The following Security Council press statement was issued on 10 November 2018 by Council President Ma Zhaoxu (China):
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The members of the Security Council condemned in the strongest possible terms the terrorist attacks of 9 November 2018, which killed and injured innocent Somalis.
The members of the Security Council expressed their deepest sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims, as well as to the people and Government of Somalia. The members of the Security Council wished a speedy recovery to those injured.
The members of the Security Council commended the swift...
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The Libyan National Conference Process - Final Report...The Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, reiterated in an interview with Al Hurra TV that the political solution is the only way to end the war in Yemen. He stressed that he is working to overcome all obstacles to be able to call for a new round of consultations before the end of this year, adding that the parties have repeatedly expressed their desire to return to the negotiations table.
...The Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, stressed the importance of ongoing Track II efforts, as complementary to official negotiations in Yemen, indicating that it is crucial to work on peace-building in Yemen, in parallel to official diplomatic efforts, known as Track I, to end the war. He added that “the real work in Yemen starts the day after we reach a political deal. We should all work to prepare for that day.”...
Mr. Chairman, [Ambassador Dee‑Maxwell Saah Kemayah, Sr., Permanent Representative of Liberia],
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,
On behalf of the Secretary-General, I am pleased to address the Fourth Committee on his sixth report entitled “Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions”. We deeply appreciate the Committee’s continued support on this important issue.
I would like to thank Finland and Mexico as co-facilitators of this item for their leadership and engagement. I also thank all Member States once again for the very constructive interactive dialogue that we had last July focusing on special political missions and conflict prevention.
Today’s debate is another opportunity to exchange views on a range of key policy matters relating to special political missions, some of the challenges they face, and how we can continue to improve their effectiveness.
Mr. Chairman,
As requested by the General Assembly resolution 72/89, this year’s report of the Secretary-General contains detailed information regarding the Secretariat’s efforts to improve expertise and effectiveness, transparency, accountability as well as geographical representation, gender perspective, and women’s equal participation.
Mr. Chairman,
I would like to first address one of the key policy issues addressed in the report: conflict prevention and sustaining peace.
The changing nature of conflict today calls for inclusive, integrated, and innovative approaches. In this regard, the Secretary-General has placed prevention at the centre of everything the United Nations does.
To achieve this objective, special political missions remain one of our most important instruments to operationalize preventive diplomacy, assist in conflict resolution, and support longer-term efforts to sustain peace.
In Iraq, the engagement of UNAMI contributed to the normalization of relations between the Federal Government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil following recent tensions. In Somalia, UNSOM is supporting the Federal Government in implementing its Roadmap on Inclusive Politics, which aims to create a conducive environment for the elections in 2020-21.
In Myanmar, the new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, who started her work in May 2018, has been working closely with the authorities to help resolve the Rohingya crisis.
And in Syria and Yemen, our Special Envoys continue their efforts to resume political processes to end protracted conflicts that have produced devastating humanitarian implications.
Our three regional offices in West Africa, Central Africa and Central Asia continue to serve as forward platforms for preventive diplomacy, working closely with Member States, regional organizations, and civil society. UNOCA [UN Regional Office for Central Africa] and UNOWAS [UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel] are together supporting regional efforts to address the impact of violence carried out by terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. In Central Asia, UNRCCA [United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia] continues to engage regional stakeholders on shared water and energy resources and supports the reinforcement of national and regional capacities for dialogue and conflict prevention.
Second, I would like to address the issue of gender and geographic diversity in special political missions.
One of the greatest strengths of the United Nations is its diversity; the broad representation of men and women from the global United Nations membership. The Secretary-General continues to be committed to promoting and improving the representation of women, including in special political missions. Women now comprise 44 per cent of serving and designated heads and deputy heads of our field-based special political missions. This has increased by 16 per cent over the past year. We will continue to bolster our efforts to implement the Secretary-General’s system-wide strategy on gender parity. Similarly, improving geographical diversity will remain our priority.
Third, I would like to emphasize the importance of regional partnerships.
The Secretary-General is committed to building meaningful partnerships for prevention, and strong partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations are essential elements for the success of SPMs.
At the strategic level, the Secretary-General has personally worked to enhance and expand new forms of collaboration with regional partners. In June, he convened a high-level interactive dialogue with a number of regional and other organizations active in the realm of international peace and security. This meeting resulted in renewed commitment to promote multilateralism. Participants also agreed to take concrete actions to further advance their cooperation, particularly at the field level.
Our SPMs engage in regular consultation and coordination with regional and sub-regional organizations.
For example, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan worked closely with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union to support the peace process between the two countries. This partnership contributed to the signing in September of the Revitalized Agreement to Resolve the Conflict in South Sudan. In the same period, our regional office in West Africa (UNOWAS), together with ECOWAS [Economic Community of West Africa] and the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) mobilized regional organizations active in the Sahel to create synergies and coordinate efforts to better address the multifaceted challenges in this region.
Fourth, I would like to highlight the focus on women and youth in our activities.
Special political missions continued to integrate gender perspectives and to champion and support the effective participation of women in peace processes. They are also working closely to support national and regional efforts to implement the women, peace and security agenda.
In Colombia, an inclusive gender working group is playing a critical role in mainstreaming gender considerations in the verification of aspects of the peace agreement between the Government of Colombia and the former guerilla group (FARC-EP). Meanwhile, the Women’s Advisory Board to the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria is helping to ensure gender perspectives and women’s participation are taken into consideration throughout a complex political process.
And in the Great Lakes region, high-level solidarity missions by women leaders representing the UN, the African Network of Women in Conflict Prevention and Peace Mediation (FemWise) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region were deployed to a number of countries in the region to promote the participation of women in decision-making and peace processes.
In Afghanistan, UNAMA, in the context of its electoral assistance, has continued to support the Government promote gender equality and women’s participation. It is noteworthy that in the legislative elections held last month, one-third of voters were women.
In the same spirit, SPMs have been actively engaging youth in different aspects of their work. This includes political dialogue, as well as peace and reconciliation processes.
In Somalia, UNSOM [UN Assistance Mission in Somalia] has developed a Youth Strategy jointly with the UN Country Team and national authorities.
In Central Africa, UNOCA – in close cooperation with ECCAS, UNESCO, La Francophonie and the Government of Gabon – has been working with African youth groups to foster a culture of peace and fight radicalization.
Security Council resolutions 2250 (2015) and 2419 (2018) on youth peace and security and the recent United Nations Youth Strategy, launched in September by the Secretary-General, provide SPMs with further opportunities to harness the potential of young people as agents for peace.
Finally, I would like to raise the issue of security and safety.
As you know, many of our SPMs support complex peace processes in highly volatile and challenging security environments. A number of these environments are characterized by ongoing violent conflict as well as terrorist and criminal activity by non-state armed groups. In places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, our staff face a considerable risk of becoming collateral victims, or even direct targets, in particular of extremist groups.
My Department is working closely with the Department of Safety and Security on risk management strategies and security mitigation measures. Such measures include the deployment of UN armed civilian personnel, deployment of military personnel on the ground as well as the deployment of guard units provided by Member States.
In particular, we are looking forward to the phased return of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya to Tripoli and other parts of the country in 2019, security conditions permitting. This will allow us to provide more direct support for the implementation of the United Nations Action Plan for Libya and to complete the political transition.
We need continued support from Member States to ensure that the safety and security of our personnel is fully guaranteed.
Mr. Chairman,
In conclusion, I would like again to underscore the critical role played by special political missions in the maintenance of international peace and security.
The reforms endorsed by the General Assembly, particularly the restructuring of the peace and security pillar, will further strengthen the ability of the SPMs to deliver on their mandates.
The individual and collective cooperation and support of Member States and regional partners remain essential to the success of our SPMs. I am grateful to this Committee and the broader Membership for the continued support in that regard.
I would like also to take this opportunity to pay a special tribute to the United Nations personnel serving in special political missions, working under challenging conditions to advance the promise of the Charter. We greatly value and appreciate their commitment and dedication.
I look forward to hearing your views. Thank you.
The Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, held a consultative meeting with a group of independent Yemeni figures, who represent a wide spectrum of the Yemeni society, to discuss the current situation in Yemen, and his endeavors to resume the political process. More than 30% of the Yemeni figures taking part in this meeting were women. This one-day meeting, which convened in Amman under Chatham House rules, is the second...
Thank you, Mr. President,
The last Security Council meeting on the situation in Ukraine took place five months ago, on 29 May 2018. As I stated then, the UN has been consistent in its strong support for the lead role of the Normandy Four, the Trilateral Contact Group, the OSCE and other key actors to find a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Donbas. The Secretary-General has also repeatedly called for revitalizing efforts in these negotiation formats and bilateral channels. We therefore welcome the Council’s Presidential Statement of 6 June, which encouraged all the parties to recommit to the peace process, recalled the centrality of the Minsk Agreements and urged scaled-up support for humanitarian efforts. We also note the 11 June meeting in the Normandy Format – the first at Ministerial level in over a year.
Despite these efforts, however, there has been little progress in talks to end the fighting. The conflict in eastern Ukraine, now in its fifth year, remains an active threat to international peace and security.
On the ground, continued and unpredictable escalations of hostilities aggravate the climate of insecurity and breed uncertainty about the parties’ intentions. As negotiations on different tracks continue to search for points of convergence, effective implementation of any agreements is still lacking.
It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that the incidence of violence this summer was the lowest of any equivalent period since the conflict broke out in 2014. The so-called “Harvest Ceasefire” and the “Back to School Ceasefire” - two recommitments to the ceasefire negotiated by the Trilateral Contact Group - were instrumental in reducing shelling and fire from small arms and light weapons, in turn resulting in the relatively low, although still tragic, figure of four civilian deaths between 1 June and 31 August. Clearly, with sufficient political will and genuine commitment to agreements, it is possible to stop the violence on the ground and drastically reduce the impact of the conflict on the civilian population.
Regrettably, however, over the last six weeks, ceasefire violations have again increased, and casualty levels have risen. In September alone, OHCHR recorded 20 conflict-related civilian casualties. More than half of the civilian casualties in September were the result of mines or explosive remnants of war.
The UN continues to call upon the parties to ensure the full and immediate implementation of the ceasefire agreements and exercise utmost restraint in order to protect the civilian population in the conflict-affected areas. The priority of the parties should be to, without delay, withdraw heavy weapons from populated areas, disengage forces and protect civilian infrastructure.
The UN is also following reports of increased tensions in the Sea of Azov, which negatively affects the overall atmosphere in the region. We underline the need to avoid any risk of escalation, provocation or miscalculation.
Mr. President,
The Minsk Agreements, endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2202 (2015), form the only agreed framework for a negotiated peace in eastern Ukraine.
Echoing the Security Council’s expectations, expressed through the PRST of 6 June, the UN calls for swift progress in the implementation of the Minsk Agreements.
We welcome the most recent extension by the Ukrainian Parliament, on 4 October, of the law on special order regarding the local governance of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, consistent with Ukraine’s commitments under the Minsk Agreements.
Mr. President,
The UN urges all parties to avoid any unilateral steps that could deepen the divide or depart from of the spirit and letter of the Minsk Agreements.
On 7 September, the de-facto entities in Donetsk and Luhansk announced the holding of so-called “leadership” elections scheduled for 11 November. Despite Ukraine’s objections, media report that preparations are still going ahead. As we understand, two separate ballots in both Donetsk and Luhansk are reportedly being planned: one for the “Head of Republic” and one for the “People’s Councils”. These will reportedly be voted in for terms of five years.
I wish to recall that election-related matters are addressed in the Minsk Agreements as part of a comprehensive package and they are under consideration in the existing negotiating mechanisms. I therefore caution that any such measures, taken outside Ukraine’s constitutional and legal framework, would be incompatible with the Minsk Agreements.
Mr. President,
On this occasion, I wish to acknowledge the tireless work of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission on the ground in the face of extremely challenging conditions. I reiterate our call for all to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of the monitors.
As you will hear from ASG Mueller, the human cost of the conflict for the people of Donbas continues to rise. The UN spares no efforts to fulfil its responsibilities in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the monitoring of human rights. It is essential, however, that this role is not politicized or instrumentalized by any side.
Mr. President,
It is time for renewed and constructive action by all concerned to overcome the apparent impasse in diplomatic negotiations.
The UN underlines the need to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognized borders, in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Once again, we urge all parties to display the necessary political will and to recommit to the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements to ensure the earliest possible end to the conflict and help bring about peace and stability to all of Ukraine.
Thank you.
Querido Señor Presidente,
Le agradezco mucho por esta oportunidad desde Beirut.
I would take this opportunity to update you and Members of the Council since my briefing, which took place last week in New York. Today, I will focus particularly on an update after my consultations in Damascus two days ago.
Following the Secretary-General’s meeting with Syria’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Moalem during the General Assembly, I met Minister Moalem in Damascus on 24 October.
We focused on the political process and the efforts to convene a constitutional committee. I appreciated the frank, quite frank, nature of the exchanges that we had in Damascus.
Minister Moalem expressed appreciation for his meeting with the Secretary-General during the General Assembly. He indicated that this had paved the way for the meeting in Damascus.
I will now refer as accurately as possible to what I heard from Minister Moalem.
He strongly underlined principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of UN member states. He underlined that the Syrian constitution is a highly sensitive matter of national sovereignty.
On the Sochi Final Statement, Minister Moalem referred to another outcome rather than the one circulated by the Russian Federation to this Council. He said that it was possible for the Government of Syria to take “some elements” of the outcome circulated by Russia and “reconcile” them with the government’s preferred other “outcome” -- and the key differences in this regard concerned, mainly, the role of the UN.
As regards the understanding reached between Russia and the United Nations before the Sochi event – which I mentioned specifically when I briefed you on the 17th of October – Minister Moalem did not view it as consistent with the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Basically, Minister Moalem did not accept a role for the UN in general in identifying or selecting the Middle Third list.
Rather, Minister Moalem indicated that the Government of Syria and Russia had agreed recently that the three Astana guarantors and the Syrian Government would in consultation among them prepare a proposal as regards the Middle Third list, and present it to the UN facilitation.
I should add just for the sake of completeness that Minister Moalem did not in this occasion and in this meeting indicate the Government’s views on the mandate, chairmanship, decision-making or other aspects of rules of procedure necessary for a constitutional committee to function.
Senor Presidente,
For my part, I welcomed the chance for the UN to talk directly with the Government on the constitutional committee. I also regretted that this had not been possible since the Sochi meeting, as the Government had declined the UN offers to engage it directly on the constitutional committee and its follow-up.
I recalled that it was in this context of non-engagement by the Government with the UN that the UN began to work with the Astana guarantors – at their own suggestion – on a package, and that Russia and Iran had informed the UN that they have been constantly consulting the government as the consultations proceeded.
I indicated that it was also appropriate and logical for the UN as the mediator mandated by the Security Council to seek understandings with Russia regarding a meeting that Russia had proposed, hosted and facilitated in Sochi, in order to ensure a common understanding of how the initiative would contribute to the UN-mandated process.
I reminded Minister Moalem of the convening role of the UN mandated by Security Council resolution 2254. I also recalled the terms of the Sochi Final statement as circulated by the Russian Federation to this Council. And, if you allow me, I remind you also today that it was indeed agreed, and I quote:
End of quote.
I have explained in detail during the last briefing to all of you the criteria that guide us in approaching the question of the list. And I went through these with Minister Moalem.
Most importantly, I stressed that the UN was in Damascus precisely to consult the Government on the list. As the facilitator, I offered for the UN to work there and then with the government if the government objected to particular names, or even on development of a new credible, balanced and inclusive list, as long as it had those characteristics. I observed that this seemed to me to be fully respecting the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic – indeed, it was an invitation to exercise that sovereignty.
At a certain point, Minister Moalem proposed that I do withdraw the proposed Middle Third list already on the table. I indicated that the UN could withdraw its proposal only – only -- once and only if there was an agreement on a new credible, balanced and inclusive list consistent with Security Council resolution 2254 and the Sochi Final Statement. I urged that we should seize the opportunity to ascertain if that was possible or not.
Minister Moalem indicated he would get back to me if new instructions came from his own leadership. However, he also said he preferred at this stage to await the outcome of my own forthcoming consultations with the Astana guarantors.
I should add that Minister Moalem stated that the Astana guarantors had rejected the initial UN proposal on a third list. I for my part indicated this was not really the case and that, while they suggested the need for some changes, they were engaging on the proposal, and it has already been revised more than once. I also indicated that all three guarantors supported the UN’s role as per Security Council 2254 and Sochi.
Mr. President,
The Government has expressed its position clearly and indeed indicated, and I can say so, that it wished it to be known publicly, which I am doing at the moment. I cannot at this stage report, however, any evolution on its own position beyond what I just told you and I heard myself and I am reporting to you faithfully. The efforts of those who convened and sponsored Sochi to ensure that the Government of Syria would be fully on board with the outcomes of the final declaration of Sochi have not, as of today, produced therefore the outcome we were hoping for. Otherwise we would have heard something different.
Taking into account: (1) the mandate of the Special Envoy embodied in the Security Council resolution 2254; (2) Minister Moalem’s different understanding of the role of the UN and of the Sochi Final Declaration; (3) the extent of the Government’s desire to re-open work to date; well we do have a serious challenge, let’s be frank. It is my intention to spare no efforts to address this challenge during the forthcoming weeks.
Since Minister Moalem indicated that the Government’s preferred methodology at this stage was working with the Astana guarantors on a third list, a lot of responsibility and expectation rests now on them and on how to implement the Sochi declaration in a manner that carries forward the implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 and gives practical effect to the basic points on which the UN supported Sochi.
As I already indicated, the UN proposal was made after careful consultations including with the guarantors, and has been revised already in light of those consultations. The very difficulties of keeping everyone on board should be a reminder to all to be careful in thinking that some radically different approach has any prospects of success.
The UN is not opposed to constructive and moderate suggestions -- so long as we maintain the same spirit of credibility, I repeat credibility, balance, international legitimacy of the Middle Third list on the table, and we have a sense of urgency to find common ground or at least clarify where we stand. Because we should not miss the opportunity of the Idlib window. That is why November is becoming so important.
Let me also stress once more: the UN believes that it is important to ensure a minimum 30 percent women in the committee, and that this requires at least 24 out of the 50 in the Middle Third to be women.
Tomorrow, I will be traveling to Istanbul to brief the Presidents of France, Germany, Russia and Turkey when they meet to discuss Syria. I am honoured by this invitation. I will use that occasion to remind these four important leaders that -- given that a catastrophe in Idlib has so far been avoided; given the international consensus to see a credible and balanced constitutional committee under the UN facilitation as soon as possible; and given Secretary-General’s instructions to me, who I am constantly consulting, on this occasion even more than ever, that I should be exhausting every avenue in the time that remains of my mandate – there is in my opinion still a clear window of opportunity that needs to be urgently seized. The influence that can be exercised by all world leaders including very much the four world leaders who I am meeting tomorrow in Istanbul can be crucial in ensuring that this happens.
Since on Monday, members of the Small Group will meet in London, I will use also that occasion to host a meeting later-on with them within the context of the Geneva process.
And I really look forward to hosting the Astana guarantors very soon. They themselves met in recent days and, according to their statement, discussed many aspects of a constitutional committee. That meeting will be a vitally important consultation.
I will spare no efforts in the time that remains of my mandate to verify whether it is indeed possible to convene a UN-facilitated, Syrian-owned, Syrian-led constitutional committee that is credible, balanced and inclusive, and contributes in the context of the Geneva process to implementing Security Council resolution 2254.
If it is, the UN will convene it as soon as possible such a committee.
I will, in any case, share a full assessment as Special Envoy when I brief yourselves, the Security Council, in person on 19 November.
Meanwhile, we shall keep our door open, we shall keep under view all options for a constructive and credible outcome.
Señor Presidente le agradezco mucho. Este es mi reporte hasta ahora.
