Thank you, Mr. President,
The last Security Council meeting on the situation in Ukraine took place five months ago, on 29 May 2018. As I stated then, the UN has been consistent in its strong support for the lead role of the Normandy Four, the Trilateral Contact Group, the OSCE and other key actors to find a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Donbas. The Secretary-General has also repeatedly called for revitalizing efforts in these negotiation formats and bilateral channels. We therefore welcome the Council’s Presidential Statement of 6 June, which encouraged all the parties to recommit to the peace process, recalled the centrality of the Minsk Agreements and urged scaled-up support for humanitarian efforts. We also note the 11 June meeting in the Normandy Format – the first at Ministerial level in over a year.
Despite these efforts, however, there has been little progress in talks to end the fighting. The conflict in eastern Ukraine, now in its fifth year, remains an active threat to international peace and security.
On the ground, continued and unpredictable escalations of hostilities aggravate the climate of insecurity and breed uncertainty about the parties’ intentions. As negotiations on different tracks continue to search for points of convergence, effective implementation of any agreements is still lacking.
It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that the incidence of violence this summer was the lowest of any equivalent period since the conflict broke out in 2014. The so-called “Harvest Ceasefire” and the “Back to School Ceasefire” - two recommitments to the ceasefire negotiated by the Trilateral Contact Group - were instrumental in reducing shelling and fire from small arms and light weapons, in turn resulting in the relatively low, although still tragic, figure of four civilian deaths between 1 June and 31 August. Clearly, with sufficient political will and genuine commitment to agreements, it is possible to stop the violence on the ground and drastically reduce the impact of the conflict on the civilian population.
Regrettably, however, over the last six weeks, ceasefire violations have again increased, and casualty levels have risen. In September alone, OHCHR recorded 20 conflict-related civilian casualties. More than half of the civilian casualties in September were the result of mines or explosive remnants of war.
The UN continues to call upon the parties to ensure the full and immediate implementation of the ceasefire agreements and exercise utmost restraint in order to protect the civilian population in the conflict-affected areas. The priority of the parties should be to, without delay, withdraw heavy weapons from populated areas, disengage forces and protect civilian infrastructure.
The UN is also following reports of increased tensions in the Sea of Azov, which negatively affects the overall atmosphere in the region. We underline the need to avoid any risk of escalation, provocation or miscalculation.
Mr. President,
The Minsk Agreements, endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2202 (2015), form the only agreed framework for a negotiated peace in eastern Ukraine.
Echoing the Security Council’s expectations, expressed through the PRST of 6 June, the UN calls for swift progress in the implementation of the Minsk Agreements.
We welcome the most recent extension by the Ukrainian Parliament, on 4 October, of the law on special order regarding the local governance of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, consistent with Ukraine’s commitments under the Minsk Agreements.
Mr. President,
The UN urges all parties to avoid any unilateral steps that could deepen the divide or depart from of the spirit and letter of the Minsk Agreements.
On 7 September, the de-facto entities in Donetsk and Luhansk announced the holding of so-called “leadership” elections scheduled for 11 November. Despite Ukraine’s objections, media report that preparations are still going ahead. As we understand, two separate ballots in both Donetsk and Luhansk are reportedly being planned: one for the “Head of Republic” and one for the “People’s Councils”. These will reportedly be voted in for terms of five years.
I wish to recall that election-related matters are addressed in the Minsk Agreements as part of a comprehensive package and they are under consideration in the existing negotiating mechanisms. I therefore caution that any such measures, taken outside Ukraine’s constitutional and legal framework, would be incompatible with the Minsk Agreements.
Mr. President,
On this occasion, I wish to acknowledge the tireless work of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission on the ground in the face of extremely challenging conditions. I reiterate our call for all to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of the monitors.
As you will hear from ASG Mueller, the human cost of the conflict for the people of Donbas continues to rise. The UN spares no efforts to fulfil its responsibilities in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the monitoring of human rights. It is essential, however, that this role is not politicized or instrumentalized by any side.
Mr. President,
It is time for renewed and constructive action by all concerned to overcome the apparent impasse in diplomatic negotiations.
The UN underlines the need to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognized borders, in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Once again, we urge all parties to display the necessary political will and to recommit to the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements to ensure the earliest possible end to the conflict and help bring about peace and stability to all of Ukraine.
Thank you.
Querido Señor Presidente,
Le agradezco mucho por esta oportunidad desde Beirut.
I would take this opportunity to update you and Members of the Council since my briefing, which took place last week in New York. Today, I will focus particularly on an update after my consultations in Damascus two days ago.
Following the Secretary-General’s meeting with Syria’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Moalem during the General Assembly, I met Minister Moalem in Damascus on 24 October.
We focused on the political process and the efforts to convene a constitutional committee. I appreciated the frank, quite frank, nature of the exchanges that we had in Damascus.
Minister Moalem expressed appreciation for his meeting with the Secretary-General during the General Assembly. He indicated that this had paved the way for the meeting in Damascus.
I will now refer as accurately as possible to what I heard from Minister Moalem.
He strongly underlined principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of UN member states. He underlined that the Syrian constitution is a highly sensitive matter of national sovereignty.
On the Sochi Final Statement, Minister Moalem referred to another outcome rather than the one circulated by the Russian Federation to this Council. He said that it was possible for the Government of Syria to take “some elements” of the outcome circulated by Russia and “reconcile” them with the government’s preferred other “outcome” -- and the key differences in this regard concerned, mainly, the role of the UN.
As regards the understanding reached between Russia and the United Nations before the Sochi event – which I mentioned specifically when I briefed you on the 17th of October – Minister Moalem did not view it as consistent with the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Basically, Minister Moalem did not accept a role for the UN in general in identifying or selecting the Middle Third list.
Rather, Minister Moalem indicated that the Government of Syria and Russia had agreed recently that the three Astana guarantors and the Syrian Government would in consultation among them prepare a proposal as regards the Middle Third list, and present it to the UN facilitation.
I should add just for the sake of completeness that Minister Moalem did not in this occasion and in this meeting indicate the Government’s views on the mandate, chairmanship, decision-making or other aspects of rules of procedure necessary for a constitutional committee to function.
Senor Presidente,
For my part, I welcomed the chance for the UN to talk directly with the Government on the constitutional committee. I also regretted that this had not been possible since the Sochi meeting, as the Government had declined the UN offers to engage it directly on the constitutional committee and its follow-up.
I recalled that it was in this context of non-engagement by the Government with the UN that the UN began to work with the Astana guarantors – at their own suggestion – on a package, and that Russia and Iran had informed the UN that they have been constantly consulting the government as the consultations proceeded.
I indicated that it was also appropriate and logical for the UN as the mediator mandated by the Security Council to seek understandings with Russia regarding a meeting that Russia had proposed, hosted and facilitated in Sochi, in order to ensure a common understanding of how the initiative would contribute to the UN-mandated process.
I reminded Minister Moalem of the convening role of the UN mandated by Security Council resolution 2254. I also recalled the terms of the Sochi Final statement as circulated by the Russian Federation to this Council. And, if you allow me, I remind you also today that it was indeed agreed, and I quote:
End of quote.
I have explained in detail during the last briefing to all of you the criteria that guide us in approaching the question of the list. And I went through these with Minister Moalem.
Most importantly, I stressed that the UN was in Damascus precisely to consult the Government on the list. As the facilitator, I offered for the UN to work there and then with the government if the government objected to particular names, or even on development of a new credible, balanced and inclusive list, as long as it had those characteristics. I observed that this seemed to me to be fully respecting the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic – indeed, it was an invitation to exercise that sovereignty.
At a certain point, Minister Moalem proposed that I do withdraw the proposed Middle Third list already on the table. I indicated that the UN could withdraw its proposal only – only -- once and only if there was an agreement on a new credible, balanced and inclusive list consistent with Security Council resolution 2254 and the Sochi Final Statement. I urged that we should seize the opportunity to ascertain if that was possible or not.
Minister Moalem indicated he would get back to me if new instructions came from his own leadership. However, he also said he preferred at this stage to await the outcome of my own forthcoming consultations with the Astana guarantors.
I should add that Minister Moalem stated that the Astana guarantors had rejected the initial UN proposal on a third list. I for my part indicated this was not really the case and that, while they suggested the need for some changes, they were engaging on the proposal, and it has already been revised more than once. I also indicated that all three guarantors supported the UN’s role as per Security Council 2254 and Sochi.
Mr. President,
The Government has expressed its position clearly and indeed indicated, and I can say so, that it wished it to be known publicly, which I am doing at the moment. I cannot at this stage report, however, any evolution on its own position beyond what I just told you and I heard myself and I am reporting to you faithfully. The efforts of those who convened and sponsored Sochi to ensure that the Government of Syria would be fully on board with the outcomes of the final declaration of Sochi have not, as of today, produced therefore the outcome we were hoping for. Otherwise we would have heard something different.
Taking into account: (1) the mandate of the Special Envoy embodied in the Security Council resolution 2254; (2) Minister Moalem’s different understanding of the role of the UN and of the Sochi Final Declaration; (3) the extent of the Government’s desire to re-open work to date; well we do have a serious challenge, let’s be frank. It is my intention to spare no efforts to address this challenge during the forthcoming weeks.
Since Minister Moalem indicated that the Government’s preferred methodology at this stage was working with the Astana guarantors on a third list, a lot of responsibility and expectation rests now on them and on how to implement the Sochi declaration in a manner that carries forward the implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 and gives practical effect to the basic points on which the UN supported Sochi.
As I already indicated, the UN proposal was made after careful consultations including with the guarantors, and has been revised already in light of those consultations. The very difficulties of keeping everyone on board should be a reminder to all to be careful in thinking that some radically different approach has any prospects of success.
The UN is not opposed to constructive and moderate suggestions -- so long as we maintain the same spirit of credibility, I repeat credibility, balance, international legitimacy of the Middle Third list on the table, and we have a sense of urgency to find common ground or at least clarify where we stand. Because we should not miss the opportunity of the Idlib window. That is why November is becoming so important.
Let me also stress once more: the UN believes that it is important to ensure a minimum 30 percent women in the committee, and that this requires at least 24 out of the 50 in the Middle Third to be women.
Tomorrow, I will be traveling to Istanbul to brief the Presidents of France, Germany, Russia and Turkey when they meet to discuss Syria. I am honoured by this invitation. I will use that occasion to remind these four important leaders that -- given that a catastrophe in Idlib has so far been avoided; given the international consensus to see a credible and balanced constitutional committee under the UN facilitation as soon as possible; and given Secretary-General’s instructions to me, who I am constantly consulting, on this occasion even more than ever, that I should be exhausting every avenue in the time that remains of my mandate – there is in my opinion still a clear window of opportunity that needs to be urgently seized. The influence that can be exercised by all world leaders including very much the four world leaders who I am meeting tomorrow in Istanbul can be crucial in ensuring that this happens.
Since on Monday, members of the Small Group will meet in London, I will use also that occasion to host a meeting later-on with them within the context of the Geneva process.
And I really look forward to hosting the Astana guarantors very soon. They themselves met in recent days and, according to their statement, discussed many aspects of a constitutional committee. That meeting will be a vitally important consultation.
I will spare no efforts in the time that remains of my mandate to verify whether it is indeed possible to convene a UN-facilitated, Syrian-owned, Syrian-led constitutional committee that is credible, balanced and inclusive, and contributes in the context of the Geneva process to implementing Security Council resolution 2254.
If it is, the UN will convene it as soon as possible such a committee.
I will, in any case, share a full assessment as Special Envoy when I brief yourselves, the Security Council, in person on 19 November.
Meanwhile, we shall keep our door open, we shall keep under view all options for a constructive and credible outcome.
Señor Presidente le agradezco mucho. Este es mi reporte hasta ahora.
The longstanding border controversy between the Co-operative Republic of Guyana and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela arose as a result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void. Within the framework of the 1966 Geneva Agreement between the two countries, the Secretary-General conducted Good Offices from 1990 to 2017 to find a solution to their border controversy. During this time, four Personal Representatives of the Secretary-General, with the support of DPA, worked closely with the parties toward this end.
Former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon communicated to the parties on 15 December 2016 a framework for the resolution of the border controversy based on his conclusions on what would constitute the most appropriate next steps. Notably, he concluded that the Good Offices Process would continue for one final year, until the end of 2017, with a strengthened mandate of mediation, and that, if significant progress had not been made by that time towards arriving at a full agreement for the solution of the controversy, he would choose the International Court of Justice as the next means of settlement, unless the Governments of Guyana and Venezuela jointly requested that he refrain from doing so.
On 30 January 2018, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, following a careful analysis of developments in 2017, chose the International Court of Justice as the means to be used for the solution of the controversy. In reaching this decision, the Secretary-General also reached the conclusion that Guyana and Venezuela could benefit from his continued good offices through a complementary process established on the basis of his powers under the Charter, stressing that he remained committed to accompanying both States as they seek to overcome their differences regarding the border controversy. Following this decision, Guyana filed an application instituting proceedings against Venezuela with the International Court of Justice on 29 March 2018.
On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had appointed a Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) to enable him to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the resolution, as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36).
The remaining provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) to be fully implemented include the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all its territory, and strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon. The Secretary-General continue his efforts to encourage the relevant parties to make further progress towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), in the interest of stability in the region.
The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has fulfilled the reporting functions of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on resolution 1559 (2004) since former Special Envoy Terje Rod Larsen ended his functions in May 2016. In carrying out this mandate, the Special Envoy consults with the Government of Lebanon, the Security Council, and other interested Member States to assist the Secretary-General in the preparation of semi-annual reports to the Council on the implementation of the resolution.
Señor Presidente, Embajador Lorenti, [Sacha Lorenti, Bolivia],
Dear Friends, Members of the Council:
When I briefed you last month, I said that we were approaching a moment of truth in the effort to convene a UN-facilitated, Syrian-led, Syrian-owned constitutional committee. The constitutional committee is the main item which is at the moment operationally left about how to implement [resolution] 2254. Everything else is still there on the table but that one [element] is the most important one at the moment. A credible and balanced committee could be the cornerstone of an inclusive political process for Syrians towards implementing Security Council resolution 2254 – the only one we have.
Yesterday, I consulted the Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and received his very clear instructions regarding our accelerated efforts to convene a credible and balanced constitutional committee – the only kind that the UN Secretariat would be willing to convene and the only one it would be willing to be associated with. I will come to those instructions later.
First, let’s be a little bit precise about where we are.
As I told you last month, some things are quite clear. The Government list and the Opposition list of 50 names each for a constitutional committee are not in question.
But questions continue to be raised, mainly by the Syrian Government, over the composition of the Middle Third list of 50 names. So, let me recall how we did arrive at the Middle Third list that is now on the table, and indeed has already been further revised, more than once, and updated in a new list.
The Sochi Final Statement spoke of the need to include, I quote: “Syrian experts, civil society, independents, tribal leaders and women” (unquote), with (quote) “adequate representation of Syria’s ethnic and religious components” (unquote). The Sochi final statement made clear that it was via the Geneva process, and the facilitation of the Special Envoy, that the final selection would be made.
Actually, in truth, it went even further than that. The Secretary-General has asked me to remind the Council that, in addition to the terms of the Sochi Final statement itself, an explicit UN-Russian understanding was made during the Vienna consultations, which took place just before the UN attended Sochi – namely that I as Special Envoy would be free to draw not only on names emanating from Sochi but also on other names, including of Syrians who did not attend Sochi, if necessary to form a balanced and credible list.
And let me recall also that Security Council resolution 2254 anyway mandates the United Nations to convene parties in the political process, and tasks the Geneva talks to set a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution.
The Middle Third list was developed very carefully, believe me, by the United Nations. We received inputs, listened to many – including the guarantors of course, and also others. Above all, we also did our own careful homework.
We sought out credible and neutral Syrian experts – including people who have played a role in previous constitution-making process – who could bridge build between the sides, and whom the two sides could constructively work with. We looked for respected civil society representatives, independents and other Syrians of standing – individuals who could somehow represent the many Syrians who are not political affiliates but still deserve a stake in their future – as in any other constitutional process.
Of course, we do know that all Syrians, like all of us, have some political opinions or leanings – that is natural. But we sought a fair balance between those leanings, so that no political side could dominate the committee – this is a key part of what we consider the “credibility and legitimacy” of the list.
We ensured adequate representation of different ethnic, religious and regional backgrounds – as well as a balance between those living inside Syria and the millions of Syrians for the moment living outside their country due to the conflict.
And finally, with the full support of the Secretary-General and as part of our commitment to give effect to Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security, we insisted that a minimum of 30% of the constitutional committee should be women, and this meant bringing many qualified and expert women, of all backgrounds, into the Middle Third. Indeed, the proposed Middle Third is almost half women.
That is what has guided the UN effort to facilitate the Middle Third, and to revise it into a new list, as it has already done.
I have also carefully facilitated the development, as 2254 and Sochi both say that I should, on a logical basis, of some basic aspects of process and rules of procedure that could enable the constitutional committee to work.
From the three lists – government, opposition, and middle third – it would be possible to identify a smaller group – 15 from each – to form a drafting body of the constitutional committee.
The constitutional committee could be mandated to draft for popular approval a constitutional reform, as a contribution to the political settlement in Syria leading to a new political structure, giving effect to the Sochi Final Statement of 30 January 2018, within the context of the Geneva process to implement Security Council resolution 2254. Such a constitutional reform could aim to embody in the constitution and constitutional practices of Syria the letter and spirit of the 12 Principles developed in Geneva, with a lot of hard work, and endorsed in Sochi, which offer the people of Syria a vision of a future that can be shared by all.
The constitutional committee could work in Geneva with impartial Syrian chairmanship acceptable to all components and supported by UN facilitation, and with appropriate decision-making arrangements.
These arrangements should all take place consistent with respect for the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Syria, and with UN facilitation to enable the Syrians themselves to engage each other and to independently and democratically determine their own future with dignity.
Clearly, the key parties are the Syrian parties, and equally, the prospect of a constitutional committee being effective does rest also on strong support from key countries. These will be further engaged by us in the coming few weeks.
So, let me start with the Government of Syria. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Moualem met the Secretary-General during the General Assembly – I also attended the meeting.
The Foreign Minister on that occasion did strongly cast doubt on the Sochi statement and its outcome, indicating that the Government had very different understandings about those matters. He called for a fundamental reassessment of the work that has been done to date on the Middle Third list and rules of procedure, and on the UN facilitation role.
For his part, the Secretary-General reiterated the Sochi statement and outcome and the mandate of the Security Council, and offered to have me explain the work that has been done on that basis in much more detail. He appealed to the Foreign Minister for the Government to work in partnership with the UN.
For their part, two of the Astana guarantors – Russia and Iran – have also called the Middle Third list into significant question – indicating that it does not meet the requirements of the Government, notwithstanding the extensive consultations and the Sochi understandings. They have at the same time indicated that they continue to engage the Government of Syria on the matters. Senior Russian officials will indeed be in Damascus in the coming days.
Turkey, which had initially felt that our list could benefit from revision, has indicated lately its full understanding of the logic and composition of the list now on the table.
For its part, the Syrian Negotiations Committee – “the opposition” – confirmed to the Secretary-General during the General Assembly their readiness to move ahead on the basis of the broad package on the table. The opposition met at the beginning of this week in Riyadh, and most of their nominees for the constitutional committee are at present, while we are talking, sitting together in internal consultations to prepare for their work.
The Small Group of countries – Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States – have all urged that the United Nations convene the constitutional committee without delay. Similar messages came during the last few days from a large number of European and Arab Foreign Ministers with whom I met during the General Assembly.
Querido Señor Presidente,
I wish to inform the Security Council that the Government of Syria has invited me to Damascus next week. This is a follow-up to the meeting with the Secretary-General during the General Assembly. I plan to engage them on the work that has been done on the Constitutional Committee. I will of course be ready, if the Council so wishes, to report back to it after my visit on whether these direct consultations have produced, as we hope, the approval and agreement on a credible and inclusive third list.
I also intend before the end of the month to invite the Astana guarantors for consultations with me in Geneva, and also to engage the Small Group. That would, in my view, be the last opportunity for putting finishing touches on the preparations for convening a constitutional committee.
I would hope then to be in a position to issue invitations to convene the constitutional committee hopefully during November. I offer no prediction whether this is possible. What I do know is that after nine months of preparations, it is important to launch a credible constitutional committee and that whatever transpires, I would like to come back and brief you in November on where we stand.
Let me remind all of us: without steps on a safe, calm and neutral environment, the work of a constitutional committee will not end up being very meaningful. We all know that. But first thing first: the constitutional committee. On this front, despite our best efforts regarding steps on safe, calm and neutral environment, we have seen very few concrete outcomes during 2018. I hope we will see more in the coming months. For instance, the Working Group on the release of detainees and abductees, the handover of bodies and the identification of missing people met again last week in Tehran -- but we keep urging for the first tangible results. Many, many people in Syria are waiting for that.
Let’s look now at the big picture for a moment and then we go back to the constitutional committee. A catastrophe has so far been averted in Idlib, and the Russian-Turkish memorandum of understanding appears to be being implemented. Major strides have been taken in defeating terrorism and this should continue to be a priority. ISIL’s territorial base has largely been erased – though it does remain dangerous. The de facto map of Syria is for the moment relatively stable, but it must not become a de facto soft partition, nor a theatre for new international confrontations. There must therefore be a political path forward. President Putin and President Erdogan said that the Idlib deal offered a window for the constitutional committee to be established and the political process to go ahead. The European Union will host for instance a third Brussels Conference in March 2019 – we know that its decisions will depend on a credible political process.
The United Nations has done all that it can, and frankly more, to find a way to convene a credible and balanced constitutional committee. We are ready to do more and in an accelerated way during the forthcoming month, taking advantage of the Idlib window of opportunity, but we are not ready to convene a committee that is not credible and balanced.
In that regard, having consulted the Secretary-General, let me also give you some heads up - if I may: I will myself be moving on as of the last week of November. I have had the honor to serve for four years and four months as Special Envoy. I have for some time been discussing with the Secretary-General my desire for purely personal reasons to move on. I have deeply appreciated his constant support and wise counsel on this matter.
But I will definitely not say goodbyes or engage in reflections today. A month can be a century in politics. We still have a very intense and hopefully fruitful month ahead. I am not laying down the charge until the last hour of the last day of my mandate. In fact, the Secretary-General has instructed me that my last month of service should be used to actively verify whether the UN is in a position or not to convene a credible and balanced constitutional committee and report to the Security Council accordingly. I plan to do so with clarity and frankness, and count on the support of the Security Council and all Syrian counterparts to do so.
So, let me summarise some bottom lines of my message, which has been long:
Thank you.
