arms shipment by the French Navy in the Northern Indian Ocean in March 2016. In January 2017, France invited the Secretariat to examine the seized arms.  After examination of the weapons and analysis of information provided, the Secretariat is confident that the weapons seized are of Iranian origin and were shipped from Iran.  

    Fourth, the report also highlights the participation, for the second year in a row, of the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) in the Iraq Defence Exhibition held in March which may again have implications regarding implementation of the assets freeze. Since the DIO is an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), its funds, other financial assets and economic resources on the Iraqi territory should have been frozen by Iraqi authorities. The issue was raised again with the Permanent Mission of Iraq and the Secretary-General intends to report back to the Council in due course. The Secretary-General report also provides information on additional travels by Major General Qasem Soleimani since the second report.  The travels were reported by Iranian and Arab media outlets.

    In addition to the above findings, the report also reflects official information provided by Member States to the Secretary-General. They included information from Israel, Lebanon, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America and Yemen.  The Secretariat has not been able to independently corroborate these reports and will provide further updates, as appropriate, should additional information become available. 

    Mr. President, 

    As we are about to enter into the third year of JCPOA implementation, the Secretary-General would like to once again reaffirm the particular responsibilities of JCPOA participants in carrying the full and effective implementation of the agreement. The Secretary-General is hopeful that all participants will continue to make progress in the implementation of the agreement, and in the process secure its durability.  

    In closing, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of H.E. Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi (Italy) in his role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I would also like to convey our fullest support to him as well as to the Security Council in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). 

    Thank you.

  • 28 يونيو 2017

    Сообщение для СМИ

    47-ая встреча совместного Механизма по Предотвращению и Реагированию на Инциденты (МПРИ) была проведена в городе Гали под председательством Организации Объединённых Наций.  Грузинские, российские, абхазские и МНЕС (Миссия Наблюдателей Европейского Союза) представители приняли участие во встрече.  Встреча оказалась полезной и деловой.

    Общая обстановка на местах в плане безопасности начиная с предыдущей встречи МПРИ была оценена как относительно спокойная и стабильная. Внимание было привлечено к важности сотрудничества между всеми участниками с целью предотвращения инцидентов.

    Участники продолжили обсуждения с целью достижения торжества справедливости по случаю от 19 мая 2016 г. об убийстве грузинского гражданского лица в одной из бывших точек пересечения.

    Участники обменялись последней информацией относительно случая двух грузинских мужчин, задержанных с начала апреля 2017 г. за предполагаемое пересечение линии контроля в “несанкционированном месте”. Вновь прозвучал призыв к соответствующим участникам рассматривать этот случай с гуманитарной точки зрения.

    Участники подчеркнули важность горячей линии связи как эффективного инструмента для своевременного обмена информацией. Им было рекомендовано использовать горячую линию связи эффективно и обоснованно, прежде всего, для предотвращения инцидентов.

    Было согласовано провести следующую встречу 26 июля 2017 г. 

  • 28 يونيو 2017

    On 28 June 2017, the 47th meeting of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) was held in Gali town under the chairmanship of the United Nations.  Georgian, Russian, Abkhaz and EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission) representatives took part in the meeting. The meeting was useful and business-like.

    The overall security situation on the ground since the previous IPRM meeting was assessed as relatively calm and stable. Attention was drawn to the importance of cooperation between all participants in order to prevent incidents.

    The participants continued discussions with a view to achieving justice on the 19 May 2016 killing case of a Georgian civilian at one of the former crossing points.

    The participants exchanged latest information on the case of two Georgian men detained since the beginning of April 2017 for the alleged crossing of the line of control at an “unauthorized location”. The appeal was reiterated to relevant participants to consider the case from a humanitarian angle.

    The participants stressed the importance of hotline as an effective tool to exchange information on a timely basis. They were encouraged to make use of hotline effectively and reasonably in order, first and foremost, to prevent incidents.

    It was agreed to hold the next meeting on 26 July 2017. 

  • 28 يونيو 2017

    Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Conference on Cyprus, and Espen Barth Eide, Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Cyprus, spoke to journalists at a press point after the opening of the Conference on Cyprus on Wednesday, 28 June in Crans-Montana, Switzerland.  

    JF: Good afternoon.  I am delighted to be here today and glad to be here with the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General, Espen Barth Eide. The Secretary-General asked me to come out and represent him today for the opening. He will arrive to the talks later this week, and he asked me to pass on a message to the two leaders and to the guarantor parties that they should seize this opportunity. This is an historic opportunity to solve a problem that has been there for decades. The Secretary-General last met with the leaders on June 4th in New York to prepare for this Conference. In fact it was at that meeting when the two leaders agreed to reconvene the Conference on Cyprus.  And what we heard this morning gave us the hope and the conviction that the leaders and the three guarantors have come to this Conference with the determination to overcome the challenges and resolve the issues. I think at this point I will ask the Special Adviser to add his words.

    EBE: Thank you Under-Secretary-General Feltman, I want to reiterate that we feel that we had a good opening session with everybody, with the guarantors, with the two sides, and with the European Union as an observer. Mr. Frans Timmermans, the First Vice President of the European Commission, joined us this morning and we had a constructive and good start where we started to address the critical issues that will be the focus of table one, which is the security and guarantees questions, which are those that pertain to all participants of the Conference.  And then in half an hour, the second table will start its work. First, the two negotiators will have a planning session, how to structure that second table which will be on the bi-communal issues that are still pending, because as you know, the statement of the Secretary-General after the meeting with the two leaders on the 4th of June made very clear that while security and guarantees is now a particularly essential question, there are outstanding issues in those other chapters as well and we need to have a process that is interdependent and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. So these tracks will happen in parallel and that second track will start today and continue. In principle, these two tracks will be constantly active. There may be more emphasis on one and less emphasis on the other, and the other way around, but in principle, they will remain open and this is the way we found a way to deal with everything because all participants yesterday and today made it clear that they came here to Crans-Montana to try to solve the problem. And the Cyprus problem is of course all chapters. So this is the way it is structured. I am encouraged with what I heard so far. As I said in Geneva, hard work will remain, and we make no mistake, we are very much aware of that, but we have a set-up for having larger meetings, smaller meetings, bilateral meetings, meetings in small groups, maybe leaders and ministers only, and we will do what is possible to facilitate. But at the end of the day, of course, it is the responsibility of the Conference participants to go that final mile, to think outside the box, to try out some new ideas so that we finally can go down from this beautiful Swiss mountain with a plan. Thank you.

    Q: Mr. Eide, welcome back again. Today you should meet the guarantor powers, but you changed the modality and you are going to meet them separate. Why is that?

    EBE: We had that in the programme and then we just agreed that we will do it in three separate sessions because we heard interesting things this morning that we will continue to develop for the afternoon session. And this is the way it goes; once you start such a conference, you used tracks that everybody is together in the most effective way and we jointly agreed that this would be the most effective way.  

    Q: Just wondering what kind of signal do you see in the fact that the UK, one of the three guarantors, just sent back the two high representatives that were yesterday evening and this morning here. Is there any particular signal that you see in that?

    JF: That has to do with UK politics. That has nothing to do with the Conference on Cyprus that we are here. In fact, given the parliamentary votes in London, I think it is admirable that both Secretary Johnson and Minister Alan Duncan were here last night. And they have left able representation here and they are monitoring the situation.  We have the full commitment of the UK to work on finding a solution on the Cyprus problem.  

    EBE: If I just might add that Minister of Europe Duncan will come back as soon as these votes are over. And Foreign Secretary Johnson also said that he, in principle, is aiming at coming back when time permits. But the UK is constantly here. And by the way, we knew this all the time.  It is not news for us.  I mean, this was clear that today they had these inaugural votes after the Queen’s speech and we fully understand that without them, the Government might not continue, and in politics, people tend to think that that is important.

    Q: Mr. Eide, you said yesterday that the four other issues, barring security, were basically done. Does that just mean that we are waiting for the security issue to fall, or could you unpack a little bit more how far along we are in terms of the other four issues being discussed?

    EBE:  What I said, and what I will repeat now, is that the four first chapters, and I could even add the fifth – territory – much more work has been done than on the security chapter. It doesn’t mean that they are completely done. There are a few but very important issues. There is particularly one issue in the area of governance. There is one more issue of some importance in the territory chapter. And we still have to wrap up the final property deal; even if most of it is there, there are a few issues that are still remaining.  And they are not remaining because we did not have time to do it, or that we forgot about them, they are remaining because the leaders chose to put them on the list of those issues they can only deal with at the very end and as part of a broader package. And now I think the sense that we are getting from everyone here is that this is the moment to actually unwrap these issues as well. And because of inter-connected nature, this has to happen in parallel, because you cannot any longer do one chapter and then another one. So in principle while we’re here in Crans-Montana, all issues are open, but in two separated formats, a format with the guarantors and the EU as an observer, plus the sides, on security and guarantees principally, maybe some treaty related issues, and then the second level which is for the sides only, but they will feed each other and inform each other.

    Q: I would like to ask did the parties this morning found a common basis for discussion for security and guarantees. And what will be the sequence of the discussion regarding the other chapters and the inter-connection between the chapters. Thank you.

    EBE: So as I said, this second track starts now in 22 minutes, and the negotiators will start by answering exactly that question, what will be the sequence of this other track.  But there is a hint already in the statement from the Secretary-General on the 4th of June, which highlights territory, property, governance and power sharing, and it is exactly around these issues that I just mentioned. So it is quite clear what will be the early emphasis, and because these are those questions outside of security and guarantees, that the leaders feel have a ‘make or break’ character to them. There are many more issues, but they don’t really, you can’t really say that they will, can break the deal, there is simply work to be done. But these issues are still of a more essential nature.  And to your first question Stella - yes, we had a good beginning, we had a good beginning, actually I think beyond what we expected for the beginning. It does not mean that we have concluded, nor did we expect to, but there were ideas put on the table that’s something we will work on tonight, and in the coming days. So largely yes, but we still have to conclude what it exactly means.

    Q: Thank you very much. A question for both of you; Mr. Feltman, there are a bunch of other peace processes going on where the UN is involved. Would you agree that the Cyprus peace process, on paper at least, is the easiest, and if you can’t get a deal here, what does it stay for the others? And a question for Mr. Eide, if you do get a deal, are we correct in thinking this will go to a referendum? Would that be in November? Can you tell us what would be the outcome? Thanks.

    JF: I don’t think one can really compare from one peace process to another because they’re all so different. In some cases, such as in this one, the UN’s playing a facilitating role, in others the UN is playing more of a supporting role, it’s hard to compare. I was in Colombia last week, for example, where the UN is involved in one specific aspect of the Colombia peace process, and while there are challenges in Colombia, I was there to witness part of the disarmament, the laying down of arms by the FARC rebels, so there’s some progress there. I think that what’s notable about this process is that the two leaders have taken the process further than their predecessors have taken it, that they come up with a remarkably expansive set of convergences between the two sides on the chapters that the Special Adviser was describing. That’s not to underestimate the differences that still have to be overcome. But what I found reassuring this morning was the positive atmosphere and the forward-looking nature of the comments by the two leaders and by the three guarantors who were in the room. There was a sense that whatever disagreements there may be about history, that now is the time to come to an agreement about the future of Cyprus. And that certainly is consistent with the message that Secretary-General António Guterres asked me to deliver to the two leaders, to the three guarantor parties and to the EU as an observer this morning, and I felt that the interventions that each of the others made were consistent with that vision of the Secretary-General. 

    EBE: Yes, and that’s an easy question to answer. Both leaders envisaged that with the advent of an actual deal between them, they will present it to referenda. There will be two simultaneous referenda happening at the same date, sometime later this year, if a deal comes out of this. But of course, first we will clinch the deal and then we’ll decide when that would happen. But that’s the logic.

    Q: What would the UN consider as a success from Crans-Montana?

    EBE: Of course, the biggest success would be an actual comprehensive agreement. That’s hard, but not impossible, in the sense that so much has been discussed that you know, if this is really productive and we take our time and we focus on the essentials, it is not beyond reach. It could happen. Short of that, we could have not a framework deal, but a breakthrough on the key issues. A breakthrough that will lead the leaders to tell each other that Cyprus will reunify, there is some more work, we might go back to Cyprus and wrap up certain things that we haven’t had time to do here, but it will happen. I think if we don’t have either of those, I don’t think we can talk of success in Crans-Montana, so this is what we’re working on. 

    Q: Mr. Eide, you said yesterday in Geneva that this is the “best chance” for finding a solution for the island, this conference. So, do you still think that this is the best chance, after what you saw in the opening session? Also, you said this is not the last chance. What did you mean by that? Are we expecting more talks after Crans-Montana? 

    EBE: Thank you for asking, because, what happened yesterday, that I was asked by more than one of you whether this was the last chance, and I very deliberately said that I hear a number of people saying that, I prefer to say it’s the best chance. I did not say that it was not the last chance, if you see my point, I just did not say that it was the last chance. There’s a nuance that I think was lost when your excellent articles came to the desk and they shortened it – I think you know the feeling, I know the feeling. So I haven’t said it’s not the last chance but I haven’t said it is the last chance, but I reiterate, it is the best chance. And after this morning, I feel even better about this chance. 

    Q: I was going to ask you to clear [up] something that was being reported in some media this morning, that there was a crisis in the morning meeting, just to clear that there wasn’t such a thing.

    JF: The atmosphere was positive. The interventions were forward-looking. I have to say that I was pleasantly surprised, to be honest. I’ve participated in several of these sessions alongside the Special Adviser, and I thought today’s was the most constructive session in which I’ve participated. And remember, this was Table One. This was about security and guarantees. This was about the issue that’s been least developed and the issue that is probably the most difficult, again, not to underestimate challenges on the others, and yet the atmosphere was positive: the two leaders, the three guarantor powers, shared some creative ideas that we can pursue later in more detail. There was, I’d say, a remarkably positive attitude.

    EBE: Definitely no crisis.

    Q: Mr. Eide, do you have the full blessing of the Secretary-General, Mr. Guterres, after the withdrawal of the document you tried to implement, that caused some controversy within the Greek Cypriot side and indeed, the Greek side. 

    JF: You posed the question to the Special Adviser, but I’m going to answer, because I’m here representing the Secretary-General at this opening. The Secretary-General will arrive later in the week to join the conference. The Secretary-General wants me to assure everyone that he is fully behind this process, he is fully behind the work that the Special Adviser and his team have done, and he respects and admires what the two leaders have done in terms of developing the convergences that have occurred so far.

    Q: Mr. Eide, you said this is the best chance. What makes you believe this is the best chance, since we’ve had other chances before, and how long are you prepared, and the sides are prepared to stay here to realize this? 

    EBE: So, both leaders told the Secretary-General, Anastasiades and Akýncý both said to the Secretary-General on 4 June that they will go here and stay, and their aim is to find a settlement. So we didn’t define how long that was, but it was clearly understood that we talked about weeks in plural, if necessary. For planning purposes, we have been planning to be here till Friday 7 July. That does not mean neither that we will necessarily leave that afternoon, nor that we will have to stay till that day, but that’s a planning assumption. But the idea is to be here to try to solve the outstanding issues, now that we have everyone together. And all delegations will remain as well. That doesn’t mean that they will always be at the same level, but there will always be a fully empowered negotiator from every delegation that is here until the meeting is over. And that has been cleared and agreed and reiterated by everybody. So we’re in here for the long haul. How much time it takes, time will show.

    Q: Given the essence of the document that was proposed to both sides, given the fact that there was over-reaction of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, and Turkey and Greece, and given that it was supposed to be the basis of how we moved one step forward – how we discuss security and guarantees – do you believe that those preconditions - wrong word maybe for our Turkish Cypriot colleagues – do you believe that those things that needed to be done and said for the discussion of guarantees have happened on the way here, and have they happened today? Has anything replaced what the document was supposed to do?  

    EBE: First, I want to link up to the question of the document. The document has not been withdrawn. That’s a wrong expression. We simply concluded that it’s not common.  We presented it, it exists, it’s not common. So we are not using it as a common platform. That’s a wrong expression. [The Special Adviser later clarified that the document was not a common document and therefore was not and will not be tabled at the Conference on Cyprus. However, the positions that were captured in the document from Monte Pelèrin III in January and the ideas that had informed the drafting of the document in consultation with all parties, remained available to inform the positions of the sides.]. We simply concluded that it’s not common. We presented it, it exists, it’s not common.  So we are not using it as a common platform. 

    That’s actually not a problem, we realize now, because in the interventions that we already have heard, we basically heard the same elements again. Because, remember, this document was not invented by us. It was a compilation of input and elaboration of input that we got from all sides, the same sides, the same people, and they have been discussing most of those issues anyway, but as their own inputs to the talks. So I think, as I said yesterday, and I can say that with even more confidence today, what mattered was the process towards, you know, collecting these ideas. The fact that we don’t formally talk about a common document is not an issue because in reality that started the thinking and we could see today that that thinking continues in a positive sense. As the Under-Secretary-General Feltman said, we heard five opening interventions, from the sides, from the guarantors and an exchange around these issues, which basically encapsulates what are the issues to be discussed. And what we’re going to do this afternoon and maybe tomorrow is to continue to deep dive into what these different elements are, and it shouldn’t be much of a surprise that it’s not shockingly different from what was in this document. But, the document as a document is not seen as a common document, which is fine. And you were right; basically everybody felt that it was leading too much in the direction of the opposite side, which is not completely unfamiliar in the Cyprus talks.

  • 27 يونيو 2017

    Mr. President [Sacha Sergio Llorentty Solíz of Bolivia], Dear colleagues, 

    Let me start by giving a summary of what is our own analysis based on the latest developments and on some of the possible future steps ahead. As usual in Syria we have a mixed picture and I have to refer to it. There have been some interesting technical steps in advance of the 7th round of intra-Syrian talks that will take place as you know very well by now on the period of the 10-14 July. There are currently serious efforts on the other hand underway to deliver further agreements and implementation agreements regarding the de-escalation zones before an Astana meeting which is planned on the 4-5 July. But there have also been worrying developments which we cannot ignore and we will elaborate a little bit on that. We are at a time of testing whether the political will exists for real de-escalation and more meaningful political talks and move beyond preparatory talks. 

    Throughout this period, Mr. President, dear representatives of the Security Council, the UN has been quite active, convening joint technical meetings with opposition experts, seeking to support the efforts of the Astana guarantors on de-escalation, consulting widely including in Moscow and Paris and with many others, and laying the basis for a new round of the Geneva talks - and also having consultations with our colleagues in the European Union. Let me map this out for you and look to where we can go next. 

     

    Mr. President, 

    In the last round of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, I did announce the establishment of a technical consultative process - you remember, that was an additional layer that we believe can be very helpful in actually abolishing layers by accelerating the real talks. This technical consultative process was meant to develop relevant options on constitutional and legal issues that would need to be considered anyway and resolved anyway in relation to any proposals and positions put forward in formal sessions. This was designed in fact to help the formal talks to progress more expeditiously, and be better prepared by ensuring that any negotiated transitional political process would enjoy solid technical constitutional and legal foundations. Let me give you one example, some times ago as you will remember, we had a moment of truth in Afghanistan, many years ago, I was around and some of you were. And there was a feeling that nothing was moving forward until at a certain point there was a rush for conference in Bonn. Much of the work had been already prepared. Preparatory work which appears sometimes to be tedious, sometimes not conclusive, was immediately put in action and utilized as homework preparing for the Bonn conference. Well we are in a certain way doing something similar, waiting for the major Geneva conference, God willing. 

    We made it clear that the consultative process created was technical - as you know everything we do is political but the particular emphasis in this case were technical -, expert and non-binding in nature. It was not designed, and it is not designed to act as a negotiating forum, to take on the political responsibilities of the formal sessions, or to take on itself the Syrian people’s right to determine the constitutional future of the state of Syria. But it is a serious process because it does prepare for this. 

    You will recall that both the Government and the three opposition invitees to the intra-Syrian talks – those mentioned in 2254 – all agreed, last time, to participate in separate consultations under this consultative process, and indeed we were able to do so separately in the last round for - at least two days. 

    Since then, there has been a potentially significant new development. On 15 and 16 June, two days ago, opposition experts from the High Negotiations Committee and the Cairo and Moscow platforms convened jointly, together, in the same room, in Geneva at the invitation of the UN within the framework of the consultative process. This was the first time a joint set of UN meetings with the opposition invitees in one room has taken place, and not only for protocol reasons, but substantively discussing during the whole day among them and with us - and we believe we must build on this. 

    The opposition experts worked to develop joint technical options regarding the schedule and process for drafting a new constitution and its popular approval. They also discussed the principles involved, covering the substance of the so-called living 12 points that we did put forward in round 4. The experts also discussed these issues in the context of a negotiated political transition process within the framework of relevant resolutions of the Security Council. 

    While such expert meetings are by nature exploratory and non-binding, the joint meeting brought to light welcome similarities and common technical and perhaps even political understanding of various issues, and could potentially be the beginning of greater technical coordination among these three groups and we hope you will be helping us in supporting these three groups to do so in order to show unity. 

    The participants felt that more work could be even more productive, and my office has, therefore, accordingly invited them to participate next week in a further set of joint meetings in the framework of the consultative process on constitutional and legal issues, ahead of the seventh round of formal intra-Syrian talks, taking place as you know in July. 

    You will recall that the Government of Syria which was by the way the first to commit to the technical process, communicated to me that it would participate in expert meetings in the framework of technical consultation process during formal sessions of the intra-Syrian talks -- but not outside those formal occasions. I therefore look forward to experts from my team continuing during the 7th round the engagement that began with experts from the Government during the 6th round. 

    Naturally, the UN remains ready to engage with the Government experts at any mutually convenient time, including before and after formal talks. 

     

    Mr. President, 

    In my formal invitations to the forthcoming round of the intra-Syrian talks, I encouraged the invitees to prepare actively. I look forward therefore, to them engaging in an intensified set of discussions on issues across all four baskets – governance issues, constitutional issues, electoral issues, counter-terrorism, security governance and medium term confidence-building issues. I hope it will be possible to accelerate the peace talks. I am giving consideration to sharing some of my own thinking on certain issues in order to stimulate the parties. 

    If the environment is propitious, I am also ready to seek to facilitate direct talks between the Government and the opposition, hopefully unified opposition, in those talks, either at the formal or technical level. This is something that all sides have stated more than ones they want, and I hope conditions are being created that could enable this. 

    I also believe it would be important to aim for a further round towards end August or early September, in advance of the September General Assembly meeting. 

    Both during and between the upcoming rounds of formal talks and expert meetings, my team will continue to closely engage with the members of the Women’s Advisory Board of Syria and the Civil Society Support Room and listen to their suggestions and practical advice. In particular, my team and I continue to strive to engage with and hear the priorities of more women's organizations, including those working across Syria, inside Syria, during and between rounds of intra-Syria talks. 

    In this context, I should note that, following the last round round of intra-Syrian talks, we did activate our Civil Society Support Room, which allowed us to consult with more than 50 civil society organizations and experts from all walks of life and different expertise, from both within and outside Syria. 

    The more we engage with these interlocutors, the more we are convinced that civil society will be critical to preserving and indeed regenerating the social cohesion of a country that for too long has been torn apart by war. 

     

    Mr. President, 

    As we advance the overall political effort unfolding under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva, efforts are continuing by the three guarantors to finalize modalities for the implementation of the Astana de-escalation memorandum concluded on 4 May. A meeting of the guarantors is planned for Astana to be in Astana on 4 and 5 July. I plan to be present at that meeting.   

    With every week that passes, we know it, without a final arrangement for the de-escalation zones being indeed finalized, the fragility of the ceasefire regime and the risk posed by the fragility increases. I am aware of the genuine efforts currently being undertaken to try and overcome the remaining obstacles, as was witnessed by my own team of experts from my own office during the recently held technical-level meeting of the joint working group on de-escalation in Moscow. 

    The UN team continues to stand ready to provide technical advice, whenever and wherever needed. Because we need a success in Astana, as Astana desperately needs a success in the Geneva political process in order to consolidate what we are all trying to do. Let’s give de-escalation efforts a fair chance to succeed because that is what people are asking in order to bringing the violence further down and enabling confidence-building. 

    I also express the hope that the discussions aimed at finding a suitable formula for addressing the difficult situation that has emerged in the south of Syria, will also yield positive results. 

     

    Mr. President, 

    As we plan for Geneva intra-Syrian talks and as the Astana guarantors work for de-escalation, let us recall what has been achieved and some of the challenges that are still to be met on the ground. 

    Since the three guarantor states signed the de-escalation memorandum on 4 May in Astana, violence is clearly down. Hundreds of Syrian lives continue to be spared every week, and many towns have returned to some degree of normalcy.   

    That is a good general trend, but it is not the same good trend everywhere. In some areas, the fight and violence has been continuing and in fact intensified. 

    The overall significant improvement of the security situation on the other hand has not, and we have to recognize that, regrettably, yielded equally significant progress on humanitarian access to areas where the needs are the greatest. The support of the ISSG co-chairs and other ISSG members has been helpful, and efforts are continuing. However, let me be honest, much more needs to be done - and urgently - to enable safe, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to all Syrians, wherever they are, particularly in the areas which have been difficult to reach. 

    Let me also stress the importance of moving forward on the issue of detainees, abductees, missing people and on the important issue of humanitarian demining. Let me express here my appreciation to UNMAS for its continuing engagement in this regard. 

     

    Mr. President, 

    We note that the fight against terrorism appears to be proceeding with Daesh under pressure and in retreat in various locations in Syria. The same time incident between the international anti-ISIL coalition and forces of the Government of Syria and its allies, including the downing of a Syrian military plane, have taken place. 

    As I see it, the ideal trajectory over the coming two weeks would be: progress in Astana on 4-5 July; then a further set of joint technical expert meetings with the opposition groups in the same week; and then a continued discussion and dialogue hopefully among international stakeholders (including at the G20 Summit in Hamburg on 7-8 July), in which Syria can not be avoided as a subject. And all this in support of both the Astana de-escalation efforts and the intra-Syrian Geneva-based political process. I hope that a combination of these elements would help shape an environment conducive for the next round of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva in the months to come, and bring us one step forward on the journey towards our shared goal of implementing the resolutions of this Council, in particular 2254. All the political efforts of the United Nations are directed towards this end, and we continue, with the guidance of the Secretary-General to count on the strong support of all of you and of the Security Council as a whole. Thank you. 

  • 21 يونيو 2017

    Good morning, Mr. President, Esteemed Members of the Security Council.

    The months since my last briefing have been unusually tense in Afghanistan. The deteriorating security situation has brought underlying political tensions to the surface. At the same time, the willingness of the Government to take steps towards peace was demonstrated by their successful holding earlier this month of a Kabul meeting on regional peace and security, as well as the continuous implementation of the political agreement with former insurgent group Hezbi-i Islami. But without enhanced efforts by the National Unity Government to increase political inclusiveness, strengthen accountability and improve the Government’s credibility, particularly in the security sector, we are likely to face more crises in an increasingly fragile environment. The events of the early morning of 20 June, when the Government’s attempt to remove the final protest resulted in violence is a reminder of the need for caution, calm and unity.

    Mr. President,

    The most recent security and political crisis was sparked by a terrorist bombing in Kabul’s centre on 31 May. This was followed by large street demonstrations protesting growing insecurity which turned violent, and then a suicide attack at a subsequent funeral of one of those killed in the demonstrations. Chief Executive Abdullah, Foreign Minister Rabbani and other senior political officials were near the blasts at the funeral but were thankfully unhurt. The political fault-lines that emerged are increasingly along an ethnic basis, which is particularly worrying at a time when the Islamic State is attempting to provoke sectarian strife in the country through attacks against Shia Muslims.

    During the anti-government demonstrations on 2 June, we at UNAMA conducted extensive outreach to leaders on all sides, particularly leaders of political movements which were considering joining the protests. We urged restraint, warned of the negative consequences for everyone of loss of control, and requested them to give time to allow their grievances to be addressed without violence. Coupled with the intensive efforts by the government and members of the diplomatic community, the immediate risk of escalation was defused. We are grateful for the subsequent expressions from the government and political leaders outside the government that UNAMA’s efforts contributed to calming the situation. I remain concerned, however, that without changes in governance practices we are likely to face future crises that might be more difficult to contain.

    What is the root of the problem? There have been indications since last summer that Afghanistan’s broad political consensus was fraying. In recent months, a growing number of political factions, some who were formerly part of the National Unity Government as well as a younger generation of political forces, have begun to criticise and demand reforms to the Government. They argue that it is not sufficiently consultative or inclusive. The Government, on the other hand, claims that opposition groups block important reforms and stoke tension by calling for the Government to be replaced. Each side accuses the other of acting against the national interest. It appears to me undeniable that these perceptions have contributed to tensions that characterize today’s political environment. The existence of opposition is natural in any political scene, but the amount of mistrust is growing and there is an increasing resort to uncompromising slogans and statements which can fuel further violent protest. Efforts at inclusiveness and building consensus for political stability are critical.

    The 31 May suicide bomb exploded just outside the restricted diplomatic enclave in the middle of Kabul. It took more than 90 lives and injured close to 500 people—all Afghans. While there were no serious international casualties, a number of diplomatic facilities, including several UN buildings, were badly damaged. Some embassies have had to evacuate staff while their facilities are repaired. Despite these realities, it is imperative that the attack not be allowed to undermine international support for Afghanistan including development and economic assistance. The international community must not be intimidated nor succumb to the terrorists.

    Mr. President,

    The Government’s ability to hold a high-level meeting of the Kabul process on regional peace and security in Kabul on 6 June, with the participation of 24 states or organizations, demonstrated its resilience and the determination of the international community to maintain its support for Afghanistan and the National Unity Government.

    In his opening speech, President Ghani stated: “We are gathered in this conference because the world community signed a promise that terrorism would not be tolerated. And today we are demanding that the world makes good on this promise.” In this regard, I welcome the General Assembly’s endorsement of the Secretary-General’s proposal to create a new office on counter-terrorism headed by an Under-Secretary-General.

    The Afghan vision for peace is premised on the fact that a stable Afghanistan would lead to a stable and more prosperous region. Achieving this vision will require the strong determination of all states concerned, particularly of the region and the neighbourhood. The Afghan Government has requested at the Kabul conference for the international community to address this issue in all its facets. The nexus of crime, corruption, and terrorism eventually undermines all states and the state system, which is why states must unite to combat it. The proof of our commitment will be a stable Afghanistan.

    On the Afghan side, the recent series of security incidents has demonstrated the urgent need for reforms in the security sector. I welcome the Government’s commitment to transparent, merit-based appointments, and credible investigations of the events of 31 May, 2 and 3 June, 20 June, and other reforms in the ministries of the Interior and Defence.

    Mr. President,

    Afghanistan faces numerous internal challenges in addition to fighting an insurgency that seems to be gaining ground. These include deep rooted political tension, the difficulty of integrating socially and economically the thousands of Afghan refugees who return each day, an economy that is only very slowly recovering after the international drawdown in 2014, and pervasive corruption. The economy remains heavily dependent on development assistance. The private sector, as the biggest potential provider of employment, suffers from a lack of investor confidence and pervasive corruption. As a result, economic growth can neither match population growth nor generate enough employment for the many young Afghans entering the labour market every year. Corruption undermines the legitimacy of the state. It prevents a real economy from emerging. It contributes to insecurity. Corruption is at the heart of the problem of impunity, which itself is at the heart of the ongoing human rights challenges. Afghans alone are not to blame, but the consequences of corruption disproportionately affect Afghanistan.

    In April, UNAMA issued its first comprehensive report on corruption in Afghanistan. I was gratified by the intensity of the public’s response to this report. Afghans understand the effects of corruption and impunity because they face them every day. Positive steps have been made to tackle this problem by the National Unity Government. Reforms that have begun to work in the Ministry of Defence are now being applied to the Ministry of Interior. The Anti-Corruption Justice Centre is proving to be an effective instrument.

    UNAMA’s Human Rights remains committed to provide credible data of the impact of the conflict of civilians, especially women and children. It continues to engage with all main parties to the conflict to support them in taking measures to limit harm against civilians. UNAMA’s report on the treatment of conflict detainees for the period of 2015 and 2016 was published in April to coincide with the second periodic review of Afghanistan by the United Nations Committee against Torture. UNAMA welcomes the Government’s renewed commitment to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and to take further steps to eliminate the torture and ill-treatment of detainees. These efforts must be accelerated to increase accountability and increase public trust in the Government.

    Mr. President,

    The attack of 31 May and the events that followed should serve as a clarifying moment. We are at a point where we need to take conscious decisions to reverse negative trends and seek stability or face far worse. The recent crisis has illustrated the dangers of pushing narrow interests, be they domestic or international, in Afghanistan’s fragile context. There are two specific issues in particular that we must focus on.

    First, in the domestic sphere, preparation must be accelerated for the next round of elections, parliamentary and presidential. Decisions must be made regarding the use of technology, and the role and modalities of international electoral assistance. Work must start on voter registration. The electoral calendar must be made clear. In my discussions with Afghan political actors, especially outside of Kabul, it is clear that the lack of clarity on these issues is a major component of the growing political mistrust. We understand that the Independent Elections Commission will make an announcement as early as tomorrow regarding the date for parliamentary elections. I believe that this announcement will contribute to allaying the political tensions I have referred to in this briefing.

    Second, as I have repeatedly stated in this forum and elsewhere, a genuine peace process with the Taliban is essential and urgent. In the 6 June Kabul meeting, the need for a modus vivendi between Afghanistan and its neighbours was stressed. At the same time, I encourage the people of Afghanistan to begin an internal dialogue on the meaning of peace and reconciliation. The Government and the Taliban need to engage directly with each other to define a political solution. In this regard, the appointment of the new Chair of the High Peace Council is a welcome development, but it is only a first step towards the Council’s revitalization and its new role in driving the peace process.

    Mr. President,

    UNAMA is doing all it can to help contain political tensions, using our long-standing relationships and our experience. I have been proud of the entire mission and Country Team for these efforts. I was honoured to welcome the Secretary-General to Afghanistan last week, where his visit clearly demonstrated his and this Organization’s commitment to Afghanistan, solidarity with its people, and perseverance in the pursuit of peace.

    We look forward as well to the results of the strategic review, which you have requested. We are hopeful and confident that it will ensure that we have the tools to continue to work for peace in Afghanistan.

    On the eve of the important Muslim holiday of Eid, I wish to again reiterate my call for unity and urge restraint so that families and communities can enjoy a peaceful end of Ramadan.

    Thank you.  

  • 20 يونيو 2017

    Mr President,

    Thank you for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on  developments in Burundi and the efforts of the United Nations and partners to help resolve the crisis in the country.

    As Members of the Security Council are aware, on 5 May, the Secretary-General appointed former President of Burkina Faso Michel Kafando as his new Special Envoy to lead and coordinate United Nations political efforts on Burundi, and to provide assistance to the mediation and facilitation led by the East African Community.  Mr. Kafando visited New York from 30 May to 7 June for briefing and introductory meetings and consultations with Member States and the Secretariat. He will travel to the region shortly, to meet with Burundian stakeholders, the EAC Mediator and Facilitator, the African Union, and other relevant actors. This engagement in the region will give us a better insight into the status of the political process, the assessment of regional leaders of the situation and on the way forward.

    Since the latest briefing to the Security Council on 9 March, the situation in Burundi has remained volatile.

    On the political process, after some delays, an EAC Summit of Heads of State and Government was held on 20 May in Dar es Salaam at which President Museveni of Uganda was elected Chair of the Eastern African Community and approved the progress report and recommendations presented by EAC Facilitator former President Mkapa. In the report, Mr. Mkapa highligthed nine points to, as he put it, “clean the polluted political environment” for effective preparations of the 2020 elections, including confidence building measures, inclusivity and political space, return of refugees and exiled political leaders and preservation of the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement.

    Mr. Mkapa expressed concern over the slow progress in the dialogue and called on all parties to engage in good faith and without preconditions. He  also expressed concern over the Government’s demand to ‘repatriate’ the EAC-led dialogue to Burundi. Mr. Mkapa urged the leaders of the region to put their full weight behind his facilitation, including by providing appropriate funding for the process.  The next round of consultations is scheduled to take place in Arusha in early July.  The joint EAC-UN-AU working group continues to meet regularly in Arusha, with the participation of a team from the Office of the Special Envoy in Burundi, in support of the efforts of the Facilitator.

     

    Mr President, Members of the Council,

    The security situation remains fragile.  Recent weeks have seen grenade attacks in the capital, and repression and intimidation by security forces and associated groups.

    OHCHR, as well as  human rights NGOs, continue to report targeted arrests, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment of real or perceived opposition members and supporters, as well as extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances.

    Reports of incitement to hatred and violence have  increased since April 2017,with regular testimonies and video recordings  of rallies by the Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the ruling CNDD-FDD.  The dissemination of one such video on social media prompted CNDD-FDD to issue a statement on 5 April 2017, condemning the inflammatory lyrics and attributing the events to “influences outside the party”.  On 18 April, the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a strong statement condemning the hateful rethoric and incitement to violence.

    The Government of Burundi has not resumed cooperation with OHCHR, since it was suspended in mid-October 2016.  OHCHR has been awaiting a response from the Government regarding amendments to a proposal for a new Memorandum of Understanding. The Commission of Inquiry on the human rights situation in Burundi established by the Human Rights Council presented its second oral briefing on 15 June. The three commissioners regretted the lack of access to the country and lack of cooperation by the government of Burundi.  The Commission of Inquiry has collected more than 470 testimonies of human rights violations allegedly committed in Burundi since 2015. The Commission will present its final report to the Human Rights Council this coming September (2017).

     

    Mr. President, Members of the Council,

    In its final report issued on 12 May, the Commission Nationale de Dialogue Inter-Burundais (CNDI) stated that the majority in Burundi support  a revision of the Constitution,  the lifting of presidential term limits and changes to other provisions of the Arusha Agreement.  Subsequently, President Nkurunziza appointed  a constitutional review commission, which has yet to be established, with a six-month mandate to submit proposals to amend the Constitution.  The  CNDI report and the creation of the constitutional review commission were denounced by opposition parties, including  CNARED.  Civil society leaders in exile also condemned the move, which they consider a potential catalyst for unrest.

    It is of great concern that these developments are taking place against the backdrop of widespread restrictions on civil liberties and political freedom. Implementing the proposed changes in the current climate will likely lead to an escalation of the crisis.

     

    Mr. President, Members of the Council,

    Since the Secretariat’s last briefing, the socioeconomic and humanitarian situations have also deteriorated. Three million people in Burundi  are in need of humanitarian assistance. Nearly 2.6 million others experience acute food insecurity, with over 700,000 in need of emergency food assistance. Mass displacement continues, due to natural hazards, food insecurity and socio-political factors.  About 209,000 people are internally displaced.  The number of Burundian refugees in neighbouring countries exceeds 400,000. Humanitarian actors have scaled up their response but have yet to reach the capacity required to meet emerging life-saving needs.  The Government has eased some restrictions on humanitarian access.  The humanitarian community has appealed for 73.7 million US dollars to assist a third of the estimated three million people in need. The appeal is currently funded at only 35 percent, and the humanitarian community urgently needs additional financial support.

    The IMF projects a growth rate of  zero percent and an inflation rate of 12.4 percent in 2017. Severe fuel and electricity shortages further disrupt business and social activities and drive up prices. Blackouts lasting several days at a time have reportedly caused an uptick in criminal activities in some areas.

    The Secretariat  remains fully committed to assisting the people of Burundi and supporting the EAC-led dialogue process.  Regional actors and international partners need to put their full weight behind the EAC-led dialogue and continue to press for the implementation of confidence-building measures, to help create conditions conducive for the holding of an inclusive and credible political dialogue.

    I thank you for your attention.

  • 20 يونيو 2017

    Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

    Today I devote my regular briefing to the Council to reporting, on behalf of the Secretary-General, on the implementation of resolution 2334 during the period from 25 March to 19 June.

    I will focus on developments on the ground in accordance with the provisions of the resolution, including on regional and international efforts to advance peace.

    Let me once again note that nothing in the report can be divorced from the broader context in which it is happening: the half century of occupation, the stalled peace process, the lack of dialogue between the parties, as well as continued illegal settlement activities, terror, violence and increased radicalization.

    Allow me to note that this month’s briefing coincides with the 50-year anniversary of the Arab-Israeli war, which resulted in Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza and the Syrian Golan. Achieving a negotiated two-state outcome is the only way to lay the foundations for enduring peace that is based on Israeli security needs and the Palestinian right to sovereignty and statehood.

    Now is not the time to give up on this goal.

    Now is the time to create the conditions for a return to negotiations to resolve all final status issues on the basis of relevant UN resolutions, mutual agreements and international law.

    Mr. President,

    Resolution 2334 calls on Israel to take steps “to cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem.” No such steps have been taken during the reporting period. In fact — since the 24th of March – there has been substantial increase in settlement-related announcements as compared with the previous reporting period, with plans for nearly 4,000 housing units moving forward and 2,000 tenders issued.

    The United Nations considers all settlement activities to be illegal under international law. Resolution 2334 states that the international community will not recognize any changes to the 4th of June 1967 lines, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed to by the parties themselves through negotiations.

    Plans for some 3,200 units were advanced through the various stages of the planning process in 22 settlements in Area C of the occupied West Bank. These plans include 2,000 housing units in major population centers of Ma’ale Adumim and Ariel, and over 800 units in Kerem Reim, Oranit and Beit El.

    One hundred units were advanced for the new settlement of Amihai, established in the eastern Shiloh Valley for the former residents of the Amona outpost, where the Israeli authorities also declared 241 acres as ‘state land’ in the same zone. Both acts would further sever the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian State, solidifying a line of settlements dividing the northern and central West Bank. As construction on the new settlement began today, the Prime Minister stated that “there will never be, a Government that is more prosettlement than our Government”.

    Separately, tenders were issued for close to 2,000 housing units in four settlements close to the 1967 line — Alfei Menashe, Beitar Illit, Beit Arie and Karnei Shomron. Infrastructure tenders for a future construction of over 200 settlement units in Kochav Yaakov, located between Ramallah and Jerusalem were also re-issued.

    In East Jerusalem 770 housing units in the Gilo Southern Slopes reached the final approval stage, and building permits for over 360 housing units were granted in Ramat Shlomo, Pisgat Ze’ev and Ramot.

    Meanwhile, according to OCHA, the reporting period witnessed a sharp decline in the number of demolished Palestinian-owned structures in Area C: 29 structures were demolished or seized, down from 149 in the previous reporting period. East Jerusalem saw a less pronounced decrease in demolished structures from 49 to 32; however, the monthly average of demolitions in East Jerusalem since the beginning of 2017 remains at the same levels as in 2016 when demolitions reached a 15-year record.

    Mr. President,

    Allow me to turn to the problem of violence that remains a hallmark of the conflict. Resolution 2334 calls on all sides to refrain from such acts and undertake efforts to combat them.

    During the reporting period, the security situation on the ground remained relatively calm. No rockets were fired from Gaza towards Israel and the Israeli Defense Forces did not conduct any airstrikes in Gaza.

    However, according to OCHA seventeen Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces, in various incidents including reported terror attacks, clashes, and military operations. One Israeli soldier was killed in a car ramming attack on 6 April outside the Ofra settlement, northeast of Ramallah, and, on 16 June, a policewoman was killed in a shooting and stabbing attack by Palestinian assailants in the vicinity of the Old City of Jerusalem.

    On 14 April, a British exchange student was killed by a Palestinian assailant in a stabbing attack in Jerusalem.

    The Israeli Security Forces killed a Jordanian citizen reportedly involved in a stabbing incident in the Old City on 13 May, and on 25 May a Palestinian fisherman off the coast of Gaza. The reporting period also witnessed the shooting of two Palestinian men during protests at the fence along Gaza’s northern border.

    On March the 24th, a senior Hamas military commander was assassinated by unknown assailants in Gaza City. This was followed by a lockdown of Gaza by Hamas in which for a period of a few days the de facto authorities did not allow Palestinians or internationals to leave the Strip. In April, Hamas executed six Palestinian men for alleged collaboration with Israel, an act that was condemned by the international community.

    Settler-related violence continued during the reporting period as well. According to OCHA, 31 incidents were documented, resulting in one Palestinian killed, ten injured, and damage to Palestinian property. Much of the violence has centred around the West Bank settlement of Yitzhar, near Nablus, a recurrent source of violent actions against neighbouring villages in the past.

    Against the backdrop of Israeli security officials reportedly warning of the increased risk of another terror attack by Jewish extremists, like the one against the Dawabshe family two years ago, a Rabbi from Yitzhar was indicted for incitement to violence against Palestinians, while a number of others have been arrested.

    Mr. President,

    Security Council resolution 2334 called upon both parties to refrain from acts of provocation, incitement, and inflammatory rhetoric, and to “clearly condemn all acts of terrorism." Regrettably, such calls continued to go unanswered during the reporting period.

    Palestinian officials and media outlets affiliated with Fatah continued to commemorate perpetrators of past terror attacks against Israeli civilians. One community center was recently named after a Palestinian woman who was involved in an attack in which 38 Israelis, including 13 children were killed in Tel Aviv in 1978. UN Women and Norway withdrew support from the organisation.

    Hamas leaders have also continued their deplorable practice of celebrating recent attacks against Israeli civilians as “heroic,” including the 1 April stabbing in Jerusalem’s Old City in which two civilians were injured. And, just a few hours after the complex attack at Damascus Gate last Friday, in which a policewoman was killed, Hamas was quick to praise "the three martyrs from today’s heroic Jerusalem operation.”

    Some Israeli officials have also employed provocative rhetoric. Politicians have repeatedly declared that there will never be a Palestinian state, pledging to take the idea of statehood “off the agenda.” In a regrettable incident, an Israeli minister spoke at an event, attended by other members of the Knesset, celebrating the publication of a book promoting abhorrent views towards Israel’s Arab citizens. The book was condemned by the Anti-Defamation League as “dangerous and inhumane” and a number of the participants expressed regret at their attendance.

    Mr. President,

    Resolution 2334 reiterated the call by the Middle East Quartet on both parties to take steps “to reverse negative trends on the ground that are imperiling the two-state solution.”

    In May, Israel approved a number of positive measures to improve the Palestinian economy. These included the 24-hour opening of the Allenby Bridge for a three-month period, which is effective as of today, in addition to extended operating hours at the Tarkumiya, Ephraim, Gilboa, Maccabim and Reihan crossing points, and the construction of a vehicular crossing at Eyal. In addition, the package envisions the development of an industrial zone that includes bonded warehouses and a natural gas and fuel terminal, aiming to enhance Palestinian authority over trade and customs issues. The measures also included the demarcation of approximately 4,000 acres of land in Area C, including next to three major Palestinian cities — Ramallah, Nablus and Tulkarem – in which the regulation of planning and zoning will undergo changes, with potentially positive implications for Palestinian development.

    Palestinian and Israeli Finance Ministries held a number of meetings to discuss fiscal leakages, a critical issue given the Palestinian Authority’s 800 million dollar financing gap. The parties have progressed in discussions on VAT clearance revenues. In early June, in accordance with the Electricity Agreement signed last September, Israel transferred 30 million dollars to the Palestinian Authority in lieu of equalization levies and health stamps and agreed to conduct monthly transfers in the future. In May, the Joint Water Committee held its first meeting in seven years.

    Mr. President,

    During the reporting period, the situation in Gaza has heightened intra-Palestinian tensions, creating an increasingly dangerous humanitarian situation, and raising serious concerns about the prospect of another conflict.

    By establishing an Administrative Committee to run civilian affairs, Hamas tightened its control of Gaza and further antagonized the legitimate Palestinian authorities, reducing the prospects for reconciliation.

    Meanwhile, a standoff between Fatah and Hamas over the payment of taxes on fuel led to the shutdown of the only power plant in Gaza, leaving residents with four hours of electricity per day. Basic services, including health facilities, water supply and wastewater management have almost ground to a halt increasing the risk of health and environmental disasters. Today Gaza depends exclusively on Israeli electricity lines, which normally provide 60 percent of supply; on Egypt; and on a UN-managed emergency fuel operation that given the funding available, will expire in two to three months.

    On May 15th , the Palestinian Authority informed Israel that it would reduce its payment for the electricity Israel supplies to Gaza by 30 per cent. One month later, Israel agreed to the Palestinian request. An initial five per cent reduction was implemented on 19 June; further cuts are expected to have catastrophic consequences for Gaza’s population.

    Mr. President,

    Going beyond the scope of today’s report on the implementation of resolution 2334, I want to — once again – warn all parties that Gaza is a tinderbox.

    If and when it explodes, it will have devastating consequences for the population and derail all efforts at advancing peace.

    Two million Palestinians in Gaza can no longer be held hostage by divisions. For a decade they have lived under the control of Hamas. They have had to deal with crippling Israeli closures, Palestinian divisions and have lived through three devastating conflicts. Perpetuating this situation breeds radicalism and extremism.

    We have a collective responsibility to prevent this.

    We have a duty to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.

    Returning to the resolution, Mr. President,

    During the reporting period there have been no developments related to Member States’ distinguishing, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied in 1967. There have, however, been continuing efforts by the international community to advance peace.

    On the 29th of March in Jordan, at the Summit of the League of Arab States, Arab leaders committed to re-launching serious peace negotiations on the basis of the two-state solution, establishing a Palestinian state “on the lines of June 4, 1967 with its capital in East Jerusalem” and reaffirmed their commitment to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

    In May, on his first trip abroad, U.S. President Trump visited Israeli and Palestinian leaders and made clear that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical to combating the threat of violent extremism and terrorism. He expressed his personal commitment to helping both sides achieve a peace agreement that would begin a process of peace throughout the region.

    The Secretary-General looks forward to working with the United States, Russia, the European Union and regional partners towards improving the environment for peacemaking, including by engaging with all sides to improve the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza.

    Mr. President, Members of the Council,

    In closing, I would like to share some broad observations on the reporting period.

    First, I must stress once again the urgency of addressing the rapidly deteriorating situation in Gaza.

    We must acknowledge the significant budget constraints the Palestinian Authority is currently facing and the need to support the Government in addressing them. However all decisions must be taken with due consideration of their humanitarian impact. I, therefore, call on Palestinian leaders to urgently reach the necessary compromises that will return Gaza to the control of the legitimate authorities.

    Last month, I warned the Security Council that this crisis is leading us toward another conflict. A conflict that no one wants. I urge all parties to act before it is too late.

    Secondly, the policy of continued illegal settlement construction in the occupied Palestinian territory contravenes resolution 2334. The large number of settlement-related activities documented during this period undermine the chances for the establishment of a viable, contiguous Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution.

    Thirdly, the continuing terror attacks, violence and incitement remain a very serious concern. Leaders have a responsibility to implement measures demonstrating their commitment to combatting violence and any acts of provocation and inflammatory rhetoric.

    Fourthly, while Israeli initiatives to improve the Palestinian economy are positive steps forward, it remains to be seen whether this will significantly increase Palestinian civil authority, in line with Quartet recommendations and prior commitments between the parties.

    Mr. President,

    In this symbolic month it is time to turn the challenges of the past into opportunities for the future. As the Secretary-General recently stated: “The occupation has shaped the lives of both Palestinians and Israelis. It has fueled recurring cycles of violence and retribution. Its perpetuation is sending an unmistakable message to generations of Palestinians that their dream of statehood is destined to remain just that, a dream; and to Israelis that their desire for peace, security and regional recognition remains unattainable.”

    Every day that passes without peace, is another day we neglect our collective responsibility to advance a meaningful strategy towards a negotiated two-state solution that meets the national and historic aspirations of both peoples. 

    The United Nations will continue its determined engagement with the parties and all key stakeholders to achieve that objective.

    Thank you.

  • 15 يونيو 2017

    Сообщение для СМИ

    46ая встреча Гальского Механизма по Предотвращению и Реагированию на Инциденты

    46-ая встреча совместного Механизма по Предотвращению и Реагированию на Инциденты (МПРИ) была проведена в городе Гали под председательством Организации Объединенных Наций, с участием грузинских, российских, абхазских и МНЕС (Миссия Наблюдателей Европейского Союза) представителей.

    На встрече участники продолжили обсуждение по некоторым важным вопросам, обсуждаемым на предыдущих встречах, таким как убийство гражданского лица год назад в одной из недавно закрытых точек перехода. К сожалению, ссылаясь на «недостаточность доказательств»,   абхазские участники сообщили, что решение было принято снять обвинения с подозреваемого. После одного года интенсивной работы и передачи материалов расследования на встречах МПРИ, такое решение стало большим разочарованием.

    Участники также обсудили случай двух лиц, задержанных за предполагаемое пересечение в несанкционированном пункте в начале апреля этого года. Был обращён призыв рассматривать этот случай с гуманитарной точки зрения и освободить задержанных. Участники также обсудили процесс “обустройства границы” и закрытие пунктов пешеходного перехода, которые влияют на повседневную жизнь местных жителей.

    Председатель подчеркнул бесспорную ценность МПРИ как важной платформы для обсуждения по вопросам, связанным с безопасностью, и для укрепления доверия. Он настоятельно призвал участников сосредоточить внимание на предотвращении инцидентов и на сотрудничество в расследовании любого инцидента для торжества  справедливости.

     Было согласовано провести следующую встречу 28 июня 2017 г. 

  • 8 يونيو 2017

    Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

    At the outset, I would like to reiterate, on behalf of the Secretary-General, my solidarity with the people and Governments of Iraq, Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Egypt and Iran following the recent terrorist attacks on their cities. I call on all Member States to redouble their efforts to strengthen international cooperation to address terrorism and violent extremism, and bring those responsible for these despicable attacks to justice.

     

    Mr. President,

    Thank you for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the fifth “Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.”

    This report was prepared with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, and in close collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, and other relevant entities.

    Since January 2016, the four previous reports to the Security Council on ISIL’s threat focused on the global landscape; South East Asia; Yemen and East Africa; Libya and Afghanistan; and Europe, North Africa and West Africa. This fifth report has taken a global approach with a focus on the financing of terrorism.

     

    Mr. President,

    This fifth report stresses that ISIL, despite continuous military pressure, continues to resist, particularly in Mosul and Raqqah. At the same time, ISIL has reorganized its military structure, giving more power to local commanders, and is more focused than ever before on enabling and inspiring attacks outside of conflict zones. 

    The threat from ISIL has been intensified by its use of the Internet and social media to disseminate propaganda online to a wide international audience. Although the volume of such messages has declined in the past 16 months, the threat persists as supporters outside Syria and Iraq collect and re-distribute this propaganda.

    In Europe, ISIL has used its online presence to encourage supporters to mount attacks in their countries of residence. This has led to multiple attacks, including in Belgium, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Some attacks were carried out by foreign terrorist fighter returnees, while others were conducted by individuals who had not travelled to conflict zones. Despite being sometimes labelled as “lone actors”, investigations demonstrate that the perpetrators often received support or resources from facilitators and, in a number of cases, were in direct contact with ISIL enablers.

    The report notes a decrease in the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and in the overall number of ISIL fighters during the last 16 months. However, returnees and the relocation of fighters from the conflict zones to other regions now present a considerable threat to international security.

    Although ISIL’s financial situation has steadily declined over the past 16 months, it continues to rely chiefly on the same two revenue streams- sales of hydrocarbons and extortion/taxation, which may amount to tens of millions of dollars per month. ISIL has also drawn income from antiquities smuggling, agricultural products, sale of electricity, exploitation of mineral resources such as phosphates and sulfuric acid, external donations, kidnapping for ransom, and human trafficking. As ISIL loses its control on population centers and its forces continue to dwindle, it will also have substantially lower costs. Despite growing liquidity shortages, ISIL may be able to stretch further its existing resources.

    ISIL continues to fund affiliates, while urging them to become more self-sufficient and proactive in developing internal revenue streams. Money services, including exchange houses and money couriers, continue to be a preferred method for ISIL and its supporters to move funds across borders.

    As Member States consider efforts to counter the ISIL financing, a key concern is how to allow reconstruction and stabilization funds to flow into liberated areas, including by reconnecting international financial structures, without also enabling ISIL remnants to abuse these structures and exploit this new liquidity.

    In regard to ISIL’s evolving threat outside of Syria and Iraq, ISIL-affiliated groups in North Africa have shown considerable resilience and pose a serious danger. For example, while ISIL in Libya has been weakened after losing a significant portion of the territory it controlled, its threat persists in Libya and in neighbouring countries. In West Africa, ISIL is challenging established Al-Qaida affiliates. In East Africa emerging ISIL affiliates operating in Puntland and parts of Southern Somalia compound the threat posed by Al-Qaida’s affiliate, Al-Shabaab. ISIL in Somalia and ISIL in Yemen represent an increasing menace. ISIL in Afghanistan is shifting its focus to the north of the country. The threat level has intensified in South-East Asia, with ISIL directing more of its attention, including its propaganda, at the region. 

     

    Mr. President,

    I welcome the efforts of this Council over the past months to adopt resolutions on countering terrorist narratives; protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks; stemming the destruction, looting and smuggling of cultural heritage sites and artefacts, as well as their illicit trade and trafficking carried out by terrorist groups or in a context of armed conflict; and addressing the terrorist threat in the Lake Chad Basin region.

    Member States, the UN and international, regional and subregional organizations continue to strengthen existing tools while also developing new ones to address the rapidly evolving threat posed by ISIL, including the threat posed by returning FTFs.

    In this context, the report highlights some points that deserve attention:

    Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 2253, 11 associated individuals have been listed in the UN ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, and among them eight are listed as financiers or financial facilitators.

    Member States are making substantial progress on adapting their legal and operational frameworks to the requirements of Security Council resolutions to address the terrorist financing and FTF threats. Notwithstanding, more work needs to be done in regard to the implementation of these norms and mechanisms, including in the context of terrorist asset-freezing; cross-border movement of cash; and human rights compliant travel measures to address the FTF threat.    

    UN entities’ efforts, as well as those of other key actors such as INTERPOL and the Financial Action Task Force, have helped strengthen regional and national frameworks to counter terrorism financing and stem the flow of FTFs. Other examples in the report include: CTED’s assessments and identification of good practices; and the capacity-building initiatives of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, UNODC and UNICRI’s, including on the legal and judicial aspects of terrorism financing, kidnapping for ransom and asset freezing, and border security and management.

    The CTITF Office and CTED recently concluded the second iteration of the Security Council-mandated “All-of-UN” Capacity Building Implementation Plan to Stem the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. While the projects included in the Plan continue to address the entire life-cycle of the FTF phenomenon, this updated version focuses on the tail-end of the FTF life-cycle, with a number of projects related to prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration to support Member States in their efforts to address returnees. A number of projects have now been completed or are well under way. The Plan now includes 50 projects submitted by 13 entities, with a total budget of 107 million dollars over 5 years. 41 percent of the total budget is funded.

    I invite all of you to inform your capitals of the new and partially funded projects and let us know of any projects you may be interested in co-funding.

    The UN is assisting Member States and regions most at risk and where UN support can bring added value. For example, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, as mandated by Security Council resolution 2195 (2015) and S/PRST/2015/24,  and in collaboration with other CTITF entities, is developing a regional “All-of-UN” Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism (I-ACT) initiative for G5 Sahel countries, as well as a national I-ACT for Mali.  

    As mentioned in the report, the UN engagement in the Sahel will evolve in response to the continued threats posed by terrorism, violent extremism, transnational organised crime and illicit trans-border trafficking. Partnerships between the UN system and regional stakeholders need to be strengthened to effectively support G5 Sahel countries’ efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. The UN is renewing its engagement in the region, following an independent review of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.  

     

    Mr. President,

    Since the first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2253, ISIL and its affiliates have remained under continuous military pressure and experienced significant setbacks. At the same time, ISIL is becoming an increasingly transnational threat, which severely undermines international peace and security.

    Consequently, the Secretary-General welcomes the focus that the Security Council has put on this matter, and urges you to enhance multilateral cooperation to address the threats and challenges he has reported on. 

    The Secretary-General considers countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism one of the highest priorities of the Organization. This is why, in his report A/71/858,  currently being considered by the General Assembly, he recommended the establishment of a new Office of Counter-Terrorism headed by an Under-Secretary-General.

    I am convinced that the new office will provide stronger leadership to our counter-terrorism efforts, enhance UN coordination, and increase the impact of our assistance to Member States.

    Thank you, Mr. President. 

  • 31 مايو 2017

    On 31 May 2017, the 46th meeting of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) was held in Gali town under the chairmanship of the United Nations, with the participation of Georgian, Russian, Abkhaz and EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission) representatives. 

     At the meeting, the participants followed up on some important issues discussed at the previous meetings, such as the killing of a civilian person a year ago at one of the recently closed crossing points. Regrettably, referring to “insufficient evidence”, the Abkhaz participants informed that the decision had been made to drop charges against the suspect. After one full year of intensive work and handover of investigation materials at the IPRM meetings, the decision was a great disappointment.

    The participants also discussed the case of two persons detained for alleged crossing at unauthorized point in early April this year. An appeal was made to look into the case from the humanitarian point of view and to release the detainees. The participants also discussed the process of “borderization” and closure of pedestrian crossing points, which have an impact on the daily lives of the local residents.

    The Chair emphasized the indisputable value of the IPRM as an important platform for the discussion on security-related issues and confidence building. He urged the participants to focus on prevention of incidents and cooperation in the investigation of any incident for justice to be served.

     It was agreed to hold the next meeting on 28 June 2017. 

  • 25 أبريل 2017

    On 25 April 2017, the 45th meeting of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) was held in Gali town under the aegis of the United Nations, with the participation of Georgian, Russian, Abkhaz and EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission) representatives. As in the previous meetings, the discussion was business-like, and the participants also engaged in bilateral consultations in the margins of the meeting.

    Security-related issues and prevention of incidents were prominently featured on the agenda.  Participants followed up certain issues discussed at the previous meetings, including the May 2016 murder case.  Additional information was provided on the cases of alleged trafficking of radioactive materials in the previous years, which had been previously discussed. 

    Participants also discussed the crossings of schoolchildren and the issues essential for the daily lives of the local population. The issues related to detentions in the vicinity of the line of control were discussed. Appeals were reiterated to look into the crossing-related detentions from the humanitarian point of view.

    One recent double-murder case in the Gali district was raised for the discussion, and according to the findings of the preliminary investigation, it had been linked to domestic homicide. The need to find and bring the suspected perpetrator to justice was emphasized; and in this context, close cooperation between the relevant law enforcement agencies on this and other cases was encouraged.

    The importance and need for the information exchange on planned sensitive activities for confidence-building purposes was once again highlighted.

    It was agreed to hold the next meeting on 31 May 2017. 

  • 15 أبريل 2017

        

  • 7 أبريل 2017

    Madame President,

    The Council has requested the Secretariat to provide an update on Syria. In addition, Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura will brief the Council in less than a week. I will therefore keep my remarks short.

     

    Madame President,

    In the last two months, we have seen the 30 December 2016 ceasefire falter, amid a steady escalation of military activity. In mid-February, Government forces escalated its their military operations in several areas of Damascus and Homs, recapturing Wadi Barada and al-Waar in Homs.  Military advances there were accompanied by the large scale evacuation of fighters and their families. The Syrian Government cited the presence of the al-Nusra Front in these areas – claims disputed by the opposition. Subsequently, during February and March, armed opposition groups, sometimes coordinating with al-Nusra Front, launched offensives in Daraa, Damascus and Hama.

    On 4 April, as government forces were fighting to regain territory recently lost to opposition offensives in northern Hama, disturbing reports emerged of an alleged chemical attack, in nearby Khan Shaykhoun in southern Idlib. Sources on the ground reported airstrikes. The attack was ostensibly the cause of a reported 86 deaths and more than 300 injuries. The Council discussed this in an emergency session on 5 April. The OPCW has announced that its Fact Finding Mission (FFM) is starting to investigate the alleged Khan Shaykoun attack. Earlier today, the Secretary-General, in a public statement, shared that he was abhorred by the chemical weapons attack in Khan Shaykhun, and the death and injury of many innocent civilians.

    This morning at approximately 04:35 hours local time in Damascus - 7 April - two US naval vessels deployed in the eastern Mediterranean Sea launched a total of 59 cruise missiles targeting the Al-Shayrat military airbase in Homs Governorate. The United States has stated that this was in response to what it states was the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons from this airbase. The US claimed that the missiles severely damaged or destroyed Syrian aircraft and support infrastructure and equipment. According to news reports, the US said that they had informed Russian Federation forces of the strike in advance, using the established de-confliction mechanism, and taking precautions to minimize risk to Russian or Syrian personnel located at the airfield.

    A statement from the Syrian General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces called the attack a “blatant act of aggression” which had caused six deaths and “huge material damage.” Iran and the Russian Federation condemned the attack. The UK, Australia, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and New Zealand have expressed some support for the strikes.

     

    Madame President,

    The Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security. We hope the Council can unite and exercise that responsibility to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun. It is important that this Council sends a strong collective message that any use of chemical weapons shall not be tolerated and will have consequences. The Secretary-General stresses that the international community has a responsibility to hold the any perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks accountable and to ensure that chemical weapons are never used again as an instrument of warfare. 

    The protection of civilians and accountability should be at the top of our peace and security agenda. In the case of Syria, there can be no genuine protection if parties to the conflict, Government and opposition, are permitted to act with impunity and if the Syrian Government continues to commit human rights violations against its own citizens. Protecting the Syrian people requires immediate action, action that is rooted in the principles of the United Nations and international law.  Mindful of the risk of escalation, the Secrteary-General has publicly appealed for restraint to avoid any acts that could deepen the suffering of the Syrian people. We further urge all parties involved in military operations to abide by international humanitarian law and take all necessary precautions to avoid and minimize civilian casualties. 

     

    Madame President,

    As the Secretary-General said today, these events underscore our belief that there is no other way to solve the conflict than through a political solution. We call on the parties to urgently renew their commitment to making progress in the Geneva talks. Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva Communiqué remain the foundation of, and contain the core principles for, United Nations mediation efforts in this regard.  

    Thank you, Madame President.

  • 24 Mar 2017

    Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Thank you for the opportunity to brief on this important topic.

    I would like to start by expressing my sincere condolences to the loved ones of the victims of Wednesday’s terrorist attack in London and my deep sympathy to the people and Government of the United Kingdom

    We needed no reminder of the horror of terrorism. But the London attack -- like those in Kabul, Baghdad, Maiduguri and so many other places recently– must move us to strengthen international counter-terrorism cooperation in line with international human rights and humanitarian law standards

     

    Mr. President,

    Today, terrorists, particularly in armed conflict situations, are destroying lives but also visiting their horrific violence on historical sites and objects. Indeed, the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage and the trafficking in items of great artistic, religious or cultural significance target individuals and communities on cultural and religious grounds. The protection of heritage, then, is not only a cultural issue; it is also a security and humanitarian imperative.

     Terrorist groups like ISIL exploit cultural sites to finance their activities while strengthening their linkages with transnational organized crime. And they destroy and traffic cultural heritage to undermine the power of culture as a bridge between generations, people of different backgrounds and religions.

    Today’s resolution aims to strengthen international cooperation to deprive terrorists of funding, but also to protect cultural heritage as a symbol of understanding and respect for all religions, beliefs and civilizations.

    Awareness of the essential importance of the protection of cultural heritage is not new, but it has grown considerably over the past several years. Creating MINUSMA’s mandate in 2013 through Resolution 2199, the Security Council established the link between the illicit trafficking of cultural objects and the financing of terrorism. Resolution 2322 (2016) urged States to bolster cooperation to prevent and combat trafficking in cultural property and related offences that benefit or may benefit terrorist groups.

    Meanwhile, during the fifth review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the General Assembly expressed concern in resolution 70/291 that terrorists may benefit from transnational organized crime in some regions, including from the trafficking of cultural property, and condemned the destruction of cultural heritage by terrorist groups. 

    In resolution 68/127, the General Assembly deplored “attacks on religious places and shrines and cultural sites in violation of international law, in particular human rights and humanitarian law”.   

    And there is already a strong international legal and normative framework to address these crimes. This is based on the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime and Corruption; the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; and the International Guidelines for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Responses with Respect to Trafficking in Cultural Property and Other Related Offences.

     

    Mr. President,

    Protecting cultural heritage requires us to make every effort to implement this international legal and normative framework and strengthen international cooperation.

    It also demands a global criminal justice response that can prevent trafficking in cultural property by disrupting organized criminal and terrorist networks, including through anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering action, and bringing perpetrators to justice.

    We need to put a stronger focus on investigation, cross-border cooperation and exchange of information, and on bringing in private and public sector partners, including dealers and the tourism sector, to promote supply chain integrity and stop the illicit trade and sale of cultural property.   

    The United Nations system, particularly through the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) entities, is increasingly supporting Member States efforts to address these threats through advocacy and capacity-building assistance. 

    For example, UNESCO and UNODC are already working together, along with INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization, and other partners, to assist Member States in protecting cultural heritage and countering the trafficking in cultural property.

    As CTITF Chairman, and in light of this debate and the resolution that was adopted today, I will encourage the CTITF Inter-Agency Working Group on Countering the Financing of Terrorism to develop new projects to help Member States protect their cultural heritage. 

     

    Mr. President,

    The United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, have demonstrated their determination to further integrate the protection of cultural heritage in their counter-terrorism work.

    With the support of United Nations entities, Member States are strengthening their legal frameworks and criminal justice systems, and enhancing their collaboration to prevent and respond to terrorists’ attacks against their cultural heritage. I believe we can, and must, do even more.

    This resolution provides a good basis to do just that. The United Nations stands ready to do its part.

    Thank you, Mr. President. 

  • 21 Mar 2017

    On 21 March 2017, the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions (UNRGID) organized and chaired the 44th meeting of the Gali joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM). The meeting took place in a constructive and business-like atmosphere. With the aim to solve existing problems, the participants have discussed in details all agenda points in good faith.

     

    In addition to the19 May 2016 murder case, which has remained on the agenda, the participants extensively discussed the recent closure of the two pedestrian crossing points at the line of control. In this regard, the participants have exchanged information on reasons for the decision to close the crossing points and several measures taken to minimize the impact.  Nevertheless, the concern was expressed about the implications on the daily lives of the local population, as well as security on the ground.  The Chair has once again appealed to the participants to look into the issue from the humanitarian point of view in order to avoid any negative impact on the local residents. Furthermore, one recent case of detention involving three women was addressed.

    The participants also discussed several alleged attempts of trafficking radioactive materials in previous years and agreed to exchange available information for the purpose of investigating the cases.

    The participants have agreed to hold the 45th IPRM meeting on 25 April 2017.

  • 15 Mar 2017

    This UN DPA guidance seeks to inform mediators and their teams, as well as conflict parties, about the principles and strategies for the effective inclusion of women, as well as a gendered perspective, in mediation processes. The guidance addresses mediation preparation, process design, and substantive issues including security arrangements, participation, constitutions, language and the implementation of peace agreements through a gender lens.

     

    Download in Arabic

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  • 22 فبراير 2017

    On 22 February 2017, the 43rd meeting of the Gali joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) took place under the chairmanship of the United Nations.  The atmosphere during the discussions was positive and businesslike.

    The participants followed up on some issues discussed at the previous meetings, including the May 2016 murder case; as well as health and safety conditions of a long-term prisoner. In particular, they exchanged views on the validity of previously presented investigation documents and discussed provision of necessary material evidence to the court in order to move forward the resolution of the murder case. In this context, the Chair encouraged the participants to take pragmatic steps in order to overcome existing impediments.

    The participants also continued discussions on the announced closure of two crossing points at the line of control, focusing on the possible implications for the movement of the local population. Information on the already implemented measures to facilitate the movement of the population was shared by the respective participants. The Chair and other participants appealed to look into the issue from the humanitarian perspective in order to minimize any negative impact in this respect.

    The participants agreed to hold the 44th IPRM meeting on 21 March 2017.

  • 16 فبراير 2017

    Mr. President, members of the Security Council, 

    On the night of 8 February, ISIS and its affiliates in the Sinai launched a series of rockets towards the Israeli coastal resort of Eilat. Thankfully, no one was killed or injured in the attack. I unequivocally condemn this act as well as those who inspired, implemented and celebrated it.

    I recall this incident because it is a chilling reminder of the need for states to work together and stand firm against terror.

    The Middle East continues to be plagued by extremism, bloodshed and displacement that feeds intolerance, violence, and religious radicalism far beyond the region.

    The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, sadly, is not immune from these sweeping regional threats. Although leaders on both sides agree on the need to continue Israeli-Palestinian security coordination, there is increasing anger in the street and radical views are hijacking the discourse as moderate voices are increasingly vilified and cast aside.

    It is critical that we all understand that we must never allow the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to drift into the abyss of the extremism and radicalism sweeping the region. Palestinians, Israelis and the international community have a duty to act responsibly, avoid escalating tensions, refrain from unilateral actions and work together to uphold peace. 

    Sadly, today unilateral actions are returning the parties to a high-stakes collision course.

     

    Mr. President,

    In 6 February, the Israeli Parliament adopted the so-called “Regularisation Law” which enables the use of privately owned Palestinian land for Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank without the owners’ consent. The law has the potential to retroactively “regularise” – under Israeli law – thousands of existing settlement units built on land owned by Palestinian individuals living under occupation, as well as dozens of illegal outposts. Its passage marks a significant shift in Israel's position concerning the legal status of the West Bank and the applicability of Israeli law therein. It contravenes international law and according to the Israeli Attorney General it is also unconstitutional. It is expected that the Supreme Court of Israel will rule on its constitutionality soon.

    If the law stays in place, it will have far-reaching consequences for Israel, while seriously undermining prospects for the two-state solution and for Arab-Israeli peace.

    This period also saw Government statements announcing significant settlement expansion, which were quickly followed by action. Within a three-week period, the Israeli authorities promoted some 4,000 housing units in Area C, including tenders for around 800 units, advancement of around 3,000 units and approval of plans for an additional 230 units. These numbers are all the more worrying if compared to the whole of 2016, when 42 units were tendered and some 3,000 were advanced in Area C. Settlements were also advanced in East Jerusalem during the reporting period, with the issuance of building permits for over 900 units.

    Settlement activities are illegal under international law, as stated by the Middle East Quartet, they are one of the main obstacles to peace. All core issues, Mr. President, should be resolved between the parties through direct negotiations on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions and mutual agreements.

     

    Mr. President,

    I continue to be concerned by the daily violence. So-called “lone wolf” attacks against Israeli civilians, though greatly reduced as compared to 2016, continue. On February 9th, in the market of Petah Tikva in central Israel, an 18-year-old Palestinian from Nablus shot and stabbed six Israelis, who were injured in the attack.

    In the West Bank, three Palestinians were shot and killed by Israeli security forces in recent weeks, two allegedly attempting attacks on Israeli soldiers, while a teenager was killed during clashes with Israeli security forces. I once again call for the calibrated use of force and stress that live fire should be used only as a last resort, in situations of imminent threat of death or serious injury, with any resulting death or injury properly investigated by the authorities.

    The trend of demolishing Palestinian-owned structures continues. Some 57 structures have been torn down, displacing 108 people. Last year saw over 1,000 demolitions, the largest annual number of demolitions on record, nearly double the figure for 2015. I once again take this opportunity to urge Israel to cease this destructive practice.

     

    Mr. President,

    I welcome the Palestinian decision to hold the postponed local elections on May 13th, however I also take note of Hamas’ rejection of that decision. Let me urge all factions to work together in good faith to uphold democracy and to overcome the internal divisions that are undermining Palestinian national institutions and the legitimate aspirations for statehood.

    Local elections, if held simultaneously in both Gaza and the West Bank, and conducted in line with international standards, can contribute to advancing reconciliation. Gaza and the West Bank should be reunited under a single, legitimate and democratic Palestinian authority on the basis of the PLO principles and the rule of law, in accordance with existing agreements. 

    In Gaza, we have consistently warned that the situation is not sustainable and that another escalation is likely, unless the pressing needs of the population are more systematically addressed.

    I also note that Hamas in Gaza has elected a new leadership. It is for this leadership to ensure that Gaza remains calm and avoid the risk of spiraling into another conflict. Rocket attacks, tunnel construction and smuggling only heighten that risk. 

    After over three months of relative calm, the launching of a rocket from Gaza towards Israel on February 5th – which landed without injury –reminds us all of the risk of further destabilizing an already combustible environment.  In this environment all sides should exercise maximum restraint.

    The volatile situation in Gaza continues to be exacerbated by the persistence of a major humanitarian and development challenges, related in large part to the crippling closures of the Strip and the continuing political divide. This winter has borne witness to a serious electricity crisis which in December left Palestinians in Gaza with only two hours of electricity per day. Tens of thousands of people came out in the streets in mass protests, many — including journalists, were detained. The crisis was temporarily resolved with a generous contribution of US$ 12 million from the State of Qatar.

    As we speak, the United Nations is working actively with the Palestinian Authority, all stakeholders and key donors, on a roadmap to ensure that Gaza’s massive electricity problems are addressed in a sustainable manner.

     

    Mr. President,

    Briefly turning to Lebanon, the reactivation of state institutions has continued. The President and Prime Minister have expressed their confidence that an electoral law will be agreed with the aim of holding timely elections.

    On February 11th, in an interview, President Aoun stated “[…] the need to maintain Hizbullah’s weapons”. The UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon is in discussion with authorities on their continued commitment to relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions1701 and 1559, which clearly call for the disbanding and disarmament of all non-state armed groups.

    Relative calm continued in the UNIFIL area of operations and along the Blue Line, with the exception of some ground and air violations. On 19 January, UNIFIL deployed on both sides of the Blue Line to mitigate tensions including weapons pointing between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the context of the placement of a soil barrier near El Adeisse by Lebanese municipal workers, in violation of the Blue Line. 

    Meanwhile in the UNDOF area of operations the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic is holding, albeit in a volatile security environment on the Bravo side. On February 8th, the IDF carried out a strike on the Syrian side of the Golan in response to a spillover fire incident involving a tank shell that landed in an open area in Israeli-occupied Golan. Spillover from Syria continues to heighten the risk of further escalation between the two sides.

    Both sides however have stated their continued commitment to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Conditions permitting, the full return of UNDOF to the area of separation remains a priority.

     

    Mr. President,

    Returning to the Palestinian - Israeli conflict, recent developments should be of concern to all.

    Some may hold the illusion that the conflict can be “managed” indefinitely. That the absence of a clear strategy to advance peace is a strategy in itself.

    The Middle East Quartet Report and Security Council resolutions have clearly outlined what is needed to advance a sustainable and just peace. The two-state solution remains the only way to achieve the legitimate national aspirations of both peoples. Israel can take the necessary step to stop settlement expansion and construction in order to preserve this prospect, while the Palestinian leadership can demonstrate their commitment to tackling the challenges of violence and incitement on their side. This will create an environment that will facilitate bilateral final status negotiations that the international community can support.

    As Palestinians and Israelis face another period of uncertainty and concern for what lies ahead, I urge leaders on both sides to carefully contemplate the future they envision for their people.

    Will it be a future built on perpetual conflict, rising extremism and occupation? 

    Or will it be a future built on mutual respect and an appreciation for the unimaginable wealth of opportunities that would come with peace?

    The answer seems obvious but, as history has painfully demonstrated, the path to peace is riddled with hazards. The United Nations remains resolute in its commitment to help Palestinians and Israelis strive to overcome these challenges.

    Thank you.

  • 8 فبراير 2017

    I am delighted to be with you to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Children and Armed Conflict mandate and I thank the President of the General Assembly, His Excellency Peter Thomson, for convening this event.

    The mandate was an important call for us all to consider that how we treat children will affect future prospects for peace. In the Department of Political Affairs, we engage in preventive diplomacy, and work in partnership with national and regional partners to address the root causes of tensions and violent conflict. Through our experience, we have learned that how a society treats young people can be at the same time an indicator for how that society will be able to sustain peace.

    Looking back 20 years, to the time when the mandate was enacted, a fundamental shift in the nature of conflict was already underway: from interstate armed conflict to conflict within States.

    And indeed, the proliferation of non-state actors, the rise of violent extremism, regionalisation of conflicts and protracted unresolved conflicts together create a picture that is much more complex than we could have imagined.

    Many of these complex conflicts which the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict focusses on also see engagement by the Department of Political Affairs. This includes the UN Special Political Missions or Envoys, who work in the most dangerous and difficult situations we face together. And they are the places where children continue to be at the highest risk.

    I am therefore deeply aware of the importance of the visits that the SRSG makes to the countries, and of the work of her office. Her reports highlight the challenges we face. They help to influence parties to conflict and to bring international attention to where it is most needed.

    Yet even with the strength, commitment and expertise of this engagement, the news can be grim.

    The most recent report of the SRSG finds that violations against children are tragically on the rise.

    In Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria and Yemen, child casualties persist or have increased, and attacks on civilian infrastructure, including schools and hospitals continue. Elsewhere children are abducted or humanitarian access is denied.

    Even in these most difficult settings, however, SRSG Zerrougui and her team have had some crucial successes. The Afghan government has taken significant steps to end child recruitment in its security forces, including extending the police child protection units to 21 of the 34 provinces. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi has reiterated publicly that it is illegal to pay a military salary to anyone under 18. Monitoring and dialogue continues in the occupied Palestinian territory. And Action Plans have been developed in other places where conflicts are ongoing. Several of our Special Political Missions, including Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, have child protection advisers who work directly with mission leaders to negotiate with parties, ensure that children are protected and that the monitoring and reporting mechanisms are implemented.

    This is not enough, however. We must work to put an end to the use of military strategies that depend on violations of humanitarian law and we must support sustainable and inclusive peace processes that lead to meaningful political solutions.

    The Department of Political Affairs has also worked with SRSG Zerrougui and other partners to include provisions in ceasefire agreements and peace agreements that address the concerns around the involvement of children in armed conflict and on engagement with non-state armed groups. We welcome the development of the “Checklist for drafting children and armed conflict provisions in ceasefire and peace agreements” that was developed with UN and other partners and is a useful tool for mediators.

    DPA also commends the strong engagement of the SRSG and her office in the Colombian peace process. This has contributed to important commitments by the parties, which we hope to see implemented, to the early release of children from the FARC-EP and to the establishment of a special reintegration program tailored to their needs.

    20 years ago we had not envisaged the rise of violent extremism and the situation of children in conflicts involving terrorist groups. Increasingly, violent extremist groups are abducting children and are using children to perpetuate suicide attacks or as decoys, crimes that are, for example, committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria. We emphasise now more and more that any counter-terrorism effort must incorporate appropriate responses in its treatment of children.

    Finally and fundamentally, as Graça Machel so poignantly argued 20 years ago, the best way to protect children from armed conflict is to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict in the first place.

    We continue to believe in that goal. DPA’s central priority is conflict prevention and sustaining peace.

    The new Secretary-General’s vision intently focuses on integrating the work of the three UN pillars, peace and security, development, and human rights, to “sustain peace”. It is through working together, in a truly integrated approach, that sustaining peace and sustainable development will, together, deliver a better future for children.

    The plight of children affected by armed conflict, and the dedication Ms. Zerrougui and her office have shown, inspire us. We must continue to strive, and strive harder, in our efforts to protect children and to prevent and resolve violent conflicts. In DPA, we remain committed to and proud of our strong partnership with the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict and we congratulate you on the twentieth anniversary of your mandate.

    Thank you.

  • 7 فبراير 2017

    Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the fourth “Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.”

    This report was prepared with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, and in close collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), and other relevant United Nations actors and international organizations.       

     

    Mr. President,

    The report stresses that ISIL is on the defensive militarily in several regions. But although its income and the territory under its control are shrinking, ISIL still appears to have sufficient funds to continue fighting. The group relies  mainly on income from extortion and hydrocarbon exploitation, , even though resources from the latter are on the decline. Member States are concerned that ISIL will try to expand other sources of income, such as kidnapping for ransom, and increase its reliance on donations.

    ISIL is adapting in several ways to military pressure – resorting to increasingly covert communication and recruitment methods, including by using the ‘dark web’, encryption and messengers. Moreover, it has expanded its area of attacks to countries neighbouring Iraq and Syria, while continuing to encourage followers farther afield to perpetrate attacks. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist fighters leaving Iraq and Syria augment the threat of terrorism in their countries of origin.

     

    Mr. President,

    The previous reports to the Security Council on ISIL’s global threat, have focused on South East Asia, Yemen and East Africa, Libya and Afghanistan. This, fourth, report focuses on Europe, North Africa and West Africa:

    1. Since declaring in 2014 its intent to attack Europe, ISIL has conducted a range of attacks in that region. Some of these attacks were directed and facilitated by ISIL personnel, while others were enabled by ISIL providing guidance or assistance or were inspired through its propaganda. 
    2. While the military offensive in Libya has dislodged ISIL from its stronghold Sirte, the group’s threat to Libya and neighbouring countries persists. Its fighters – estimated to range from several hundred to 3,000 – have moved to other parts of the country.
    3. ISIL has increased its presence in West Africa and the Maghreb, though the group does not control significant amounts of territory in the region. The reported loyalty pledge to ISIL by a splinter faction of Al-Mourabitoun led by Lehbib Ould Ali may elevate the level of the threat.
    4. ISIL-affiliate Boko Haram is attempting to spread its influence and commit terrorist acts beyond Nigeria, and remains a serious threat, with several thousand fighters at its disposal. It is, however, plagued by financial difficulties and an internal power struggle, and has split in two factions.

    The fourth report also notes some of the measures taken by Member States through the Security Council and the General Assembly since the last report.

    On international cooperation and information sharing, the report highlights Security Council resolution 2322 (2016), which calls upon Member States to consider establishing laws and mechanisms to allow for the broadest possible international cooperation in the judicial and law enforcement spheres. The report also notes the General Assembly consensus resolution of 21 November aimed at further enhancing and strengthening collaboration between the INTERPOL and the UN. INTERPOL reports that information sharing between Member States has since increased.

    The report also mentions Security Council resolution 2331 (2016), which recognizes the connection between human trafficking, sexual violence and terrorism and other transnational organized criminal activities, calling upon Member States to prosecute and penalize perpetrators. Some States, with help from UNODC, have instituted special procedures to screen for trafficking victims among refugees and asylum seekers.

    The report highlights some of the actions Member States have taken in Europe, the Mahgreb and West Africa to counter ISIL Regarding Europe, for example, it stresses the improvements in States’ information sharing and cooperation on addressing terrorist attacks and on curtailing the travel and transit of foreign terrorist fighters. Although more work needs to be done, including on the use of Advance Passenger Information systems, the report notes that substantial progress has been made to counter the financing of terrorism despite continuing challenges.

    The report also notes efforts by the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to prevent and counter violent extremism, including projects to bring together information on radicalization and intervention and raise awareness about the phenomenon.

    Regarding the Maghreb and West Africa, the report notes that States are pooling resources regionally to combat terrorism, while improving the sharing of information on FTFs. It also highlights that some States – with UN support – are developing and implementing counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism strategies. Some West African States are taking action on countering the financing of terrorism, including through legislation, though the report notes that few terrorist financing cases have been prosecuted.

    During the reporting period, a number of United Nations entities have taken further steps to support the efforts of Member States to counter the threat of ISIL. For instance:

    • The CTITF Office and CTED are currently reviewing the Security Council mandated “All-of-UN” Capacity Building Implementation Plan to Stem the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in order to adjust it to the changing phenomenon. The 37 project proposals address the entire life-cycle of the FTF phenomenon, including radicalization, travel, financing, return, and rehabilitation and reintegration should they return. The Plan is currently 23 per cent funded.
    • UNCCT provides capacity-building assistance to Member States through a number of projects at the global, regional and national level. At the global level progress was made on the Border Security Initiative, the development of the Border Security and Management programme, and the Advance Passenger Information (API) project, while at the regional level UNCCT continued to provide assistance on the development of strategies to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism. The centre also continued its efforts to improve the capacity of Member States in East and West Africa to address kidnapping for ransom, which is a potential source of funds for ISIL affiliated groups. At the regional and national levels, the Integrated Assistance for Counter Terrorism (I-ACT) initiative aims to develop a coherent and coordinated capacity building programme to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism.  During the reporting period, much progress was made in the implementation of the I-ACT, both in Mali, with the support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, and regionally, in the preparation of an I-ACT for the G5 Sahel, as mandated by Security Council Presidential Statement 2015/24 on Peace and Security in Africa. The UNCCT has also continued its preparation for a project to enhance aviation security in Nigeria.
    • The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published a Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons. UNODC also continued to provide assistance to Member States in the MENA region aiming to strengthen law-enforcement capacity at international airports, as part of its Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP).
    • UNODC and CTED collaborated to provide technical assistance to Member States on strengthening judicial cooperation on foreign terrorist fighters and have held technical consultations with Nigeria on the prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of persons associated with terrorist organizations.
    • The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) implemented projects in the Maghreb on preventing and managing violent extremism, including in prison settings. 

     

    Mr. President,

    The need to develop sustained, coordinated responses to the grave threat posed by ISIL and associated groups and entities is beyond question. There are 19 universal counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, as well as related regional instruments on international terrorism, and relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. But we need to do more, as Member States continue to face significant challenges to ensure effective international cooperation.

    Improving our response is critical to address the growth of transnational terrorism as ISIL expands its area of attacks and foreign terrorist fighters leave Syria and Iraq. Even though many foreign terrorist fighters stay behind in the conflict zone, those returning or leaving the conflict could pose a grave risk to the country of origin or to the countries they are travelling to or transiting through, such as Iraq and Syria’s neighbours as well as countries in the Maghreb.

    The Secretary-General has warned that terrorism exacerbates conflicts, and that it takes little to trigger a crisis that can engulf a country, or a region, with global consequences. He has urged Member States to step up efforts to resolve conflicts, including those that are responsible for the dramatic increase in global terrorism.

    As we consider what more we can do to check and roll back ISIL, we must also step up efforts to prevent and resolve the violent conflicts that both drive and are made worse by terrorism. These are mutually reinforcing pursuits. Ultimately, it is the spread and consolidation of peace, security, development and human rights that will most effectively deprive terrorism of the oxygen it needs to survive.

    Thank you, Mr. President. 

  • 2 فبراير 2017

    Mr. President,

    Distinguished members of the Council,

    The conflict in Ukraine will soon enter its fourth year. Since the Department of Political Affairs last briefed the Council on the situation in eastern Ukraine on 28 April 2016, fighting has continued unabated, with only short periods of respite.

    Almost 10,000 people have been killed (Ukrainian armed forces, civilians and members of armed groups), and over 23,000 injured since the beginning of the conflict, according to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU). Over 2,000 of those killed were civilians.

    Since 7 January this year, and in particular over the last few days, we have seen a dangerous intensification of the conflict. On 1 February, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reported over 10,000 explosions in the Donetsk region over 24 hours, the highest number of violations yet recorded by the Mission. While the most serious clashes in the last few days have predominantly hit the Avdiivka – Yasynuvata– Donetsk airport area, heavy fighting has also been reported near Mariupol, Popasna and the Svitlodarsk/Debaltseve areas, both in government-controlled and non-government controlled territory. The entire length of the Contact Line has seen a serious escalation of hostilities, and there is still a risk of further deterioration of the situation.  The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has also registered frequent use of heavy weapons proscribed by the Minsk Agreements, such as multiple-launch-rocket systems, including in the areas designated for disengagement as per the 21 September 2016 Agreement on Disengagement of Forces and Hardware. There are reports of civilian casualties, including at least four deaths since the escalation on 28 January, and heavy losses among the combatants on both sides. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission also recorded damage to civilian houses and a school in populated areas of Avdiivka, which raises serious concerns about possible violations of international humanitarian law by all sides.

    There are now reports of clashes that are directly endangering civilian crossing points, residential areas and critical civilian infrastructure, such as water purification plants and delivery systems, power lines and heating supply lines. Ensuring the urgent disengagement of forces at all checkpoints across the contact line would greatly improve the security of the population in conflict affected areas, where more than 20.000 people cross the contact line daily. Hundreds of thousands of civilians on both sides of the contact line are still at risk of losing all access to water, heating and electricity, bringing the spectre of further displacements closer. This is particularly worrying, given the frigid winter temperatures in the region at present.

    There are also real threats of serious environmental disasters should major chemical waste storage locations in the area be shelled. As of yesterday, thousands of inhabitants in Avdiivka, including children, were reportedly at risk of being evacuated. Combatants must stop the shelling in cities such as Avdiivka, on both sides of the contact line, and allow for the restoration of basic services. The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs will shortly provide further updates on the humanitarian situation on the ground.

     

    Mr. President,

    We welcome the prompt statement of the Security Council on 31 January concerning the deterioration of the situation in Donetsk region. The Secretary-General has expressed deep concern about the high level of military readiness and the recent intensification of fighting, which is having an increasingly serious impact on the civilian population in the conflict zones.  He has called on all parties to immediately halt all hostilities, fully observe the ceasefire, allow immediate and unhindered humanitarian access to the affected population, facilitate full and safe access to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to report on the situation on the ground, and renew serious efforts towards the peaceful settlement of the conflict. He particularly underlines the imperative for all sides to take all measures to protect civilians. The sides should refrain from any action that may be seen as provocative or escalates tensions.

    The hostilities in Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area increased in intensity in a few days to levels never recorded before in this area by the OSCE SMM. This escalation demonstrates how precarious the situation remains and how suddenly and abruptly the security situation can deteriorate. The statement agreed at the meeting yesterday in Minsk of the Trilateral Contact Group and the Representative from certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions lays down the urgent measures the sides should take not only in this area, but along the entire contact line in order to prevent further ceasefire violations that could in turn spiral out of control.

    This is a positive development, but the test will be in the implementation of the measures. The pattern of successive ceasefire agreements broken by fresh violence has left civilians caught in the crossfire and trapped in suffering. With every new day of fighting, the conflict becomes more entrenched and difficult to resolve. There is no military solution to this conflict.

     

    Mr. President,

    Despite the commendable efforts of the Trilateral Contact Group and the Normandy Four, the recent intensification of the conflict coincides with a period of relative stagnation in the diplomatic processes designed to find a peaceful solution and ensure the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements. The international community must remain constructively and actively engaged, however, if we are  to prevent this crisis becoming a catastrophe. In this regard, there is a pressing need to revitalise the negotiation process without delay. 

    The United Nations continues to strongly support the efforts in the Normandy Four and Trilateral Contact Group frameworks and of the OSCE Chairmanship in Ukraine. We commend the work of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, who are carrying out essential work under extremely difficult circumstances in the conflict areas. The United Nations calls on both sides to lift all restrictions on the OSCE SMM’s freedom of movement and to immediately end all use of force and threats against the Mission’s monitors . We welcome the visits of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Austrian Foreign Minister Kurz to Ukraine and the Russian Federation in January and hope that his engagements, along with other ongoing efforts, will bear fruit. The United Nations stands ready to support these efforts. I look forward to hearing shortly from Ambassador Apakan, Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, regarding his assessment of the latest developments the ground.

     

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    It has been almost two years since the “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements” was signed on 12 February in Minsk, which was in turn endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 2202 on 17 February 2015. This remains the foundation through which we, the international community, have committed ourselves to engage in the search for lasting peace in eastern Ukraine. I urge you all to continue such efforts with renewed vigor.

     

    Mr. President, distinguished members of the Council,

    In accordance with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the United Nations remains committed to supporting a peaceful resolution of the conflict, in a manner that fully upholds the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine. The United Nations priority remains to support the peace efforts in Ukraine led by the OSCE and ensure the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements. The parties themselves, however, have the main responsibility to work constructively towards this end.

    Thank you, Mr. President.

     

  • 24 يناير 2017

    On 24 January 2017, the 42nd meeting of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) took place under the chairmanship of the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions (UNRGID). It was the first meeting this year, which took place in a businesslike atmosphere. The participants assessed the overall security situation on the ground since the previous IPRM meeting as relatively calm and stable.

    The participants discussed in detail the materials, which had been transferred earlier, on the May 2016 killing incident at Khurcha-Nabakevi crossing point, and exchanged views on how to proceed in a pragmatic way. They were encouraged to further develop this trend of cooperation and address concerns of each participant in good faith.

    The participants followed up on the issues discussed at the previous meetings. They also discussed new agenda points, with a particular focus on the imminent closure of the two pedestrian crossing points along the line of control and possible implications for the local population. The issues related to changes to the “border zone” in the Gali district were also discussed, and concerns were expressed about the possible negative impact on freedom of movement. The Chair appealed to the respective participants to look into the matter from the humanitarian point of view and to take into consideration the well-being of the local population, especially schoolchildren and people traveling for medical purposes.

    Furthermore, the participants discussed the issues related to sensitive activities, such as military exercises, and the need to exchange advanced notice with the purpose to enhance transparency and avoid misperceptions.

    The participants agreed to hold the 43rd IPRM meeting on 22 February 2017.

     

  • 18 يناير 2017

    Mr. President,

    Members of the Security Council, Ladies and Gentlemen,

    On 16 January, the United Nations welcomed the first anniversary of  “Implementation Day” of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which was endorsed by Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).  One year on, the Secretary-General is encouraged by the continued reaffirmation by all JCPOA participants, including during the meeting of the Joint Commission in Vienna on 10 January, of their unequivocal commitment to the full and effective implementation of the agreement.

    The JCPOA -- reached by the E3/EU+3 and Iran on 14 July 2015 -- is a good example of how multilateral diplomacy, political will and perseverance can resolve the most complex issues.  It is imperative that its participants, the United Nations and the broader international community continue to support the full implementation of this historic multilateral agreement for its full duration.  Its comprehensive and sustained implementation guarantees that Iran’s nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful.  It will help realize the long-awaited aspirations of the Iranian people to be reconnected to the global economy, and bring to a satisfactory conclusion the consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue by the Security Council.

     

    Mr. President,

    Today’s meeting of the Security Council is taking place against a backdrop of steady implementation, cooperation and progress.  Since “Implementation Day”, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued five reports documenting continued implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments.  In her statement on the first anniversary of “Implementation Day”, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, noted that lifting of nuclear-related sanctions, as promised in the agreement, resulted in a surge in bilateral trade and investment in Iran, contributing to better living standards for the benefit of all.  The Secretary-General underscores the importance of all JCPOA participants equally accruing the full benefits of the agreement, and calls upon all its participants to continue to work together in good faith and reciprocity.

     

    Mr. President,  

    Thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (S/2016/1136).  The report was submitted to the Council on 30 December 2016 pursuant to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and paragraph 7 of the note by the President of the Council issued on 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44).   

    As guided by the Security Council, the report of the Secretary-General focuses on the implementation of the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).  It does not cover implementation of annex A to the resolution – namely implementation of its nuclear-related commitments by Iran and of their sanctions lifting commitments by other participants – nor touch upon issues falling within the remit of the Joint Commission. 

    Let me now turn to the main findings and recommendations of the second report of the Secretary-General related to annex B of resolution 2231. 

    First, the Secretary-General has not received any report, nor is aware of any open source information regarding the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the resolution.  Moreover, and also on an encouraging note, Member States have made greater use of the procurement channel process through which the transfer of nuclear-related items is approved by the Council on the basis of recommendation provided by the Joint Commission.  Five nuclear-related proposals were submitted since July last year.  Three of the proposals have been approved; the other two are still under consideration.

    The proposals were processed in accordance with the timelines established by resolution 2231 (2015), with due regard for information security and confidentiality.  The operational linkages established between the Security Council and the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission are functioning well, and I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge the excellent cooperation that we have with the European External Action Service, especially its Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission.

    Second, the Secretary-General has also not received any information regarding Iranian ballistic missile activitiesor ballistic missile-related transfers to Iran undertaken contrary to the relevant provisions of the resolution.

    Third, in terms of restrictions on arms-related transfers, the report includes information on the seizure of an arms shipment by the French Navy in the Northern Indian Ocean in March 2016.  France concluded that the arms shipment originated in Iran and that such transfer had been undertaken contrary to annex B of the resolution.  In addition, the Secretariat also received information from Australia and the Combined Maritime Forces on another arms seizure, off the coast of Oman, in February 2016, by the Royal Australian Navy.  That shipment of arms was also assessed, by the US Navy, to have originated in Iran.  Both seizures bear strong similarities with the one reported by the United States in June 2016 (and mentioned in the first report of the Secretary-General).

    The Secretariat looks forward to the opportunity to examine the arms seized in all three instances and obtain additional information, in order to corroborate the information provided and independently ascertain the origin of the shipments.

    Still on arms-related transfers and of particular concern is the June 2016 televised statement by the Secretary-General of Hizbullah that Hizbullah receives its salaries, expenses, weapons and missiles from Iran.  The statement suggests that transfers of arms from Iran to Hizbullah may have been undertaken contrary to resolution 2231 (2015).  In addition, the report notes the November 2016 letter by Israel to the Secretary-General and the Council about the alleged use of commercial flights by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to transfer arms and related materiel to Hizbullah, and the subsequent response from Iran that such claims were baseless and unsubstantiated accusations.

    With regards to the case of Iranian participation in an arms exhibition held in Baghdad in March 2016, which was presented in the first report of the Secretary-General on this issue, I am able to inform the Council today that Iraqi authorities confirmed in October 2016 that all items exhibited were returned to Iran.  Therefore, no further follow-up will be taken by the Secretariat in relation to this matter.

    Finally, Mr. President, the report draws the attention of Council members to possible ongoing travel ban violations by individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).  The report includes information on two possible foreign travels by Brigadier General Naqdi and on numerous possible foreign travels by Major General Soleimani which are supported by photographic evidence released by Iranian and other regional media outlets.  The Secretariat raised these possible violations with the countries involved.  Iraq and Syria did not deny nor confirm such information, but emphasized that no invitations were extended or visas were issued by their respective authorities to the individuals.

    In response to the Secretariat’s request for clarification on the possible transfer of arms to Hizbullah as well as the possible travel ban violations, Iran underlined that “measures undertaken by [Iran] in combating terrorism and violent extremism in the region have been consistent with its national security interests and international commitments.”

     

    Mr. President,

    Looking forward to the second year of JCPOA implementation, I would like to once again emphasize the particular responsibilities of JCPOA participants in carrying the full and effective implementation of the agreement.  The wider international community also has an interest in and must contribute to the long-term implementation of the agreement.

    In closing, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of H.E. Ambassador Roman Oyarzun Marchesi (Spain) in his role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in 2016. I would like to congratulate H.E Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi (Italy) on his selection as Facilitator for 2017.  Ambassador Cardi, you and the Security Council can count on the full support of the United Nations Secretariat in your stewardship of the resolution endorsing this historic agreement.

  • 12 يناير 2017

    Mr. President,

    Thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in the Lake Chad Basin region, a region which continues to suffer from the combined effects of violent extremism, and a serious humanitarian crisis as well as human rights abuses and violations  by terrorist elements and counter-terrorism measures.

    Boko Haram continues to perpetrate violence against civilians in the Lake Chad Basin region with varied frequency and intensity through kidnappings, suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as ambushes on towns and villages. Since October 2016, Boko Haram has shifted most of its assaults to military positions.  It is unclear whether the military is the intended target.  However, the upsurge in clashes with the military seems to be the result of reaction to the counter-insurgency operations of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), as well as a shift in tactics following the split in Boko Haram’s leadership last August between Abu Bakr Shekau and his former second in command Abu Musab al Barnawi. The recent trend of attacks appears to be in line with al Barnawi’s stated intention to focus operations less on Muslim civilians, and more on military, Western and Christian targets.

    Despite the commendable military efforts by the region against Boko Haram, including the take-over of its stronghold in the Sambisa Forest in Nigeria, Boko Haram retains the capacity to carry out attacks, as illustrated by its attack on 3 January on a military check point in Baroua in Diffa region, Niger; the 7 January attack on a Nigerian military brigade in Buni Yadi town, Yobe State in north-eastern Nigeria; and the multiple suicide attacks in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State, Nigeria on 8 January.  

      

    Mr. President,

    Far too long a time has passed since the fateful day of the kidnapping of the Chibok Girls. The release of some of the girls, especially the 21 that were released on 13 October following negotiations facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Government is encouraging. According to the Nigerian Government, negotiations for the release of the remaining girls are continuing. SRSG Chambas continues his engagement with Nigerian authorities and international partners to determine how best to support the Government’s efforts for the release of the remaining abductees. In his consultations, SRSG Chambas continues to stress the need for the international community to support Nigeria in addressing the issue of mass abductions by Boko Haram, the rehabilitation and reintegration of abductees, and for better humanitarian access to the north-east of the country.

     

    Mr. President,

    Under-Secretary-General Stephen O’Brien will brief on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin region and the challenges therein. Countries of the Lake Chad Basin continue to face a serious humanitarian crisis.  The fact that the number of people in need of assistance has continued to increase and underscores the seriousness of the situation and the need to address the root causes of the crisis if further violence, displacement, and loss of lives are to be averted

    The ongoing violence has had devastating effects in the region.  It has destroyed lives, livestock and food stocks, paralyzed the local economy and undermined the economic development of the affected countries. The economic impact of the crisis is substantial and is estimated at about US$ 9 billion in north-eastern Nigeria alone.

    Boko Haram’s destructive activities are taking place in areas of entrenched poverty, marginalization and high levels of income and social inequality, caused, in part, by an absence of state authority and a severe financial crisis. The UN response, as well as that of concerned States and partners, will need to address the immediate violence and humanitarian needs, while simultaneously addressing the root causes of violent extremism and radicalization. Only a combined approach will help in repairing the material and social damage inflicted on communities. The overall goal of the response to the Lake Chad Basin crisis should seek to achieve durable solutions, recovery and sustainable development. Support should also entail measures to help reverse the adverse effects of climate change on the livelihoods of communities in the affected areas, including the resuscitation of Lake Chad and the preservation of its micro-economy.

    Despite the challenges, progress has been made in addressing the immediate humanitarian needs, as well as the restoration of state authority and local governance systems in reclaimed areas. In northern Nigeria, the UN has significantly increased its physical presence to help improve social cohesion, basic social services, livelihoods, reconciliation and psycho-social support for returnees and internally displaced persons, as well as in the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure and in building the capacity of local governments. The three-phased reconstruction and rehabilitation plan unveiled by the Nigerian Government on 7 January for the affected areas in the north-east over a five-year timeline is a welcome development and deserves support.  

     

    Mr. President,

    Grave human rights violations and abuses have accompanied Boko Haram attacks and the counter-terrorism responses. Women and girls remain subject to sexual violence, including sexual slavery and forced marriage. Counter insurgency operations, both national and under the MNJTF, have been accused of breaches of international humanitarian law; dire detention conditions for Boko Haram suspects, including children; and the prolonged holding of IDPs and refugees by security forces for ‘screening’ purposes.

    Notable measures have been taken by the Government of Nigeria to address incidents of sexual and gender-based violence against displaced women and children in camps. We urge the authorities in all countries of the region to strengthen their response to such violations and abuses, including by providing assistance to survivors, bringing all perpetrators to justice and providing targeted protection services in camps and host communities.

    There have been encouraging reports of surrender of former Boko Haram fighters in Chad and Niger, who are mostly nationals of the two countries. We encourage the authorities of the concerned countries to examine their rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for ex-Boko Haram fighters and their families, to enable UN and partners to better support the programmes.

    The promotion and protection of the human rights of victims of terrorism must be a priority in national responses to acts of terrorism. Respect for due process and prompt trials for persons detained for Boko Haram related offences, especially children, who should be treated as victims and dealt with in accordance with international standards for juvenile justice, should guide broader counter-terrorism measures.  All children encountered in military operations should be handed over to child protection actors and standard operating procedures should be developed in this regard.  

    The importance of ensuring that military and security responses respect international human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law and take all precautionary and preventive measures during operations to ensure the protection of the civilian population is self-evident. Failure to do so could fuel pre-existing grievances and perpetuate conflict. As the Secretary-General has emphasized, counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights should not be seen as conflicting goals, but rather as complementary and mutually reinforcing.   

     

    Mr. President,

    To support Member States’ efforts to combat terrorism and ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice, the UN continues to provide strategic counter-terrorism technical assistance and trainings. Additionally, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with the support of the European Union, held in December 2016 a high-level meeting with Nigerian federal and local authorities to consider approaches to prosecuting, rehabilitating and reintegrating persons associated with Boko Haram. The consultations underlined the need to develop a comprehensive legal framework to deal with persons associated with Boko Haram, including a prosecution strategy and to design and implement human rights compliant and gender-sensitive rehabilitation and reintegration strategies. Similar consultations will be proposed to Cameroon, Chad and Niger during a visit by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee planned for early this year. The visit will aim at facilitating the development of national comprehensive and integrated approaches to prosecuting, rehabilitating and reintegrating persons associated with Boko Haram and to promote regional cooperation in criminal law and other related matters.  

     

    Mr. President,

    The MNJTF is presently undertaking military operations in the thickly forested riverine shores of Lake Chad. The operation faces unique challenges, including a difficult terrain, lack of dedicated airlift capability especially for casualty evacuation, logistics and sustenance of troops, amphibious capabilities, IED detection equipment, night vision equipment, reconnaissance assets and long-range field communication equipment.

    The  contribution of 50 million Euros by the European Union Commission to the African Union Commission in support of the MNJTF, and funds provided by other bilateral donors need to be disbursed in a timely manner to the Lake Chad Basin Commission to enable the regional force to address the challenges it faces.

     

    Mr. President,                                                                                                            

    A military approach will not bring an end to Boko Haram. Affected countries must simultaneously tackle the humanitarian consequences as well as the root causes that led to the emergence of the group. Military operations should be followed with stabilization measures, the restoration of state authority and addressing the social, economic and political grievances of marginalised communities. The four countries of the Lake Chad Basin region are, without distinction, equally affected by the Boko Haram scourge, in a context of dire financial crisis and associated political and social tensions. They need the Security Council’s and the wider international community’s support to succeed in their efforts to bring about stability, and build the resilience of affected communities.

    The UN remains committed and ready to support regional efforts to address the consequences and root causes of the Boko Haram crisis. However, the apparent failure of Economic Community of Central African States and the Economic Community of West African States to hold their long-planned joint Ministerial Summit on Boko Haram is of concern. The UN continues to encourage the region to develop a common strategy to address the drivers of the Boko Haram crisis. The support of the Security Council in urging ECCAS and ECOWAS to convene their joint meeting will underscore the urgency of the matter.  

    Thank you.

  • 1 يناير 2017

    The 2017 Update complements the MYA 2016-2017providing an overview of what’s new for 2017 with a particular focus on DPA’s response to the twin “Sustaining Peace” resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly in April 2016.

2016

  • 30 ديسمبر 2016

    2016 was a year of transition for the United Nations. In his last year at the helm of the Organization, former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon moved to translate the conclusions of the wide ranging and recent reviews of the United Nations peace and security work into meaningful reforms and action, and saw the adoption of the landmark “Sustaining Peace” resolutions. The United Nations also welcomed a new leader, António Guterres, who has made a “surge in diplomacy for peace” his clarion call. These changes, along with the continuously evolving “conflict landscape” that gave rise to them, promise to have a transformational effect on the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). 

  • 25 ديسمبر 2016

    The end of year 'Politically Speaking - Year in Review 2016' publication features some of the highlights of our online magazine Politically Speaking. 

  • 20 ديسمبر 2016

    Your Excellency Mr. Peter Thomson, President of the General Assembly,

    Your Excellency Ms. Ana Silvia Rodriguez Abascal, Deputy Permanent Representative of Cuba and Chargé d’affairs.

    Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

     

    Allow me, on behalf of the UN Secretary-General BAN Ki-moon, to deliver his message to mark the passing of former President of Cuba Fidel Castro.

    I join with all of you in conveying sincere condolences to the Government and people of Cuba on the death of His Excellency Fidel Castro Ruz. 

    Fidel Castro was one of the most important Latin American leaders of the 20th century.  He was the most influential shaper of Cuban history since his own hero, José Martí, struggled for Cuban independence in the late 19th century.

    As Prime Minister, President, Commander of the Cuban Armed Forces and First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, his role at the helm of Cuba spanned nearly 50 years, during which he left a major imprint on his country and on global politics.

    As President, Fidel Castro turned Cuba into a regional model of access to education and public health. He went on to make on Cuba’s expertise in these areas the center of the country's regional and international cooperation.  This commitment is still evident today in Cuba’s invaluable support to the Colombian peace process and its rapid medical response to the recent Ebola crisis in Africa. 

    I have vivid memories of my visit to Cuba in January 2014, during which I had the opportunity to hold discussions with President Fidel Castro.  Until his last days he was deeply concerned about the future of humanity and the challenges of our times.

    I once again express condolences to the Government and people of Cuba.

  • 17 نوفمبر 2016

    Mr. President,

    Excellences,

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    I thank Senegal for organizing this briefing on the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

    The holding of this meeting clearly demonstrates that the two organizations are more than ever willing to work together to address global and regional challenges. The magnitude and complexity of these challenges are simply too big for any country or organization to tackle alone. To be successful in preventing and resolving conflicts we need to join forces with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, to devise joint strategies and draw on our comparative advantages.

    In this regard, the Secretary-General has taken note of the OIC-2025 Programme of Action adopted by the Islamic Summit in Istanbul in April 2016 and its Ten Year Programme of Action, which identified conflict situations as a major challenge facing the Islamic Ummah in the 21st Century. The Secretary-General welcomes the Communiqué of the OIC’s 13th Islamic Summit and its support for the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.

     

    Mr. President,

    The United Nations has been working closely with the OIC for more than 20 years in promoting a culture of peace, tolerance and understanding.  In the last years, the UN, in particular through the Department of Political Affairs, has stepped up its cooperation with this regional organization and has engaged with it to promote a deeper political dialogue.

    There is no doubt that our cooperation has not been without challenges. Resources, capabilities and mandates vary, and our memberships, although overlapping, are different. The strategies of the United Nations and the OIC, at times, may also be different.  The best approach to these challenges is to deepen our strategic dialogue to forge common approaches to emerging crises.

    In that sense, cooperation between the UN and the OIC is reinforced through direct contacts between the secretariats of the two organizations and between the specialized agencies and bodies of the United Nations system and the OIC.  The Secretaries-General of the two organizations meet during UN General Assembly sessions and on many other occasions. 

    The UN supports the OIC call for ‘strengthening its role in conflict prevention, confidence building, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitations in Member States as well as in conflict situations involving Muslim communities.’

     

    Mr. President,

    The UN has taken a number of steps to institutionalize its relationship with the OIC by helping strengthen its capacity through mediation and electoral assistance, and by holding desk-to-desk talks with the OIC on areas of mutual concern, such as peace and security. The Secretariats of the UN and the OIC hold General Cooperation Meetings every two years, as mandated by the General Assembly. These meetings are attended by a large number of agencies from organizations and set objectives and matrixes of implementation for joint projects and activities. The 13th General Cooperation Meeting took place in May 2016 at the UN Office in Geneva.

    The UN and OIC share common objectives in promoting and facilitating the Middle East peace process and the Question of Palestine. The OIC Extraordinary Summit on Palestine and Al-Quds al-Sharif in Jakarta adopted a resolution entitled “United for A Just Solution” which reaffirmed the positions of Member States and the Jakarta Declaration to pursue concrete steps in support of Palestine and the protection of the Holy Sites in East Jerusalem. Additionally, in the last Security Council Open Debate on the Middle East, the OIC reiterated the need to preserve the two-state solution and for Security Council to act on settlements.

    On Yemen, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UK Department for International Development and the OIC co-chaired a high-level event on the humanitarian situation in Yemen. The meeting generated over $100 million in additional funding for the 2016 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan.

    The UN appreciates the OIC’s support for a peace process in Afghanistan, whose realization is crucial for long-term growth and stability of the country. Despite some delays, the planned international OIC conference of Ulema on Afghanistan is a positive step towards constructive dialogue aimed at strengthening the foundations of peace and national reconciliation in Afghanistan.

    In Sudan, the partnership between the UN and the OIC remains an indispensable part of the collective effort of the international community to bring peace, security and development to that country. In Darfur, the core of that partnership has been the support of the OIC, under the leadership of Qatar, for the signing and the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. We need to continue this level of engagement to achieve an all-inclusive peace process which addresses the roots causes of the conflict and ensures durable solutions.

    In Somalia, the UN and OIC maintain a critical partnership in state-building, as well as in promoting comprehensive peace and security. The challenge now is for the international community to harmonize its support to achieve comprehensive progress toward common objectives that include coordinated support to the security sector, preventing violent extremism, and community recovery and extension of basic services at the local level.

    In Mali, the OIC was a member of the international mediation team during the 2014-15 inter-Malian dialogue and remains a committed member of the Agreement Monitoring Committee to this day.

    During the electoral process in Central African Republic at the end of 2015, the OIC played an instrumental role in defusing tensions between rival political parties in the country. In agreement with Chad, the OIC successfully called on the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) to cease hostilities in the Central African Republic and allow for the elections to take place in areas that were under its influence.

     

    Mr President,

    The UN appreciates the OIC’s support to the political dialogue process in Libya.  We would welcome a greater role of the OIC in supporting the UN mediation efforts in the country and in encouraging OIC Members States to use their leverage with Libyan parties to make the compromises needed to fully implement the Libyan Political Agreement. 

    The OIC has played a key role in Sierra Leone’s recovery efforts since the civil war there and, more recently, in the aftermath of the Ebola outbreak.  It is worth mentioning that the last meeting of the OIC Contact Group on Sierra Leone, which was held in New York at the ministerial level on 19 September, focused, inter alia, on progress made in Ebola recovery.

    I would like also to note the continued importance of the still active OIC Trust Fund for Sierra Leone, which was established in 2002, to assist in the process of reconciliation and rehabilitation.  And the UN is thankful to OIC members for their continued economic cooperation with Sierra Leone, particularly in the areas of agriculture, natural resources and energy.

    The UN continues to collaborate and strengthen its electoral engagement with the OIC. This involves the training of electoral staff and observers and support towards the establishment of the database and institutional memory of the organization. In addition, the Electoral Assistance Division and UNDP provide technical electoral assistance to a number of OIC Member States.

     

    Mr. President,

    Let us use this valuable Security Council meeting to reaffirm and deepen our common commitment to promoting peace, respect for human rights and offer of better opportunity for all the peoples of these regions and the world.

    Thank you very much

  • 11 نوفمبر 2016

    On 11 November 2016, the 41st meeting of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) took place under the chairmanship of the United Nations. The participants of the meeting followed up on several matters discussed at the previous meetings.

    The participants also went through new agenda points registered by them, including concerns related to alleged detentions and denied crossing in certain occasions, as well as, one specific humanitarian issue. The emphasis has been made to avoid any steps, which might negatively impact the freedom of movement of the local population, especially school children.

    Similarly to the previous meetings, the participants have used the IPRM platform for bilateral dialogue on issues of their concerns, which the Chair of the IPRM has welcomed as an opportunity to solve technical problems on the ground.  

    The participants have also exchanged detailed information in writing about some criminal cases.

    The meeting took place in a constructive and businesslike atmosphere.

    The participants agreed to hold the 42nd IPRM meeting on 24 January 2017.

  • 31 أكتوبر 2016

    Mr. President,

    Thank you for this opportunity to update the Council on the latest developments in Yemen and challenges facing efforts to ensure the country’s return to peace and stability.

    What Yemen is witnessing today contravenes the commitments made by the parties to the United Nations to peace. The security situation is dire, and the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate despite the efforts of the humanitarian agencies.

    With regards to security, the Grand Hall in Sana’a witnessed a tragic attack on 8 October, where nearly one thousand Yemenis were gathered to pay their condolences at a funeral, left more than 140 dead and 550 injured. I visited the site of the attack several days ago together with family members of the victims, and saw for myself the shocking scale of destruction. The Mayor of Sanaa, Abdel Kader Hilal, a seasoned politician known for his bravery and commitment to peace until his last day, and two members of the De-escalation and Coordination Committee (DCC) were among the victims of the attack. The bombing of a funeral is contrary to all Yemeni norms and traditions and the perpetrators must be held accountable. I extend, once again, my deepest condolences to the families of the victims and wish a speedy recovery to those who were wounded in this attack. I commend the statements by the families of the victims, which called for restraint and thorough investigation of the incident. This is a clear demonstration of their sense of nationalism and their commitment to peace.

    The Arab Coalition has taken responsibility for the attack and its Joint Incidents Assessment Team conducted a rapid preliminary investigation, which recommended action against those involved and a revision of the Coalition’s rules of engagement. It will be very important to complete the investigations and to ensure accountability of those involved.

     

    Mr. President,

    Sadly, the 8 October attack was not the only incident where civilians and civilian infrastructure were targeted in the past weeks. On 3 October, shelling of Bir Basha district of Taiz, from areas controlled by the Houthi-GPC forces, resulted in nine civilian deaths including three children. Indiscriminate attacks on residential areas of Taiz have been ongoing for many months. They have caused great damage to the city and its population and must stop. These incidents are a horrific reminder of the consequences of war, a war that has blighted the country during the last eighteen months of conflict.

     

    Mr. President,

    The conduct of the parties on the ground is contrary to the commitments they made previously to engage fully and constructively in the UN-mediated peace process. I called on the parties to recommit to the April 10 Terms and Conditions for the Cessation of Hostilities. Although I would have preferred an open-ended Cessation of Hostilities, I was able to gain agreement on 72-hour pause which entered into force on 19 October. I regret to report that both sides were involved in significant violations of the Cessation of Hostilities from its first day. I am deeply concerned by the escalation of hostilities, which has continued at an alarming rate in the past few weeks. Fighting has escalated in Taiz, Maarib, al-Jawf, Hajjah and on the border with Saudi Arabia, where ballistic missile attacks have increased in both frequency and range. Targeting the area of Mecca al-Mukarrama was a dangerous development, which affects the course of the war and the feelings of more than 1.5 billion Muslims worldwide.

    I am also concerned that international vessels travelling off the coast of Yemen have come under fire from Houthi-controlled territories in recent weeks. A UAE vessel was targeted in the Strait of Bab al-Mandab. US destroyers travelling through international waters were reportedly targeted by direct missile attacks, and responded by reportedly firing on Houthi radar sites. These incidents risk a more acute escalation of the conflict, and threaten the security of international maritime movement. I thank the Council for its call on 4 October, for “such attacks to cease immediately”.

    In southern Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) continue attacks on state institutions and civilian targets. In Aden, on 1 October a suicide bomber killed one civilian and injured three others, and on 29 and 30 September, gunmen affiliated with IS assassinated a retired intelligence officer and a security officer. As part of their counter-terrorism efforts, Yemeni security forces raided the house of a prominent IS leader and confiscated a variety of weapons and explosives. In Abyan, counter-terrorism forces killed three militants, including a high-ranking AQAP affiliate and arrested two others.

     

    Mr. President,

    The escalating military situation continues to worsen a very dire the humanitarian situation which requires far greater attention from the international community. Local authorities are unable to provide basic social services for the population. This is particularly prevalent in the health sector, where only 45 per cent of facilities are functional. In addition to the growing difficulty for Yemenis to obtain medical treatment at home, many Yemenis are also unable to seek treatment abroad due to the prohibition of commercial flights from Sanaa. I call for the immediate resumption of commercial flights to and from Sana’a. I also call on the Houthis and the GPC to ensure that access for humanitarian agencies are free from bureaucratic impediments and intimidation. My colleagues Stephen O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Mohannad Hadi, Regional Director of the World Food Programme for the MENA region, will provide you with a more detailed briefing of the humanitarian situation and the UN’s efforts to provide assistance.

    I should add that the worsening economic situation threatens to create a far greater humanitarian crisis in the coming months if urgent action is not taken. Salary payments for most civil servants have already ceased. This was a primary source of income for much of the population. Unless they are continued quickly, many more Yemenis will face destitution and be forced to rely on humanitarian aid to survive. There should be a commitment from all parties, including the Government of Yemen, the Houthis and GPC to collaborate to ensure the continued functioning of the Central Bank and a rapid resumption of salaries throughout the country.

     

    Mr. President,

    Despite the International Community’s calls for the Yemeni parties to fully commit to the peace process, the parties continued to embark on unilateral actions, which risk undermining the prospects for peace. On 2 October, the High Political Council established by the Houthis and GPC, asked the former Governor of Aden  to form a new government. President Hadi’s decision to replace the Governor of the Central Bank and relocate the Bank to Aden has created further economic uncertainty at a time when urgent measures to save the economy are necessary. Prime Minister Ahmed bin Dagher announced via social media plans to convene the National Body to ratify the draft constitution. I urge the parties to refrain from taking any further measures, which will only complicate reaching a negotiated settlement to put Yemen on the path to peace.  

    I conducted extensive consultations with the Yemeni parties and members of the international community over the last few weeks, and presented the parties with a comprehensive and detailed roadmap to end the conflict. The roadmap is consistent with Security Council resolution 2216 (2015) and other relevant resolutions, the GCC Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, and the Outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference. The Roadmap contains a set of sequenced political and security steps, conducted in parallel, which would help Yemen return to a peace and orderly political transition.

    The Roadmap foresees the creation of military and security committees, which would supervise withdrawals and the handover of weapons in Sanaa, Hodeida and Taiz. The committees would also be tasked with ensuring the complete end of military violence and the safety and security of the population and state institutions. The Roadmap also lays out interim political arrangements including the appointment of a new Vice President and the formation of Government of National Unity which would lead Yemen’s transition process and oversee the resumption of political dialogue, completion of the constitutional process and ultimately elections. I was informed, unofficially, that the parties have rejected the Roadmap. This demonstrates that the political elite in Yemen remains unable to overcome their differences and prioritize national, public interest over personal interests. It is time for the parties to realize that there can be no peace without concessions, and no security without agreement. They should base their positions on the question of how to ensure security and stability for the Yemeni people.

    I will return to the region immediately following this briefing to start consultations with both parties in Sana’a and Riyadh with the aim of reaching a detailed agreement based on the Roadmap. It is now the responsibility of the delegations to prioritize peace, rather than partisan agendas. The Roadmap and the agreements discussed in Kuwait should allow process towards a comprehensive settlement in the coming weeks if the parties engage in good faith and demonstrate a sense of political and national awareness.

    I am grateful for the International Community’s continued support to my proposal for a comprehensive agreement and calls for a Cessation of Hostilities. The quadrilateral meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in Jeddah, New York and in London have supported these efforts along with their counterparts from the remaining members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. These calls were echoed in other meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the Sultanate of Oman, France, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the deputy Foreign Minister of Russia. I am grateful to the Council Members for their unwavering support of the efforts to restore peace in Yemen.

     

    Mr. President,

    After 18 months of horrific fighting, thousands of deaths, injuries and unspeakable human suffering, we all need to ask how long will Yemenis remain hostages to personal and reckless political decisions? What are the parties waiting for to sign a political agreement? Have they not understood that there are no winners in wars?

    The Roadmap I have proposed to the parties is widely supported by the International Community because it provides a comprehensive solution, and includes guarantees for the political representation all political groupings.

    I would like to ask the Council for its full support of the peace plan, and for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a release of detainees. And to the Yemenis I say, the dawn of peace could be near, in case those responsible decide to prioritize national interest and start working on rebuilding a stable state, which guarantees the rights of all of its people without discrimination.

    Thank you.

  • 26 أكتوبر 2016

    Mr. Chairman,

    Excellencies,

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    It is a great pleasure for me to address the Fourth Committee and introduce the Secretary-General’s latest report on “Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions”, requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 70/92.

    I am pleased to be accompanied by my colleague Atul Khare, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, in this debate.

    I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the delegations of Finland and Mexico for their continued leadership on this agenda item, and their close cooperation with the Secretariat.

     

    Mr. Chairman,

    This is the fourth General Assembly debate on special political missions. We view this annual debate as a crucial opportunity for the Secretariat and Member States to exchange views on some of the key challenges that SPMs face today. Our discussions over the last few years have fostered greater understanding and awareness regarding the important role that SPMs continue to play, and their contribution to international peace and security.

    Since the creation of this agenda item in 2013, we have continued to see a deterioration of the global strategic environment, with significant implications for special political missions and the broader UN peace and security agenda.

    The Secretary-General’s recent report to the World Humanitarian Summit depicted this bleak reality. After two decades of consistent decline, the number of civil wars has increased quickly since 2008. The eruption of violent and intractable conflicts has led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis: 60 million people are currently displaced, the highest number since the Second World War. 80 percent of all United Nations humanitarian assistance is directed at conflict-affected victims.

    If we are to reverse these trends and fulfill the purposes of the UN Charter, a global effort will be required to prioritize and prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts. A new “diplomacy for peace”, to use the words of the Secretary-General-designate, is urgent.

    Special political missions are one our most important mechanisms to achieve this goal. Their recent experience shows that they can play a vital role to prevent and resolve conflicts, and build a sustainable peace.

     

    Distinguished delegates,

    This year’s report addresses a number of policy issues that are critical for the work of special political missions. As requested by the General Assembly, the report contains detailed information regarding the efforts undertaken by the Secretariat to improve geographical distribution and gender representation in SPMs, as well as to advance transparency and accountability.

    I am proud that the staff in our Special Political Missions is broadly geographically representative of the United Nations membership, and in particular of the regions where they are deployed. At the same time, we are fully aware that we must continue to improve our geographical representation from specific regions as well as the number of senior female officials. This will remain a priority for DPA.

    We also recognize that significant progress needs to be made to improve the representation of women in SPMs at all levels. As a priority, we must address some of the structural obstacles that have stood in the way of gender parity, and develop mechanisms to nurture the next generation of women who will rise to leadership ranks within our missions.

     

    Mr. Chairman,

    Allow me to turn to some of the other policy issues addressed in the report.

     

    First, conflict prevention and sustaining peace.

    The peace and security reviews carried out over the last two years have brought renewed attention to conflict prevention. They have reminded us that the United Nations was established with the central purpose of “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. They also recognized that conflict prevention remained under-prioritized and under-resourced, calling for a sustained engagement to bring prevention back to the fore.

    The report before this Committee describes the measures taken by the Secretary-General to transform this rhetorical commitment into action. But let us make no mistake: conflict prevention is a shared responsibility of the international community at large: the Secretariat, UN agencies, funds and programmes, regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions and, primarily, Member States.

    This is why I strongly welcome the adoption of the “Sustaining Peace” resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council. They reflect the commitment of the membership towards improving our preventive capacities across all stages of a conflict, in order to ensure that peace is indeed sustainable.

    Sustaining peace lies at the core of the work of all special political missions, from those deployed in preventive settings – such as UN regional offices – to those overseeing complex political transitions – such as our missions in Guinea Bissau or Iraq. Sustaining peace is also at the heart of the mandate of our special envoys and mediation teams, who work daily to bring the parties around a peaceful solution to conflicts.

    I reiterate my Department’s strong support to this agenda, as well as our commitment to work closely with the broader UN system as we move forward with its implementation.

     

    Second, regional partnerships.

    It is an undeniable reality of the 21st century international peace and security landscape that the United Nations, regional and sub-regional organizations need to work closely together if we are to truly make a difference in resolving conflicts and supporting a sustainable peace.

    From our regional office in Central Africa to the newly-deployed United Nations Mission in Colombia, SPMs are often mandated to work side-by-side with their regional counterparts in pursuit of peace and stability. Our cooperation is based on a shared understanding that the UN and regional actors can have a multiplying effect by drawing on our respective comparative advantages.

    These partnerships are important not only to advance crucial country-specific processes, but also to allow us to support Member States in addressing cross-boundary issues that affect entire regions. Organized crime, illicit trafficking and violent extremism are transnational in nature, and demand that Member States devise regional and sub-regional strategies.

     

    Third, the women, peace and security agenda.

    The Review of the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) was an important milestone that conveyed a key message: the direct and effective involvement and leadership of women in peace processes, politics, public institutions and justice systems is essential to peaceful societies and sustainable development.

    In DPA, we are fully committed to this agenda. I personally act as the Departmental focal point for women, peace and security issues, and oversee our progress towards the 15 commitments DPA has undertaken in the context of Security Council resolution 1325. In 2016, DPA established a stand-alone gender, peace and security unit and developed a Department-wide gender strategy, in close consultation with our special political missions in the field.

    These new capacities have better positioned DPA to respond to the significant expectations from Member States – and the international community more broadly – for progress on the women, peace and security agenda.

     

    And finally, safety and security.

    Over the past decade, SPMs have been deployed to increasingly volatile environments, often amidst active conflicts or in the immediate aftermath of war. Our missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, Syria and Yemen all serve as examples. The volatility of these operational settings puts great pressure on the ability of our missions to implement their mandates. They also represent an everyday risk for our staff working in this area.

    The cost of doing business in these contexts is high. Take Somalia as an example. In 2016 alone, there were 10 direct attacks on the UN. To carry our mandated tasks in such a challenging setting, our mission requires the necessary security and operational measures that allows us to deploy and operate responsibly while mitigating risks. Our guard unit, in particular, plays an essential role to allow the mission to operate.

    But this is an investment that we must be willing to make. This is where the United Nations can make a difference for the people we serve. In Somalia, the UN helps 800,000 people meet their food security needs on a monthly basis. We have vaccinated 2 million children against polio, ending a serious outbreak. We provide support to federal and regional governments for the first national development plan in 30 years. And to enable these activities and ensure that progress on the ground is sustainable, we engage closely on the political front to support the emerging federal states, promote national reconciliation, and assist a host of institutions, including the justice and electoral systems.

     

    Mr. Chairman,

    As the report illustrates, special political missions continue to play a critical role. I am grateful for the support that Member States have continued to demonstrate to this crucial tool, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council.

    From our part, the Secretariat remains committed to working closely with this Committee to discuss overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions, including through the useful mechanism of regular interactive dialogues. We look forward to working closely with the Bureau of the Fourth Committee to plan our next interactive dialogue.

    Before concluding, I would like to pay a special tribute to the United Nations staff members serving in special political missions, working under the most difficult conditions to advance international peace and security.

     

    Thank you.

  • 19 أكتوبر 2016

    As agreed at the previous Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting, the fortieth meeting took place on 19 October 2016 in Gali town under the chairmanship of the United Nations.

    Participants have actively engaged in the discussion, exchanged information and views on all points on the agenda, thus contributing to business-like atmosphere at the meeting. They were encouraged to continue this trend in their future engagements. 

    Participants followed up on the issues and cases raised at previous IPRM meetings. They once again exchanged information on the investigation process with regard to the 19 May 2016 killing of an unarmed person. In this respect, a representative of the Abkhaz military prosecutor office, who was present as an expert, provided an update on the status of the investigation and the next steps, which should be taken. He also responded to questions raised by other participants. 

    Furthermore, with regard to the previous murder cases and other incidents, participants exchanged additional information on some of them. In addition, they have discussed new points on the agenda, including a murder case, which took place in 2006; and freedom of movement of school children as well as detention of two individuals in September 2016.

    The participants agreed to hold the next meeting of the IPRM on 11 November 2016 in Gali.

  • 19 أكتوبر 2016

    Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

    I would like to begin today by thanking the Council for your support, expressed during the previous briefing for the work of UNSCO on the ground under challenging circumstances as the situation in Israel and Palestine, unfortunately, continues to deteriorate. 

    International focus on the Question of Palestine may have been overtaken by the tragedy in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East, but it cannot be allowed to be relegated to a secondary problem.

    Sadly, settlement announcements, outbreaks of violence and terror, and the absence of visionary leadership continue to define the conflict. The inability to see beyond the horizon and grasp the benefits of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, of ending the occupation, of establishing a two-state solution that meets the national aspirations of both Palestinians and Israelis alike, is a historic loss to the region as a whole.

    The absence of progress has led to growing anger and frustration among Palestinians and profound disillusionment among Israelis. It has strengthened radicals and weakened moderates on both sides.

    On October 9th, a Palestinian opened fire, killing two Israelis and injuring six others in a terror attack in occupied East Jerusalem. Our thoughts and prayers go out to the families of the victims.

    Deplorably, Hamas and many others chose to justify and glorify the attack and its perpetrator. 

    This tragic incident once again underscores an undeniable truth – if Palestinians genuinely hope to reach the long-overdue goal of statehood and an end to the occupation, this will not be achieved through violence, but must be reached through negotiations.

    In separate incidents, during recent clashes in East Jerusalem, a 20-year-old Palestinian civilian died after being shot by Israeli security forces. Separately, an unarmed 12 year old girl was also shot in the legs by security guards while approaching a checkpoint.

     

    Mr. President,

    During the reporting period, Israel has continued with settlement planning, including the recent promotion of an initial 98 out of 300 housing units in Shilo, located deep in the occupied West Bank. If implemented, this plan will drive a wedge between north and south in the West Bank and jeopardize the contiguity of a future Palestinian state. Israeli officials have defined this move as an attempt to relocate settlers from the illegal Amona outpost, which has been slated for demolition by the Israeli Supreme Court.

    I once again reiterate the position of the Secretary-General that settlements are illegal under international law and undermine the two-state solution.

     

    Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

    Adding to this troubling overall picture, Palestinians have again been unable to exercise their democratic rights after local council elections in the West Bank and Gaza were postponed. The political bickering, mutual accusations, legal challenges and counter-challenges that followed have left the people of Gaza and the West Bank feeling more apart.

    I am concerned by recent calls by Hamas legislators in Gaza for the Hamas led government to resume its work in Gaza. Such a step would seriously undermine the Palestinian Government of National Consensus and would also make the reconciliation almost impossible.

     

    Mr. President, 

    In August, I raised UN and international concerns about the steady continuation of Israel’s policy of expanding its presence in the occupied West Bank. Today, I wish to discuss another impediment to a negotiated solution — the security, humanitarian and political situation in Gaza. Three deadly conflicts in the past eight years have eroded both Palestinian belief that Israel wants anything more than Gaza’s destruction and Israeli conviction that their Palestinian neighbours desire peace.

    Fueling Israeli fears is that Gaza is controlled by a de facto authority whose overtly anti-Semitic Charter equates resistance with violence, rejects peaceful solutions and aspires to the obliteration of Israel.

    Israel accuses Gaza militants of continuously seeking to obtain money and military matériel, including by smuggling in civilian boats, concealing components for the production of rockets inside commercial shipments and diverting construction materials from needy beneficiaries. The United Nations has been informed by Israel of at least 41 serious smuggling attempts which have been intercepted since the beginning of 2016. Although the UN lacks the capacity to independently confirm the smuggling accusations, if accurate, they show the intention to continue attacks against Israel.

     

    Mr. President,

    Last week, I travelled to Gaza where I witnessed warehouses, empty of construction materials, as the reconstruction process is significantly slowing down. And this is due to limitations of imports. No new residential reconstruction projects have been approved since March. In the recent days the approval of some 80 projects – some of which had already been started - has been revoked by Israel.

    I saw residential buildings half built. I met with families whose projects have been cleared for reconstruction, yet have not received any cement for months. I heard from those that have tried to navigate the web of rules governing the import of materials considered ‘dual-use’ with no luck or response. I stand with the people in Gaza who have suffered through conflicts, closures and continue to face unimaginable suffering.

    At current rates, it will take more than one year to catch up on the backlog of approved projects and years to address the full housing and reconstruction shortage in Gaza.

    These trends are worrying and I call on the parties to the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism to recommit once again to ensuring its smooth operation. Failing to do that will put in question the viability of the mechanism and undermine the precarious calm in Gaza today.

     

    Mr. President,

    According to some estimates, in the last decade, militants in Gaza have fired nearly 16,000 rockets and mortars at Israel. Some 200 projectiles have been fired since the end of the last conflict. While since 2014 there has been little damage or injury, there is an ever-present risk of a potentially catastrophic escalation that neither wants nor needs.

    During the 2014 conflict, Israel discovered and destroyed 14 tunnels crossing into its territory and, in May of this year, detected and destroyed two more.

    Allow me to reiterate the joint position of Russia, the United States, the European Union and the Secretary-General of the UN as stated in the Quartet report: the illicit arms build-up and militant activity in Gaza must be terminated. Such actions increase the risk of a new escalation of hostilities, keep thousands of people on both sides of the border under constant threat of attack, and undermine the reconstruction process.

    The militant threat, however, should not serve as an excuse for Israel to indiscriminately harm civilians in Gaza. In addition to the continuing severely restrictive closures, I am concerned by persistent incursions and the almost daily firing and shelling by Israeli forces into Gaza along the fence and at sea.

     

    Mr. President,

    The vicious cycles of conflict in Gaza must end. To do so, control of Gaza must return to the Palestinian Government of National Unity committed to the PLO principles. The closures on Gaza must also be lifted in line with Security Council resolution 1860. Palestinians and Israelis both deserve the right to lead a normal life in freedom and security, with their human rights respected.

    Since Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007 40 per cent of Palestinians living in the occupied territory are beyond the control of the legitimate Palestinian government.

    Israel’s closure policy and severe restrictions have brought social, cultural and economic interaction between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to a virtual standstill. The widening chasm that has emerged between both parts of the occupied Palestinian territory undermines the national state-building enterprise and threatens the very viability of establishing a unified Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution. Unity is, therefore, critical.

    I encourage Hamas to pursue reconciliation with Fatah in line with the PLO principles and to consider redefining its political stance.

    Turning briefly to the Golan, Mr. President, I remain concerned by the volatile situation which undermines the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement and jeopardises the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. It remains critical that the parties to the Disengagement Agreement maintain liaison with UNDOF in the first instance, exercise maximum restraint and refrain from any action that could escalate the situation across the ceasefire line and the already volatile regional environment.

     

    Mr. President,

    Returning back to the Question of Palestine, let me close my briefing by issuing two warnings.

    Firstly, to those who believe that the people of Gaza can be punished by closures or by imposing restrictions on the entry of construction materials that are vital for the economy. They should know that the temperature in Gaza is rising.

    Allow me to also be abundantly clear to those who build tunnels, fire rockets, smuggle military materiel, profit from the black market or seek to create confrontation. Their actions are dangerous and irresponsible. They are stealing from their own people and risk the lives of Palestinians and Israelis alike.

    We must all avoid the risk of sleep-walking into another violent conflict at a time when the region as a whole needs moderate forces to unite and stand up to the radicalisation that we see across the Middle East.

    Gaza’s future is inextricably linked to the future of the Palestinian people and their goal of establishing an independent state. But the longer its population continues to suffer under the intolerable weight of Gaza’s current dynamics, the further Palestinians are from realizing that objective, and the closer we are unfortunately to the next major escalation.

    Thank you.

  • 13 أكتوبر 2016

    Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the third “Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.”

    As with the previous reports, the report was prepared with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, and in close collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, and other relevant United Nations actors and international organizations.        

     

    Mr. President,

    The report stresses that ISIL and its affiliates have continued to experience significant military setbacks, which has undermined ISIL’s ability to hold territory, generate assets and maintain “governmental” structures. ISIL is attempting to adapt to this new reality and has intensified its efforts at extortion, to compensate for the loss of revenue from oil. In Iraq and Syria, ISIL’s previous success in holding territory and operating as a quasi-State has been significantly challenged due to the efforts of several Member States.

    However, the report notes that the threat posed by ISIL continues to be significant and to diversify. ISIL and associated entities continue to compete strategically but also to cooperate tactically, occasionally providing each other with operational support. The military pressure currently being exerted on ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic has resulted in an increase in the number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters’ returnees, in particular to Europe and the Maghreb, presenting a growing challenge to global security. ISIL has also increased the number of attacks outside conflict zones, and employs deadlier tactics.

    Increasingly complex and nearly simultaneous attacks in different countries—committed through large-scale operations and individual or small terrorist cells, either directed or inspired by ISIL—have a significant impact and present particular problems to Member States in terms of the security response.

    ISIL continues to assert itself in cyberspace, using closed fora, encrypted messaging systems, and communications through the “dark net” to recruit and distribute its propaganda.

     

    Mr. President,

    To highlight the impact of ISIL in various regions of the globe, the report focuses on South-East Asia, Yemen and East Africa:

    1. In South-East Asia, ISIL’s propaganda has re-energized pre-existing terrorist networks and inspired individuals to travel to conflict zones as foreign terrorist fighters. the region hostsforeign terrorist fighters actively directing attacks, is affected by ISIL  propaganda and fundraising efforts, as well as the risks that foreign terrorist fighters’ returnees present.
    2. In Yemen, even though it has intensified its attacks, especially in the Aden area, and recruitment efforts, ISIL has not yet managed to gain significant local support and is generally rejected by the population. Nevertheless, the ISIL leadership maintains a close interest in Yemen. 
    3. Two new ISIL cells have emerged in Somalia. One of these groups, operating in the Puntland region, is being supported by ISIL in Yemen. The second one is operating in southern Somalia. Both groups face strong resistance from Al-Shabaab.

    In regard to Member States’ efforts to address the threat of ISIL, the report highlights some of the actions taken in South-East Asia. For example, it stresses that countries in the region have introduced and continuously updated national counter-terrorism strategies and legislation; established national counter-terrorism coordinating bodies; strengthened international cooperation—although more work needs to be done in this area; developed institutional and legislative counter-terrorism financing tools; recognized the importance of putting in place effective border controls; and payed increased attention to developing comprehensive approaches to countering and preventing recruitment and violent extremism.     

    A growing number of Member States have addressed the potential threat posed by returnees through a broad range of criminal justice, administrative and rehabilitation and reintegration measures, as called for in resolution 2178 (2014). They have also taken a preventive approach, including by charging individuals with inchoate and preparatory offences. However, Member States continue to face numerous challenges in this context, such as generating and converting intelligence information into admissible evidence.

    The overall progress made by Member States in developing and implementing rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, remains more limited among Member States of some of the most-affected regions.

    During the reporting period, a number of United Nations entities have taken further steps to support the efforts of Member States to counter the threat of ISIL. For instance:

    • The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force has further developed the Security-Council mandated capacity-building implementation plan for countering the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. The plan was presented to Member States almost ten months ago but has only been 20 per cent funded to date
    • UNODC is developing a program for South and South-East Asian States on strengthening legal and institutional frameworks for targeting the financial flows and economic resources of ISIL, Al-Qaida and their associates.
    • OHCHR submitted a report on best practices on how protecting and promoting human rights helps prevent violent extremism.
    • CTED has been assisting ASEANAPOL (ASEAN Police Chiefs) to establish a Regional Joint Operations Centre in Kuala Lumpur.
    • UNICRI is enhancing its cooperation with Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia in the design and implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs) and FTFs.
    • In the field, UNSMIL continued to prepare assessment reports on ISIL, which it shares with Member States.

     

    Mr. President,

    As the military operations against ISIL in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya continue to make progress, we anticipate an increase in the number of returnees and of attacks outside conflict zones. The increasingly transnational threat that ISIL represents may therefore become a growing challenge to international peace and security.

    In this context, the Secretary-General’s call for “comprehensive and purposeful international cooperation to effectively prevent violent extremism and counter-terrorism,” becomes all the more important.  Despite the international community’s efforts, international counter-terrorism cooperation is still not up to the level of the danger posed.

    Furthermore, if we aim to anticipate new terrorist threats and dynamically address the evolving nature of ISIL, military, security and law enforcement measures need to be complemented with preventive actions that address the drivers of violent extremism conducive to terrorism, as demonstrated by the focus provided by the Security Council.

    Nevertheless, to effectively address the growing transnational threat of terrorism and violent extremist, I would like to underscore the importance of political will. I would also like to encourage you to consider the need to further mobilize necessary financial and technical resources to meet the growing demands of counter-terrorism and PVE programmes. These efforts would enormously help the United Nations to support Member States in implementing the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

    Thank you, Mr. President.

     

  • 25 سبتمبر 2016

    Madam President, Members of the Security Council,

    These are indeed chilling days, as the Secretary-General said, for Syria and for the people of Aleppo in particular. The past week has been one of the worst ones in Syria during the near six years of this devastating conflict. Earlier in the week I had to deeply regret the fact that the meeting of the International Syria Support Group did not yield the results we were hoping, and actually saw the outcome that it put in jeopardy the agreement reached by the two co-chairs – in which we want to continue to believe – on 9 September in Geneva, which was meant to reinvigorate the concept and the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities.

    The ISSG meeting took place in the middle of news of the government of Syria declared an offensive of now a de facto besieged eastern Aleppo. And it came on the footsteps of two unrelated but compounding tragic events. One refers to the incident in Deir El Zor. The second one was the attack on a humanitarian convoy. I can only reiterate the concern expressed by the Secretary-General on the first incident, which was acknowledged as a tragic mistake by the US, and our shared deep outrage on the deadly attack on the humanitarian convoy. But no incident, irrespective of whether it can be attributed or not, does justify what is going on in front of our own eyes: the unravelling of the CoH and the simultaneous unleashing of unprecedented military violence affecting innocent civilians as well.

    Madam President, let us recall briefly that following the 9 September announcement of the agreement between the Russian Federation and the US which was a complicated agreement which took long time and which required long evening and night discussions –, the renewed cessation of hostilities that came into effect three days later did indeed reduce violence. Even Aleppo witnessed a reduction of military activities. We heard of families coming out of their shelters and houses to celebrate Eid on the streets. People started to become cautiously optimistic. But there was still sporadic shelling inside of the city and some airstrikes in the countryside, but at a lower level.

    And then on 18 September, airstrikes resumed on Aleppo City, when five districts were hit reportedly with five severe airstrikes. And when the Government unilaterally declared the end of the cessation of hostilities on 19 September, we began to hear reports of use of barrel bombs and airstrikes in eastern Aleppo, where, I want to remind all of us, up to 275,000 people are currently de facto trapped – fair enough, there is 1.6 million people on the other side of Aleppo, but they are not isolated as the ones in eastern Aleppo. Only minutes after the Government’s announcement, our own team in Aleppo – which happened to be there because we had sent them to accompany and assist these possible truck convoy that was meant to leave Turkey in order to get via Castello Road to eastern Aleppo – they clearly heard the sounds of shelling and bombardment begin in Aleppo.

    As the Secretary-General has reported to this Council, on the evening of the same 19 September, there was a horrific attack which took place against a humanitarian convoy to Oram Al-Kubra, killing 20 humanitarian Syrian workers and drivers including the team leader, destroying 18 out of 31 clearly identified trucks. We have condemned this attack in the strongest terms – as have many other Member States around this table who have offered condolences and have been calling for an enquiry and for those who committed such an action to be held accountable.

    Since that fateful day, we have seen the situation in eastern Aleppo deteriorate to new heights of horror. Amid intensive airstrikes reported on Friday, following the announcement of the beginning of a government offensive – an announcement made by the government itself –, the community across opposition-controlled eastern Aleppo even called off their own Friday prayers. Information received by OHCHR indicates dozens of airstrikes on Friday and Saturday, that have been hitting residential buildings across the de facto besieged eastern Aleppo, causing scores of reported civilian deaths and injuries, including those of many children.

    First responders appear overwhelmed and unable to respond to many of the sites. We have seen reports of 3 of the 4 centres operated by the White Helmets in eastern Aleppo being hit. As numbers of casualties are rising, rescue workers struggle to remove people from under the rubble. Even tools that might or might have been able to mitigate some of the suffering of civilians have reportedly been destroyed in the attacks against the civil defence stations.

    Information received from sources on the ground, allegedly due to airstrikes on AOG-held areas, suggest the following numbers to date – we can’t verify them but these are the figures we are seeing at the moment: 213 fatalities in Aleppo province, 139 fatalities in eastern Aleppo, 74 fatalities in rural Aleppo, all including dozens of women and children.

    How many airstrikes? Obviously we have no independent capacity to verify. And sources on the ground tell us that they no longer have the capacity to count them accurately, given the chaos in Aleppo city, due to the fact they often take place at night and with remarkable new intensity. We heard the words “unprecedented”, in quantity and also in scale and type, in the types of bombing. We have seen reports, videos and pictures of reported use of incendiary bombs, that create fireballs of such intensity that they light up the pitch darkness in eastern Aleppo, as though it was actually daylight. We now hear of bunker-busting bombs being used and see pictures of large craters in the earth much larger than in previous aerial bombings. If it is confirmed, the systematic indiscriminate use of such weapons in areas where civilians and civilian infrastructure are present may amount to war crimes. Civilians across town must be asking themselves where on earth is now safe to be in this tormented city.

    We have also seen reports of armed opposition groups firing hellfire rockets – you know what they are? They are basically gas canisters full of nails, stones and iron, which are being thrown in a rudimentary way across the other side of the line and do kill civilians, including one which hit al-Maari school in Hamidiyey neighbourhood on 22 September. On 19 September, the area close to the UN hub in western Aleppo was actually hit with two mortar shells coming from the opposition, killing one civilian.

    Reports continue that medical centres are being targeted, including an alleged strike on an ambulance and medical triage centre in an AOG-held area of south-western Aleppo, which has caused fatalities also amongst medical staff, once again. We hear of streets so filled with rubble, huge piles of rubbles due to this new type of bombs, that ambulances cannot even pass through them.

    Madam President, up to 275,000 people – and they can’t be all terrorists frankly – in Eastern Aleppo have now been under a form of de facto siege for almost 20 days, since the al-Ramouseh corridor was closed and after the Castello road was blocked since 7 July.

    Since this closure, the humanitarian situation has taken a turn for the worse. &nbspIn essence, basically supplies are running out. WFP stocks inside eastern Aleppo amount to only 12,000 food rations (which means basically sufficient for 60,000 people out of 275,000). And there is no prospect of replenishing them, since both roads are blocked. Bread is available only for 3 days a week and bakeries are being hit (which could reduce again in coming days). There is lack of fuel for general public use, reducing the services on transport, private wells, and household use - especially for cooking.

    As this Council is aware, the UN/WFP had planned to send a convoy to eastern Aleppo at the beginning of the renewed cessation of hostilities and WFP had mobilized a convoy of 40 trucks – I have the pictures here, every morning at 5 o’clock they are ready, they are waiting to go –, loaded with food rations sufficient to provide full food rations for some 35,000 people and wheat flour assistance for an additional 130,000 people of the 275,000. We all know what happened: the convoy never moved because it never received sufficient guarantees – frankly, let’s be honest – from either side and the cessation of hostilities broke down. We had complicated arguments raised by the government, such as driving licences suddenly becoming crucial in the whole conflict, and on the opposition side all sorts of arguments asking for all sorts of impossible conditions in order to make sure we would have the guarantees. Obviously there was a hesitation from both sides to see this convoy moving, and we saw the result of this.

    2 million people now have no access to running water through the public network, after intense fighting stopped water pumping from the two key pumping stations that service the population - both eastern and western parts of the city. On 22 September, the Bab Al-Nairab water pumping station, that serves the eastern part of the city, was reportedly hit by airstrikes. And Jaish al-Fateh turned off as a retaliation the water to 1.5 million people in the western part of the city –so no water-, in a grave tit-for-tat type of move. Water has now been luckily, and we hope more regularly, turned back on, after difficult last-minute negotiations led by UNICEF. However, people in eastern Aleppo still remain at risk due to interruptions to safe drinking water. Water from wells, which used to be plenty, has become, due to the conflict, highly contaminated and people, particularly vulnerable children, are at risk of catastrophic outbreaks of waterborne diseases. &nbspGod forbid, that’s the last thing we need in a moment like this.

    If nothing else, from a humanitarian point of view, we ask this Council: (1) to press for a cessation of the violence and protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure. (2) weekly 48-hour pauses in the fighting to ensure at least that the UN and partners can reach eastern Aleppo – without preconditions neither from the government nor frankly from the opposition. (3) to press for medical evacuations, and there are several cases, for urgent cases from eastern Aleppo.

     

    Madam President,

    Returning to the military situation on the ground, where we have several accounts of almost each event, there were reports of the Government announcement to retake all of Aleppo city. Indeed, shortly after the agreement announced in Geneva on 9 September close to midnight between Russia and the US, President Assad visited what was left of Darayya and he announced his intention to “liberate every inch of Syria”. Furthermore we saw reports that indicated that the reported objective of government and pro-government forces is to “squeeze out terrorists without civilian casualties” – I repeat “squeeze out terrorists without civilian casualties” –, and maintain a corridor for fighters to leave eastern Aleppo. However, we are seeing it, civilians are dying, and are dying in large numbers.

    The last days have seen intense military clashes on major front lines including Handrat, Shaikh Sa’id, Old Aleppo, Old Ramousa and Hamdaniah districts. Yesterday, government forces said they had taken over Handrat district north of the city – a claim that armed opposition groups now dispute – whatever the case it is a fact there has bee heavy fighting there. There were contradicting statements from the opposition on whether counter offensives are led by Al-Nusra Front or Fatteh Halab Operations Room of FSA groups. We have seen information from other sources that tell us that more than half of fighters present in eastern Aleppo are Al Nusra. We have also seen reports alleging the intentional placement of firing positions close to social infrastructure and inside civilian quarters. &nbspWe have seen that in other conflict, it is not a reason for anyone to destroy the whole building.

    The one constant in this violently unpredictable conflict is that neither side will win and therefore both ultimately will lose, and above all Syrian people are going to lose and they are losing their lives day by day. All we can expect from Aleppo, if the Syrian Government is intent on retaking it is completely – and this is a military analysis done by people far more competent than us – a slow, grinding, street-by-street fight, over the course of months, if not years, whereby the ancient city will be almost completely destroyed. In the face of these illusions of imminent victory, I must reiterate what we now believe to be an almost self-evident truth, but a truth that does not seem to be actually implemented: a so-called military ‘solution’ or victory in Syria is impossible, including in Aleppo.

     

    Madam President,

    Syrians on all sides still make clear their demand for a ceasefire and a credible political solution. But trust is seriously broken. On 9 September, in Geneva that night, I remember very much both Sergey Lavrov and John Kerry being concerned about it, saying they can’t go on making statements that do not have a follow-up. But I want to believe – because I am still a naïve UN official – that they really meant what they said and they really negotiated hard, comma by comma, because they wanted every word. But frankly the international community and the Syrians are swiftly losing any remaining hope and the international community is losing any credibility with the parties – unless we salvage what was agreed upon.

    A tiny window of opportunity, dear friends, still exists, and we want to believe does exist, for the Russian Federation and the US to actually help the Syrians and the region step away from the brink of more years of bloody conflict which risks to become even worse.

    On Wednesday I reported to the Security Council how the Secretary-General has asked me to present a framework of proposals to the sides as a starting point for negotiations in resumed talks as requested by the ISSG co-chairs. I am ready to do just that. But the ISSG and the co-chairs, including this very Council as suggested through an important comment made by HE the Chinese Foreign Minister on Thursday at the ISSG, that this Council has a responsibility to ensure the relaunching the Cessation of Hostilities without delay and ensure its implementation, with all the risks and difficulties this entails.

    We all know that this conflict cannot be resolved through negotiations without the help and assistance of the co-chairs and the region. So I am asking, indeed urging, both of them to go that extra mile to see if they can save their agreement of 9 September and do so at the eleventh hour – since that agreement not only provides some basis for the resumption of talks, but it also provides a wider framework for how to combat terrorism – we have no doubts about that, I want to believe we all agree on that – and de-conflict the region more generally and ground the Syrian air force, as it was part of that agreement.

    My appeal to this Council today is the following: please, develop a common course of action to enforce a cessation of hostilities in Syria. I am still convinced that we can turn the course of events. We have proven this more than once before. We have come a long way to date to not allow the small but tangible achievements of the CoH to be buried under the dust of Aleppo’s rubble.

    I have been asked, Madam President, by many – Mr de Mistura, why don’t you resign at this point? Frankly all this is leading nowhere and this will send a strong signal. No I am not. Because any sign of me resigning would be a signal that the international community is abandoning the Syrians, and we will not abandon the Syrians, and neither will you. We don’t need that kind of signal that would make news for five minutes and then not only Syria would be abandoned by everyone but also the hope that the international community does believe that we want to get out of the conflict.

    Thank you Madam President.

  • 9 سبتمبر 2016

    On 9 September 2016, the thirty-ninth meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) chaired by the United Nations was held with the participation of Georgian, Abkhaz, Russian and European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) representatives.

    The meeting took place in a constructive and professional atmosphere.  The participants followed up on the issues raised at previous IPRM meetings. Accordingly, they exchanged views on the current state of investigation into the 19 May fatal incident at the crossing point in Khurcha village, Zugdidi district.  They agreed to continue the discussion on this issue at the next meeting, including possible exchange of additional information to be provided by the authorities in charge of the investigation process.

    Furthermore, the participants revisited the murder case, which had occurred in 2010, and had been discussed at the 18th IPRM meeting on 15 June 2010. They exchanged information about the condition of one detainee, as well as one missing person. Recent developments on the ground and at the sea were also discussed. In the framework of advance notice of sensitive activities, the point on “Early warning on military and other activities in the vicinity of ABL (Administrative Boundary Line)” was addressed. It was noted that this issue is important for conflict prevention and confidence building purposes.

    The participants agreed to hold the next meeting of the IPRM on 19 October 2016 in Gali.

  • 31 أغسطس 2016

    Mr. President,

    I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the latest developments in the pursuit for peace in Yemen.

    The last month has been tragic for Yemen. The departure from Kuwait without an agreement has betrayed the expectations of millions of Yemenis who had hoped that these talks would bring an end to the conflict and open the way for Yemen’s return to a peaceful and orderly transition.

    The end of the Kuwait talks was followed by a severe breakdown of the Cessation of Hostilities and a dangerous escalation in military activities. Extensive military confrontations have been on-going in recent weeks in Sana’a, Taiz, Al Jawf, Shebwa and Mareb governorates and along the border between Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The clashes have involved the use of artillery, airstrikes and ballistic missiles and have resulted in tens of casualties, extensive destruction and renewed displacement.

    As has been the case throughout the conflict, numerous violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have accompanied the fighting.  On 17 August, the Secretary-General noted with concern the continued escalation of hostilities in Yemen and along the border area, including airstrikes and ground fighting.  He also condemned in the strongest terms the attack on a rural hospital in Hajjah.

    According to human rights organizations, at least 60 members of the Baha’i community in Sana’a have been detained without charge, including six children. Further arrests were reportedly carried out on 16 August. This demonstrates a worrying disrespect for the human rights of minority groups, and I echo the call from human rights groups for the immediate release of those still in detention and I call on all parties to fulfil their obligations and release all prisoners and detainees.

    I call on all groups to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law to protect civilian life and infrastructure.

    The military escalation will continue to provide opportunities for the spread of terrorist groups. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State continue to wreak havoc in significant parts of Yemen. For example, a suicide attack in Aden killed and injured tens of Yemenis on 29 August. The Yemeni Army’s growing ability to confront extremist groups, evidenced by the recent detention of suspected AQAP militants and military operations in Zinjibar and Hadramout, is encouraging.  However, the absence of the state in many parts of Yemen, in addition to the chaos created by war, will continue to facilitate the expansion of these terrorist groups which represents a real threat to the region.

     

    Mr. President,

    The Kuwait talks concluded after over three months of difficult negotiations. I would like to restate my gratitude to the Emir of Kuwait for hosting these talks and for his efforts to encourage the Yemeni parties to conclude an agreement. The talks in Kuwait did not yield an agreement but they were not without important results. During the talks, the architecture of a roadmap emerged, which we will expand upon in the coming weeks. Before departing Kuwait, I agreed with both parties to continue consultations separately and to reconvene direct talks at a later stage.

    Delaying progress towards an agreement is particularly dangerous considering the grave deterioration in the economic situation. Of particular concern are delays in the payment of salaries in many parts of the country. Without external support, the lack of revenue and shortage of liquidity could make it impossible for salaries to be paid in the coming months. There are  reports of civil servants unable to collect their wages in Aden and other parts of the South. The stoppage of salary payments risks driving many more Yemenis into destitution and vastly exacerbating the humanitarian situation. It will be necessary to find practical  solutions which will allow Yemen to overcome the liquidity crisis and ensure continued payments of salaries without discrimination everywhere in the country.

    From a humanitarian perspective, the escalation in fighting has led to tragic and unnecessary civilian deaths, casualties and a worsening of humanitarian suffering. The number of internally displaced persons has risen to over three million. Food prices are on average at least 60 per cent above pre-crisis levels while income levels have dropped dramatically. Despite the rising levels of need, it has become increasingly difficult for humanitarian agencies to access many areas. The health care system and other basic social services are struggling to cope with an increased workload and fewer resources. The cessation of Yemenia flights to and from Sana’a has blocked access to Yemenis seeking urgent medical treatment outside of the country, removing a much needed humanitarian life-line. In this context, I welcome US Secretary of State Kerry’s announcement of an additional sum of $189m to the YHRP, which remains only 28% funded. 

     

    Mr. President,

    Over the past two weeks I have conducted intensive meetings in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. In Riyadh, I met with President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and Prime Minister Ahmed Bin Dagher, who reaffirmed their willingness to continue consultations on the basis of the principles agreed upon in Kuwait. During these visits I also held extensive discussions with the Foreign Ministers and senior officials of Yemen, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States. These discussions have reaffirmed the strong international and regional support for settlement of the conflict in Yemen and a commitment to help overcome the desperate economic and humanitarian challenges the country is facing.

    During my last visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia I briefed a joint meeting of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States which had been called specifically to discuss how to overcome obstacles in the peace process. The meeting was followed by a discussion with the Foreign Ministers of the GCC member states, who emphasized their full support of the United Nation’s efforts in Yemen. In both encounters, there was strong support for a return to the Cessation of Hostilities, which began on 10 April 2016. There was also consensus on the need for a full and comprehensive political solution, involving clearly sequenced political and security measures, firmly grounded in the GCC initiative and its implementation mechanism, Security Council resolution 2216 (2015) and the National Dialogue Conference outcomes.

    This proposed agreement will define a path for the rapid formation of a Government of National Unity to be formed immediately following the withdrawals and handover of heavy weapons in Sana’a and some other vital areas.  Implementation would be overseen by Military and Security Committees comprised of senior military professionals, acceptable to both parties, who would assume responsibility for the security of the population, critical infrastructure and state institutions. The agreement would provide for the immediate restoration of the functioning of state institutions free of interference from revolutionary committees or other bodies created during the conflict.

     

    Mr. President,

    The effective resumption of talks will only be possible if all parties maintain their commitment to a negotiated settlement and refrain from unilateral actions. I am extremely concerned by the announcement by Ansar Allah and former President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, of the formation of a Supreme Political Council with broad administrative, security, economic, and legislative powers. These actions breach the commitments provided by both Ansar Allah and the GPC to engage constructively in the peace process as requested by this Council and creates a new potential impediment to progress towards an agreement.

    Unilateral actions of this sort will only complicate Yemen’s path to peace and delay the end of military violence. We cannot effectively negotiate new political arrangements while unilateral steps are being taken which are inconsistent with a future comprehensive agreement.  I therefore urge both to refrain from taking any additional unilateral steps, which could undermine attempts to reach a peaceful settlement.

    With the foundation of international and regional support, I will resume consultations with the Government of Yemen, Ansar Allah and the General People’s Congress in order to take advantage of this new initiative to and build on the progress made in Kuwait.

     

    Mr. President,

    In order to accelerate the path to renewed talks, the resumption of the Cessation of Hostilities will be critical. Further military violence will not ease the way to a negotiated settlement. As I resume consultations, my priority will be to gain a re-commitment from all sides to the Cessation of Hostilities. This should start with the full deployment of the De-escalation and Coordination Committee in Dharan al-Janub. As specified in the Terms and Conditions, which were agreed before the start of the Kuwait consultations, the Cessation of Hostilities should include a full end to all military activities by land, sea or air, and using any kind of weapon. It should include a complete de-escalation along Yemen’s border with Saudi Arabia.

    The re-commitment to the Cessation of Hostilities will spare Yemen the further loss of life, allow the increased flow of humanitarian assistance and generate much needed confidence for the negotiation of a comprehensive and peaceful solution. Only a negotiated political settlement can put an end to the devastation and injustice brought about by this horrific war.  The Yemeni people have suffered for far too long and understandably demand that Yemen’s leaders demonstrate their commitment to the well-being of Yemen and the Yemeni people, and that they restore peace and security to their country without further delay.

    Peace in Yemen is a priority, and the safety and security of all Yemenis should not be taken for granted. The United Nations has dedicated all of its political and administrative expertise to help Yemenis, but this will not be sufficient, if the decision-makers do not uphold their responsibilities and prioritize the interest of the population. The United Nations has not and will not fail Yemen. Yemen’s leaders must not fail the Yemeni people, all the Yemeni people, in the South and in the North.

    Thank you Mr. President

  • 30 أغسطس 2016

    Mr. President,

    Distinguished Members of the Council,

    As part of UNIOGBIS efforts to assist in resolving the political crisis, I have continued to engage with multiple stakeholders in furtherance of the Secretary-General’s good offices, including through meetings with regional Heads of State to advocate for support to Guinea-Bissau. I also convened several meetings with the AU, the CPLP, ECOWAS and the EU, as well as with key bilateral partners and national stakeholders, to promote the coordination of mediation efforts to break the political gridlock. I have been greatly encouraged by the commitment of all international partners to remain engaged in the country.

    I am pleased to note the collective commitment by national stakeholders to engage in dialogue. The ongoing political impasse can and must be resolved. The parties to the crisis should be urged to honour their commitment to make the necessary sacrifices and concessions needed to end the parliamentary standoff and put the government machinery back on track. In this regard, I call upon political leaders to put partisan considerations aside and focus on the national interest as well as the welfare of the suffering population.

    I am also pleased that the military continues to demonstrate restraint and neutrality in the face of the political stalemate. Many of them look forward to receiving pledged support for their demobilization and socio-economic reintegration. For the stability of Guinea-Bissau, we must not fail them.

    While addressing the current impasse remains the immediate priority, breaking the stalemate should also provide the opportunity to the political actors of Guinea-Bissau to reflect on ways of ending the recurrent cycle of institutional paralysis and ensuring sustainable stability. This can only be achieved through genuine and inclusive dialogue among the citizenry. Such an exercise has the potential to stabilize institutions and pave the way for tackling related priorities, including justice and reconciliation, the restructuring of the judicial and human rights architecture, the reform of the defence and security sectors, and the fight against drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime.

    In this connection, it is heartening to note that preparations for the National Conference are on course. Earlier this month, a delegation of the Organizing Commission of the National Conference, with funding from the Peacebuilding Fund, visited Timor-Leste to learn from the country’s experiences in national dialogue and transitional justice processes. This experience will no doubt feed into the impending dialogue.

     

    Mr. President,

    As we all know, there is no development without stability. The path to stability will require a pragmatic and integrated approach. This means that in addition to the current focus on achieving stability from the top down, we should also invest energy and resources to foster stability from the bottom up. To this end, I call upon the donor community to consider allocating more resources to the social sectors, including health and education, and to programmes that empower women and create opportunities for the youth.

    The people of Guinea-Bissau are resilient, peaceful, decent and hard working. All they aspire to is mainly to improve their daily lot and overcome the harshness of poverty. These aspirations should not be held back or constrained by political contingencies. While we continue to work with the Bissau-Guineans for the return to full stability, we should design resilient policies and programmes for their benefit that would be impervious to fragility and instability.

    The people of Guinea-Bissau are counting on the support of this august body and that of the international community at large.

    I thank you very much for the attention. 

     

    Original version in French.

  • 29 أغسطس 2016

    Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

    With no prospect for resuming negotiations in sight, developments on the ground continue to undermine an already precarious situation. Illegal settlement construction advances, Gaza remains beyond the control of the legitimate Palestinian authority and the political leadership on both sides continues to shy away from the steps that are necessary for peace. This is the reality which continues to erode trust in the prospect of a two-state solution, the constituency for which is dwindling both in Israel and Palestine. 

    Although the past month has been relatively calm in terms of the frequency and intensity of violence in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory a number of security related incidents continue to cause concerns.

    Firstly, the apparent extrajudicial execution by members of the Palestinian Security Forces in Nablus on 23 August of a man, while in custody. He was suspected of orchestrating the killing of two security personnel earlier in the week. I welcome the announcement by Prime Minister Hamdallah of an investigation and call for a thorough, independent and transparent process in line with international standards in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of this crime.

    On 21 August, militants in Gaza fired two rockets, one of which landed in a residential area of Sderot, causing no injuries. Israel responded by directing some 60 missiles and shells at 30 suspected military installations in Gaza. Once again I reiterate that such rocket attacks and the response they elicit risk lives of both Palestinians and Israelis and do not serve the cause of peace.

    On 26 August a Palestinian man, who was reportedly under psychiatric care, was killed by members of the Israeli Security Forces. A preliminary investigation has established that he was unarmed and did not pose a threat. I call upon Israel to ensure accountability and take all necessary measures protect against the unjustified use of force.

    It is against such backdrop that preparations are advancing for the 8 October Palestinian local council elections. In a positive development, on 25 July, political parties signed an electoral code of conduct, to which all parties and candidates must adhere. These elections are expected to be the first simultaneous polls in the West Bank and Gaza since 2006.

    Conducting the local elections in line with established international standards can contribute to advancing Palestinian reconciliation. The lack of unity however, or any attempt to influence the outcome of the elections, including through intimidation, threats, violence or coercion, risks widening divisions and undermining the Palestinian national cause. In this respect, the recent decision by Fatah to bring the party together, a decision welcomed by Jordan, Egypt and the region, is an important step towards laying the groundwork for national reconciliation and unity.

    Turning briefly to Gaza, Mr. President, three days ago we marked the two-year anniversary of the ceasefire of the last Gaza conflict. While progress has been made on reconstructing the physical damage, sadly we are miles away from repairing the physical and psychological damage of the conflict. While Gaza remains locked away from the rest of the world, in the grip of militants, and dependent on aid and humanitarian assistance, the status quo will sadly prevail.

    We need a radical overhaul of how we deal with the problems of Gaza.

    Until the closures are lifted, the militant buildup has ceased, and Gaza is back under the control of the legitimate Palestinian authorities, international funding and an uninterrupted flow of aid are a lifeline to over one million Palestinians in the Strip, who are struggling to survive within a dire humanitarian situation. In this context, I commend the Government of Palestine for enabling a much-needed humanitarian payment to over 20,000 unpaid civilian employees in Gaza, made possible by the generous donation of the State of Qatar.

    Separately however, I am very concerned about the recent Israeli indictments of two aid workers accused of diverting funds and/or material to Hamas. These are very serious and deeply troubling accusations that must be investigated thoroughly, quickly and proven in a court of law. I welcome the commitment of the United Nations Development Program and World Vision International to uphold the highest standards of accountability. It is important that the international community continues to enforce its policy of zero tolerance for any wrongdoing and assures partners that robust measures are in place to ensure that aid goes to whom it is intended to.

     

    Mr. President,

    It has been nearly two months since the Middle East Quartet outlined spoke clearly of the threats to the two-state solution and offered practical recommendations to ensure an eventual return to meaningful negotiations to end the occupation that began in 1967.

    Its recommendations continue to be ignored, including by a surge in Israeli settlement-related announcements and continuing demolitions.

    Let me focus briefly on the expanding Israeli footprint in the occupied West Bank including East Jerusalem, which Russia, the EU, United States and the UN Secretary-General — all part of the Quartet, clearly condemned.  

    We heard that settlement construction is not an impediment to a two-state solution; that “a few houses” are not a problem for peace. Let me ask in return Mr. President: How will advancing the construction of over 1,700 housing units bring the parties closer to negotiated peace, how will it uphold the two-state solution, how will it create hope for the Palestinian people, or how will it bring security to Israelis?

    Since 1 July, Israel has advanced plans for over 1,000 housing units in occupied East Jerusalem – in Pisgat Ze’ev, Ramot, Har Homa, and Gilo – as well as 735 units in Ma’ale Adumim and other settlements in the West Bank.

    It has published tenders, some new, for 323 units in East Jerusalem settlements and reissued tenders for 42 units in Kiryat Arba, near Hebron, for which it also allocated over USD 13 million of new funding.

    It is undertaking a new land survey to identify potential ‘state land’ in the sensitive E2 area. This step could enable the establishment of a new settlement on the outskirts of Bethlehem, further restricting that city’s development and contributing to the dismemberment of the West Bank.

    It is also reportedly examining plans for new housing units for over 100 Israelis on a portion of a military compound in Hebron that it has allocated for this purpose.

    Israel advanced the so-called retroactive ‘legalisation’ of the Horesh Yaron and Rechelim outposts  and put forward a potentially precedent-setting proposal to relocate the illegal outpost of Amona – which is slated by Israel’s High Court of Justice for dismantling by the end of the year – onto nearby ‘absentee land’.

    All of these plans Mr. President would essentially create new illegal settlements and I call on Israel to cease and reverse these decisions.

    Let me be clear: no legal acrobatics can change the fact that all outposts – whether ‘legalised' under Israeli law or not, whether located on state land, or absentee land, or private land - just like all settlements in Area C and East Jerusalem, remain illegal under international law.

    It is difficult to read in these actions a genuine intention to work towards a viable two-state solution. This appears to reinforce a policy, carried out over decades, that has enabled over half a million Israelis to settle in territory that was occupied militarily in 1967.

     

    Mr. President,

    The Quartet highlighted that Palestinians living in Area C and East Jerusalem are also disproportionately denied Israeli building permits. The past two months have seen an increase in the enforcement of non-punitive demolition orders against Palestinian structures in East Jerusalem, with 43 structures demolished, affecting more than 340 people. According to our colleagues in OCHA, in Area C, in August alone, over 91 structures across 26 communities were demolished for the lack of Israeli building permits, displacing some 125 people and affecting the livelihoods of over 2,100.

    The Bedouin in Area C are particularly vulnerable. Some communities, such as the herders in Susiya and those in the controversial E1 area around East Jerusalem, are particularly at risk, especially as settlement expansion plans move forward. Repeated rounds of demolitions of homes or livelihoods and restrictions on basic services are part of an environment that pressures these communities to move.

    Susiya, for example, is built on private Palestinian land in the southern West Bank. It is sandwiched between a settlement and an outpost. For years, planning schemes submitted by the residents to the Israeli authorities have been repeatedly rejected, while the neighbouring settlement has been granted a generous planning scheme, and the nearby illegal outpost, is connected to water and electricity networks.

    The demolition of this community would set a dangerous precedent for displacement and feed the perception that Israel aims at a de facto annexation of Area C.

     

    Mr. President,

    I note a new plan for the occupied West Bank, announced recently, promoting differential treatment to areas of the occupied West Bank from which perpetrators or suspected perpetrators of attacks against Israelis originate.

    While measures that generate economic opportunities for some Palestinians are helpful, they cannot come at the cost of what may amount to collective punishment for others, or undermine the legitimate Palestinian institutions and aspirations for ending the occupation.

     

    Mr. President,

    Turning briefly to the Golan, the situations remains volatile and continues to undermine the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed groups in the areas of separation and limitation continue with several incidents across the ceasefire line reported.

    I take the opportunity to also draw attention to a nearly 100 million dollar shortfall in UNRWA's core budget. This funding gap affects the Agency's key services for vulnerable Palestine refugees throughout the region and compounds regional instability. It must be addressed with utmost urgency.

     

    Mr. President,

    Let me say that more than 37 years ago, the Security Council determined that Israeli settlements in occupied territory have no legal validity and are an obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. That determination was true in 1979, and is equally true and even more urgent of a concern today.

    For years we have been managing this conflict, while the occupation has continued, Palestinians have been dispossessed, and a one-state reality has been establishing itself on the ground. It is time for all of us — the leaders on both sides, with support from the region and the international community, to end the conflict on the basis of relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and in a manner that meets the legitimate national aspirations of both peoples.

    Both sides should work to reverse the negative trajectory, to build trust and to restore hope that a negotiated two-state solution is not just a political slogan but a reality that can be achieved through negotiations in our lifetime.

    Thank you.

  • 2 أغسطس 2016

    On 2 August 2016, the thirty-eighth meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) chaired by the United Nations was held with the participation of Georgian, Abkhaz, Russian and EUMM representatives. The meeting took place in a positive atmosphere, in which the participants discussed various issues on the agenda.

    Based on their undertakings to provide feedback on cases discussed at the previous IPRM meeting, the Georgian and Abkhaz participants exchanged useful updates on the ongoing investigations and subsequent legal proceedings of the 19 May fatal incident at the crossing point in Khurcha village, the fate of a missing person from Gali town since early 2007, and the killing of an Abkhaz serviceman in October 2008.  They also discussed a new case on the agenda – a double murder, which took place on 29 December 2011 in the Gali district. 

    Crossing modalities for the local population and representatives of international organizations at the central crossing point [Inguri Bridge], and other related issues, which might have an impact on the freedom of movement were discussed in detail.  The participants exchanged information on the arrangements for the schoolchildren, who cross from one side to another to attend schools, and agreed to ensure smooth crossings for the upcoming academic year. 

    It was agreed to hold the next meeting of the IPRM in Gali on 8 September 2016.