The longstanding border controversy between the Co-operative Republic of Guyana and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela arose as a result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void. Within the framework of the 1966 Geneva Agreement between the two countries, the Secretary-General conducted Good Offices from 1990 to 2017 to find a solution to their border controversy. During this time, four Personal Representatives of the Secretary-General, with the support of DPA, worked closely with the parties toward this end.
Former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon communicated to the parties on 15 December 2016 a framework for the resolution of the border controversy based on his conclusions on what would constitute the most appropriate next steps. Notably, he concluded that the Good Offices Process would continue for one final year, until the end of 2017, with a strengthened mandate of mediation, and that, if significant progress had not been made by that time towards arriving at a full agreement for the solution of the controversy, he would choose the International Court of Justice as the next means of settlement, unless the Governments of Guyana and Venezuela jointly requested that he refrain from doing so.
On 30 January 2018, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, following a careful analysis of developments in 2017, chose the International Court of Justice as the means to be used for the solution of the controversy. In reaching this decision, the Secretary-General also reached the conclusion that Guyana and Venezuela could benefit from his continued good offices through a complementary process established on the basis of his powers under the Charter, stressing that he remained committed to accompanying both States as they seek to overcome their differences regarding the border controversy. Following this decision, Guyana filed an application instituting proceedings against Venezuela with the International Court of Justice on 29 March 2018.
On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had appointed a Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) to enable him to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the resolution, as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36).
The remaining provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) to be fully implemented include the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all its territory, and strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon. The Secretary-General continue his efforts to encourage the relevant parties to make further progress towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), in the interest of stability in the region.
The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has fulfilled the reporting functions of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on resolution 1559 (2004) since former Special Envoy Terje Rod Larsen ended his functions in May 2016. In carrying out this mandate, the Special Envoy consults with the Government of Lebanon, the Security Council, and other interested Member States to assist the Secretary-General in the preparation of semi-annual reports to the Council on the implementation of the resolution.
Señor Presidente, Embajador Lorenti, [Sacha Lorenti, Bolivia],
Dear Friends, Members of the Council:
When I briefed you last month, I said that we were approaching a moment of truth in the effort to convene a UN-facilitated, Syrian-led, Syrian-owned constitutional committee. The constitutional committee is the main item which is at the moment operationally left about how to implement [resolution] 2254. Everything else is still there on the table but that one [element] is the most important one at the moment. A credible and balanced committee could be the cornerstone of an inclusive political process for Syrians towards implementing Security Council resolution 2254 – the only one we have.
Yesterday, I consulted the Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and received his very clear instructions regarding our accelerated efforts to convene a credible and balanced constitutional committee – the only kind that the UN Secretariat would be willing to convene and the only one it would be willing to be associated with. I will come to those instructions later.
First, let’s be a little bit precise about where we are.
As I told you last month, some things are quite clear. The Government list and the Opposition list of 50 names each for a constitutional committee are not in question.
But questions continue to be raised, mainly by the Syrian Government, over the composition of the Middle Third list of 50 names. So, let me recall how we did arrive at the Middle Third list that is now on the table, and indeed has already been further revised, more than once, and updated in a new list.
The Sochi Final Statement spoke of the need to include, I quote: “Syrian experts, civil society, independents, tribal leaders and women” (unquote), with (quote) “adequate representation of Syria’s ethnic and religious components” (unquote). The Sochi final statement made clear that it was via the Geneva process, and the facilitation of the Special Envoy, that the final selection would be made.
Actually, in truth, it went even further than that. The Secretary-General has asked me to remind the Council that, in addition to the terms of the Sochi Final statement itself, an explicit UN-Russian understanding was made during the Vienna consultations, which took place just before the UN attended Sochi – namely that I as Special Envoy would be free to draw not only on names emanating from Sochi but also on other names, including of Syrians who did not attend Sochi, if necessary to form a balanced and credible list.
And let me recall also that Security Council resolution 2254 anyway mandates the United Nations to convene parties in the political process, and tasks the Geneva talks to set a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution.
The Middle Third list was developed very carefully, believe me, by the United Nations. We received inputs, listened to many – including the guarantors of course, and also others. Above all, we also did our own careful homework.
We sought out credible and neutral Syrian experts – including people who have played a role in previous constitution-making process – who could bridge build between the sides, and whom the two sides could constructively work with. We looked for respected civil society representatives, independents and other Syrians of standing – individuals who could somehow represent the many Syrians who are not political affiliates but still deserve a stake in their future – as in any other constitutional process.
Of course, we do know that all Syrians, like all of us, have some political opinions or leanings – that is natural. But we sought a fair balance between those leanings, so that no political side could dominate the committee – this is a key part of what we consider the “credibility and legitimacy” of the list.
We ensured adequate representation of different ethnic, religious and regional backgrounds – as well as a balance between those living inside Syria and the millions of Syrians for the moment living outside their country due to the conflict.
And finally, with the full support of the Secretary-General and as part of our commitment to give effect to Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security, we insisted that a minimum of 30% of the constitutional committee should be women, and this meant bringing many qualified and expert women, of all backgrounds, into the Middle Third. Indeed, the proposed Middle Third is almost half women.
That is what has guided the UN effort to facilitate the Middle Third, and to revise it into a new list, as it has already done.
I have also carefully facilitated the development, as 2254 and Sochi both say that I should, on a logical basis, of some basic aspects of process and rules of procedure that could enable the constitutional committee to work.
From the three lists – government, opposition, and middle third – it would be possible to identify a smaller group – 15 from each – to form a drafting body of the constitutional committee.
The constitutional committee could be mandated to draft for popular approval a constitutional reform, as a contribution to the political settlement in Syria leading to a new political structure, giving effect to the Sochi Final Statement of 30 January 2018, within the context of the Geneva process to implement Security Council resolution 2254. Such a constitutional reform could aim to embody in the constitution and constitutional practices of Syria the letter and spirit of the 12 Principles developed in Geneva, with a lot of hard work, and endorsed in Sochi, which offer the people of Syria a vision of a future that can be shared by all.
The constitutional committee could work in Geneva with impartial Syrian chairmanship acceptable to all components and supported by UN facilitation, and with appropriate decision-making arrangements.
These arrangements should all take place consistent with respect for the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Syria, and with UN facilitation to enable the Syrians themselves to engage each other and to independently and democratically determine their own future with dignity.
Clearly, the key parties are the Syrian parties, and equally, the prospect of a constitutional committee being effective does rest also on strong support from key countries. These will be further engaged by us in the coming few weeks.
So, let me start with the Government of Syria. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Moualem met the Secretary-General during the General Assembly – I also attended the meeting.
The Foreign Minister on that occasion did strongly cast doubt on the Sochi statement and its outcome, indicating that the Government had very different understandings about those matters. He called for a fundamental reassessment of the work that has been done to date on the Middle Third list and rules of procedure, and on the UN facilitation role.
For his part, the Secretary-General reiterated the Sochi statement and outcome and the mandate of the Security Council, and offered to have me explain the work that has been done on that basis in much more detail. He appealed to the Foreign Minister for the Government to work in partnership with the UN.
For their part, two of the Astana guarantors – Russia and Iran – have also called the Middle Third list into significant question – indicating that it does not meet the requirements of the Government, notwithstanding the extensive consultations and the Sochi understandings. They have at the same time indicated that they continue to engage the Government of Syria on the matters. Senior Russian officials will indeed be in Damascus in the coming days.
Turkey, which had initially felt that our list could benefit from revision, has indicated lately its full understanding of the logic and composition of the list now on the table.
For its part, the Syrian Negotiations Committee – “the opposition” – confirmed to the Secretary-General during the General Assembly their readiness to move ahead on the basis of the broad package on the table. The opposition met at the beginning of this week in Riyadh, and most of their nominees for the constitutional committee are at present, while we are talking, sitting together in internal consultations to prepare for their work.
The Small Group of countries – Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States – have all urged that the United Nations convene the constitutional committee without delay. Similar messages came during the last few days from a large number of European and Arab Foreign Ministers with whom I met during the General Assembly.
Querido Señor Presidente,
I wish to inform the Security Council that the Government of Syria has invited me to Damascus next week. This is a follow-up to the meeting with the Secretary-General during the General Assembly. I plan to engage them on the work that has been done on the Constitutional Committee. I will of course be ready, if the Council so wishes, to report back to it after my visit on whether these direct consultations have produced, as we hope, the approval and agreement on a credible and inclusive third list.
I also intend before the end of the month to invite the Astana guarantors for consultations with me in Geneva, and also to engage the Small Group. That would, in my view, be the last opportunity for putting finishing touches on the preparations for convening a constitutional committee.
I would hope then to be in a position to issue invitations to convene the constitutional committee hopefully during November. I offer no prediction whether this is possible. What I do know is that after nine months of preparations, it is important to launch a credible constitutional committee and that whatever transpires, I would like to come back and brief you in November on where we stand.
Let me remind all of us: without steps on a safe, calm and neutral environment, the work of a constitutional committee will not end up being very meaningful. We all know that. But first thing first: the constitutional committee. On this front, despite our best efforts regarding steps on safe, calm and neutral environment, we have seen very few concrete outcomes during 2018. I hope we will see more in the coming months. For instance, the Working Group on the release of detainees and abductees, the handover of bodies and the identification of missing people met again last week in Tehran -- but we keep urging for the first tangible results. Many, many people in Syria are waiting for that.
Let’s look now at the big picture for a moment and then we go back to the constitutional committee. A catastrophe has so far been averted in Idlib, and the Russian-Turkish memorandum of understanding appears to be being implemented. Major strides have been taken in defeating terrorism and this should continue to be a priority. ISIL’s territorial base has largely been erased – though it does remain dangerous. The de facto map of Syria is for the moment relatively stable, but it must not become a de facto soft partition, nor a theatre for new international confrontations. There must therefore be a political path forward. President Putin and President Erdogan said that the Idlib deal offered a window for the constitutional committee to be established and the political process to go ahead. The European Union will host for instance a third Brussels Conference in March 2019 – we know that its decisions will depend on a credible political process.
The United Nations has done all that it can, and frankly more, to find a way to convene a credible and balanced constitutional committee. We are ready to do more and in an accelerated way during the forthcoming month, taking advantage of the Idlib window of opportunity, but we are not ready to convene a committee that is not credible and balanced.
In that regard, having consulted the Secretary-General, let me also give you some heads up - if I may: I will myself be moving on as of the last week of November. I have had the honor to serve for four years and four months as Special Envoy. I have for some time been discussing with the Secretary-General my desire for purely personal reasons to move on. I have deeply appreciated his constant support and wise counsel on this matter.
But I will definitely not say goodbyes or engage in reflections today. A month can be a century in politics. We still have a very intense and hopefully fruitful month ahead. I am not laying down the charge until the last hour of the last day of my mandate. In fact, the Secretary-General has instructed me that my last month of service should be used to actively verify whether the UN is in a position or not to convene a credible and balanced constitutional committee and report to the Security Council accordingly. I plan to do so with clarity and frankness, and count on the support of the Security Council and all Syrian counterparts to do so.
So, let me summarise some bottom lines of my message, which has been long:
Thank you.
New York, UN Headquarters
Since the General Assembly’s first resolution, in 2007, calling for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, we have seen significant progress. Today, some 170 States have either abolished the death penalty or introduced a moratorium on its use. This positive momentum is marred by setbacks and the continuation of practices in violation of the relevant treaties.
...The 45th round of the Geneva International Discussions (GID) took place on 10 October 2018.
On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the GID, the Co-Chairs acknowledge the participants’ continued commitment to this unique mechanism, which allows them to meet and to address important issues and concerns in order to reach tangible results.
Throughout the years, the GID have contributed to improved stability and accountability on the ground. A key achievement has been the establishment of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) and the related hotlines, which enable local security actors to address incidents on the ground. However, the Co-Chairs regret the current difficulties surrounding the IPRMs. While taking note of the positions of the participants, the Co-Chairs call on them to resume the regular meetings of the IPRMs without further delay.
Despite some achievements, core issues on the GID agenda remain to be resolved. While the principle of the non-use of force is largely being adhered to, efforts to agree on a joint statement on non-use of force and to work towards steps implementing this commitment have so far been inconclusive. Further work is required to provide sustainable security.
While there has been progress, challenges also remain regarding the needs and rights of conflict-affected communities. To address those, a broad range of humanitarian issues are being extensively discussed, such as livelihoods, documentation, freedom of movement as well as missing persons. Positive steps have been undertaken on archives and environmental threats, but much more needs to be done. Unfortunately, substantial discussions on IDPs and refugees have not been possible in recent years, due to repeated walkouts by some participants.
As we mark the 10th anniversary of the GID, the Co-Chairs call on the participants to adopt a forward-looking and more constructive approach that will allow this unique format to fulfil its mandate. The primary responsibility for making effective use of this format lies with the participants. The Co-Chairs remain fully committed to do their utmost to facilitate this process.
The participants agreed to hold the next round on 11-12 December 2018.
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), Mohamed Ibn Chambas, welcomes the decision taken by the Government and opposition parties in Niger to revise the electoral code within the National Committee for Political Dialogue (CNDP).
"This agreement between all political actors members of the CNDP is a major step forward in consolidating the political dialogue in Niger," said Mohamed Ibn...
